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Abstract 
 
Informed by particular theories of migration and of new global migrations as 
problematic European states, pulled by both exclusionary particularist and inclusionary 
universalist tensions, have taken increasing measures to restrict access to ‘unwanted’ 
forced migrants to their territories and welfare states. To these ends governments have 
devised welfare policies for forced migrants which are simultaneously mechanisms of 
deterrence and internal immigration control, in tension with their obligations to protect 
refugees. These are systems of ‘Welfare as Control’. 1990s UK legislation has 
increasingly eroded and separated asylum seekers’ social rights, culminating in the 
“qualitative leap” (Cohen, 2001) of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act (IAA), 
which introduced a separate and inferior welfare ‘safety net’ for asylum seekers, 
explicitly designed to control their migration externally and internally. These 
legislations have implicated welfare and social care workers in implementing welfare 
fraught with tensions of control. In their 1999 IAA New Labour extended this to utilise 
voluntary sector agencies to implement key sections of the deterrent ‘safety net.’ An 
intensive ethnographic case study grounded in critical realism was undertaken with a 
voluntary sector organisation in this contradictory positioning of delivering Welfare as 
Control, as a Reception Assistant for the Home Office’s National Asylum Support 
Service (NASS). Using observation and gathering insider accounts and documents over 
eight months in 2002-2003, the ethnography explored the lived experiences, practices 
and understandings of service providers and people seeking asylum, in this everyday 
world at Refugee Arrivals Project. The setting resonated with tensions, dilemmas and 
compromises. RAP’s autonomy was constrained by NASS’ chaos, bureaucratic 
dominance and imperative to restrict and control access to welfare, compromising the 
organisation’s ability to address clients’ often ‘complex and multiple’ needs. Asylum 
seekers experienced “anormalised” (Geddes, 2001) lives, loss of autonomy and dignity 
in Reception, feeling they were “hanging” out of control in multiple uncertainties, with 
those the safety net was designed to protect, often least protected. Although RAP used 
their discretion and ethical urges to increase the “informal gain” and fill the gaps of 
social rights in practice, (Morris, 2002), their integrity was threatened. This research 
contributes to a new ‘Sociology of Forced Migration’ (Castles, 2003) and has 
implications for all voluntary and public sector agencies and workers embroiled in 
delivering ‘Third Way’ policy generally, but specifically Welfare as Control.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
…asylum issues are an index of our spiritual and moral civilisation. How you 
are with the one to whom you owe nothing, that is a grave test and not only as 
an index of our tragic past. I always think that the real offenders at the half way 
point of the century were the bystanders, all those people who let things happen 
because it didn’t affect them directly. I believe that the line our society will take 
in this matter on how you are to people whom you owe nothing is a signal. 
(Rabbi Hugo Gryn, Auschwitz survivor, 1996. Cited in Kushner and Knox, 
1999:416) 
 
That a social democratic government has succeeded in making ‘asylum seekers’ 
and ‘refugees’ into monster words is almost unbelievable, (Stan Cohen, 
2000:43).  
 
In his millennium contemplation at the dawn of the 21st Century, in the light of events of 
the closing 20th Century, Stan Cohen struggled to comprehend  how the current British 
government could, through word and policy deeds, represent and treat people seeking a safe 
state of refuge, as folk devils, “monsters.” In 2000, when I began this research, the newly 
elected (1997) New Labour government had passed and begun enacting a legislation aimed 
at controlling entry of and controlling post-entry, people seeking asylum in the UK. The 
predominant, explicit rationale behind the legislation was to deal in a “Firm but Fair” way, 
(Home Office, 1998) with the ‘problem’ of ‘bogus’ refugees (or ‘economic migrants’ 
pretending to be refugees). This rationale was based on then accepted and popularly 
understood notions of people who claimed asylum and their migrations, and the 1999 Act 
was a culmination and continuation of (yet also departure from) the rationales of similarly 
targeted Conservative legislations through the 1990s.  I felt the same disbelief as Stan 
Cohen, that a New Labour government could join with the right wing press, and previous 
right wing governments, in using demonising and stigmatising rhetoric and in devising 
policies to fit this view, so contributing to society’s understanding of people seeking safety 
as ‘bogus’ “monsters”.  
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By way of introduction to this piece of research, I offer a “natural history” of my journey 
to the study it has become and is presented here, with the aim, as Silverman (2000:236) 
suggests, of engaging the reader with my “thinking in process;” illuminating why I began 
this research and chose the topic, focus and approach I have. This reflexivity should place 
the researcher firmly within the research, as is essential to all (qualitative) social science. 
Documenting the inevitably messy and roundabout journey (necessarily edited) that a 
project of this kind involves, should not only make the research more understandable but, I 
hope, more interesting. The ‘natural history’ begun here is continued in the methodology. 
  
From a young age, I have had an acute awareness of global injustices; immense disparities 
of wealth and security and all that goes with that, including peoples’ forced displacement. 
My interests in issues affecting people seeking asylum were initially aroused when I 
became aware of the  withdrawal of entitlement to welfare benefits from any person 
claiming asylum ‘in-country’ or pursuing their legal right to appeal after an initial refusal, 
by the Conservative government’s 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act.  This awareness 
came not just from broadsheet reports of hundreds of people forced to sleep rough, seeking 
out phone boxes and park benches, but from personal tales of friends in church groups 
trying to house and help destitute and distraught individuals. I became aware of widespread 
protest and the involvement of churches, refugee support groups and concerned individuals 
setting up emergency soup kitchens and finding beds for people affected. My partner wrote 
a newspaper article on the experience of some people in this position, interviewing destitute 
asylum seekers and members of support groups witnessing the distress the legislation had 
caused. He took some destitute people to the school he worked at to raise awareness, 
educate the teenage pupils and challenge their media-fuelled misconceptions about refugees 
and the reasons they seek asylum. We accommodated some young asylum seeking men 
when we could with a house full of four young children. This personal experience further 
stimulated my interest in issues around the seeking of refuge from global troubles and 
British societal reaction to people doing so, as well as disbelief and outrage that any 
government would deliberately legislate to enforce the destitution of an already particularly 
vulnerable group. The pressure of protest forced the High Courts to take on that 
government. The judiciary  decided that the Conservatives’ 1996 action was illegal, that the 
Government could not have intended these consequences, and that local authorities must 
accommodate and feed destitute asylum seekers under different previous legislations.    
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1997 was a year of hope. I began my undergraduate degree, and so began attempting to 
make sense of the world social scientifically through sociological and psychological lenses.  
Also New Labour, which in opposition had bitterly opposed and accused the Conservatives 
of ‘playing the race card’ with their 1996 legislation and demonising rhetoric, was elected. 
Prior to their 1997 election, then shadow Home Secretary and minister, Jack Straw and 
Doug Henderson wrote in Fairer, faster, firmer: Labour’s approach to Asylum and 
Immigration, “No other act in this Parliament has aroused such justified and widespread 
opposition as the Asylum and Immigration Act.” They quoted The Economist (09.01.1996),  
 
… by promoting anti-immigrant policies the government risks encouraging racism 
and undermining liberty. It deserves contempt, not votes, for proposing this nasty 
little bill. 
 
And continued,  
 
Labour fought the act every step of the way because it…hits genuine asylum 
seekers as hard as fraudulent applicants…threatens race relations…inhumanely 
denies refugees the means to live (cited in Hayter, 2000:77).  
 
The election to government of New Labour represented new hope for many, desperate to 
see the back of eighteen years of Conservative rule and to see significant change and 
reform in most areas of public life. Their stance  in opposition, and these kinds of 
statements, gave many campaigning and caring for the rights of refugees and people 
seeking asylum much hope that, in government, New Labour would improve the asylum 
system for asylum seekers; increasing their rights and making the conditions of their claim-
making more humane and less harsh. At the time I hoped, indeed expected, that a New 
Labour government would de-stigmatise and clear the name of people travelling around the 
world to find security in the UK; would fight the tabloid press, attempt to change the terms 
and tenor of public discourses and re-educate the public so that these migrants were 
welcomed, not vilified.  
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My (and many others’) hopes were dashed when it became clear from the delayed white 
paper that appeared in June 1998, that New Labour would make its primary aim and 
underlying premise, to deter ‘abusive’ claimants, so continuing the same direction and drive 
of previous Conservative  legislations. Disregarding almost all of the objections raised by 
refugee support organisations such as the Refugee Council, Amnesty International and the 
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, the Immigration and Asylum Act became law 
on 6th December 1999. Despite professing to be ‘fairer and faster’ and to be providing 
adequate protection to ‘genuine refugees’, the fundamental and overwhelming tenor of this 
legislation was on the ‘firmer.’ Only 60 MPs, and only 17 of these Labour, voted for an 
amendment recommended by the predominantly Tory House of Lords, to allow asylum 
seekers normal welfare benefits until the government had reached its own target of 
processing asylum claims in 6 months. Therefore, instead of restoring a reasonable means 
to live to people claiming asylum in-country, this Act withdrew the rights to welfare 
benefits from ALL asylum seekers, replacing these with a separate and inferior cashless 
system of vouchers worth significantly less than the national minimum standard of living. 
When this Act was passed, I felt disbelief and dismay; let down by a labour government 
abandoning socialist for neo-liberal principles and responding, it seemed, only to the  
tabloid cry,  ‘Britain is a soft touch,’ by getting tough.  
 
Through the summer of 1999, the relentless media campaign to smear people seeking 
asylum and other migrants, de-humanised, criminalised and often indiscriminately grouped 
together as ‘illegals,’ became hysterical and intensely unpleasant with some outright racism 
(for instance, from the Dover Express). This ‘campaign,’ which rounded on one group or 
another, notably at this time Eastern European Roma (The Sun, ‘Kick the gypsies out,’ cited 
in Hayter, 2000: 82), seemed to go hand in hand with the by-election calls of politicians, 
notably Ann Widdecombe and William Hague, on the ‘softness’ of  Labour towards asylum 
seekers. It was in this context, and it seemed in response to and unable to resist such public 
populism, that New Labour introduced its ‘get tough’ legislation. I had felt appalled and 
ashamed by this media smearing and one-sided representation, and angry at the politicking 
and new policies and laws, it seemed, hurried in to appease such right-wing, and in some 
cases, racist thinking. I began thinking of the human individuals whose lives would be 
affected by these new policies, and wondering what the implications might be for them in 
their daily lives, trying to find security.  
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My interest and concerns about British (and ‘Fortress Europe’s’) treatment of refugees led 
me to begin my third year undergraduate dissertation seeking to explore some of the more 
complex issues and some of the humanly lived realities of seeking refuge in a strange and 
hostile country, under such legal conditions. I was inspired by one of my lecturer’s, 
(ethnomethodologist Max Travers),  research of immigration courts which explored the 
minutiae of legal officials’ decision-making, administrative processes and  interaction with 
asylum claimants and how a ‘culture of refusal’ might affect their deciding on claims, 
(Travers, 1999). However, for practical and other reasons, I changed my dissertation 
subject, in the hope that I might have the opportunity to take up this research at post-
graduate level, with more time and resources to research the area thoroughly.  When the 
opportunity arose to start a PhD, in the summer of 2000, the 1999 Act had been in force for 
three months and many stories had begun filtering through of people suffering at the hands 
of a chaotic and seemingly inhumane new system of ‘safety-net’ welfare. This was 
especially through no-choice dispersal around the country, receiving subsistence by 
voucher and the failings of the new bureaucracy established to manage the system (NASS), 
at the first hurdle.  I began wondering about the hidden and complex realities, practices and 
voices that I knew would lie beyond the one-sided, or sometimes polarised public debates 
dominated by the screaming dailies and politicians’ statements.  What were the processes, 
and ethical, practical and political decision-making, that resulted in policies such as these 
being written and enacted? For the thousands of different people involved in many different 
ways, in enacting these policies daily, on-the-ground, what was involved? Particularly, it 
seemed to me, those involved in trying to support people seeking asylum, must face 
considerable dilemmas when putting these policies into practice. Also, how was this new 
system experienced by the people it was designed to control and ‘support’? What was it 
like to arrive in a strange land and be dispersed without any choice to Newcastle or 
Glasgow or Hull, where there were few other minority ethnic populations, to survive on and 
shop with vouchers, and when the only information local populations might have about 
you, is learned from the Daily Mail or Daily Express?   
 
When I submitted my PhD proposal I hoped to be able to explore some of these hidden 
areas and voices and understandings, with the aim of illuminating and making heard and 
understood how these policies were lived out in daily practice, what they involved people 
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actually doing, and what they meant to and for individuals, families, organisations and 
workers living them out. I felt this could contribute towards a better understanding 
grounded in the complexity and detail of lived experience, of some of the issues around 
policy responses to forced migration. From the exploration I had done, there seemed to be a 
dearth of qualitative and ethnographic research in this field. Whilst so much of the public 
debate centred around numbers, a de-humanising practice in itself, much research around 
forced migration to this country, while important, seemed to be either secondary, or within 
social policy and focussed on more quantitative aspects and effects of specific policies 
(Duke, 1996, for example). Hidden voices belonging to hidden human beings leading 
hidden lives, of both forced migrants and those working with them dealing with hidden 
issues, seemed little heard or known about.  Therefore to achieve the aim of illumination of 
these shadowy areas, the only way of approaching this research would be to do an in-depth 
qualitative study, where ideally I would immerse myself in some of these daily settings, 
observing and listening to the actors and action involved, or failing that, I might be able to 
interview people in-depth, about their experiences. Also, I felt drawn to ethnography as a 
methodology which would suit my personality, of exploring in-depth and attempting to 
understand others points of view and experiences. My initial research proposal was entitled 
“Mechanisms of Ostracism,” where ‘mechanisms’ referred to the specific measures of the 
1999 legislation (such as no-choice dispersal or cashless subsistence) designed to 
‘ostracise’ (or socially exclude) asylum applicants. With Max Travers as my first 
supervisor, his theoretical and methodological positions and research provided me with a 
number of challenges and questions to ask of my own research. 
 
I was inspired by his research interests in the ‘private worlds’ of often unexplored work 
settings of various administrative agencies involved in deciding about immigration and 
asylum claims, focusing “on the practical concerns of people dealing with concrete tasks in 
particular institutional settings,” (Travers, 1999:3). He hoped that by describing and 
illuminating these ‘private worlds’, his reader would be enabled to “reflect upon the nature 
and effects of immigration control at both a human and institutional level”, (ibid). Max 
Travers countered criticisms that interpretative sociological research at a micro-level could 
say nothing to, or ignored, the wider political debates or broader levels of social existence. 
He was also particularly critical of academic research that he believed was heavily ‘value-
laden’, or “unashamedly moralistic,” arguing that for sociology in Britain, 
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 …there continues to be a need for theoretically-informed research about social 
processes that does more than offer a selective description of the facts, interspersed 
with moral commentary, (Travers, 1999:178).      
   
Whilst refuting the possibility of ‘value-free’ social scientific research and recognising 
these age-old debates, I took heed of Max’s warnings, but felt it would be essential to do 
theoretically-informed research which also engaged with the ethics and political debates of 
this highly politicised and ethically charged area of study. This would involve a personal 
journey, alongside my research journey, and I hoped that with honesty and reflexiveness, I 
would be able to move beyond an urge and tendency just to rant against seeming injustices 
to develop a sensitive, theoretically and empirically informed, yet critical understanding of 
the field of asylum policy in practice. I felt it important to take up the challenge of playing 
a part in, as O’ Neill (2001) describes it, the civic role of the university and its academic 
researchers; that describing and illuminating some of the hidden, micro areas of social life, 
and listening to and re-presenting some unheard voices, might offer some emancipatory 
potential for addressing injustices uncovered and not just assumed.  I felt that through 
exploring the lived experiences of policy in practice, any questioning of that policy would 
be based on firmer and more sensitive ground, involving an understanding of the “difficult 
moral choices” (Travers, 1999:179)  of policy makers, politicians and practitioners when 
devising and operating policy.  
 
Having taken on the task of doctoral research with broad ideas of my direction, the journey 
to a narrower focus and then completing it was a long, messy and complex one involving a 
variety of influences and chances helping shape it into what it became and is. Early on, 
some important happenings contributed to my understanding and the direction I began 
taking my research in. At a debate I attended in June 2000 on the fairness of Britain’s 
treatment of asylum seekers featuring Home Secretary Jack Straw, Shadow Home Secretary 
Ann Widdecombe, Refugee Council CE, Nick Hardwick, among others, I noted Straw’s 
acknowledgement of the contradiction stemming from the 1951 Convention. That is, that 
there is no international right to asylum, just a right to non-refoulement, which means that 
travelling legally to a country for asylum is almost impossible, but if fortunate enough to 
set foot on a territory, claiming asylum is legal. I was heartened at Straw’s acknowledgment 
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of the contradiction, but felt this was disingenuous considering the intense efforts of his 
government to make travelling to Britain legally as difficult as possible, through their new 
national laws. Straw also said Britain’s treatment of asylum seekers was not fair but he was 
trying to make it fairer, by trying to steer a path and securing a balance between the two 
poles of the left, who suggested there should be no immigration controls at all, and the right 
who were playing the race card and seeking to block New Labour proposals “to deal with 
genuine abuse” (!) Ann Widdecombe argued that all asylum seekers should be locked in 
Reception Centres until their claims were settled. One questioner from the floor stated that 
the vouchers for subsistence introduced with the 1999 Act, were akin to the stigmatising 
yellow stars Jews were forced to wear in Nazi Germany. Straw stated that asylum policy 
and issues involve shades of grey, not black and white.  
 
I attended several conferences which helped shape my thinking. Especially important, was 
hearing the contributions of Steve Cohen, a radical lawyer, campaigner and writer on 
immigration related issues and migrants’ rights, (specialising in the history of responses to 
Jewish migration to the UK) at the Barbed Wire Britain Conference, September 2000. At 
this event, Cohen described and criticised the involvement of social work and voluntary 
sector agencies in implementing the 1999 Act, as collusion in policy harmful to the welfare 
of asylum seekers rather than protective of it. Cohen was particularly disparaging about the 
role of the large VS Refugee Support Organisations, such as The Refugee Council and his 
contributions set me thinking about the role of the multiple agencies that were agreeing to 
play a part across the country in the new 1999 system. Cohen argued such organisations 
were complicit with the government in implementing a new ‘Poor Law’, when their first 
duty should be to the vulnerable individuals they were set up to support. One local (Oxford) 
VS support organisation had refused to comply with the Act.  Steve Cohen told me of some 
research a colleague of his (Humphries, 2001) was engaged with on the role of social work 
teams in implementing legislation potentially compromising to anyone ‘subject to 
immigration control’. This argument struck me very powerfully, and set me puzzling over 
the ethical dilemmas such organisations had presumably (though not necessarily) battled 
with when deciding to be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the new system and I began following a line of 
enquiry into this puzzle. I found myself personally, ethically racked over these dilemmas. 
Could these agencies have brought the legislation down by refusing to be involved, as 
Cohen suggested, and forced restored social rights to asylum seekers? Or would the 
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government merely have turned to the private sector, despite their lack of expertise, in 
which case social care agencies would have been abandoning asylum seekers to less able 
and less concerned businesses? How compromised would they be in practice? 
 
I began reading around the subject of welfare and internal immigration control and talking 
with social workers teaching social work at my institution about their roles and professional 
codes of conduct, and their experiences of working under the 1996 asylum legislation. I 
also began researching the reach of the new legislation, and the experimentation of the 
government setting up new multi-agency consortia, and visited another conference run by 
Capita for country-wide stakeholders in these consortia on initial teething problems and 
issues in their regions. One project manager of a consortia was furious because he had spent 
a year co-ordinating and preparing multi-agencies for receiving asylum seekers in that 
region, only to be told that the government would not be signing the contract with them.  
An LGA executive spoke of the dispersal as “a huge piece of social engineering, which 
would have profound effects.” The overwhelming subject at the conference, formally and 
informally, centred on the immense problems encountered on all levels at attempting to  
provide practically to co-ordinate adequate services and to address the issues involved in 
the arrival and reception of asylum seekers under the new system. This conference gave me 
a flavour of diverse public and voluntary sector agencies and individuals within them 
attempting to grapple with the numerous practical and ethical issues of planning for and 
putting this policy into practice, of wrestling with and attempting to hold onto the aims of 
their daily work. The Refugee Council speaker gave away some of the contradictions 
implicit in her organisation’s role. Her brief was to speak of problems which remain (with 
implementing the 1999 Act).  She began by saying, “what problems don’t?” She 
commented on the constant talk of crises and problems, and the consequent equation of 
asylum seekers with problems.  Eventually however, she concluded that asylum seekers 
should be viewed as opportunities not problems. The RC speaker also spoke of the 
separation of asylum seekers from refugees, into two totally different systems, the former 
being based on social exclusion, with the intention of government (although without any 
planning or policy on it) to develop integration for the latter. She argued that integration 
should start on day one, but that each Act has progressively removed more rights from 
those seeking asylum, and has been designed to socially exclude them. However, she 
answered “yes,” to her own question, “Does the Refugee Council want the new system to 
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work?” Another speaker from a local authority said that their definition of success was 
different to that of the Home Office, but also that it was too simplistic for local government 
to say the Home Office was ‘bad’ or ‘not interested’. Attending and observing at this 
conference was a further lead towards an ethnographic study of the anomalies (and 
complexities) of these policies in daily and longer term practice, for agencies designed to 
provide supportive services, when those policies were designed to facilitate social exclusion 
rather than inclusion.      
 
During the two years from November 2000, when I officially began my PhD research, to 
November 2002, when I began my main ethnographic fieldwork with Refugee Arrivals 
Project, I both expanded and narrowed my focus in attempt to work out my direction, my 
methodology,  who to research with, and what my research was about. My research process 
was both inductive and deductive, purposive and contingent as I explored the literature, 
wider conceptual issues, the concerns of practitioners in primary pilot interviews, the 
constantly changing political and practical scene and the methodological options. My 
thinking and reading broadened out as I began to consider the interconnectedness of local 
issues, processes and practices with much wider national, international and global ones, 
over time and space. Individual and local experiences of forced migrants and in relationship 
with forced migrants were woven into a global picture of conflict, power and resource 
distribution and exchange, of complex histories between and within nations. Literally, the 
arrival of global migrants on the doorstep of local UK and European citizens brought the 
world and the processes of globalisation home, alive and real, and these could not be 
ignored. I explored the literature on globalisation and global migrations and forced 
migration, raising my awareness of the interconnectedness of these forces and patterns with 
national and regional policies and histories of immigration and migration controls. 
Thinking around these national and regional policies led to considering the ethical and 
philosophical bases and boundaries of belonging and non-belonging; of citizenship, 
sovereignty, social exclusion/inclusion, human rights and convergences in international and 
national law. I also explored the growing (and related) literature on the convergence of 
regimes of welfare and immigration control. I considered the huge literature on ‘race’, 
racism, anti-racism and ethnicity, as an approach to regional, national and local responses 
to the arrival of forced and other ‘new migrations.’  
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Whilst broadening my field of view in my reading and initial literature review, I began with 
broad ideas about conducting research with several agencies involved in implementing 
welfare aspects of the 1999 Act. Following up this puzzle, or problematic, of their 
‘contradictory positioning;’ (implementing legislation potentially contrary to the welfare of 
their clients), I considered doing some ethnography, or at least interviews, with a few 
different agencies at different positions to the government and asylum welfare legislation. I 
had decided that this would also be the best way to gain access to the ethnography and 
accounts of people seeking asylum’s experience of the new NASS system. With this, and 
the aim of establishing some of the issues on the ground to guide my research, and 
attempting to gain access for ethnographic work, in early 2001 I interviewed and worked on 
building the trust of several social services Asylum Team Leaders in the South and a 
receiving VS organisation’s ED in a North East dispersal region. These threw up some 
interesting themes, confirming and elaborating on the contradictory and differentiated 
nature of their positions and roles, encouraging me to pursue my hunches and the direction 
set by hearing Cohen’s protest and my ongoing secondary research. My attempts to secure 
any of these organisations for further ethnographic study failed, but fortuitously a more 
apposite example of an organisation in this contradictory positioning agreed in theory to 
give me access for such research, but not until they had climbed out of the chaos they found 
themselves in, in early 2002.  
 
In the meantime, I had discovered Duvell and Jordan’s (2000) research on the 
compromising role of Asylum Teams following the 1996 Act, and was beginning to search 
for an ethnographic stance and methodology that could encompass the rich micro 
complexity of daily lived experience and the social structures that constrained and enabled 
it. A breakthrough came by being immensely inspired and spurred on by Stephen Castles’ 
case for a ‘Sociology of Forced Migration’, at a conference in April 2002 and Castles’ 
(2003), and also O’ Neill’s (2001:10) aim (though in a quite different ethnography) to “deal 
with the contradictions of oppression and the utter complexity of our lived relations 
towards the close of the twentieth century.”  I explored critical realism, as a methodological 
approach that could do this work, drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, Dorothy Smith and Michael 
Burawoy who, in very different ways, accepted a critical realist understanding of social 
reality in their methodologies (despite divergence on what that social reality consists of). I 
also explored the work of Michael Lipsky, who offered an insightful guide to understanding 
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the dilemmas of individual workers within the structures of public service organisations and 
‘street level bureaucracies,’ offering a potentially promising generic blueprint to hold my 
specific findings up against.  
 
It was with these general ideas, and gathering of selections of the literature mentioned in a 
long and unwieldy literature review, my initial pilot interviews and some papers and 
preliminary research reports I wrote about these, that I was eventually able to enter the 
everyday world of Refugee Arrivals Project, after the six month postponement while they 
re-staffed and re-structured. These and other elements of deduction, induction, planning and 
focusing or funnelling of my research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) were what took 
me into this voluntary sector organisation and the lived experiences of the individual 
workers, clients and involved others, and of the agency as a whole. Eight months of 
gathering data, of inductively and deductively following leads and beginning to analyse 
these in interaction with commitments in the field, then months more of transcription and 
data analysis (such as thematic coding) led me into finally writing up.  I found some themes 
and conclusions that had been suggested by the literature and influences I had identified 
before entering the field. I also found new themes and conclusions, and needed to turn 
again to others’ research literature, some newly written since beginning my research and 
fieldwork, and my thinking took new twists and turns as I used some of this (as well as 
those already mentioned) to help me analyse and make sense of my data. “Welfare as 
control,” emerged from the research process as a whole; from the very beginnings 
described here; from the initial research problematic as I grasped it and developed it from 
Steve Cohen’s observations, to the ways in which I found and interpreted the ‘safety-net’ 
Reception of people seeking asylum in West London, and hence thought and wrote about it, 
as follows. 
 
I have attempted to explain why and how this research came about and is the way it is, by 
way of introduction. In order that the reader may make further sense of this thesis, it is 
important to explain the rationale for the order of material in chapters and how these fit 
together as a whole. Chapters 2 and 3 are my selection and review of the relevant literature 
that I have used to understand and make sense of the everyday worlds I researched 
ethnographically. They were written after the proceeding chapters; although including a re-
write of my pre-fieldwork literature review, they also contain much post-fieldwork 
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material.  As I have explained, this literature was identified both before and after doing my 
fieldwork and analysing my raw data, which threw up some new and unexpected themes 
and previously unexplored ideas to attempt to make sense of. Therefore, Chapters 2 and 3 
are intended to be understood as an essential part of the data analysis, despite their 
appearing before the presentation of my analysed data in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9; they 
introduce the themes uncovered both before during and after data collection. They serve as 
part of the explanation of the descriptions of the lived experiences of the data chapters. 
Chapters 2 and 3 are also intended as an essential contextualising of the primary research, 
from the global, macro and conceptual levels of analysis predominantly in Chapter 2, to the 
closer national historical, local and micro levels, predominantly in Chapter 3. The closing 
section of Chapter 3 is a summary framing and providing justification of this research.  
 
Taking into consideration the vital identification of wider and deeper social structural 
influences on the local setting in Chapters 2 and 3, the methodology Chapters 4 and 5 lay 
out my understanding of this social reality and both the philosophical, theoretical and 
methodological grounding for the methods I used to collect, analyse and understand my 
data. Again these chapters were re-written (and written) after doing fieldwork and 
alongside data analysis. Describing what I did was obviously not possible before doing it, 
and methodology only seems to come alive and begin to make sense, in practice. Therefore 
the methodology described in Chapter 4 is intrinsically interwoven with preceding and 
proceeding chapters; offering a detailed explanation for the inclusion of the material in 
chapters 2 and 3, describing how the data in Chapters 6 to 8 were collected and analysed 
and providing a guide to understanding the rationale behind my interpretation of those data 
and conclusions from them (Chapters 9 and 10). In order for the reader to be able to make 
sense of the detailed analysis of the fieldwork and of the local setting of this voluntary 
sector organisation and its position in the system of safety-net welfare under the 1999 IAA, 
it is essential to provide a descriptive picture or profile of the case study organisation, 
Refugee Arrivals Project, which is the purpose of Chapter 5.  
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are the products of analysis of the ethnographic fieldwork data. From 
identification of the main themes arising from the dialectic (interactively inductive and 
deductive) process of exploring the research puzzle ‘on the ground’, these chapters are 
organised around overarching themes. Chapter 6 explores what implementing policy in 
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practice (‘welfare as control’) involved doing daily; for differently positioned workers and 
the organisation as a whole, as they negotiated with their clients around the boundaries to 
the specially designed welfare safety-net. Chapter 7 explores the experiences and 
understandings of some of the people journeying through the Reception stage of ‘welfare as 
control,’ as they seek asylum. Chapter 8 addresses ways in which Refugee Arrivals Project, 
as a VS Refugee Support Agency, sought to maintain its integrity in the face of the 
contradictions of ‘welfare as control;’ when clients presented with “multiple complex 
needs,” RAP was  resourced only to provide for “very basic needs”, therefore work 
generated frequent dilemmas and compromises.  
 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by considering conclusions from the three data chapters 
taken as a whole, and then Chapter 10 discusses more generally how this research might 
contribute to the understanding of the contradictory positioning of a VS organisation (and 
others similar) implementing a policy of ‘welfare as control’ at this time and place. Having 
discussed some of the strengths and limitations of the research, Chapter 10 explores what 
this research ‘says’ to the broader picture as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3; what its broader 
relevance, contribution to knowledge, policy implications or suggested ways forward might 
be, in the light of the study.    
 
It is worth highlighting that this piece of research describes and explains a specific 
historical moment in time and space, set within a complex constantly changing and shifting 
social and political environment moving and shaping migration movements and responses 
to them. Between the summers of 2000 and 2006, while I have been working on this 
research, there have been numerous changes in UK (and EU) official asylum policy and 
policy in practice, from amendments to the 1999 IAA to two new Acts and amendments 
being debated and implemented (the 2002 NIAA, the 2004 AIA, and a 2005 five year 
policy plan on asylum and immigration). Perceptions, reactions, understandings and the 
framing of ‘problems’ around asylum, migration and immigration have shifted and changed 
with political and global events, and trends.  From September 11th 2001, asylum seekers 
became perceived and represented in media discourse, more as a threat to security, and as 
potential terrorists, than (as previously) as threats to a British ‘way of life’ or to the Welfare 
State (although these continued to be underlying perceptions). There followed the 
American and British invasion of Afghanistan, provoking extensive movement of Afghani 
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refugees across borders and continents, including to the UK, to find refuge. However, by 
the 2002 NIAA, some political discourse and the government, was discussing and moving 
towards the more positive concept and policies of ‘managed migration’; actively 
encouraging specific groups of economic migrants to migrate to and work in the UK. 
Former ‘White List’ Eastern European countries joined the EU in 2003, and overnight 
hundreds of previously ‘illegal immigrants’ or ‘manifestly unfounded’ asylum claimants 
could legally enter the UK to work.  
 
Towards the end of my fieldwork period, workers in RAP discussed the build up to, 
protests against and eventual US and UK attack on Iraq in March 2003. There was intense 
mixed feeling among them about the war, many Iraqi and Kurdish refugees having flown 
Saddam Hussein’s regime previously. However this war precipitated further Iraqi migratory 
flights, and with a few terrorist attacks on European cities, some argue it precipitated 
stronger anti-West radical Islamist feeling. With the introduction of more extensive anti-
terrorist legislation in the UK, it seems a greater mistrust of Muslims generally and 
amongst Muslims of the state has grown. Very recently in 2006, a new focus of distrust and 
anger has been directed at those immigrants serving criminal convictions in the UK, but not 
subsequently deported, and the Home Office for allowing this, feeding a differently 
nuanced criminalisation of immigrants.  
 
Throughout the 6 year research period, focus and emphasis in public, media and political 
discourses seems to have shifted somewhat away from the demonisation of asylum seekers 
and refugees specifically, to a more general mistrust and resentment of immigrants in 
general. Again, during my fieldwork in January 2003, Tony Blair promised that he would 
halve the number of asylum claimants in six months. Based on a trick with the asylum 
statistics, and an actual decrease in numbers of claimants, it seemed that some of the 
government’s deterrent measures, particularly those outside UK borders (the closing of 
Sangatte was one such), had successfully deterred some asylum seekers from coming to the 
UK. However, despite such a change in focus, the asylum system of ‘welfare as control’ 
initiated with the 1999 IAA continues to operate in adapted, amended and also more 
practised ways after 6 years of trial and error. The Government continues to devise 
‘mechanisms of ostracism’ of asylum seekers. It also seems that the debates and many of 
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the factors raised in this research seem likely to stay relevant in a continually globalising, 
conflict-ridden, divided, and disparately resourced world.  
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2 The ‘big picture’: the global and broad context of a local sociological study of 
forced migration                                      
 
 
In local studies on issues concerning forced migration, it is essential to recognise their 
implicit and explicit inter-connectedness with the broader levels of the spatial, 
conceptual, historical, relational, social and structural, (Castles, 2003). This chapter aims 
to contextualise this study concerned with a local setting in forced migration within its’ 
broader and global context, and so aid understanding of the micro in its connectedness 
with meso and macro levels of analysis and ‘reality’. This chapter discusses various 
contradictions at these levels, whilst focussing in. Firstly however, it is vital to discuss 
terms of reference and discourses which so dominate this contentious area, because 
“‘perceptions’…are central to the politics of migration,” (Geddes, 2003:153). 
 
2.1 The terms and discourses of ‘asylum’             
 
It is essential, arguably particularly in this area of study, to discuss, deconstruct and 
problematise the formal and informal terms of reference, labels, concepts and discourses 
currently used in everyday social contexts such as in everyday talk, in the media, in 
politics, and law, by practitioners, activists, and academics , and those I will use in this 
study. Although holding to the fundamentally material character of social relations, it is 
essential in understanding this social world, to make visible taken-for-granted discourses 
where the “matrix of concepts through which we understand the world and act in it 
profoundly affects those actions and thus the world itself” (Levitas 1998:3).  
 
The term ‘asylum seeker’ entered the online OED in 2001, was first inscribed in UK law 
in the 1999 IAA, being a cold war creation used first in the American Political Science 
Review in 1959 describing the few dissidents seeking a safe asylum from the Soviet 
Union, (Moss 2001). The word ‘refugee’ from late 17th Century French origin (from the 
Latin for refuge)(OED 2001) referring to people “forced to leave their country in order to 
escape war, persecution or natural disaster”, has become narrowed, in signatory statesto 
the 1951 Geneva Convention (and 1967 Protocol) definition, to the extent that Tuitt 
(1996) talks of the metaphorical “death of the refugee.” In the UK media ‘asylum seeker’ 
became common parlance in the 1990s; in the Guardian in 1990 the term ‘refugees’ 
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outnumbered ‘asylum seekers’ by 10:1, by 2000 it was less than 2:1. Moss (2001: 
www.guardian.co.uk) found the unquestioned ‘refugee’ displaced by war in former-
Yugoslavia in 1993, replaced by the ‘asylum seeker’ in 1994, matching “bureaucratic 
unease about growing numbers claiming to be refugees.”  
 
Western European construction of the refugee in law Tuitt (1996:2) argues is “a grossly 
aborted conception of the refugee,” denying many of the global conditions producing 
refugee-hood, denying the refugee identity and thus adequate protection. The so-called 
“new asylum seeker” from the 1980’s represented not just greater movements of people 
for new reasons due to greater ease of travel, but their unexpected arrival at the borders of 
the developed world and new tensions and hostilities towards them from the receiving 
states (Tuitt 1996:69). The 1951 Convention was drafted when the “statist paradigm,” 
was unquestioned and “refugee protection was constructed as a compromise between the 
desire of states to control entry and the continuing existence of mass displacement,” 
(Harvey, 2000:372). These tensions became greater with the “new asylum seeker,” which 
Gibney (2004:10) points out includes only those refugees who arrive at the borders of 
another country and whose status “as an endangered person is typically undetermined. 
To be an asylum seeker a person merely has to claim to be a refugee,” and so the 
category of ‘asylum seeker’ is both narrower and more expansive than that of refugee.  
 
Therefore the UK bureaucratic category of ‘asylum seeker’ raises immediate doubt over a 
person’s status as “endangered;” whether they are a ‘genuine’ or a ‘bogus’ refugee. Moss 
(2001:www.guardian.co.uk) argues “‘Refugee’ is a word that evokes immediate 
sympathy; ‘asylum seeker’ is a colder, more bureaucratic term, and it is convenient for 
the Home Office that the latter is now increasingly favoured.”    It joins the other newly 
used quasi-bureaucratic categories differentiating types of migrant, including ‘economic 
migrant’ often used pejoratively to refer to an asylum seeker considered not to be a 
‘genuine’ refugee. ‘Asylum seeker’ also largely became a pejorative term, “Those on the 
right no longer even have to use the word ‘bogus’; their tone suggests that they consider 
all asylum seekers bogus,” (Moss 2001:www.guardian.co.uk).  
 
Alongside its official use in legal and bureaucratic decision-making, such terminology is 
used in various discourses by the “primary definers” (Hall et al 1978:59) socially 
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constructing migrants to the UK and migration in general, in an interpretive framework or 
“inferential structure” that has been predominantly negative. A lot of academic (and 
other) attention has turned to explicating this negative social construction in the 
(particularly tabloid) media and politics, many deeming it racist, or ‘scapegoating’ 
migrants in moral panics of extraordinary proportions (e.g. Bralo, 1998; Kaye, 1998; 
2001; Speers, 2001; Law, 2002). Cohen (1994:82) citing the then Home Secretary 
Douglas Hurd as one of Britain’s “frontier guards”, argued 
 
The construction of a new stigmatised group, the ‘disguised economic migrant’, 
was necessary to the deconstruction of the morally untouchable category of the 
‘deserving political refugee. 
 
The actual effects of such popular discourses and representations, (e.g. on public opinion, 
action and policy making, Statham, 2003; Saggar, 2003) have also been researched and 
acknowledged, not just by left-leaning academics and activists defending refugee rights, 
but by the police (ACPO, 2001), 
 
…racist expressions towards asylum seekers appear to have become common 
currency and acceptable in a way which would never be tolerated towards any 
other minority…Experience over the last four years has been that where asylum 
communities have been established there has been ill-informed adverse media 
coverage which has contributed to heightened local tensions and resentment of 
asylum seekers. 
 
 And the government’s Audit Commission (2000:33), advising on dispersal,  
 
…negative press coverage can inflame public opinion and create a climate in 
which fair treatment is hard to achieve. At present, press coverage of asylum 
seekers is overwhelmingly negative… Devising a local press and publicity 
strategy prior to receiving asylum seekers can help to create more positive 
coverage. 
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However Threadgold (2001:3) warns “some politicians, policy-makers and academics 
are sometimes too quick to call community common sense ‘racism,’ or to brand the 
media with racist reporting,” that too straightforward links should not be made out of 
“extraordinarily complex processes”.  East (2000: i, 1) argues that the ‘asylum debate’ is 
polarised and “Neither the ‘bogus’ nor the ‘forced to flee’ discourses promote an 
understanding of people seeking asylum as creative, reflexive agents of their own 
destiny” leaving neither asylum seekers nor ‘agents of welfare’ to articulate their own 
perspectives. She proposes that some discourses defending refugees  
 
…can lead to a glossing over of some deep and challenging issues… People who 
are refugees are caught between these diverse yet similar responses: between 
those who treat them as objects of moral concern and those who treat them as 
objects of suspicion. In the process, human beings are defaced. 
 
Bralo (1998:19) argued from her research on 1997 newspaper representations that 
refugees were predominantly constructed in discourses of “social exclusion” which 
falsely suggested their homogenous  “pseudo-group identity” and ‘otherness’ and did not 
reflect people’s lived experience as a ‘refugee’ or their own identity. Instead it “replaces 
individual and group identity ‘by stereotyped identity with categorical prescription of 
assumed needs’ (Zetter 1991:44) in the eyes of the in-group,” (ibid:19). This “pseudo-
group identity” allows for easy scape-goating with different social exclusion discourses 
which may be “subtler than racism or nationalism,” (ibid:37). Participatory action and 
life-history research such as O’ Neill’s (2001:6-7) has sought to redress “valorizing 
discourses, and the reduction of the Other to a cipher of the oppressed/marginalised/ 
exploited…” by instead seeking “to understand, express and re-imagine the complexity of 
loss, longing, exile and re-construction.” O’ Neill (2001:3) aims to challenge and resist 
dominant images and stereotypes of ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’ which “include 
those of ‘victim,’ ‘passive,’ ‘dependent,’ and do not reflect the courage, resistance and 
the need for building self-esteem, self-identity and cultural identity in the face of tragedy 
and loss…”  
 
Many activists and academics have sought to problematise, unsettle and reclaim the 
popular dominant discourses around ‘asylum’ by referring to people who seek asylum in 
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ways which are not negative, de-humanising or objectifying in the senses mentioned 
above; by ‘myth-busting’ (e.g. Refugee Council) and through research they try to 
describe the actualities of people’s ‘lived experience.’ One preferred term for the area of 
study is “forced migration” and for those in such a situation “forced migrants,” Marfleet 
(1998:71) argues,  
 
The notion of ‘forced migration,’ of those coerced into flight, is the only approach 
which encompasses the predicament of most asylum seekers. Such an idea has 
long been resisted by Western governments keen to differentiate refugees from 
other categories of migrants… Today, migrants are part of the process in which 
capital, information and ideas do move more freely across national boundaries 
and in which large numbers of people are both induced and coerced to migrate. 
Differentiation between ‘economic migrants’, ‘refugees’ and others becomes 
meaningful only for those most determined to perpetuate systems of exclusion. 
 
However others would argue that while the boundaries differentiating refugees from 
other migrants, especially the narrow ‘legal’ definitions used in Western Europe to 
exclude people, are blurred and peoples’ reasons for migrating often complex, it is still 
important to differentiate those in fear of their lives through persecution or danger in 
order to ensure they are offered adequate protection, and their needs met in different 
ways from those not in this position. Gibney (2004:11) suggests this depends on which 
end of the spectrum of reasons for economic migration a person is on, 
 
Whereas a refugee claims to enter because he or she is being persecuted or faces 
a situation of life-threatening danger, economic migrants are driven to seek 
entrance by (often only slightly) less pressing considerations, such as the desire to 
improve a low standard of living. Individual economic migrants might be located 
at various points on a continuum according to their reason for entrance, with 
those seeking to improve an appallingly low quality of life marked by serious 
economic deprivation… at one end and those migrating between first world 
countries in order to take up more lucrative employment opportunities…at the 
other. Clearly, some, though not all, economic migrants have a strong claim to 
enter based upon need. 
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In this study I will use the bureaucratic and legal labels that the UK government uses to 
differentiate migrants, while accepting that these are socially and legally constructed, are 
problematic and do not sum up such individuals’ identities, they may refer to people’s 
different experiences before arriving in the UK, so possibly shared needs. Essentially, 
being ascribed such a status by immigration and asylum law and bureaucracy, has real 
consequences on the rights, obligations, freedoms, constraints, and access to specific 
types of welfare a person is entitled to as well as deciding the most likely pathway 
through bureaucratic and legal systems. Thus to be labelled ‘asylum seeker,’ or granted 
‘refugee’ status is likely to affect the real and often shared ‘lived experiences’ of people 
in these structural positions, in quite significant ways vital to understand in this study. 
Obviously differences between individuals labelled ‘refugee’ are as great as their 
similarities, but this study aims to ascertain what is “emblematic” about a person’s 
experience as an asylum seeker from her unique “idiosyncratic” journey (Bourdieu et al, 
1999:ix). Where I believe differentiation is unnecessary, however, I will use more 
‘humane’ terms.  
 
2.2 Towards a ‘sociology of forced migration’ 
 
Castles (2003) has recently proposed that sociology has neglected or sidelined ‘forced 
migration’ and should study it, as it is a fundamental aspect of current global social 
transformations. This research aims to take up his challenge, so it is important to 
summarise it here. His reasons include the massive growth in numbers of people forced 
to migrate in different ways, for different reasons since the cold war, (and explaining why 
most do not). The significance of forced migration in contemporary societies is more 
sociologically important, as Bauman (1998:9) argues, “mobility has become the most 
powerful and most coveted stratifying factor”.  Forced migration, as all migration, is 
intrinsic to globalising economic systems, as many ‘Northern’ states rely silently on 
undocumented migrants to fulfil labour needs and the ‘migration industry’ emerged to 
facilitate forced migration. Globalisation maintains and increases systems of inequality, 
exclusion and inclusion socially, economically and politically particularly in (but also 
within) the North-South divide, making reasons and distinction between economic and 
human rights motivations for migration multiple and blurred. The study of migration has 
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been dominated by geography and economics, however the failure of policies based on 
that research has led sociology to explain migration’s social dynamics, largely ignored by 
refugee and forced migration studies. Thus, it is timely and essential to theorise forced 
migration sociologically, as an integral part of North-South relations and intrinsically 
related to (often indistinguishable from) economic migration, both being “forms of 
expression of global inequalities and societal crises” (Castles 2003:17).   
 
‘Refugee Studies,’ has grown phenomenally over the past 50 years into an inter-
disciplinary academic focus “based around a ‘label’” (Zetter 1988, in Black 
2001:57).With ‘Forced Migration’ studies dating from the early 1980s, it has  been 
closely linked to practical and policy concerns, and traditionally close to inter-
governmental and NGO humanitarian organisations. Castles (2003) argues that this is 
both a strength and a weakness of research; a strength in that research has been intended 
to serve vital practical purposes to alleviate human suffering; but a weakness in that 
research has been largely narrowly policy-driven and dominated. The failure of migration 
policies, Castles explains, is due to research unquestioningly using problem definitions 
and concepts of policy makers and researching often specific, short-sighted bureaucratic 
problems. Sociology has thus considered forced migration studies as peripheral and a-
theoretical (e.g. Travers 1999). Castles argues that a more theoretical, historical 
‘sociological’ take, embracing inter-disciplinarity, would offer “more useful public 
knowledge,” (ibid:27).  
 
Castles agrees with Portes (1997) that the existing sociological studies have over-
emphasised local, empirical, cultural distinctiveness and adaptation, neglecting broader 
theoretical explanations on the structural causes and dimensions of forced migration and 
the incorporation of forced migrants into receiving societies. He argues that forced 
migration should be analysed as a pivotal aspect of the emergent global world order, 
political economy, transnationalism and globalisation, and that local studies should 
always be contextualised within these broader processes that are intrinsic to them; “there 
can be no compartmentalised theory of forced migration,” (ibid:27).  
 
A sociology of forced migration needs a division of labour where micro, macro and meso 
levels of analysis and processes between them are linked, and “specific studies of specific 
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groups or situations are informed by broader studies of global social, political and 
economic structures and relationships – and vice versa,”(ibid:22). It must acknowledge 
itself part of, and bring together, an inter-disciplinary project, as “Migration is an 
existential shift which affects every part of human life” (ibid:22). This involves 
understanding forced migration in terms of social relations on global, regional, national 
and local levels, as well as studying processes of loss of identity, community 
disintegration and their regaining and rebuilding.  
 
A further aspect in sociology which could impede its adequate theorising of forced 
migration has been its often implicit nation-state framework of analysis, other than 
Marx’s political economy which pre-empts globalisation theory. This has meant that the 
“stranger, or ‘Other’, is seen as deviant and potentially dangerous”(p23) and theorising 
has centred on assimilation and integration of the ‘stranger’, and deeply rooted, hard-to-
shift national traditions with “tunnel-vision,”(p24). Castles argues therefore that current 
global transformations necessitate “the analysis of transnational connectedness and the 
way this affects national societies, local communities and individuals,” (p24), that the 
sociology of forced migration is vital in its own right and contributing to ‘global 
sociology’.  
 
Castles (2003) makes a strong case for forced migration as an integral aspect of the 
emerging new global order and ongoing social, political and economic global and 
transnational transformations, citing the globalisation literature (Castells, 1996; Held et 
al, 1999). Although movements of migrants are as old as recorded history, a 
contemporary sociology must analyse new aspects of forced migration in the current era 
of globalisation and as “both a result and cause of social transformation in the South,” 
where there have been “new wars” and conflicts (Kaldor, 2001) which Northern 
economic interests have exacerbated. While Southern underdevelopment is increasingly 
seen as a security threat to the North, and humanitarian aid and peacekeeping as essential 
to development, a system of “networked global liberal governance” controlled by the 
North, attempts to transform whole Southern societies (Duffield, 2001).  
 
Crucially to this research, Castles outlines ways in which forced migration is socially 
transforming Northern societies. In common with, and distinctive from other migrations, 
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forced migration has significantly increased the social and cultural diversity of 
populations and proliferation of transnational communities. Such increases in forced 
migration coincided with the settling of older immigrant communities, multiculturalism 
and the end of the long boom, economic restructuring, deindustrialisation, privatisation 
and deregulation thus “immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers appeared as the physical 
embodiment of the external threat to jobs, living standards and welfare,” (ibid:20). 
Asylum and migration became politicised; extreme right movements and racist violence 
proliferated; and construction of the threatening ‘Other,’ legitimising public order 
policies diverted attention from economic and political problems. New exile diasporas are 
taking on different either transient or permanent characteristics to transnational 
communities under globalisation conditions (Cohen, 1997; Van Hear, 1998). The impact 
of forced migration in the Northern world is clearly important for sociological attention.  
 
Castles suggests possible research topics, outlines methodological principles and a 
theoretical framework important for an emergent sociology of forced migration. The 
overarching principle is “to integrate various levels of analysis into a global political 
economy,”(p28) so research topics would range from local to global political economy. 
And it would include as relevant here, “dynamics of settlement” such as “social policy for 
forced migrants and its relationship to broader social policy” and the "relationship 
between bureaucracy and human agency in refugee settlement,” (p28,29). With 
theoretical grounding, relevant methodological principles include: interdisciplinarity; a 
historical understanding of sending and receiving societies; a holistic approach linking 
specific topics to embeddedness in different spatial levels of social relations; local, 
national, regional patterns of social and cultural relations and broader changes; 
comparative studies; human agency of forced migrants, sending and receiving 
communities; importance of participatory research methods.  
 
Castles’ (2003) proposals for a new sociology of forced migration seem an ideal 
framework and challenge for this study. Reviewing the literature will serve to 
contextualise a local ethnographic study of a refugee welfare agency in the UK within 
broader theoretical debates, global structural determinants of forced migration including 
the reception and settlement of forced migrants in this receiving society, a historical 
understanding of the reception of forced and other migrants, the relations of welfare and 
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immigration policies and the agency of these specific forced migrants and host welfare 
workers.   
 
2.3 Contradictions around forced migration  
 
A dominant theme in the literature on global migration in general and forced migration in 
particular are the contradictions and tensions involved, at all spatial levels of analysis 
(global, regional, national, local and individual), from the conceptual, ethical and political 
to the real, lived and practical (Geddes, 2000; Castles, 2000; Morris, 2002; Miles, 1993; 
Gibney, 2004). These contradictions raise dilemmas for individuals, governments, policy-
makers, groups and organisations involved. Exploring and grasping the essence of these 
contradictions is essential in order to make sense of the construction of ‘asylum’ as 
problematic and the welfare policies and practices of particular nations for receiving 
forced migrants.   
 
In line with the premise, identified by Castles (2003), that any local level, small scale 
exploration of individuals involved in forced migration cannot be viewed in isolation but 
should relate to the integral, broader, global structural implicit within it, this 
contextualisation will start from the global (and transnational) level of analysis of 
identified tensions as a framework, working down in scale. It will consider the conceptual 
and general (or real) to the practical, particular and empirical (or actual).  
 
2.4 Globalisation, migration and forced migration 
 
Globalization is a process that generates contradictory spaces, characterised by 
contestation, internal differentiation, continuous border crossings (Sassen, 
1998:xxxiv). 
 
Within the conceptual framework of contradictions and tensions, this section will attempt 
to understand the character and causes of contemporary migration, particularly forced 
migration, in the context of globalization where, as the literature demonstrates, such 
processes are far more complex and multi-dimensional than popular and policy 
understandings, allow for.  Sassen (1998) and Castles (2000) both argue that migration 
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and immigration are fundamental to the processes of globalization, and marked by 
contradictions. Characterising globalization with multitudinous ambiguities and 
contradictions is the explicit sociological norm, though Morris (1997:193) finds the 
“implicit presence” of a linear, developmental perspective “hard to escape.” These 
tensions make the globalization thesis hard to fault though there are tendencies to 
speculative and abstract terming of any transnational trend as global, and insufficient 
empirical illustration and analysis of such phenomena (Morris 1997).  
 
Globalization is a contested phenomenon, though there is general acceptance of some 
aspects or manifestations of ‘it’. Critiquing Third Way philosophies Callinicos (2001) 
observes that Held et al (1999), presenting themselves (and Giddens) as moderate 
“transformationalists”,  arrived at the correct dialectical synthesis between the “sceptics” 
(e.g. Hirst and Thompson, 1996, globalization is a myth hiding international and 
continuing national powers) and the “hyperglobalisers” (e.g. Soysal, 1994, nation state 
power is fundamentally reduced and transnational processes dominant). Held et al 
(1999:16) envision globalization as a non-evolutionary historical process or processes 
with an irreducible plurality of causes, “which embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organization of social relations and transactions.”  Marxist, Callinicos (2001:19) argues 
that “boosters” and “critics” is a more useful division. He also asserts that the critical 
belief that “global economic integration has qualitatively increased over the past 
generation and the probable outcome will be greater rather than less economic 
instability,” is coherent. Castells (2000) account of globalization as “The Information 
Age,” includes ‘boosterism’ and ‘critical thinking.’  
 
 
Burawoy (2000) also criticises globalization theorists who Giddens terms the “radicals” 
and the “sceptics,” where Giddens has set the sceptics (Hirst and Thompson; Wade; 
Evans and Weiss) up as a straw argument to knock down with his own ‘radical’s’ view (if 
there is so much hype about globalization then it must be real). Burawoy (2000:339) 
criticises Giddens and the radicals for their “cavalier approach to history,” including 
Castells, Jameson (“the apotheosis of the radicals bringing together cultural 
epiphenomenalism and historical unconsciousness”) and Harvey who “gets nearest to a 
serious engagement with transformation.”  But he ultimately gives a speculative Marxist 
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teleology of capitalism and resolutions to its crises. Burawoy is equally  critical of 
“perspectivalists,” anthropologists whose ethnography does not go beyond the 
ethnographer “who hold onto their radicalism by being sceptics at the same 
time”(ibid:340). Burawoy (2000) himself wants to “construct perspectives on 
globalization from below, what we call grounded globalizations” by using ethnography 
“to drum some reality into theories of globalization, investigating to what extent 
globalization is a flight of academic fantasy.” These ethnographers sought theories to 
stretch from the local spatial, temporal “real experiences” they investigated to the global, 
the result of which Burawoy (2000:341) claims  “are the antidote to sceptics without 
context, radicals without history, and perpectivalists without theory.”  Having re-
evaluated his theories in the light of his team’s ethnographies, Burawoy’s, conclusions 
disagree that  
 
…there is a transition between globalizations, between Global Imperialism and 
the Global Postmodern… Instead we prefer the more agnostic perspective of 
globalization in transition. Our studies point to the displacement of an old order 
while the contours of the new one are simply not clear… To Giddens 
cosmopolitanism from above we propose… a new cosmopolitanism from below. 
Globalisation cannot be reduced to an inexorable force; it is also a process in 
which we participate; it is a process embedded in imaginations we construct. It 
opens up opportunities as well as closing them down. (ibid:348,349).  
 
Both Sassen and Castles could be described as “transformationalists,” accepting the 
existence and increase of the multi-dimensional (economic, political, social, cultural) 
character of globalization but also as “critics,” certainly of the economic “logic of 
capital.” Also, like many theorists, they both accept the differentiated advances of 
globalization in different realms but the generally continuing, if eroded, powerbases of 
nation-states. The trends understood as globalization are fundamental to Habermas 
(1999:48) analysis, 
 
are transforming a historical constellation characterized by the fact that state, 
society and economy are, as it were, co-extensive within the same national 
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boundaries. The international economic system… is being metamorphosed into a 
transnational economy in the wake of the globalization of markets. 
 
He also accepts that “the ongoing erosion of borders is not just characteristic of the 
economy” (ibid:48), citing for examples Held et al’s discussion of peace-keeping and 
organized violence, media and communications networks, growing migratory 
movements.  
 
All Castles’ (2000:124-32) nine “fundamental contradictions” characterising 
contemporary globalization and migration involve that between inclusion and exclusion; 
“global linkages” embrace every human group and geographical area, but while some are 
fully included “in the new global order,” others are marginalised. Groups and individuals 
possessing characteristics that fit global markets for labour, capital or cultural goods are 
included as citizens with civil, political and social rights, those without are excluded and 
some denied the most basic rights. International migration of all ‘types’ is closely linked 
with such processes, so “migrants’ motivations are complex and multidimensional.” The 
transformational processes of inclusion/exclusion do not just envelope the 100 million 
people living outside countries of birth, 20 million of whom were refugees (in 2000), but 
societies they have emigrated from and immigrated to.  
 
Where anonymous market forces (not any tangible individual, institution or state) are 
held culpable for the inclusion of some and exclusion of others, the contradiction between 
the market and the state, means inequality is accepted as necessary to the efficiency of 
capital, and the state and welfare have drawn back from interfering with this (particularly 
since the 1980s). Developing states have been forced to open up to neo-liberal markets at 
the expense of providing welfare and employment to their people. This contradiction is 
central in international migration, dictating the emigration and immigration of 
differentiated labour; and where governments attempt to stop migration, informal social 
networks and migration industries emerge to facilitate migration more effectively than 
states can control it (Castles, 2000).  In exploring the meaning of borders Sassen (1999:4) 
says “we see a combination of drives to create border-free economic spaces and drives 
for renewed border control to keep immigrants and refugees out.”  The market/state 
contradiction includes policies which promote both free movement of capital, goods, 
 30 
information and culture transnationally but highly selective resistance to the free 
movement of labour and other migrants.  
 
The freeing of markets and decline of welfare states has produced greater inequality, and 
Castles’ (2000) third contradiction of growing wealth and poverty, within older industrial 
and newly industrialising countries and between developed and developing countries, to 
the extent that “whole nations are being excluded from the new global order”(p127), not 
now simply divided North by South. The supposed “trickle-down” of wealth predicted by 
modernization theories not materialising, Habermas (1999:51) asks  
 
how long will it take to cross the ‘valley of tears’ and what sacrifices will have to 
be made en route. How many people will be marginalized and then left by the 
wayside before the goal is reached? 
 
  Exclusions overlay such inequalities based on membership of differentiated groups 
(women, ethnic minorities) and migrants within industrializing and developed nations 
find themselves “in situations of marginalization, impoverishment and social conflict,” 
(Castles, 2000:127). In her attempt to “recover the concrete, localized processes through 
which globalization exists” Sassen (1998:xx) analyses the presence and co-existence 
within global cities of strategic sites for corporate global capital and a global 
disadvantaged workforce, “women, immigrants, and people of colour, whose political 
sense of self and whose identities are not necessarily embedded in the ‘nation’ of the 
‘national community.’”  
 
Sassen’s (1998) analysis of global cities also echoes Castles’ (2000) fifth contradiction 
between the global and the local, his eighth between the national and global citizen, and 
ninth between globalization from above and from below, which they both argue (echoing 
Burawoy, 2000) provide the hope for greater equality and inclusion in a new notion of 
citizenship, and political action.  
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2.5 Theories and causes of migration and forced migration globally & movements 
 
 
Over the last five centuries mass migrations have played a major role in 
colonialism, industrialisation, the emergence of nation-states and the 
development of the capitalist world market. However international migration has 
never been as pervasive, or as socio-economically and politically significant as it 
is today. Castles and Miller (1998:283) 
 
Kushner and Knox (1999) suggest the twentieth was the century of enforced 
displacement, in their “Refugees in an Age of Genocide”. Although migration and forced 
migration have occurred throughout human history, it is widely accepted that the period 
since 1945 saw unprecedented growth in numbers of people migrating, and again since 
the 1980s and end of the Cold War, including massively increased forced migration 
globally. There is also agreement (though debate) that these new migrations are 
qualitatively different, with new causes and changed responses to them in a globalizing 
world, the new global order, or disorder.  Castles and Miller (1998) identify five 
tendencies characterising those changes in migration, which they predict will be most 
prominent for the next twenty years: globalisation, emigration and immigration affecting 
more geographical areas; acceleration, increasing numbers with accompanying political 
attention; differentiation, large range of types, and complexity, also problematic for 
policy; feminisation, women more prominent in all regions and types of migration; 
politicisation, increased interest and effects on domestic, bilateral, regional and national 
security policies. Sassen (1999), Castles, Phizacklea (1998) and others argue that 
traditional theories of migration, forced migration and immigration have too narrowly, 
simplistically and ahistorically explained what is now (maybe always was) a broader, 
highly complex multitude of processes, nevertheless all tied up in broader economic, 
political, social, cultural, environmental processes of global change, or ‘globalization,’  
 
…it is therefore inappropriate to analyse migration as an isolated phenomenon; it 
is one facet of societal change and global development. The different forms of 
migration… all arise from these broader changes. The categories are 
interdependent… (Castles and Miller, 1998:140).  
 32 
 
Castles (2003) and Sassen (1998) both argue that all types of contemporary migrations 
are an integral part of globalization; “Immigration is, in my reading, one of the 
constitutive processes of globalization today…” (pxxi). Castles and Miller (1998) divide 
migration theories into three fundamental approaches. The first of these is “Neo-classical 
equilibrium theories,” often discussed as ‘push-pull’ theories based on ideas similar to 
neo-classical economics where individuals make rational cost-benefit decisions on 
migration, influenced by various push and pull factors The second are “historical-
structural” explanations, stemming from Marxist political economy, which suggest that 
migrations are driven by the forces of capital, mobilising cheap labour, perpetuating 
inequality and uneven development, ensuring the domination of  First over Third world 
countries. Castles and Miller (1998) argue that both are too one-sided, (the first 
overemphasising agency, the second, structural determinism) and cannot account for the 
empirical and historical realities and complexities of current migrations, their logic 
unable to explain why the majority of people do not migrate.  
 
“Migrations systems theory” approaches emerged out of such critiques, suggesting that 
migrations occur out of interacting macro (e.g. political economy, interstate relations, 
practices for managing migration) and micro (social and informal networks, beliefs and 
practices of groups and individuals) factors, especially in the specific linkages or systems 
between sending and receiving societies, between which “migration chains” develop. 
Castles argues this approach is much better able to explain the complexities, specificities 
and anomalies of contemporary migrations and resettlings. Although reminiscent of the 
‘perfect’ dialectical syntheses of ‘Third Way’ approaches to globalization, the work of 
Castles, Sassen, Phizacklea and others fit under the migrations systems approach broadly 
and seem able to offer the most useful explanations with most integrity for current 
migrations, ‘voluntary’ and forced. For instance, Phizacklea (1998) rejects the 
“orthodox” and the “structural” models (fitting Castles ‘neo-classical’ and ‘historical-
structural’) dominating migration theory for twenty years, to develop a feminist 
perspective on migration and globalization by using Giddens ‘structuration’ framework to 
combine the agency and structure in women’s migrations.  
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Broadly within this systems approach, Sassen (1999) uses historical analysis of 
migrations to Europe over the past 200 years to challenge the notions of “invasion” 
which permeate  current political and popular understandings of immigration. She argues 
that a broader historical view crucially demonstrates that receiving immigration countries 
are not “innocent bystanders” but “active participants” in their immigration histories 
(echoing the ‘we are here, because you were there’ contention). She finds that migrations, 
including those of refugees, are produced, having been conditioned historically by the 
links, interrelations and “binding mechanisms” of sending and receiving countries, by 
specific complex geopolitical, economic, social conditions and structures between and 
within countries (e.g. colonial and postcolonial relations). Sassens also found that 
migrations are highly bounded in space, time and scale. They are extremely selective 
processes where only certain people leave, following “highly structured” routes, where 
many return or follow circular migrations and only some permanently settle. Refugee 
migration has been similarly conditioned and structured historically; this century by 
interstate agreements on narrow definitions of the ‘refugee’ since WW1, recently 
challenged by obvious broader realities of global refugeehood, similar to pre-WW1 
notions where 2.5 million Jewish refugees of economic despair through war and 
generalised oppression, were offered safety. Without denying people’s agency,  
 
…such migrations transcend the brute facts of persecution, poverty and 
overpopulation… these brutal motivations are raw ingredients which combine 
and metamorphose within larger political and economic structures so that people 
are set in motion, (Sassen, 1999:2) 
 
She concludes that immigration policies must reflect such broader realities, to move 
beyond attempted gate shutting against a perceived invasion of ‘others’, allowing 
immigrants and refugees to be considered  
 
…“‘today’s settlers’ to indicate old concepts of belonging do not fit present 
realities. Migrations are acts of settlement and of habitation in a world where the 
divide between destination and origin is no longer a divide of Otherness, a world 
in which borders no longer separate human realities,” (ibid:6).  
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The UNHCR’s (1997) analysis of contemporary forced migration encompasses a broad 
and complex range of global circumstances where human security is threatened and 
forced displacement occurs, prompting growing categorisation of people both inside and 
outside the UNHCR’s protectorate of ‘people of concern.’ The concepts “asylum flow, 
mass expulsion, ethnic cleansing, disaster-induced displacement, development-induced 
displacement, forced migration, internal displacement, population transfer, population 
exchange, involuntary repatriation, and imposed return”(ibid:2-3) go someway to 
reflecting this. The differentiation of voluntary and involuntary migration are 
problematised, in recognition that nearly all migration involves some compulsion. For 
examplelabour migration prompted by poverty and virtually all migration involves some 
element of choice, like where to go, or even in choosing to stay and die, or stay when 
everyone else leaves. Distinguishing between planned and spontaneous movement raises 
dilemmas problematising when people leave as a sign of forced or voluntary 
displacement. The UNHCR (1997:27) detail a complex combination of factors causing 
current loss of security and forced displacement, including “unbalanced development, 
economic decline and environmental degradation; by state collapse, state formation and 
the authoritarian exercise of state power; and by new forms of violence and warfare” 
such as violence and war-based economies and privatised violence (for instance, up to 35 
civil wars and far more lower-intensity conflicts were being fought globally in 1997).  
 
Such theoretical, academic and practical understandings of the complexity, contradiction 
and ambiguity in causes of contemporary migrations, specifically forced migrations raise 
further contradictions, ethical and practical dilemmas for supranational humanitarian 
bodies (e.g. the UNHCR), regional polities (e.g. the EU), national governments, local 
groups and individuals. Raising questions such as, how to respond, who has 
responsibility for protecting whom, if states are to have immigration policies, whose 
interests must be considered in designing them? These issues may be understood as 
tensions between national sovereignty, citizenship, the welfare state, particularism, 
partiality and impartiality, universalism, human rights, an understanding of which will 
further contextualise national and local responses and policies for receiving people 
seeking protection or asylum.  
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2.6 The tensions between universalism and particularism  
 
There is a massive growth of the global presence of millions of displaced people in need 
of security and protection and a greatly increased, though nevertheless small percentage, 
of people seeking refuge, arriving recently at the borders of most developed nations. This 
raises immense ethical and practical dilemmas for political communities, particularly but 
not exclusively, those organised as nation-states. There has been a growing literature 
debating these tensions. Although part of the wider debate on managing migration and 
immigration policies, the specific issues of refugee protection and asylum, are based on 
the  assertion that on scales of ‘neediness,’ that of refugees is the need of the protection of 
a new state and the right to life (Zolberg et al, 1989) and is more acute than those of other 
needy migrants. The character of nation-states contradicts the universalism of human 
rights, raising ethical dilemmas around controlling territorial entry and access to state 
resources, and obligations to protect those needing protection not based on physical 
proximity, (Singer and Singer, 1988).  
 
This conflict is between “partialism and impartialism” (Gibney, 2004) or “particularism 
and universalism,” (Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 1999) arising because the key 
characteristics of nation-states - sovereignty, citizenship and democracy - are 
fundamentally based on inclusionary and exclusionary principles, “Inclusionary and 
democratic to the inside, nation-states are necessarily exclusionary and undemocratic to 
the outside, rocks of facticity that defy universal justice and human rights,” (Joppke, 
1999:2). The sovereignty of nation-states was fully transferred after WW2 as the 
dominant system of rule of liberal-democratic states, that the political legitimacy of states 
or governments was determined by will of the people over the internal order of mutually 
exclusive territories: “rule in the modern world flows from the absolute sovereignty of 
state over its national territory” (Sassen, 1996:3). The shift in sovereignty from 
monarchy to secular republic, necessitated a new basis for belonging and solidarity 
within territories, so the “invention of the nation… essentially a cultural community – is 
a vital precondition for the emergence of the modern democratic republic as a political 
community” (Castles and Davidson, 2000:81). Thus another basis of exclusion from 
nation-states raising contention, is Walzer’s (1983) claim that political communities 
(nations) have the right to be “communities of character,” on the basis that members 
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have a “collective right to shape the resident population,” in other words a cultural 
community diversely “based on common descent, language and historical 
experience,”(Castles and Davidson, 2000:81).  
 
So, the argument goes, this territorial sovereignty gives states the rights to control both 
their literal and metaphorical borders (“physical borders and administrative thresholds”) 
so “by its very nature, migration and asylum law is situated in the conflict zone between 
particularism and universalism” (Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 1999:362,360). However 
migration control (particularism) and refugee protection (universalism) are based on 
different foundational principles, and are pursuing different systemic goals, “migration 
control is to manage the inflow, presence, and outflow of non-citizens on state 
territory…it is about the preservation of a particularist community…refugee protection is 
about the safeguarding of a certain level of human rights”(ibid:363).  Though they share 
some fields of operation and guiding procedural norms, “We are left with a formidable 
conflict between the state’s prerogative to exclude and the human rights imperative to 
include…”(ibid:364). Joppke (1999:281) argues that “Carried to its logical extreme, the 
doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subversive to the whole 
principle that mankind should be organized as a society of sovereign states.” 
 
Noll and Vedsted-Hansen (1999) argue that without a pre-established check on these two 
interests, particularism tends to “colonize” universalism, and without an inarguable right 
of way of one, balancing both is the only solution. They highlight the merging of refugee 
protection and migration control since states began questioning the legitimacy of most of 
the increasing numbers of asylum seekers as ‘genuine’ refugees, thus defining their 
overall rationale as preventing “irregular arrivals.” So control has taken over from 
protection. Joppke (1997) and Geddes (2000) also contend that increasing control against 
immigration tends to fit more with democracy, and generosity to immigrants (and 
humanitarianism to asylum seekers) is less popular thus elitist, another aspect of the 
dilemmas of states in responding to refugees and migrants.  
 
Some theorists argue that this conflict between universal human rights and particularist 
nation-state interests is not so stark, being mitigated and challenged by several factors. 
Habermas (1994) argues that liberal democratic states were built on the dual principles of 
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human rights and popular sovereignty, and have inbuilt internal constitutional human 
rights, “members of a democratic community are governed by themselves collectively” 
and “they are governed by law and not by man.”  However Castles and Davidson 
(2000:81) stress the contradictions in the mix of “nation,” when understood as an 
“imagined community” culturally, with “state” ensuring equal rights for members 
because “It’s model of inclusion always meant exclusion” and could lead to nationalism 
for example. Soysal (1994) and others, Joppke (1997) label as “human rights 
internationalism,” argue that the sovereign power of states is being limited by universal 
human rights laws imposed from without, such as the ECHR. More circumspectly Sassen 
(1998:7) argues that fundamental to immigration policy are “that it singles out the border 
and the individual as the sites for regulatory enforcement,” that although ratifying 
international human rights conventions, states’ sovereignty is supreme (e.g. not granting 
the right to asylum just accepting the right of non-refoulement) She asserts that “the 
individual emerges as a site for contesting the authority (sovereignty ) of the state 
because she is the site for human rights” (though she is wrongly held solely responsible 
for her migration in the first place, ibid). The transnationalizing of legal and regulatory 
regimes especially for economic globalization, and respect and enforcement of 
international human rights codes not based on national membership (such as judicial 
action defending asylum seekers rights against the legislature) offer tentative 
transformations in states’ sovereignties and the possibility of “de facto transnationalising 
of Immigration Policy.” Though Joppke (1997) disagrees, arguing that states capacities to 
control asylum seekers’ entry is increasing and that international human rights systems 
are not very effective in constraining states. Gibney (2004) stresses the need not just to 
resolve these dilemmas theoretically and ethically, suggesting impartialists demanding 
open borders is “other-worldly” but “into actual prescriptions for governments” 
recognising the “profound conflict of value between legitimate claims of citizens and 
those of refugees… exacerbated by the scope of the contemporary problem” (i.e. not just 
numbers of displaced people, but the complexity and extensiveness of the problems 
generating them). Gibney’s (2004) solution is that states without any discrimination on 
the “cultural” claims of nation, “should accept as many refugees as they can without 
undermining the provision of collective or public goods among their members,” (p84).  
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2.7 The Contradictions of migration and citizenship  
 
As well as the tensions around national sovereignty, another site of contradictions 
(Morris, 2002; Joppke, 1997; Castles and Davidson, 2000) and challenging of boundaries 
(Brubaker 1992) by migration and recent asylum seeking is the national institution of 
citizenship. While sovereignty refers to the state as a territorial organization, citizenship 
denotes the nation as a “membership association,” (Joppke, 1997:5). Many theorists 
stress the “exclusionary tensions inherent in the concept of citizenship,” that “Inclusion 
and exclusion represent the two sides of citizenship’s coin,” (Lister, 1997:42), most 
obviously as citizenship delineates those belonging and not belonging to the ‘community’ 
of members. Historically citizenship in liberal-democratic states conferred various rights 
in exchange for the loyalty of citizens. Civil, political and social rights were and are 
gained progressively, as Marshall (1950) claimed, with social rights, (realised last 
through welfare states), being essential for full participation of citizens in their formal 
civil and political rights. Marshall has been criticised for not recognising the differential 
exclusion of those outside formal citizenship and the informal exclusions by gender, 
‘race’, ethnicity, class and culture within citizenship (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). 
The boundaries of citizenship are not clear but blurred (Castles and Davidson, 2000; 
Baubock, 1998), or as Lister (1997:43) put it operate more on a continuum than as a 
dichotomy, (other than absolute exclusion from a territory), because “boundaries and 
allocative processes serve to include and exclude simultaneously,” and new boundaries 
are being drawn and re-drawn at the borders of and within nations and at supra-national 
levels (e.g. the EU).   
 
National citizenship has historically been understood as an exchange of rights for the 
solidarity and loyalty of its members in a cultural community, so not just a legal status 
but an identity; “As an identity, citizenship depends on and reinforces shared values and 
understandings, that is a common culture,” (Joppke, 1997:7). Whether mono-cultural 
nations and national identities actually existed in Western liberal-democracies, the mass 
immigrations of culturally diverse migrants since 1945 have challenged the ‘cultural’ 
institution of citizenship. This initially pressed toward assimilation, but then, in nationally 
different ways (e.g. jus sanguine and jus soli) and extents, towards accepting multi-
culturalism within citizenship. For instance Britain, with the increasing national and 
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cultural diversity of new residents since new migrations from the 1980s, has recently 
sought to strengthen the cultural dimension of citizenship, easing access to it, stressing 
the intent of  “integration with diversity” and celebrating multi-cultural belonging, 
accepting dual-citizenship but demanding loyalty ceremonies, language competence and 
knowledge of national history, (Home Office, 2002).   
 
With increased migration to Western nation-states, there have been increasing numbers of 
territorial residents living outside the boundaries of formal citizenship, with varying 
differential, predominantly civil and social rights, pathways of access to them and 
frequently moving boundaries as different states alter their policies for conditions of 
belonging. This increasing categorisation of foreign residents includes “foreign citizens 
with a legal and permanent resident status” that Hammar (1990:15) terms “denizens” 
and Castles and Davidson (2000:94) term “quasi-citizens” often with a full range of 
social and civil, but few political rights, who may (e.g. in Germany or Switzerland) have 
been born in their country of residence. But there is also a growing range of residents 
accorded varying, differential, lesser rights including tenuous or non-existent residence 
rights.,Martiniello (1994:42) terms these  “margizens” (including asylum seekers) as 
living on the margins of wealthy western societies. Non-citizen residents are also known 
as Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in Europe (nationals of states outside the EEA). 
Morris (2000:4) cites figures of 14.25 million resident foreign nationals in EC member 
states in 1990, two-thirds of whom were TCNs, with unknown numbers of unofficial 
migrants.  
 
The growing trend of EU states to differentiate and categorise migrants, permitting 
differential rights of access to state resources and participation, or social citizenship, is 
sometimes understood in terms of welfare-state protectionism or “welfare chauvinism” 
(Habermas, 1994). This is understood to have increased as, from the 1970s European 
states began to accept that their invited labour migrants were not going to return, and 
attempts to integrate them were co-ordinated with attempts at closure of further entrants.  
Bommes and Geddes (2000:2) argue,  
 
National welfare states can be viewed as political filters that mediate efforts by 
immigrants to realise their chances for social participation. These filters exclude 
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certain forms of unwanted immigration, define a variety of legal conditions for 
immigration and residence, combine them with differentiated welfare entitlements 
and, consequently, pave the social options for those who enter the country. The 
ascription of individuals to various categories of migrants… does not refer to the 
quality of the individuals falling into these categories, but to the labelling 
capacity arising from the political differentiation of migrants. 
 
Castles and Davidson (2000) and Morris (2002) point out the difference between formal 
access and substantial access to equal chances of participation in the different realms of 
society, in practice, that accompanies the differential categorisation of ‘belonging’ within 
nation-states. Morris (2002:6) uses a Weberian-style conceptualisation of this 
increasingly complex categorisation of migrants in EU states, which “is only hinted at in 
the conventional distinction between citizens, denizens and aliens (Hammar, 1990)” and 
is the outcome of a “cluster of contradictions,” diverging political dynamics and attempts 
to balance them. Different forms of migration continue despite a dominant discourse of 
closure, “the logic of the market is weighed against welfare protectionism; welfare and 
labour market regulation against demands for labour; and national resource concerns 
against trans-national obligations,” (ibid:6). The outcome is “an elaborate hierarchy of 
statuses with varying attendant rights… an increasingly complex system of civic 
stratification,” (ibid:6). Morris (2002:6) argues that this “nascent structure of inequality” 
displays another contradiction: “discriminatory exclusion and partial inclusion set 
alongside assertions of equal treatment.” 
 
Morris (2002) develops and adapts the concept of “civic stratification” from Lockwood 
(1996) which, she argues, is better able to deal with the “negotiated pragmatism” 
typifying the actual practice of rights, than previous sociological conceptualisations of 
‘boundary drawing,’ such as Brubaker’s (1992) and Freeman’s (1986), or the battling 
dualisms of the universal/particular, global/local, post-national/national. For instance, 
even universal human rights, such as the ECHR “contain their own hierarchy of absolute, 
limited and qualified rights,” (ibid:6).  Morris (2002) conceptualises and applies the 
concept of ‘civic stratification’ in empirical research in three differently positioned 
European states (Germany, Italy and Britain). She proposes three sets of paired opposite 
‘types’ of civic stratification; civic gain and deficit refer to the ways implementation of 
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rights are enhanced or impaired by informal processes; civic exclusion and inclusion are 
the formal access to rights; and civic expansion and contraction suggest the changing 
character of specific types or ‘regimes’ of rights over time. Such exclusions and statuses 
of partial membership are a further domain of inequality added to the battles for greater 
cultural equality and multi-culturalism traditionally explored in citizenship theories (e.g. 
Kymlicka, 1995). Morris (2002) views this area of civic stratification in terms of national 
government and regional (EU) polities’ management of the contradictions of 
contemporary migration. She explores the classificatory system (structure of legal 
statuses) governing eligibility for particular rights, the sorting of migrants by processes of 
exclusion and inclusion into these statuses, the actual realisation of such formal rights, 
and the shifting nature of the regime in its delivery and in relation to broader government 
practice. Her exploration provides a useful framework for conceptualising the position of 
those classified as ‘asylum seekers’ including various shifting statuses within this label, 
in relation to their formal and actually realised rights and entitlements to welfare support. 
Also useful to this study is Morris’ (2002:7) recognition that within her use of the 
concept of civic stratification this is “a system which in practice can serve as both a 
statement of rights and as an apparatus of surveillance and control.”   
 
 
2.8 The politicisation of ‘asylum’: the social construction of a ‘migration crisis’ 
 
The contradictions outlined so far on global, regional and national levels work together to 
condition and inform what has widely been regarded as ‘contentious.’  The increasing 
politicisation of the ‘new’ migrations, particularly asylum seeking as a ‘crisis’ and social 
problem needing solving through legislation and policy changes at EU and nation-state 
levels.  Castles and Miller (1998:253) even argue that “The most lasting significance of 
international migration may well be its effects upon politics.” However most theorists 
agree that the portrayal of a ‘crisis’ is out of proportion with the reality of scale and 
impact of actual new migrations to the wealthy West, that this so-called ‘migration crisis’ 
is more ‘social construction’ than reality, (e.g. Koser and Lutz, 1998; Lohrmann, 2000; 
Geddes, 2000). Others debate whether these perceptions of ‘crisis’ are produced more by 
public opinion, far right, media or mainstream political discourses (e.g. Statham, 2005). It 
is also recognised that while these particular constructions of a ‘migration’ or ‘asylum’ 
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crisis are distinct and historically specific, they are not new or unusual historically.  For 
instance Hayes (2002) demonstrates similarities in political rhetoric to the ‘unwanted’ 
migration of Jewish refugees to Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century to 
discourses around asylum seekers at the end of it.  
 
Since the 1990s increased politicisation around asylum and migration has involved a 
range of political actors, discourses and actions with immigrants as both political objects 
and actors: the emergence and variable legitimacy of new far right groups and political 
parties with nationalist, racist, anti-immigrant stances (e.g. le Pen in France, Pym Fortuyn 
in the Netherlands); EU polities; national governments; pro-migrant and asylum seeker 
groups; migrant mobilisation and new issues such as Islam; media discourses and public 
opinion, (Castles and Miller, 1998; Statham, 2005). The most dominant discourses have 
constructed new immigrants and asylum seekers as posing various ‘threats’ to Europe and 
individual nation-states, so demanding policy responses to such ‘threats’ in the context of 
the regressing borders of globalisation and within Europe, and more recently of global 
‘terrorism:’ “The social construction of the challenges posed by globalisation and 
immigration to the nation state is a central issue in the politics of both immigration and 
European integration,” (Geddes, 2000:21). This social construct is “the mixed result of 
discourses and practices by given social groups and institutions in a particular cultural, 
socio-economic and political context,” (Lohrmann, 2000:5), but there has been 
conjecture over exactly who is dominating the discourses and setting political agendas.  
 
Whilst the political mainstream argue they are responding to public opinion, others 
dispute that government policies respond to far-right agendas of immigration threatening 
national ‘communities.’ Many agree that right-leaning media (claiming to represent 
public opinion) are also responsible for directing government policy agendas. Statham’s 
(2005) British longitudinal and European cross-national research on the main roles of 
different political “claims-makers” within the ‘contentious’ politics of asylum, found that 
it was British government actors that “strongly shape” the debate, promoting an anti-
migrant/immigrant position. This countered Freeman’s (1995) ‘client-politics’ argument 
that organised political elites and interest groups drove the debate away from 
disorganised publics. Statham et al (2005:6) also found that “Counter to the ‘racist 
public’ thesis…to the extent that they get involved, civil society actors do so with a pro-
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migrant stance,” and there was little civil society mobilisation of extreme-right groups.  
Thus the “present restrictive and stigmatising” debate was dominated and shaped from 
the top-down, by British Governments and, Statham argues, media actors were more 
often the “carriers” than the proponents of political discourse,  
 
“The ‘asylum crisis’ in Western European countries led them to perceive these 
new migration flows as a destabilizing factor for their economic, cultural, social 
and political (including externally) stability”, (Lohrmann, 2000:7).  
 
While these social constructions, political discourses and actions of political actors must 
be understood in their broader global and historical contexts and in the specific historical 
and social contexts of individual nation-states and their European Union, some general 
tendencies are prevalent.  The most dominant feature of the ‘migration’ crisis 
construction has been the merging of ‘asylum’ with ‘immigration’ featuring the kinds of 
tensions mentioned between national sovereignty and human rights, where the majority 
of new asylum seekers are understood to be ‘economic migrants’ falsely posing as 
refugees fleeing persecution. This cloud of illegitimacy over all asylum seekers has 
fuelled suspicions and perceptions that these predominantly ‘unwanted’ migrants, 
constructed as mass ‘hordes,’ pose various threats to the stability and security of nation-
states. Since 9/11 particularly asylum seekers and undocumented migrants have been 
perceived as potentially threatening to national security. They have also been perceived 
to threaten ‘national identity’ or national ‘cultural communities,’ and in particular 
Husbands (1994) argues that Islamaphobia has increased with perceptions that growing 
numbers of Muslims will cause the “cultural dilution” of nation states. Such nationalisms 
also translate to a European level as Essed (1995) discusses “‘Europism’ to describe the 
defensive discourse involved in the construction of a ‘pure Europe’ as a symbolic 
continent which is cleansed of foreign and ‘uncivilised elements’ in its territory,” (Koser 
and Lutz, 1998:8). The new migrations are also depicted as threatening national European 
economies, welfare states and other social resources, in what Habermas (1992:27) calls 
the “‘chauvinism of prosperity’, focussing on the current process of European self-
definition through defending its prosperity and the institutions of the welfare state against 
greedy, indigent ‘outsiders’”(ibid). Governments have also constructed new migrations 
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(like previous immigration) as potentially disturbing local social stability, formerly ‘race’ 
but now ‘community’ relations.   
 
Many such social constructions of an asylum or migration crisis through public, political 
but specifically right-wing popular media discourses have been resoundingly critiqued in 
most academic literature across political positions as stigmatising, racializing and 
stereotyping asylum seekers.  These have been discussed as moral panics, scapegoating 
migrants (while mixing labelling terms) for broader social and political processes, such as 
globalisation and welfare state ‘roll back,’ (e.g. Mac an Ghaill, 1999:11). Also, new 
racisms have been conceptualised in more cultural and nationalist terms such as “Euro-
racism… quasi-nationalistic assertions of a European ‘us’ and a non-European ‘them’ 
taking place within highly contested national arenas”(ibid). Castles (2000:170) argues 
that, “the link between nationalism and racism is very strong,” and contemporary crises 
of national economies, social relations and politics, and the desire to protect class 
interests can lead to different forms of racism which seek either to exclude, inferiorize or 
exploit the racialised “Other”. Sivanandan (2001) talks of xenoracism (stronger than 
xenophobia) to describe new forms of racism directed at migrants and asylum seekers 
who may be white Eastern Europeans, and Phoenix (1998) similarly conceptualises new 
“hierarchies of whiteness.”  Others wish charges of racism, for instance in media 
discourses, to be used cautiously, not simplistically to cover sometimes more complex 
responses to social changes (e.g. Statham, 2005; Threadgold, 2001). Others prefer to 
conceptualise asylum seekers in terms of sociological understandings of “the Stranger,” 
rather than “the Other.” Because, as Pickering (2001:204) argues, “The stranger is 
inherently ambivalent. The relations of belonging and unbelonging are unsettled and 
confused by the figure of the stranger because he or she exists in a continual contact zone 
between belonging and unbelonging.”  East (2001) uses the term “stranger shock” to 
describe the responses of local “hosts” to dispersed asylum seekers in Britain, where it is 
more the clash of the global dispossessed with notions of solidaristic welfare rights than 
their cultural “otherness” that raise internal dilemmas and ambivalent reactions to them.  
 
At EU and national government levels the responses to social constructions of an ‘asylum 
crisis’ has overwhelmingly been to devise and enact policies to restrict entry to migrants 
seeking asylum .This combines with further “anti-asylum” rhetoric and political party 
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competition to control asylum and immigration movements. EU policy institutions, have 
devised policies “driven by its member states” (Statham and Gray, 20051) which while 
disassembling internal borders to EU citizens have attempted to construct stronger 
external borders to prevent access to ‘outsiders’, actions widely discussed as building 
“Fortress Europe” (Lister, 1997). These have included the Schengen Agreement and 
Convention (1985,1990) abolishing border controls between signatories (currently 
excluding the UK and Ireland ) but cooperating on preventing external immigration, 
whilst the Dublin Convention (1990, ratified in 1997) prevented asylum seekers making 
more than one claim in any European ‘safe’ country. Thus Geddes (2000:23) argues, “it 
is the co-existence of restriction and expansion tendencies that is a central feature of 
contemporary European immigration policies,” as governments have also begun to 
accept that in line with global economics, labour migration is essential for their 
economies and also that “liberal states can restrict but cannot control immigration” and 
will permit certain types of immigration alongside restrictive policies, while attempts at 
closing borders will always initiate migrants to find other (then illegal) entry means. Thus 
national and supra-national governments have begun to talk a little more of “managed 
migration,” but also failing to reach their restrictive targets may “actually reinforce the 
rhetorical commitment to tough and restrictive policies and a ratcheting up of the 
rhetoric of immigration control while politicians look nervously over their shoulders at 
the lurking menace of the racist extreme right,” (Geddes, 2000:23).  
 
2.9 Welfare as control                       
 
There is no more potent contemporary myth than the immigrant welfare 
scrounger, (Geddes, 2000:167).  
 
One of the most fundamental aspects of negative social constructions of asylum seekers 
and other ‘unwanted’ migrants in Western Europe has been the beliefs that such migrants 
are drawn (‘pulled’) by generous national welfare states and social rights, and that as the 
primary national resources welfare states represent, are already stretched to provide 
adequate welfare they cannot extend resources to newcomers. Also believing that most 
asylum seekers are not actually in need of state protection, they are perceived as welfare 
“free-riders,” or attempting to cheat welfare states by getting welfare support for nothing 
 46 
in return. Welfare states are another of the fundamental sites of inclusionary/exclusionary 
tensions; designed in liberal universalism to promote inclusion and equality, but also 
arguably on the exclusionary basis of national belonging, although specific national 
welfare state (and migration) histories and designs condition differential tendencies, 
(Banting, 2000; Geddes, 2003).  With new types of migration since the 1990s renewed 
attempts have been made, to clarify and restrict the “community of legitimate receivers of 
welfare state benefits” (Bommes and Geddes, 2000).This has been partly to reassure 
‘legitimate’ members and quell misconceived perceptions, but also as a method of 
immigration control, designed both to deter potential entrants from crossing external 
borders and as “internal controls,” intended to prevent access to social benefits to 
‘unwanted’ or ‘illegitimate’ migrant claimants who had gained territorial access. Roberts 
and Bolderson (1999:211) discuss the particular dilemma concerning asylum seekers’ 
claims and entitlements to welfare support that, on the grounds that “they have special 
needs, for accommodation, medical care, legal advice, language tuition or counselling,” 
they might justly ‘deserve’ such social care. But this is countered by the implicit notion 
of membership in all social policies and the ‘give and take’ of social transaction, and 
even when welfare is based on membership not of a group or nation, but universal human 
rights, “it seems inevitable that its substance is contingent on the polity within which it is 
framed and operated..” Asylum seekers “are deliberately regarded as ‘non-members’ of 
that country: the whole process of determining asylum-seekers’ rights to refugee status 
challenges the claim to membership,” (ibid).  
 
However, the ways in which migration and asylum seeking to Europe challenge 
organisational (basis of entitlement) and conceptual (notions of ‘belonging’ or 
‘deservingness’) boundaries of national welfare states, involve different trajectories of 
inclusion and exclusion. They are “mediated by national historical, social and political 
contexts… and by diverse organisational and decisional infrastructures of different 
welfare state types,” (Bommes and Geddes, 2000:3). Miles (1993), Cohen (2001) and 
Hayes (2002) for instance, also argue that specific historical understandings are necessary 
to make sense of current policy responses to different forms of migration. Banting (2000) 
and Geddes (2003) draw attention to Esping-Anderson’s (1990) typology of three types 
of welfare state, differentially influencing inclusions and exclusions of migrants and 
asylum seekers. More liberal or residualist welfare states such as the UK with less 
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complete commitment to social rights, more means-testing, and provision only for a low-
income minority, are more likely to induce “welfare chauvinism” and neo-liberalist 
emphasis on self-reliance and the market, because newly arrived, poor and unemployed 
migrants might qualify immediately. The conservative-corporatist models of nation 
states, such as Germany, with moderate levels of welfare support have also been 
pressured into more firmly demarcating “legitimate welfare receivers” and negotiated 
pragmatism. The social democratic models of Scandinavian universal, egalitarian 
redistributive welfare states have been challenged as countries, like Denmark, have 
attempted to deny access to new immigrants. Southern European welfare states differ 
again with higher levels of economic informality generally, making state internal controls 
of immigrants unpopular among majority populations also involved in the informal 
economy, (Geddes, 2003). Geddes (2003:154) argues that it is not so much migration that 
‘challenges’ welfare state borders, but rather “welfare states and perceptions of needs, 
requirements and resources structure perceptions of migration as wanted or unwanted… 
changes within these welfare states that can ‘challenge’ understandings of international 
migration.”  As welfare states are “important symbols of membership, entitlement, 
identity and belonging,” their coercive and disciplinary use to internally control 
immigration, and particularly in the suspension of many social rights from asylum 
seekers, potentially makes their social exclusion more keenly felt, (ibid:153). 
 
The different measures European nation states have taken to restrict the access of asylum 
seekers to the social entitlements of their welfare states (allowing for differential histories 
and ‘types’), as well as moves towards harmonising policies on a European level widely 
agreed to be the lowest common denominator of reception (e.g. Duvell and Jordan, 2002; 
Dwyer, 2005) involve the contradiction of “welfare as control.” With asylum seekers 
perceived to be outside the “legitimate community of welfare receivers,” as the 
‘undeserving’ poor, until their legitimacy, deservingness or ‘genuineness’ has been 
established by state decision-making systems determining their refugee or ‘other’ status, 
European states have progressively and variably reduced  social support to minimum 
survival (or non-existent) levels. States have used these measures for several purposes. 
They are attempts to appease “members’” supposed welfare chauvinism and reminding 
them of their own legitimacy (Geddes, 2001; 2003). Reducing and making welfare rights 
less ‘attractive’ has been intended to deter potential migrants outside state territory, based 
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on the largely unsubstantiated premise that such social rights are a pull factor for either 
‘economic’ migrants using the ‘asylum’ route for entry or ‘genuine’ asylum seekers who 
might otherwise go elsewhere, (Robinson et al, 2003).   
 
With varying attendant social rights the ‘civic stratification’ of all individuals “subject to 
immigration control” (Cohen, 2001) including asylum seekers, necessitates public 
services and workers in all areas of the welfare state, as well as employers, to check an 
individuals socio-legal/ immigration status so regulating access to services, thus 
enhancing “the ability of the state to monitor, observe and control the lives of asylum 
seekers” and other migrants (Geddes, 2003: 153).  This use of internal immigration 
controls was first discussed in Britain in the wake of new Conservative government 
policy, by Gordon (1985:2) who argued that “the overall effect is the questioning, 
restricting and controlling of rights, not just of those who are immigrants, but those who 
are commonly assumed to be, because they are black”.  Another intention of denying and 
restricting social rights is to ensure that asylum seekers (and other affected migrants), are 
not able to participate, integrate or be included socially, to establish roots in a society, so 
that they may be more easily uprooted, removed or deported, their migration reversed, 
(e.g. Geddes, 2001;2003).  
 
 
2.10 The welfare and immigration control ‘nexus’   
 
There is a growing body of literature (predominantly in social policy and political science 
disciplines) since the late 1990s concerned with the connections, or “nexus” (Cohen, 
2001) between European welfare states and immigration controls, particularly in relation 
to (seemingly inspired by) the conjunction of controlling the immigration of asylum 
seekers with the provisions for their welfare support (e.g. Bloch, 2000; Cohen, 2001; 
Schuster, 2000; Bommes and Geddes, 2000; Cohen, Humphries and Mynott, 2002; 
Duvell and Jordan, 2002; Sales, 2002; Bloch and Schuster, 2002). This joins a longer 
tradition of literature exploring the issues of “refugee reception” and “refugee 
integration” in receiving countries. This literature attempts to understand and explore the 
tensions intrinsic to the notions of “welfare support” as designed to facilitate social 
inclusion, with immigration control, designed to facilitate social and territorial exclusion, 
 49 
and the effects these tensions have on the lived experience of the objects of policies 
incorporating both. The more ‘radical left’ literature has stressed the long-standing 
historical relationship between nation-building, controlling immigration and welfare, 
where nation-building and welfare have operated together as ‘exclusionary,’ even racist 
processes, where excluding outsiders considered “socially and economically costly” from 
accessing national welfare states has aided ‘strong nations’ (Cohen, Humphries and 
Mynott, 2002; Miles 1993; Cohen, 2003; Hayes, 2004).    
 
It is argued that the British history of building its welfare state is entwined with its history 
of immigration controls, both of which were designed to strengthen Britain as a ‘nation,’ 
and, arguably both therefore are constructed to an extent on nationalist, even racist 
premises (Cohen, 2003). The first legislative attempt to control entry to Britain in the 
twentieth century, following the nineteenth century’s almost entirely open borders and 
official state welcome of refugees, was the 1905 Aliens’ Act passed following agitation 
concerning the “undesirable presence” of thousands of Jewish refugees fleeing Russian 
Poland, (Miles, 1993; Hayes, 2002). Although many Jews had found refuge in 19th 
century Britain, and the 1905 Aliens’ Act did not specify restriction of entry to Jews and 
retained the right to entry for refugees, the agitation that preceded it and its main sections 
were premised on the basis of excluding those considered “undesirable immigrants,” 
defined on several criteria. Aimed only at steerage passengers, the Act counted as 
undesirable people with a disease or infirmity, “lunacy”, or a criminal record, and anyone 
else who “cannot show that he has in his possession or is in a position to obtain the 
means of decently supporting himself and his dependents” (Section 1 (3), cited in Miles 
1993:144). The legislation aimed to exclude anyone who might be or become a “burden 
on the public purse,” which effectively, if implicitly was an exclusion of poor or sick 
Jewish refugees, previously constructed as “undesirable” and unwanted competition with 
the indigenous population for scarce resources. Miles (1993) emphasises the aims at 
exclusion on class grounds, with a more implicit racist consequence, whereas Cohen, 
(2003) argues that the Act signified a more explicit, if not named, anti-Semitism and the 
desire to protect the newly emerging British welfare institutions of Liberal reform from 
undesirable “foreigners.” Hayes (2002: 32) quotes a Conservative MP from Hansard 
1903, arguing “What was the use of spending thousands of pounds in building beautiful 
workmen’s dwellings if the places of our workpeople, the backbone of the country, were 
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to be taken by the refuse and scum of foreign Nations?” Hayes (2002:30) argues that the 
1905 Aliens Act and such preceding agitation for it, was the beginning of a continuing 
construction of the refugee as “burdensome, needy, socially costly, and consequently 
undesirable” and this logic is part of a further ideology around welfare and nation, 
“producing immigration controls which consistently place at their centre the need to 
access welfare as grounds for refusal of entry, and a welfare state which ensures 
provision is restricted to ‘ its own.’”  
 
Cohen (2003) and Hayes (2002) argue that the history of British welfare demonstrates its 
intrinsic nationalism (if not racism), and connection with attempts to control immigration, 
“…the ideological concepts of efficiency, eugenics, nation and empire have been a 
constant in the debates about welfare throughout this country” (Cohen, 2003:79). 
Heavily influenced by post-Darwinian 19th century concepts of ‘race’ and eugenics, the 
1906-1914 Liberal reform programme was conceived in terms of building the nation and 
breeding a strong British Imperial ‘race’, in the wake of the protracted struggle of the 
Boer War and shrinking Empire, and consequent fears that British ‘stock’ was 
weakening, (Hayes, 2002). The 1905 and 1914 Aliens Acts combined both border and 
internal controls to refuse entry to and deport several thousands of people considered 
“undesirable” particularly in their potential burden to public funds, and implicitly, their 
unsuitability in terms of the ideology of the British Imperial ‘race’. Such determinations 
of entry refusal and that eligibility for the entitlements of the Liberal Reform Acts were 
dependent to an extent on immigration status, Hayes (2002:36) argues, “are a direct 
forerunner to the present-day use of immigration rules, which prevent entry to anyone 
who may have ‘recourse to public funds’”.  Cohen (2003) goes on to argue with reference 
to the Beveridge Report, in which “we find an explicit incorporation of pre-war 
assumptions of efficiency and eugenics,” that the post-1945 Welfare State was also 
founded on strengthening a war-depleted nation and British ‘race.’ According to Cohen 
(2001;2003) both “labourism” and “welfarism” being historically entangled with the 
introduction and enforcement of immigration controls, are founded in a combination of  
“a virulent nationalism, expressed through state control of foreign workers.”  And in 
conceptualising welfare for British nationals only and improving British ‘stock,’ 
immigration controls and the welfare state are intrinsically racist institutions. Although 
Cohen (2003) concedes that the post-1945 Welfare State proudly gave entitlement to 
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benefits and the NHS, based not on nationality or immigration status but presence in the 
UK, exclusion from the welfare state was gradually achieved by further immigration 
controls and, Hayes (2002) argues, by discriminating through informal practices of 
exclusion particularly of black immigrants, for instance in new housing schemes. Geddes 
(2000:3) states that Marxist or neo-Marxist arguments emphasise the restrictiveness and 
exclusion of welfare states and immigration policies, whereas liberal theses emphasise 
their expansiveness, universalism and inclusionary principles and practices.  
 
2.11 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has, by reference to the prominent literature, developed a context at a 
predominantly global or macro and philosophical level, exploring some of the 
contradictions and tensions around the forced migration of millions of people, and 
international and national responses to receiving forced migrants.  This serves to 
underline and explain the “transnational connectedness” (Castles, 2003:24), which 
affects the national, local and individual social relations and settings, of the conception, 
delivery, reception and experience of social policy around forced migrants.  
 
Initially this chapter discusses some of the contentions around the terms and discourses 
used in everyday and popular understandings of forced migrants, academic and activist 
resistance and problematising of such labels and discourses, seeking to develop less 
oppressive and stereotyping terms.  Castles’ (2003) challenge to develop a ‘sociology of 
forced migration’, essentially encompassing the many levels from global to local, macro 
to micro, of analysis and explanation, multi-discipline and theoretically rather than policy 
driven research agendas is taken up for this study. Accepting such a challenge involves 
the exploration of the wider and broader picture, the global and philosophical issues and 
social relations which have an undeniable effect on, and so inform and will assist in 
making sense of, the local and individual worlds where the ethnography will be carried 
out.  
 
Having acknowledged the dominance of contradictions and tensions in the literature on 
the global and conceptually broad level of analysis around forced migration, the chapter 
turns to go through those considered most important for this study. After raising some 
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contemporary debates on ‘globalisation’, this section explores how some of the 
contradictions of globalisation condition and contribute to causing forced migration, that 
as Sassen and Castles argue, migration is a key aspect of globalisation where the ‘logic of 
capital’ drives states to open their ‘borders’ to the market but close them to ‘labour’ and 
other migrants. Though migrating has always been part of human history and human 
nature, twentieth and twenty-first century migration, including forced migration, some 
theorists argue is qualitatively and quantitatively different, especially since WW2 and 
again since the 1980s, being an inextricable part of other global processes. The analysis 
turns to explore some of the theoretical explanations for the scale and character of current 
migrations and forced migrations, between which there are no straightforward 
boundaries. Sassens’ contention that migration including forced migration is ‘produced’ 
and conditioned historically by sending and receiving countries and the links between 
them, and not simply the decisions and actions of individuals, is preferred. However, 
receiving societies, national and regional governing bodies struggle with the tensions of 
their universalist and particularist tendencies, their obligations to universal human rights 
and their particular polity and sovereignty, making the immigration and reception policies 
of receiving national and regional governments fraught with problems. Related to this are 
the challenges such mass migrations bring to the institution of ‘citizenship’ of nation 
states, which hold its own tensions of inclusion and exclusion. The boundaries of 
citizenship are blurred and challenged as nation-states have sought ways to include and 
exclude some on different levels and from different rights, including to welfare states. 
They devise increasingly differentiated and complex layers of membership, of inclusion 
and exclusion, which Morris (2002) has termed ‘civic stratification’.  
 
These and other tensions have contributed to the increasing politicisation of ‘asylum’ and 
‘immigration’ in the West and Europe, where dominant discourses have constructed and 
raised the profile of a ‘migration crisis’, justifying actions to stop it through increasingly 
restrictive attempts to control immigration. This alleged migration ‘crisis’ also includes 
social transformations within receiving societies, with theorists beginning to 
conceptualise new racisms, such as ‘Euro-racism’ (Mac an Ghaill, 1999) and 
‘xenoracism’ (Sivanandan, 2001). One major aspect of the politicisation of migration and 
asylum has been the supposed (mythical) assault on Western receiving nations’ welfare 
states which confer the social rights of citizenship, and a populist and political drive 
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towards welfare state protectionism or ‘chauvinism’ and tightening of welfare state 
‘borders’ mirroring territorial national borders. The delineation of “legitimate welfare 
receivers” by excluding and stigmatising the ‘illegitimate’ and the scale and character of 
controlling access to welfare states differs according to welfare state ‘types’ and specific 
national, social and historical contexts. The literature on the ‘nexus’ between immigration 
controls and welfare states is growing, and stresses, giving the British example, the 
historical connections between the development of the two and their current closer 
weaving. The next chapter will use this macro analysis to inform the closer focus on the 
national and local context of the ethnographic research.  
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3. The social and historical context for a local voluntary sector refugee reception 
agency in 2002-2003 in the UK      
 
The purpose of this chapter is several-fold. To make sense of the social relations and 
‘forces’ at work in the local everyday setting of a voluntary sector refugee support 
agency, and the ‘lived experience’ of those participating in it in the specific social and 
historical position that it operates from, it is essential to consider its closer context. This 
chapter will consider how the contradictions raised in the previous chapter are manifest in 
the national context of the UK (sometimes broadening to the regional EU context where 
relevant), considering the history of migration and forced migration to the UK and British 
responses to it of immigration controls, and refugee reception. It will consider the 
development of controlling migrants’ access to the welfare state, in the context of general 
national social welfare policy, and the specific social context of Britain (in Europe) in the 
1990s and early 2000s. In order to understand (and evaluate) current reception policies 
for forced migrants (asylum seekers) it is useful to relate them to reception policies for 
refugees historically in Britain and where relevant, elsewhere. This must include a 
consideration of the role of civil society and the voluntary sector in the welfare state in 
general and the reception of forced migrants in particular. Research exploring the role 
and experience of welfare ‘workers’ engaged in implementing social policy is important 
to understanding that of those in this study. Important also is an understanding of forced 
migrants experiences of host nations reception policies and to review the literature on 
understandings of refugees’ needs on arrival in receiving societies.  
 
This will usefully place the introduction of the 1990s legislations into context, and 
specifically the “qualitative leap” (Cohen, 2001) in the nexus between immigration 
controls and welfare, that some argue the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 
encompassed. The specific relevant measures and the design for their implementation that 
incorporated or ‘co-opted’ multi-agencies, including VS organisations will be detailed. 
Alongside placing this research into its historical and social context, this chapter by 
reviewing past and current research and sociological attention, will justify the space for 
and usefulness in adding this ethnographic study to the picture and contribute towards 
progressing the burgeoning ‘sociology of forced migration.’  
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3.1 The reception of refugees and asylum seekers 
 
The concept of ‘reception’ of refugees and asylum seekers is socially, politically and 
historically constructed and has only recently since the late 1980s become officially and 
formally used coherently to refer to one aspect of ‘asylum policy’, throughout Europe. 
Although European countries have differed, historically they have mainly organised 
‘reception programmes’ sporadically on acceptance of groups of recognised or pre-
arranged ‘quota’ refugees. It has only been since the increase in numbers of 
‘spontaneous’ asylum seekers, that national governments have begun to pay increased 
legislative attention to ‘reception’ arrangements for them. {Also when asylum seekers 
lost their innocence as refugees, so former conceptions of reception and ‘resettlement’ 
were increasingly separated by design, the latter only encouraged in policy terms when 
refugee status had been granted.} ‘Reception’ suggests an active receiving; more than just 
passive admittance onto a territory, and has at different times and places historically 
involved recognition of potentially specific needs of displaced people in exile having 
escaped persecution. However, in relation to his research on the roles of RSL’s in asylum 
support between the 1996 and 1999 Acts in Britain, Zetter and Pearl (1998:53) contend, 
 
The term ‘reception’ is often perceived in a pejorative sense, linked to an 
ineffective system of cultural control and a perversely imposed dependency…This 
has discouraged development of good practice.   
 
Considering refugee ‘reception’ necessarily involves defining  the concept of ‘asylum’; 
what exactly is asylum or the provision of protection or safety? The concept of ‘asylum,’ 
sanctuary or refuge is as old as recorded human history, but it is only since the 19th 
century solidifying of nations and their borders in Europe that it became politicised and to 
take on the twentieth century meaning of protection by one state of people having lost 
protection of another state, (Joly, 1996). The 1951 Geneva Convention, constructed from 
previous legal instruments after WW1, was primarily concerned with safe nations’ non-
refoulement of an individual fleeing political persecution on arrival at their borders. 
Asylum was, therefore, primarily protection by state territorial admission or at least the 
obligation not to return a person to the state of lost protection. However, the 1951 
Convention also specifies obligations states have to refugees on their territory, including 
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social rights ensuring a dignified existence and specified aspects of welfare and access to 
employment equal to that of nationals and no less than that of foreigners in similar 
circumstances, (Joly, 1996; Duke, Sales and Gregory, 1999). Since 1951, those not 
meeting a ‘Convention’ refugee criteria, but displaced for other reasons (such as 
generalised violence) might have been and still may be afforded protection under various 
nationally incorporated Human Rights legislations, where residence conditions are much 
more at the discretion of individual states. Living conditions for contemporary asylum 
seekers awaiting state determination of their refugee status, not mentioned in the 1951 
Convention, are further at the discretion of their states of asylum, dependent to an extent 
on which Human Rights legislations they are signatory to (and very recently EU 
harmonisation of minimum standards for their reception). Therefore, states’ reception of 
refugees or potential refugees (asylum seekers), with their obligations under international 
human rights laws to respond to their specific if potential need for protection, is and has 
been imbued with the tensions of universalism and particularism as discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
 
Whether a person or group’s exile is permanent or temporary, by their own or the 
protective state’s bidding, ‘reception’ has usually referred to the treatment or form of 
social, cultural, psychological, welfare assistance provided during the early stages after 
their arrival in the country or their asylum claim, either by the central or local state or 
formally or informally by civil society; voluntary organisations, groups or individuals. 
The formal and informal responses of individual European and developed nations to 
refugees have been conditioned by their unique, complex histories including refugee 
migrations, national and international politics, overall immigration and emigration, 
economics and welfare systems. However from the 1990s, most accounts stress the 
increasing convergence of their responses towards contemporary asylum seekers 
(Schuster, 2000; Joly, 1996) formalised by efforts to harmonise EU member states 
asylum policies including reception or welfare provision beginning with the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty, although still preserving their national distinctiveness (Duvell and 
Jordan, 2002). For instance Germany was particularly liberal post-WW2, until the early 
1990s when amongst its new asylum restrictions it suspended asylum seekers for longer 
in reception centres and further from citizenship rights and the labour market, (Schuster, 
2000). However harmonisation meant Italy, Greece and Spain having just transformed 
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from emigration to immigration countries were obliged to introduce for the first time 
some minimum welfare reception provisions (Duvell and Jordan, 2002).  
 
3.1.1 A history of ‘reception’ policies in Britain 
 
Britain’s self-proclaimed generosity towards refugees was most justified during 18th and 
19th Century laissez-faire acceptance of predominantly Jewish Eastern Europeans. Since 
the 1914 and 1919 Aliens Restriction Acts, then the 1920 Aliens Order (renewed 
annually until the 1971 Immigration Act) those with recourse to public funds including 
refugees were allowed only severely restricted entry, or deported, (Bloch, 2002).  From 
that time specific groups of refugees were granted entry and welcomed with varying 
degrees of assistance; 250,000 Belgian refugees arriving between 1914-1918 were treated 
extraordinarily well, whereas 65,000 wartime Jewish refugees from Nazism (1939-1945) 
were met with antipathy and sometimes internment (Bloch, 2002; Knox and Kushner, 
1999). The predominantly ‘quota’ refugees, quickly granted asylum (Ugandan Asians, 
Chileans and Vietnamese) between 1969 and the 1980s, were met with short-term ad hoc 
reception arrangements for each group with some funding from the Voluntary Service 
Unit of the Home Office and Overseas Development Ministry. Central government 
funded initial reception services for these groups but not later resettlement, a mode of 
operating known as ‘front-end loading’, and distanced itself from the programmes by 
delegating to speedily assembled quangos, such as the Uganda Resettlement Board, who 
further delegated to NGO’s and volunteers, such as the Red Cross (Robinson, 2003; Joly, 
1996). These schemes typically involved dispersal of reception centres and later 
accommodation-led resettlement, with local authorities  expected to volunteer 
accommodation and services to refugees. In some cases NGOs and voluntary groups 
initiated, paid towards and operated the reception of these refugees, (e.g. Joint Working 
Group for Refugees from Chile, in 1974) which included planned dispersals and periods 
in ‘reception centres’ or camps.  
 
French reception of similar groups differed by establishing a centrally government 
operated and planned refugee reception infrastructure also heavily influenced by 
numerous civil society groups, but in place for the long-term, (Joly, 1996). From her 
comparative review of French and British reception and settlement policies of specific 
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groups of refugees, Joly (1996:116,117) argues that the “typically British” ad hoc, 
pragmatic character of the responses in keeping with “its philosophical tradition of 
empiricism and its legal system based on custom and practice,” prevented effective 
development of an “institutional memory.”  Traditional NGO involvement in 
humanitarian and social work was a “blueprint” for these reception programmes which 
although allowing flexibility, was also marked with a small budget and so impossibility 
of forward planning, (ibid). While there was some central government funding and 
distant direction of these reception and resettlement programmes for ‘quota’ refugees in 
Britain there was no reception policy beyond admission to most mainstream welfare 
services for ‘spontaneous’ refugees, arriving in small numbers predominantly from 
‘behind the Iron Curtain’ or from the mid 1980s with increasing momentum from 
worldwide.  
 
3.1.2 The aims and purposes of ‘reception’ 
 
What were the aims and purposes of national reception and resettlement of refugees; 
what factors shaped these responses? The literature examining these responses reveals the 
obvious tensions of perceived national, particularist interest and universal human rights 
obligations. Joly (1996:21) argued, however, that  
 
Generally speaking, naked ‘national interest’ seems to govern decisions 
and policies on asylum in the arena of domestic policy. However, such a 
situation is fraught with contradictions…  
 
The conjunction of a complexity of historical, economic, social, political, ideological and 
cultural factors conditioned such policies, as well as those groups or political elites, Joly 
(1996) suggests, with the political power to define what the national interest was. Duvell 
and Jordan (2002) also suggest asylum reception or welfare policies are strongly 
conditioned by economic and labour market factors. For instance, from 1946 thousands 
of Eastern Europeans in displaced persons camps or already fled to Britain, including 
300,000 Polish exiles, were resettled in Britain but treated as labour recruits (European 
Volunteer Workers) to post-war reconstruction. With housing shortages after wartime 
bombing and some xenophobia, responsibility and operation of resettlement was 
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delegated to a non-governmental body allowing the government to distance itself, and 
those previously Polish soldiers were accommodated for long periods in dispersed 
accommodation camps, to prevent (perceptions of) competition in the housing shortage, 
(Robinson, 2003). Although at this time this group were considered useful to the national 
labour market and reception policies reflected that, at other times other groups have been 
considered more a ‘burden’ dependent on a number of factors including the policy and 
public opinion on immigration in general.  
 
Most of these reception schemes were at least partially concerned also with the 
recognition of the national obligation to tend to these people’s social rights as refugees, 
even if this was through the priorities of the charities and volunteers operating them. 
However these “refugee-specific initiatives” (Carey-Wood,1997) were, as stated, 
predominantly aimed at the early days of reception, with little attention or specific 
assistance given to longer-term ‘resettlement;’ refugees were expected to settle in 
dispersal areas accessing mainstream services until the Bosnian ‘programme’ between 
1992-95. This catered for mid and long term support to facilitate ongoing settlement, 
although dependent on the expected length of protection (Robinson, 2003). Although all 
differing, generally these schemes aimed to provide some kind of orientation to the 
country, information concerning social systems, some language training, medical 
screening and care, assistance in accessing housing, post-reception centres and some 
advice on training and employment. In practice, this assistance was often inadequate and 
mostly stopped when refugees were housed in their dispersal areas. The Vietnamese 
refugees, for instance, housed in small ‘clusters’ in dispersal areas, following sometimes 
long institutionalising periods in reception centres, learning little English, being a visible 
minority, suffered many problems; isolation, high unemployment, debts, ill-understood 
DHSS claims, mental health and serious health problems, domestic violence and low 
school attendance, (Jones, 1982; Joly, 1996; Robinson, 2003). However, although often 
inadequate for successful long-term settlement, and “largely resource-led rather than 
policy-led and also majority society-led rather than refugee-led” (Joly, 1996:117) these 
schemes attempted to address at least in some way these people’s immediate needs as 
refugees, as different from other migrants.  
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Based on her research Joly (1996:191) suggests ‘refugees’, although heterogeneous, can 
be considered as an ‘ideal type’ social group,  
 
…there are such social types as refugees with their own characteristics and their 
own modes of settlement in the host society… Moreover refugees are not one 
single category and this study shows at least two social types: those who nurture 
a collective project oriented towards the society of origin and those who do not 
(they never did so or abandoned it).  
 
Although sociological and legal categories often do not coincide, Joly (1996:192) argues, 
both types of refugee she identified “differentiate themselves from labour migrants in 
their motivations, their aspirations and their mode of settlement.”  Duke et al.(1999:105-
6) also state,  
Refugees have distinctive needs which necessitate specific policies if resettlement 
is to be successful. They have been forced to flee, usually at short notice, often 
leaving behind family as well as jobs, homes and possession: in fact everything 
that made up their identity… in many cases refugees seek asylum in countries 
with which they have no former connection, and they may have little knowledge of 
the language, culture or job market…preparation is impossible and the 
experience of exile, particularly in the early days, is dominated by a sense of loss. 
Their needs cannot be met merely by the provision of services on the same basis 
as nationals. Successful resettlement depends on programmes which allow them 
to find a place in the new society… 
 
While both Robinson (2003) and Joly (1996:192) stress the importance reception and 
settlement policies have had in the long-term experience of refugees’ settlement in host 
countries, (they “modulate possibilities of access, integration and exclusion”), they also 
stress that refugees interact dynamically with their own reception and settlement; they are 
not just passive receivers of policy. This point is reflected in Zetter’s (1998) 
problematisation of ‘reception,’ stressing the negative consequences of such top-down 
approaches. 
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3.1.3 Theories of refugee reception and ‘settlement’ 
 
 
While reception and settlement policies have been developed out of the perceived 
tensions of national interest and universal human rights, so theories of refugee experience 
of a host country of exile have until recently been dominated more by their adaptation to 
the host country than that nation’s culpability, and there have been few separate theories 
for refugees as distinct from other migrants, (Bloch, 2002; Castles et al, 2003). Current 
research into refugee settlement reviews and critiques past theories and concepts that 
have influenced past policies and been used normatively, (Castles et al, 2003). These 
include the concept of assimilation coming from the race-relations paradigm (Park, 1950; 
Gordon; 1964), now largely discredited for presuming a one-way process whereby 
migrants should abandon their culture and outlook and take on that of their host-society, 
when host-societies are not mono-cultural and the encouragement of migrants to maintain 
their cultures, contributing to multi-cultural societies are preferred in most western 
nations.  
 
The psychological concept of acculturation initially developed to explain the process of 
adaptation of migrants to a nation of immigration (Berry, 1980) has been applied to the 
adaptation of refugees to a host nation and purports to be a multi-dimensional several 
way, non-linear and non-normative process, “by which migrant groups adjust to being in 
contact with different cultures,” (Dona and Berry, 1999:171) and different outcomes are 
possible. Castles et al (2003) review further concepts that have been used: segmented 
assimilation; functional assimilation; incorporation; inclusion/ exclusion; insertion; 
settlement/ re-settlement (the favoured term in ‘refugee studies’); denizenship; 
citizenship, before continuing to prefer the currently preferred term of policy makers and 
politicians, ‘integration.’ While integration can be used with the similar normative 
undertones and meaning of  ‘assimilation,’ and is therefore rejected by some social 
scientists, NGO’s and activists, Castles et al (2003) rest on a definition that attempts to 
stress the relative, culturally determined and two-way character of the process, and reflect 
the problems involved with the concept: 
 
If refugees are able to participate in the host economy in ways commensurate 
with their skills and compatible with their values; if they attain a standard of 
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living which satisfies culturally determined minimum requirements…; if the socio-
cultural change they undergo permits them to maintain an identity of their own 
and adjust psychologically to their new situation; if standards of living and 
economic opportunities for members of the host society have not deteriorated due 
to the influx of refugees and is not worse than within the host population itself; 
and if the refugees do not encounter more discrimination than exists between 
groups previously settled within the host society: then refugees are truly 
integrated,  (Kuhlman, 1991:7, cited in Castles et al, 2003:125). 
 
However, Castles et al. (2003:127) emphasise that integration is not a singular linear 
process, but represents “a constellation of factors significantly influences velocity, 
trajectory and outcomes, (Vertovec; 1999).”  Such factors revolve around the migrants, 
the place and position they migrated from and conditions of their migration, as well as a 
multitude of possible circumstances around the country of immigration.  They involve 
structural factors but also the motivations, strategies and networks (agency) of individual 
and groups of migrants. Castles et al. (1999:128) offer a “check-list” of broad 
conditioning factors, they suggest could lead to an “Integration Matrix” to help identify 
specific needs and problems and develop migrant and refugee policies: “Conditions of 
exit; Categories of entrant; Legal status; Characteristics of entrants; Characteristics of 
ethnic community; Conditions of receiving context.” The specific variable factors 
conditioning a migrant’s integration can lead to “highly-differentiated socio-economic 
outcomes,” (ibid:129)  to which could be added, subjective and psychological outcomes 
also. And particularly relevant to this study, Castles et al. (2003:126-7) also state that 
although short and long-term integration processes can be distinguished,  
 
…integration starts from day one of arrival. Long-term outcomes may be 
influenced by early experiences. Individuals or groups with limited rights and 
opportunities may integrate in ways that lead to disadvantage and 
marginalisation… Asylum-seekers who are treated with suspicion and even 
confined to detention centres may find it hard to feel that they are full members of 
society when and if their refugee claims are recognised. 
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Policies designed to postpone settlement or integration are also considered potentially 
damaging to the long-term outcomes of asylum seekers by Joly (1996:95) reporting that 
French NGO’s since laying down the national structures for supporting Chilean refugees, 
intended the same social rights serve future arrivals including asylum seekers, “on the 
assumption that their settlement began with their arrival and not when they were to be 
granted status.” Duke et al (1999:107) also reiterate this in reference to the removal of 
social welfare rights from in-country asylum seekers with the British 1996 Asylum and 
Immigration Act, arguing that such policies “…have diverted the efforts of those 
concerned with refugee rights towards dealing with immediate needs for shelter rather 
than long-term strategies, undermining the process of long-term settlement…” 
 
3.1.4 What effects have reception policies had?  
 
Obviously any assessment of the success of reception and settlement policies and 
practices must consider what the initial aims were, if any and so also involve what is 
understood by success and according to whom? Aims may also be mixed; governments 
designing or agreeing or throwing together policies for the reception of refugees may be 
aiming at enabling long-term ‘integration’ (however they interpret that) and settlement; 
meeting basic, immediate needs; and/or appeasing the perceived views of the polity by 
attempting to promote good ‘race’ or ‘community’-relations; ‘burden-sharing;’ and/or 
deterring asylum claimants from coming or staying. 
 
Korac (2003) stresses the differences in understandings and practicalities of ‘integration,’ 
and therefore indicators or measures of ‘integration’ depending on who defines it. Citing 
Robinson (1998:118) Korac (2003:52) suggests “integration is a vague and ‘chaotic’ 
term,” where in refugee studies literature, because of its development from refugee 
protection including social rights, integration takes on a functional meaning, whereas 
integration in the ‘race-relations’ literature involves the necessity for different cultures to 
co-exist, so involves issues of identity and belonging. However, the problem is not just 
conceptual but practical as policy makers defining integration differently has practical 
consequences for their policy ‘objects’ - refugees and asylum seekers (and other 
migrants). Korac (2003) stresses that research on reception and settlement policies have 
tended to take the same ‘top-down’ approach as policy makers, stressing structural and 
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organisational aspects of integration, using ‘objective’ measures such as successful 
employment, access to training, social services and support in community-building. 
Attempting to redress this balance, Korac (2003) argues that it is essential to consider 
refugees’ subjective experiences of ‘integration’ and their exile, which are as important 
an indicator of ‘successful’ adaptation or integration as structural measures. Her in-depth 
interviews with refugees from former Yugoslavia in the Netherlands and Italy re-affirm 
Knudsen’s (1991) critique of assistance programmes for refugees, treating them as having 
“immature social identities” and needing re-educating to be integrated, (Korac, 2003:54). 
As Castles et al (2001) stress, integration involves sets of inter-lapping processes as 
receiving societies are not one monolith but many different sectors and, Korac (2003:54) 
argues, social policy should reflect this complexity and also building “bridging social 
capital” (after Putnam, 2000) could provide strategies for broader social inclusion. Korac 
(2003) also argues that policy interventions should not treat refugees as having one 
common identity, but recognise their highly differentiated needs as social actors of many 
differences.  
 
Korac (2003) found that the Dutch ‘model’ of integrating refugees, which involved a top-
down, state-led, phased process of reception and integration that could last for years and 
involved separation of refugees in accommodation centres, left refugees often feeling 
detached from Dutch society despite their functional integration. Dutch policies 
concentrated on functional integration but were a one-way process not treating refugees 
as active participants in their integration, but as passive policy objects, and so many 
remained state-dependent. Despite their own efforts, many refugees felt informally 
socially excluded by members of Dutch society they came into contact with and so 
socially isolated. Although having their initial needs well met, many of the refugees in 
Korac’s study felt they had been denied their autonomy and were compelled to comply. 
For instance a Bosnian Doctor, employed as such in the Netherlands, said, 
 
…we live here a parallel existence, because we don’t have real contact with 
Dutch society. We are neither accepted nor rejected… I do what I’m told to do, 
and everything is going according to ‘integration’ rules that we ‘refugees’ have to 
follow. We didn’t have to integrate really, you see, we just had to do what we 
were told, (Korac, 2003:56).  
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Even with citizenship, refugees felt uncertain about their status and Korac (2003) 
concluded that citizenship may have been perceived as yet another instrument of state 
control, rather than a guarantee of equality and full participation in Dutch society. In 
contrast, the minimal state support of refugees in Italy produced different problems. 
Initially refugees often had to sleep rough and concentrate all their efforts on meeting 
their basic needs for shelter and subsistence, so were forced to enter the labour market in 
low socio-economic positions that were difficult to move up from, and many felt they had 
not succeeded in gaining the security to plan their future. Those who found occupations 
suited to their skills spent many years getting to that position. Even after many years in 
Italy, refugees still held insecure legal statuses, but the majority felt socially integrated 
with Italians and ‘at home’ in the country. Korac (2003:60) states, 
 
The lack of a state-organized attempt to meet the group needs of refugees in Rome 
forced them to rely on their personal skills and resources in finding their way in 
Italian society. During their first years in Rome, they spontaneously formed 
networks that served as an alternative self-help reception ‘system’.  
 
These social networks were initially between inter-ethnic groups but quickly broadened 
when people had gained some means of survival, and not being mediated by professional 
social services like the Dutch system, they did not presume the same superiority of the 
receiving society culture. The cultures were not set in opposition and so building 
‘bridging social capital’ was possible and refugees and the receiving society’s 
adaptability to each other was strengthened. There was a sense of reciprocity among these 
refugees, “their contacts with Italians were characterized by a mutual process of learning 
and shifting within which both communities can gain,” (ibid: 61). Their perceptions of 
their losses were economic and of future certainty, but not of personal agency or social 
networks. Korac (2003:62) concludes that longer-term integration is affected by the first 
stages of reception and settlement, and that while provision of support towards functional 
integration is obviously important, so is the recognition and support of the agency of 
individuals in “reconstructing their lives.”  The Dutch highly managed system, whilst 
providing many of the tools for functional integration, were experienced as “…state 
measures that often do not correspond to their needs and integration goals, to which 
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refugees, nonetheless, are required to conform because of the lack of power and ‘voice’ 
in the process of integration,” (ibid:62).  
 
Korac (2003:62) stresses the importance of considering refugees points of view on how 
policy instruments for their reception and settlement affect their integration, as well as 
functional ‘indicators,’ citing Harrell-Bond’s (1999) contention that “the way in which 
refugees are ‘helped’ may itself undermine their personal coping strategies.” 
 
Bloch (2002) details four overarching factors which the literature suggests the settlement 
of refugees and asylum seekers depend upon: the policies of the country of asylum (legal 
system, citizenship status) and strategies of incorporating migrants (differential 
exclusion; multiculturalism); social networks; individual characteristics of migrants 
(language, education); and the circumstances of the migration. Bloch’s (2002) survey 
research (with qualitative interviewing) into the settlement outcomes of three 
communities of ‘spontaneous’ refugees in Newham, London, found a complexity of 
macro and micro factors generally supporting these variables, though making it difficult 
to generalise about refugees’ settlement experiences. She found further consequential 
factors that affected settlement, particularly lack of secure immigration status, which 
influenced people’s attitudes to settling in Britain as well as their capacity to move on 
with their lives. Proficiency in English, initial reasons for migration to Britain (as 
opposed to elsewhere) and aspirations to return ‘home’ and factors such as the 
marginalisation of Somali women (who tended to be lone parents) by the host and their 
own communities were important reasons for not subjectively feeling settled or 
measuring settled using Robinson’s (1986) typology of adaptation.  
 
3.1.5 The role of RCOs and social networks 
 
Bloch (2002) further stresses the importance of community organisations and the 
voluntary sector in assisting settlement, particularly at the time of her research in 1996 
when there had been no special state provision of reception and settlement services for 
spontaneous asylum seekers and refugees who, until the 1996 AIA, were formally 
permitted virtually the same access to welfare services as nationals. As we have seen, the 
voluntary sector in all its forms has played a highly significant part in the reception, 
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settlement and welfare of refugees throughout British (and most Western nations’) 
history, and within that support landscape the increasing significance of Refugee 
Community Organisations, formerly known as Refugee Associations have become well 
documented, (Gold, 1992; Carey-Wood et al., 1995; Duke, 1996; Duke et al. 1999; Joly, 
1996; Knox and Kushner, 1999; Griffiths, Sigona and Zetter, 2005). The role of RCOs in 
Europe and the US in supporting refugees and as self-help groups whilst immense is not 
unproblematic however, especially in their increasing incorporation within state reception 
and settlement policies overtly nurturing pluralist societies, (Gold, 1992; Korac, 2003; 
Kelly, 2003: Griffiths et al., 2005).    
 
The importance of social networks whether formalised in the shape of RCOs or 
informally with kin, friends or contacts with “co-ethnics,” often discussed as a 
‘community’ has frequently been shown to be of great importance to refugees in 
particular, preventing isolation, and bridging access to the host society, as is evident from 
accounts and the geographic clustering of people with the choice of where to live and 
through secondary migration from dispersal areas (Robinson, 2003; Moran, 2003). 
Robinson (2003:15) suggests being close to communities of “fellow countrymen” offers, 
“…cultural and religious institutions, their stock of housing owned by co-ethnics, their 
employment opportunities, and their access to the security and warmth of ethnic-specific 
social networks.” 
 
Griffiths et al (2005) question and problematise this long-standing straightforward 
assumption of the integrative role of RCO’s and social networks, and social capital, 
 
…emphasis on formal organisation in refugee communities, simplistic notions of 
community and the neglect of structurally embedded inequalities, are dominant in 
the literature on RCOs and are also key determinants of the policy and practice of 
refugee settlement in the UK, (ibid:209).   
 
From their theoretical analysis and recent comparative research of 40 RCOs in London, 
the West Midlands and the North West, exploring the impact of dispersal policy since the 
1999 IAA, Griffiths et al (2005:207) emphasise the “conflictual fields and differential 
power relations affecting refugee organisations,” and criticise Putnam’s, in their view, 
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functionalist and tautological account of social capital, “It chimes in comfortably with 
neoliberal concerns to constrain welfare provision and to increase processes of self-
reliance and ‘participation’ in civil society.” 
 
Relating the proliferation and incorporation of RCOs into recent policies on refugee 
integration, to broader trends of welfare and the Third Way emphasis on “…interlocked 
concepts such as social inclusion, citizenship, community and democracy have been 
incorporated within the broader discourses of participation and partnership that are now 
dominant within the public policy domain,” (ibid:208). 
 
3.2 The needs of forced migrants; refugees and asylum seekers     
 
Recent research and theorising around people forced to migrate, asylum seekers and 
refugees has warned against or is aware of the dangers of essentializing and treatment of 
these people as a homogenous social group (Al-Ali, 2002; Malkki, 1995; Indra, 1999). 
Al-Ali, 2002:102 quotes Jambresic, Kirin and Povrzanovic (1996), 
 
Treating refugees from the same country, or even a certain group of refugees as 
homogenous – not only when it comes to providing aid, but also in 
anthropological research – leads neither to efficient help for people in need nor 
to an accurate explanation of their problems and potential solutions. 
 
That said, academics also argue that despite the heterogeneity and differentiation within 
those forced to migrate, those fleeing (political) persecution have at least potentially, 
some specific or distinct needs on arrival in a country of exile, different from those 
migrating for different reasons and with a greater luxury of choice, (e.g. Joly, 1996; 
Duke, 1996). However conceptions and discourses around refugees have tended to 
stereotype them as exceptionally needy, vulnerable, powerless, passive victims (Harrell-
Bond, 1986; 1999; Indra, 1993). From anthropological research with Hungarian refugees 
to the USA Harrell-Bond (1999: 146,144) charts the “repackaging” of refugees from 
“When refugees were still ‘people’” after WW2 and during the Cold War, when refugees 
to the west were Europeans and not helpless, but to be resettled by integration into the job 
market. However with the international community particularly through UNHCR 
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following the modernization agenda of development, involved in providing humanitarian 
aid to ‘Third World’ refugees in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, Harrell-Bond 
(1999:147) found in her work and research in aid to refugees in Africa, “…that the 
‘packaging’ of refugees had dramatically altered. the documents I obtained from 
agencies emphasized images of helpless, starving masses who depend on agents of 
compassion to keep them alive.”  
 
Although UNHCR aimed to ‘make’ refugees self-sufficient, through the modernization 
lens involved agencies believed this was best achieved by putting refugees in camps and 
managing them, as they were incapable of managing themselves, through a set process 
towards integration and self-sufficiency. During this process humanitarians came to 
believe that refugees develop the “dependency syndrome,” 
 
…a kind of working hypothesis has developed among humanitarians: ‘The more 
you give, the more dependent people become’ (ibid:148). 
 
Humanitarians believed they faced a dilemma; giving too much aid attracts people to 
cross borders for it, whereas giving too little threatens mass starvation; “A delicate 
balance must be struck,” (ibid: 148), (resonating with current policy rationales behind   
deterrent ‘safety-net’ support).  
 
Harrell-Bond (1999) and Indra (1993) argue that as Mauss (1925) explored, the act of 
giving usually demands reciprocity, is not devoid of self-interest, and defines the power 
relationship between giver and receiver, “The act of receiving places the recipient in a 
position of obligation, an inferior position vis-à-vis the benefactor until the give has been 
reciprocated,” (Harrell-Bond, 1999:149).  
 
The image of refugees as passive and powerless victims, reinforces the idea that outsiders 
are needed to help them, and according to Beristain and Dona (1997) conditions the way 
both humanitarian aid is organised and the interpersonal relations between the helpers 
and the helped. While acknowledging cultural norms of reciprocity refugees, particularly 
those who were long-term recipients of aid, tended to take on this role as helpless, “to 
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exhibit the deference of a subordinate” and as Hyndman (1996) found, quoting an aid 
worker, that the aid approach  
 
…has generally encouraged its recipients to represent themselves as helpless 
victims of circumstance. Some Somalis have been representing themselves in this 
way for so long that, along with convincing the donors of its reality, they’ve also 
convinced themselves, (cited in Harrell-Bond, 1999:150).  
 
This analysis is not just relevant to assistance to refugees in the developing world but also 
to the welfare ‘models’ of Western receiving nations. Steen’s (1993, cited in Harrell-
Bond, 1999) study comparing the outcomes of the Danish policy of extended orientation 
and the UK’s “laissez-faire” welfare approach with Tamil refugees, found in Britain the 
Tamils became economically successful “Thatcher boys” but in Denmark they had been 
de-skilled through the demand that they follow the set programme and, for instance, not 
seek employment until fluent in Danish. Harrell-Bond (1999:151) argues  “There is a 
great deal of evidence suggesting the iatrogenic effects of the welfare model which 
defines the roles that refugees are expected to play vis-à-vis their helpers (Harrell-Bond, 
1986; Voutira and Harrell-Bond, 1995)”. 
 
Some academics have been particularly keen to dispel “…the creation of ‘the refugee’ as 
a ‘generic and essentialized figure’ (Malkki, 1992), a political and legal artefact meant 
to exclude certain aspects pertaining to one’s identity or to one’s experience of 
persecution (Tuitt, 1996; Hathaway, 1988, 1991; Goodwin-Gill, 1983)”, (Callamard, 
1999: 197). However, there is some general agreement concerning the at least potential 
distinctiveness of people who are refugees’ needs compared with other migrants or social 
groups, albeit that these may be highly differentiated, for instance in terms of gender 
(Callamard, 1999; Agger, 1994; Crawley, 1997), age (Ahearn, Loughry and Ager, 1999; 
causes and process of migration (Kunz, 1981; Al-Rasheed, 1994; Joly, 1996; Bloch, 
2002), experiences prompting migration (Watters, 1998), ability or disability (Roberts 
and Harris, 2002).   
 
Often reported are the psycho-social needs relating to the experience of exile, particularly 
in terms of what has been lost in flight, (and gained or reinforced in exile). Callamard 
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(1999) finds this thread in personal accounts and life-stories and other types of research 
on refugees experiences, “…the profound loss of individuality, self-esteem, and 
independence endured by refugees and fostered by the dynamics of relief assistance.” 
 
Callamard (1999) states this is general to refugee populations as a whole, transcending 
national and historical boundaries, and cites the work of Hitchcox (1990) and others, 
using Goffman’s (1961) study on asylums and Foucault’s of prisons, to envisage the 
refugee camp as a ‘controlling institution’ with control working both ways, 
 
…all individuals are constrained to behave as if they were dependent and 
helpless, which assists the perpetuation of an institution largely composed of 
workers whose role is to respond to people who have problems and are in 
need…Secondly, the majority of the Vietnamese, within their role as refugees are 
consenting participants in the process of control, (Hitchcox, 1990:174, cited in 
Callamard, 1999:203).  
 
Loss is a major theme in the literature on the experiences and needs of refugees in exile. 
The literature focuses on the loss of home (Povrzanovic Frykman, 2002; Al-Ali, 2002), 
loss of families and friends, loss and/or change of identities (e.g. to transnational ones, 
Koser, 2002), which may also include loss of former status, occupation, culture (O’ Neill, 
2001). Other needs that may be general to forced migrants are possibly as a result of what 
they bring to a country of exile, and the subsequent conditions and responses of receiving 
nations, which may also be the cause of specific needs related to their position in the 
receiving society. These may include both physical and mental health needs as a result 
(or not) of their traumatic experiences pre-migration and the conditions of life in exile, 
(Chung and Kagawasinger, 1993; Duke and Marshall, 1995; Hauff and Vaglum, 1995; 
Mghir et al., 1995 all cited in Duke, 1996), 
 
The effects of war and persecution are compounded by adverse experiences in exile, such 
as social and cultural isolation, unemployment, accommodation problems, language 
difficulties and ongoing concern about friends and relatives who are still remaining in 
their home countries, (Duke, 1996: 472).  
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3.3 The social and political context of 1990s UK asylum policy 
 
Following Castles’ (2003:29) principles for an adequate sociology of forced migration (a 
historical understanding, recognition of embeddedness of specific topics in various levels 
and breadths of social relations and changes), an understanding of the social and 
historical context of British asylum legislations from the 1987 Immigration (Carriers 
Liabilities) Act, culminating in the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act and beyond, is 
essential to considering the specificities of the welfare arrangements of that seminal 
legislation. This understanding is already informed by the broader spatial (global/ 
regional) and philosophical factors explored so far, so this section will now consider the 
local situation from a closer national perspective (not to disembed it from its broader 
context).  
 
From the less direct attempt by the Conservative government to control the number of 
people entering Britain to claim asylum with 1980s visa restrictions and the 1987 ICLA, 
(fining carriers for transporting undocumented passengers), through the first specifically 
targeted asylum legislations and a change of government, the five asylum and 
immigration acts (1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004) have increased measures to restrict 
territorial entry, and access to welfare rights to these migrants.  These legislations have 
generally followed trends in asylum policy throughout EU states, which also include 
moving from more permanent asylum towards temporary protection, and despite 
concurrent trends of shifts from centre-right to centre-left governments (Schuster, 2000). 
The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was the first primary legislation 
specifically addressing asylum in UK law, (Schuster and Solomos, 1999) and although 
extending the right of appeal to all asylum seekers (Hayter, 2000) and promoted as 
speeding up asylum decisions, it predominantly introduced restrictive measures, (Bloch, 
2000; 2002). Fingerprinting asylum seekers, fast-tracking so called ‘vexatious or 
frivolous cases’ and asylum seekers travelling through ‘safe’ third countries, and limiting 
the time to appeal to 48 hours for those receiving a negative decision were some of these, 
(Hayter, 2000; Bloch, 2002). Also the separation of asylum seekers and refugees in 
eligibility to social rights was initiated as asylum seekers’ rights to social housing were 
reduced, so reinstating the use of controlling access to welfare for forced migrants. After 
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the 1993 Act the refusal to grant refugee status rate increased dramatically from 14% in 
the six months prior to the Act to 72% after it, (Hayter, 2000).  
 
The literature suggests a complex convergence of social and historical particularities 
influencing the specific character of asylum policies in the UK. To begin with the number 
of people arriving to claim asylum from the late 1980s to early 1990s increased 
dramatically (as in other EU states, although a tiny proportion of refugees worldwide). 
Between 1980-1988 the average number of applications per year was 4,000, in 1991 it 
was 44,800, and by 2000 it was 80,315 principle applicants, (Robinson et al. 2003; 
Griffiths et al. 2005). Cheaper airfares, global communications networks, continuing 
global refugee producing situations and colonial ties laying down migration paths are 
some of the commonly cited reasons for these increased asylum migrations.  
 
With the Cold War ending these new refugees were primarily migrating from the 
developing world, and posed a new racialised image of ‘the refugee,’ -  no longer white, 
European and fleeing a total oppressive regime, but black, immigrant, and undeserving, 
(Robinson, et al., 2003). Miles and Cleary (1993:57) argue that British state responses to 
refugee migration in the late 1980s and early 1990s was influenced by “the evolution of 
an ideological conjunction of the idea of ‘race’ with immigration,” predominantly since 
1945 whereby only black and Asian people were constructed as ‘immigrants’, and this 
overrode any distinction between refugee and labour migrants. In the earlier 20th Century 
‘immigrants’ while not usually black, were (usually Jewish or Irish) “physically and 
culturally distinct from those defined as ‘our own people,’” (ibid: 57). Thus the political 
campaigns and responses of the 1980-90s were conditioned by this historical racialising 
of particular groups of migrants and not others, as posing a threat to Britain as a 
‘homogenous’ nation.  
 
Between the 1971 Immigration Act which, using “racially defined categories” (Spencer, 
1997:143) prevented almost all non-white commonwealth citizens from entering and the 
1988 Immigration Act, eroding the right of family reunion, British immigration policy 
effectively ended nearly all (particularly commonwealth) immigration for settlement, 
(Bloch, 2002). This 1988 Act prevented the entrance of primary migrants’ dependents 
who might have recourse to public funds, continuing the welfare/immigration link begun 
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with the 1905 Aliens Act, and leaving asylum seekers the primary migrants through the 
1990s, (Miles and Clearly, 1993; Bloch, 2002).  
 
Robinson et al. (2003:4) point out that the new migrations of asylum seekers to Europe 
came at a time of “sea change in attitudes towards international migration in general,” 
with oil price scares, economic downturns, de-industrialisation, cheap labour was no 
longer considered desirable and, in the early 1990’s in Britain, rises in unemployment, 
contributed to the perception of the need to control asylum migration. Castles (2003) also 
points to these new migrations coinciding with the longer term settling and emergence of 
multicultural societies from previous migrations. Although anti-discriminatory law was in 
place, and multi-culturalism official (Joppke, 1999) the right-leaning version of ‘race 
relations’ discourse and theory was also drawn on to justify restrictive responses to new 
asylum seeking migrants. Hayter (2000:55) quotes Thatcher’s 1978 TV interview, prior 
to her 1979 election win, sympathising with those believing there was too much 
immigration, and were “really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by 
people with a different culture.” “If you want good race relations… you have got to allay 
peoples’ fears about numbers.” This allusion to good ‘race relations’ and the ‘numbers 
game,’ has continued to be used by Conservative and Labour politicians in their 
justifications for attempting to restrict immigration and asylum seeking through 
immigration controls legislation. These forced migrants were increasingly considered 
within the ‘immigration’ and ‘immigration control’ context, rather than as refugees 
needing a safe country of refuge. Political and media discourses increasingly blurred 
distinctions between ‘immigrants,’ ‘illegal immigrants,’ ‘illegals,’ ‘economic migrants’, 
‘bogus asylum seekers’ and ‘refugees.’ Kaye (1994) demonstrated that prior to the 1993 
and 1996 Acts the Conservative government, coinciding with elections, led rhetorical 
campaigns to change public perceptions of refugees as ‘bogus asylum seekers’, 
demonising them as economic migrants, so justifying their tightening of immigration 
rules. Media ‘campaigns’ have assisted politicians in setting the agenda and conditioning 
public opinion in various ways, as “a bridge between the voter and the government” 
(Robinson, et al., 2003), to regard  asylum seekers as  a problem, particularly in terms of 
the numbers of them dishonestly attempting to access British welfare. Robinson et al. 
(2003) argue that the UK (and Western Europe) has been in the grip of a moral panic 
over these migrations. 
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The presumed ‘assault’ or threat on welfare that asylum seekers were posed to make, and 
the largely unsubstantiated assumption that people migrated as asylum seekers to access 
the welfare states of receiving countries (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004; Geddes, 2003; 
Robinson and Segrott, 2002), also coincided with neo-liberal transformation of the 
welfare state, beginning with Conservative rule from 1979 and continuing with New 
Labour’s third way, (Mynott, 2002; Bloch, 2000). The Conservatives sought to extend 
market principles within the welfare state, cut welfare expenditure, reduce welfare 
‘dependency,’ enforce efficiency and increase means-testing on an ideology of 
individualism, consumerism and enterprise, and rejection of social citizenship (Bloch, 
2000), in a welfare-state ‘roll-back’ or retrenchment. Dwyer (2005) points out that neo-
liberals term this good governance; decentralisation, shifting from a redistributory to a 
regulatory state and from a public service ethos to market management and state-market 
cooperation. In such a climate, the withdrawal of social rights from demonised asylum 
seekers, and their necessary conceptual separation from ‘genuine refugees’ was in 
keeping with Conservative welfare policy generally.  
 
The 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act further extended the links between immigration 
control and welfare, and internal controls, predominantly by withdrawing the right of ‘in-
country’ applicants, on the grounds that they were less ‘genuine’ than ‘at port’ applicants, 
and those on-appeal against a negative decision to any welfare support. These were 
among a range of restrictive pre and post entry measures, including the so-called ‘White 
List’ of safe countries where refoulement was deemed acceptable, the extension of ‘fast-
track’ procedures, and the introduction of employer sanctions making checking 
employees immigration status a legal duty and employing someone without permission to 
work a criminal offence, (Hayter, 2000). The right to work was withdrawn until asylum 
seekers had been resident for six months. When thousands became destitute as a result of 
the Act, the High Courts ruled that those single asylum seekers must be supported by 
local authorities under the 1948 National Assistance Act, (although with in-kind rather 
than cash assistance), and families under the 1989 Children Act. Zetter and Pearl (1999) 
stressed that the policy impact of the 1993 and 1996 Acts was to distinguish between 
asylum seekers and refugees in relation to social housing and benefits, as virtually all 
asylum seekers were excluded and living in temporary accommodation. Thus an ad hoc 
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system of welfare support was established with predominantly London and South East 
local authorities thrown with no warning or planning time into the responsibility for this 
provision to 80,000 asylum seekers in the London boroughs, by April 2000, (Robinson et 
al. 2003).  
 
There has been plenty of research attesting to the negative impact of these measures and 
the responsibility by default of local authorities in the absence of state benefits for both 
destitute asylum seekers and the service providers (Mynott, 2002b). A study of local 
authority officers found there were wide varieties in provision and considerable 
uncertainty about entitlements (Rahilly, 1998, cited in Mynott, 2002b). Zetter and Pearl 
(1998) in their study of social housing for asylum seekers and refugees found housing 
and asylum legislation had created immense barriers for asylum seekers, unpredictable 
chaos and their marginalisation and exclusion. In some areas support workers reported, 
“shocking levels of basic unmet need, from shoes and clothes falling apart, to serious 
medical conditions going untreated,” (Webber, 1997:75, cited in Mynott, 2002b:110). A 
health worker spoke of increasing mental health problems resulting not from escaped 
traumatic experiences but from current living conditions, such as “chronic depression 
and dependencies created by grinding poverty, homelessness and mistreatment in the 
UK,” Savigar, (1998, cited in Mynott, 2002b:110). Duvell and Jordan (2000) and Sales 
and Hek’s (2004) studies of social worker asylum teams, found workers felt their work 
fell well below and compromised their professional standards (see 3.6.1). As well as the 
suffering of destitute asylum seekers, the chaotic and variable provision of ad hoc support 
and the dissonant and stressful position of service providers, the ‘unintended 
consequences’ of the 1996 AIA and still increasing number of asylum applicants did 
nothing to diminish growing contentious politicisation and moral panic over asylum. 
 
Robinson et al (2003) demonstrate the spatial concentration of refugees and asylum 
seekers, from secondary migration of quota refugees and of spontaneous arrivals, in 
London throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and some clustering near the ports of Gatwick 
and Dover. This has been widely shown to result from gravitation to communities of 
social support from others of a similar ethnicity or country of origin, including assistance 
with basic needs orientation, integration and employment, as well as general employment 
opportunities and general ethnic diversity, (Jones, 1982; Carey-Wood et al, 1995; Duke et 
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al, 1999). In 1997 85% of all refugees and asylum seekers resident in the UK were living 
in London, concentrated in particular boroughs (Audit Commission 2000, and by April 
2000 this included approximately 80,000 asylum seekers. The LGA stated that in March 
2000 90% of all destitute asylum seekers were supported by London boroughs and the 
South East, including Dover. These boroughs were not fully funded by central 
government, paying the shortfalls themselves, and when housing shortages and law made 
finding suitable accommodation increasingly difficult, some boroughs began their own 
dispersals of some asylum seekers to regional LA’s and others, significantly Kent County 
Council publicised its intention to raise local Community Charges, (Robinson et al. 
2003). The issue of local ‘burdens’ and costs, combined with increasingly intense and 
hostile media coverage nationally and locally, as well as groups campaigning for forced 
migrants rights, was the backdrop to the newly elected New Labour, 1999 IAA.   
 
3.4 The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act 
 
Despite its vociferous opposition, on grounds of inhumanity, to the 1996 AIA whilst in 
opposition, (Hayter, 2000) New Labour in government produced a legislation which far 
exceeded the withdrawal of social rights from asylum seekers and pre-entry restrictions 
of previous Conservative legislations. This Act has been described variously as “a 
radical point of departure in UK asylum policy” (Griffiths et al., 2005:41), “a bold 
redrafting of the entire system” (Robinson et al, 2003:123) and, “The 1999 Act represents 
a watershed. Part VI of the Act, ‘support for asylum-seekers’, constitutes a qualitative 
leap in the link between welfare and immigration status,” (Cohen, 2001:24).  
 
Whilst Britain was late amongst other European states to introduce co-ordinated, 
centralised arrangements for the reception and dispersal of asylum seekers having 
previously used reactive, incremental, ad hoc, decentralised measures until 1999, the new 
systems were also not such a departure from previous reception responses of dispersal 
and voluntary sector implementation, (Griffiths et al, 2005). The Act also embodies 
marked continuities in its assumptions and principles with the Conservative’s 1990s 
legislation. However the 1999 IAA is radically different in a number of ways important 
for this research.  The main provisions were: 
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o Abolition of ‘White List’ of supposed safe countries (reinstated later) 
o ‘Asylum seeker’ a legal category for the first time 
o Increased measures to restrict entry and so reduce numbers of arriving asylum 
seekers: more Airport Liaison Officers, Carriers Liability extended to truck 
companies. 
o Measures to accelerate the asylum decision-making process – aimed at 6 months 
(including appeals) 
o One appeal only  
o New centralised system of reception and welfare support removing all asylum 
seekers from mainstream welfare systems (benefits, housing), co-ordinated and 
operated by new Home Office agency, National Asylum Support Service (NASS), 
implemented by multi public, voluntary, private sector agencies mostly arranged 
into Consortia 
o Cashless system of support (using vouchers) at 70% income support rates 
(removed later – April 2002) 
o Destitute asylum seekers without accommodation dispersed to UK regions away 
from London and the South East on a no-choice basis  
o Removal of any right to work for new asylum seekers 
o Extension of powers of search and arrest and detention  
 
The rationales behind this legislation were explained in the White Paper, Fairer, Faster, 
Firmer: A Modern Approach to Immigration Control (Home Office, 1998) and were 
based on the presumption that most asylum seekers were potentially fraudulent 
‘economic migrants’ and not ‘genuine refugees’, therefore controlling their entry 
territorially and by introducing deterrent welfare measures, was imperative. This was 
presented as a newly “Integrated Approach,” (ibid: 20) combining asylum and 
immigration control, to replace the former “piecemeal approach” (ibid: 18). It was also 
presented as ‘modernising’ immigration control, in line with many aspects of New 
Labour’s Third Way, for instance stressing the obligations of asylum seekers in return for 
the obligations of government towards them, (ibid: 36). It is important to explore those 
radical aspects relating to welfare arrangements of the 1999 IAA. 
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3.4.1 Controlling immigration by controlling welfare 
 
3.4.1.1 Separation  
 
The new support measures were presented as representing “the best interest of genuine 
refugees” (Home Office, 1998:36) by ensuring that “genuine asylum seekers are not left 
destitute, but which minimise the attractions of the UK to economic migrants,” (ibid: 
preface). One of the main aspects of this Act was the further separating out conceptually, 
by entitlement and to an extent physically of asylum seekers from recognised refugees 
and from the general population. The category of person, ‘asylum seeker,’ newly 
recognised legally and with increased suspicion was further removed from the morally 
‘pure’ category of ‘refugee’ in a number of ways. Sales (2002:463) talks of this 
separation in policy and popular discourse, as that of the majority of asylum seekers as 
“undeserving,” while the minority recognised as refugees are the “deserving.” 
 
…the Government believes that it must start from the position that people who 
have not established their right to be in the UK should not have access to welfare 
provision on the same basis as those whose citizenship or status here gives them 
an entitlement to benefits when in need. Any support offered for asylum seekers 
should operate on a separate basis… as a last resort, (Home Office, 1998:38).  
 
Removing asylum seekers from entitlement to most mainstream welfare provision and 
cash support by providing it separately through centralised NASS funding and by 
physically removing new claimants by dispersal away from London and the South East 
served a number of purposes. From the White Paper, this was primarily designed as a 
deterrent to potential ‘abusive’ claimants (though evidence suggests this is a largely false 
premise), but not so inhumane as to deter ‘genuine’ refugees, thus as a form of internal 
control.  
 
Also Geddes (2001; 2003:152) argues this type of legislation attempts to “demarcate 
more tightly the ‘community of legitimate receivers of welfare state benefits,’” in the 
process of defining and redefining the distinctions between ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ 
migrants in relation to perceptions around the implications they have for national, 
 80 
particularly welfare resources. This process of clarifying the distinction between the 
illegitimate and legitimate ‘community’ is understood to reassure those within it (Geddes, 
2001:143), especially in the face of general welfare state roll-back and insurance-based 
types. Thus the 1999 IAA was designed to appease those believing asylum seekers were 
denying ‘legitimate’ welfare receivers their entitlements. Sales (2002:465) states, 
 
 
The absence of any provision in the 1999 Act for those granted refugee status 
demonstrates in the sharpest form the government’s preoccupation with control in 
its asylum policy. The only reference to recognised refugees is that they must 
leave the NASS system within 14 days,  
 
However since the Act, the separation and demarcation was further emphasised by 
introducing for the first time the aim to resource and concentrate social policy on aiding 
the integration of those granted refugee status, (Home Office, 1999, although not by law 
until the 2002 NIAA). This emphasised a further aim of the legislation to delay and 
prevent settlement and integration of individuals prior to this recognition (as well as those 
rejected), 
 
Differential processes of exclusion and inclusion underlie asylum and migration 
policy in the UK, as elsewhere in the EU (Boswell, 2003). The principle of non-
integration in the reception phase (Joly, 1999) and the vast apparatus of 
deterrence wielded against asylum seekers necessarily sit uneasily alongside the 
aims of social inclusion and integration for refugees, which Integration Matters 
(Home Office, 2004) proposes, (Griffiths et al. 2005:56). 
 
Whilst not separating asylum seekers to the extent that some other EU states have done 
by containing them physically in reception and accommodation centres, the aim is 
effective separation by providing the barest tools for survival but not participation or 
inclusion, 
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The welfare-related dimension of the UK asylum system was designed to hinder 
the possibility for asylum seekers to live a ‘normal social life’ because to provide 
this opportunity could produce social integration and settlement. Vouchers and 
dispersal secure and reproduce a constant anormalisation of social life designed 
to hinder social integration and make it possible for the migration process to be 
reversed, (Geddes, 2001:143).  
 
This separation, particularly through dispersal, was also designed to relieve the 
disproportionate ‘burden’ of costs (monetary and social) on local authorities supporting 
asylum seekers since the 1996 AIA, with their overspends and in some areas, notoriously 
Dover, experiencing social tensions (as some local people campaigned against asylum 
seekers in their area) (Robinson et al. 2003). As we have seen dispersal is not new to UK 
reception of refugees or immigrants. It has been part of assimilationist policy goals, to 
reduce social tensions and spread cost ‘burdens’, then as integration goals recognised that 
‘clustering’ of minority ethnic communities not in ‘ghettos’ but ‘enclaves’ was 
considered to aid effective integration, (Griffiths et al, 2005:42). But Robinson et al 
(2003:166) argue that current dispersal premises are primarily assimilationist, using 
population engineering to reduce the social visibility of asylum seekers, “appease a 
bigoted but vocal minority of the indigenous population,” and maintain the ‘purity’ of 
social space, 
 
…for the discrepant ‘others’ to be permitted access to space at all, they will be 
relegated to socially and spatially marginal places that are ‘distant from the 
locales of the dominant majority’…  
…dispersal is less about the prohibitive expense of clustering or putting too much 
strain upon local services  than it is about soothing the fears of white voters who 
want to feel that immigration, and who is allowed to live in ‘their’ cities, is under 
control.(ibid:171).  
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3.4.1.2  Minimising ‘incentives’: a bare safety net 
 
In order to ensure those in “genuine hardship” are not left destitute, “The government is 
committed to providing such a safety net, but is determined to do so in a way which 
minimises the incentive for abuse by those who do not really need the support or who 
would make an unfounded asylum application in order to obtain the provision,” (Home 
Office, 1998:39). 
 
Thus NASS’ safety net would comprise 70% of income support in vouchers, although the 
RC and other lobbyists won the only concessions on the bill, to give £10 cash and pay 
100% income support to families with children, and no-choice accommodation including 
utilities as a ‘last resort’ if individuals could find nowhere else to stay. The Home Office 
were particularly concerned that cash benefits would act an incentive to ‘abusive’ 
claimants, thus the more expensive and operationally complex voucher system was 
instituted. The RC responded to the proposals, 
 
…they will turn the current shambles into something much worse… the ‘safety 
net’ system set out is likely to hit asylum seekers badly and risks building up a 
massive problem of social exclusion. It appears that the government has chosen 
the harshest, most expensive and complicated system of support, (RC, 1998). 
 
Mynott (2000:319) criticises the use of ‘community relations’ terminology as a mask for 
the ‘brutality’ of the support measures, 
 
This is truly an apartheid system for asylum seekers in the sense that it is separate 
and unequal. Its harshness has been deliberately constructed, driven by the desire 
to deter asylum claimants. 
  
Cohen (2001:24) states that the “qualitative leap” linking welfare with immigration 
controls is accomplished “by reducing assistance to asylum-seekers to a form of Poor 
Law.”  As well as attempting to “reassure ‘legitimate welfare receivers,’” (Geddes, 
2001:143), this enforced poverty was also intended to ‘anormalise’ lives so that migration 
could be reversed and was a further instrument of control, in that such enforced 
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dependency gave little scope for travelling elsewhere or to participate in a ‘normal social 
life’. The enforced poverty of asylum seekers in the NASS scheme has been subsequently 
verified in research (Refugee Council, 2002). Accepting NASS accommodation had an 
obvious built in monitoring and surveillance element to it, with RSLs or LAs obliged by 
law to give information about individuals, demanded by the Home Secretary, and 
residents absent for more than seven consecutive or fourteen overall days and nights 
would be evicted, (Cohen, 2002). The voucher system was found to further separate and 
stigmatise asylum seekers who found using them humiliating and degrading, (Oxfam, 
2000). 
 
3.4.2 The ‘dispersed state:’ agencies providing the safety net 
 
Cohen (2001:19) stresses the contradiction of a supposed welfare system overtly 
designed to control immigration, the greater use with this Act of internal controls; 
“control from within the state,” not just of asylum seekers but by withdrawal of benefits 
to all “persons subject to immigration control,” 
 
…the nexus places in a collusive position workers responsible for providing 
welfare. These workers are expected to withhold the very provisions for which 
their jobs exist. They are transformed into agents of immigration control, (ibid: 
20). 
 
Another significant aspect of the 1999 IAA support arrangements was the design for their 
implementation. Although the VS have traditionally been highly involved in past 
reception and settlement programmes, (the RC and RA were first formed in the 
implementation of past programmes) and RCOs had proliferated since the 1980s, the 
implementation arrangements for this Act in some senses were radically different in their 
New Labour conception of Third Way modernisation of welfare. Welfare was to be 
delivered by multiple public, voluntary and private sector agencies co-ordinated in 
Consortia in dispersal regions, in ‘co-operation’ with NASS, including major roles for the 
five main refugee support agencies, as One Stop advice Shops and Reception Assistants. 
Sales (2002) argues that the ‘Third Way’s’ retention of many aspects of neoliberalism, 
with continued private sector involvement and target setting in welfare provision, 
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incentives to cater for ‘expensive’ groups (like asylum seekers) that belie targets, are 
reduced. The emphasis on independence and social inclusion through work, and 
citizenship through participation immediately cast asylum seekers, denied the rights to 
work and participate, as the ‘undeserving’, (Sales, 2002).  
 
The convergence of the 1999 IAA (and subsequent) support arrangements with New 
Labour’s overall Third Way modernisation programme have been explored by various 
social scientists, notably Griffiths et al (2005) and Dwyer (2005), and are extremely 
pertinent to this research. Both explore the expectations that the support and dispersal 
arrangements aim to instil the working of ‘partnerships’ with consortia consisting of a 
wide range of agencies; central government, local authority, NGO, Voluntary, RCO and 
private sector interests. ‘Partnerships’ and ‘participation’ are rooted in a new 
‘managerialism’ within public services (Clarke and Newman, 1997) since the 1980s, and 
based on the concept of varying ‘partners’ working together “in the pursuit of widely 
shared goals”, (Ling, 2000:99). This Third Way arrangement is also aligned with New 
Labour’s communitarian emphasis on active citizenship, participation, social inclusion 
and social cohesion, mixed economy welfare and greater involvement of civil society, 
although sitting at odds with the implementation of an exclusionary policy. Griffiths et al 
(2005:56) in the context of their research into the formal incorporation of RCOs in 
assisting to implement the 1999 IAA, point to criticisms of this ‘partnership’ 
transformation of service delivery, as “…governmentality, which involves the 
incorporation of hard-to-reach groups ‘into compliant collaborators in creating a more 
inclusive society’”, (Ling, 2000:90). 
 
Dwyer (2005) also turns to governance theory to make sense of the arrangements of EU 
states, in devolving responsibility for forced migrants’ welfare to an array of public, 
private and voluntary actors at both regional and local levels, which he refers to as the 
‘dispersed state’ (Clarke and Newman, 1997) involved in complex networks of 
governance. Dwyer (2005) agrees with Jessop (1999) that this multi-level network form 
of governance, especially in relation to policy for deterring forced migrants, is not the 
divergence of power in different directions and levels some governance theories suggest, 
but that national governments still hold significant, if changed, power, “Many of the 
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‘partners’ involved in policy are subordinate to the aims and ambitions of national 
governments driving a particular policy agenda,” (Dwyer, 2005:8) 
 
Clarke and Glendinning (2002) question the development of ‘networked governance’ and 
the balances of power, especially theorising  which suggests that state power is being 
‘hollowed out’, arguing instead that these new forms of governance are a remaking of 
state power and extension through new means. Citing New Labour’s ‘compulsory 
partnerships’ as, 
 
 an attempt to recruit subordinated partners into the project of ‘modernising’ 
government. Such subordinate roles certainly allow some autonomy and 
initiative… However this autonomy is bounded; is circumscribed by central 
direction and resource control; is subject to surveillance and evaluation; and is 
vulnerable to termination or takeover” (Clarke and Glendinning, 2002:46). 
 
 They conclude that ‘partnerships’ are “compound, contingent and potentially 
contradictory sites of power.”  
 
The range of agencies and actors from varying sectors involved in implementing the 
NASS system are typical of New Labour’s aims at ‘modernised’ and ‘joined-up’ 
networks of governance, but Dwyer (2005:16) citing Cohen’s (2001; 2002) critiques, 
points to the “symbiosis at the heart of such ‘partnerships.’”  The contradictory positions 
whereby some agencies’ independence and critical capacity have been compromised by 
their involvement mean some of these LA’s and NGO’s now ‘need’ NASS. However, 
Dwyer (2005) points out that the state is also in a position of compromised power in 
relation to the private sector. Dwyer’s (2005) and Dwyer and Brown’s (2005) research 
into the meeting of forced migrants’ basic needs in Leeds (where the Yorkshire and 
Humberside Consortium operates), found a range of formal and informal welfare 
agencies and actors involved. The varying socio-legal statuses of these forced migrants 
significantly affected their welfare, whereby particularly those ‘failed’ asylum seekers 
were reliant on informal networks of support, RCOs, local charities and particularly other 
migrants for very basic needs. (Moran, 2003 also found this in her participative action 
research). However those still in receipt of NASS support experienced varying, 
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sometimes appalling, conditions as the regulation of private sector accommodators was 
poor. Dwyer (2005:27) concludes that, “As the state erodes forced migrants’ rights to 
public welfare the voluntary/informal sector is often left to pick up the pieces.” 
 
Although nation states actively seek to mould and constrain the options available 
to forced migrants as they try to meet their basic needs no system of governance 
is total in its control. Nonetheless, the welfare rights of forced migrants are 
subject to the dual processes of separation and erosion. The setting up of 
localised networks of governance has done little to enhance the public welfare 
that forced migrants can call upon… Notions of need and entitlement have 
become secondary to issues of claim and contribution, (ibid: 30, 31).  
 
3.5 Voluntary sector (and public service) involvement in the ‘safety net’  
 
The government is particularly concerned to explore ways of harnessing the 
energy and expertise of voluntary and independent sector bodies in providing the 
safety net, (Home Office, 1998:40).  
 
As we have seen VS involvement in receiving refugees has a long history, however in 
this instance with newly centralised control and the support system designed as a 
deterrent, commentators, academics and campaigners have pointed to the contradictory 
positions not just of public service welfare workers involved in implementing internal 
controls (Gordon, 1985; Owers, 1994; Cohen, 2001; Humphries, 2002; Sales and Hek, 
2004), but VS agencies implementing key aspects of the 1999 IAA. Most outspoken in 
this criticism is Cohen (2001; 2002; 2004), who also cited protests by asylum seekers and 
their supporters against specific VS organisations involvement, (Cohen, 2004). Although 
conceding the “honourable if mistaken nature of these agencies’ motives and the 
sincerity of the belief that they are assisting asylum seekers,” Cohen (2002:142) argues 
that certain agencies are involved in “a system which is directly antagonistic to the 
interests of refugees,”(ibid:141). Cohen is specifically critical of those VS organisations, 
the biggest refugee support NGO’s, directly and substantially funded to operate reception 
assistance and One Stop Shops, providing a range of services integral to the NASS 
system. Although he also finds the actions of non refugee-specific ‘stakeholder’ charities, 
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such as NACAB, Amnesty International and the Terrance Higgins Trust, compromising 
for collusion with NASS and the IND over aspects of asylum seeker support without 
consultation with asylum seekers themselves. Cohen (2002:150) criticises the 
government (not the RCOs) for their expectation of formal and informal support of 
asylum seekers from RCOs, arguing that it is “intolerable that often financially 
impoverished refugee communities, are being expected to support ‘their own.’”  Cohen 
(2002) argues that RSLs and LA’s are compromised by accommodating asylum seekers 
without their choice, with the option of using ‘hard to let’ properties, being obliged to 
give NASS information about occupants, and with the likely task of evicting individuals 
no longer funded by NASS at the end of their claims. The compromising role of RAAs 
and OSSs, potentially involved dissuading asylum seekers from applying for NASS 
support, accommodating them in Emergency Accommodation, facilitating dispersal and 
potentially evicting or withdrawing support for individuals if their claims had expired. 
Cohen (2002) recognises the valuable contribution the VS makes in general, but 
condemns as chutzpah, the Home Office citing these benefits as reasons to use them in 
implementing the 1999 IAA, particularly the cost-cutting intent and expectation that they 
would provide services beyond NASS safety net, and the public purse, 
 
o Volunteers… 
o Additional resources: once voluntary agencies are involved in the support 
arrangements, they will start to raise funds to provide additional services… 
o Expertise: the expertise in meeting the support needs of asylum seekers is almost 
exclusively based in the voluntary sector… 
o Networking capacity: a great strength of the voluntary sector agencies is their 
ability to draw in other organisations in the sector to provide additional 
resources or expertise… 
o Policy development:… a good record in developing imaginative responses… 
 
‘Asylum Seekers’ Support’ (Home Office, 1999, cited in Cohen, 2002:143).      
 
The argument Cohen (2002) forwarded was that by non-participation and non-
cooperation with this legislation, such agencies would force it to fold, and the 
government to restore full benefits to asylum seekers, and the VS could take up its 
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traditional role as advocating on behalf of such vulnerable groups against state power. He 
suggests the position the VS agencies have taken on their involvement is fundamentally 
incompatible with his; that theirs is essentially facilitating and helpful to asylum seekers, 
who would otherwise be condemned to unsuitable private sector agencies the government 
would contract if they refused these roles. Instead, “The voluntary sector, or part of it, is 
a designated poor law enforcer,” (Cohen, 2002:141). 
 
Cohen’s views on the unethical collusion of the VS in the 1999 IAA are echoed, if less 
radically by many others recognising the contradictory position and likely compromises 
such VS agencies and workers might face in their new roles and what seemed like their 
general endorsement, through participation, of the overall system. The Audit Commission 
(2000:25), acknowledged the possible tensions among different Consortia stakeholders, 
 
Differences in the values and cultural ethos of different stakeholders may also 
strain the partnership – some refugee community organisations may opt for a 
model driven by social welfare concerns, whereas housing providers’ overriding 
objective may be simply to work within the system’s financial constraints.  
 
The Home Office’s early review of the dispersal and voucher systems found that there 
were tensions over VS chief concerns, roles and accountability, (the concern being the 
potential non-compliance of RAAs in deterrent measures),  
 
Voluntary sector organisations, although not all, not demonstrating a clear 
understanding of their own role, with potential conflicts between acting as agents 
of NASS and providing an advisory role to the asylum seeker,  (Home Office, 
2001:15) 
 
The later operational review of NASS also expressed this conflict of interest within the 
Voluntary Sector and NASS itself, (Noble, Barnish, Finch and Griffith, 2003). There are 
elements of these tensions that are both general and specific. For instance in a Third Way 
welfare state, there are tensions generally for the VS’ in agencies’ increasing involvement 
in public service delivery. Badham and Eadie (2001:34) warn that agencies struggle to 
manage the tensions of maintaining their values, independence, and creativity with 
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contracts for service delivery that have increasing control over their activities, threatening 
their lobbying functions and their “empowering services with, and on behalf of, 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups.” Although this new position could give VS 
agencies opportunities to positively influence policy and practice to better serve groups 
they represent, their ability to retain their independence and integrity and bring about 
radical change are questioned despite government Compacts (Home Office, 1998; 2001) 
assuring independence (Badham and Eadie, 2002).  
 
There are also tensions within general welfare delivery for public sector agencies, in 
managing different aspects of their roles, government and policy priorities as well as in 
such agencies specific involvement with delivering asylum legislation. The role of social 
workers despite its former explicit stand on anti-racist and anti-discriminatory practice 
has increasingly been “drawn into a disciplinary and surveillance role in policing the 
poor, to the extent of having now been ‘tamed’, (Jones and Novak, 1999)” and is naïve 
about its “contradictory positioning,” (Humphries, 2002:126). Social work has been 
increasingly regulated and coerced to comply with political and economic objectives and 
its anti-discriminatory practice is diluted by discourses of managerialism and 
‘competence’, (Humphries, 2002). Sales and Hek (2002:59) also stress that “tensions 
between care and control are endemic to social work (Jones 1998; Jordan 1997; Parton 
1997; Thompson 2000)” generally, but social work involvement in the care and control 
of recent internal immigration control particularly of refugees and asylum seekers adds a 
new dimension to this. This includes the split in the stance of care from control in the 
treatment by government (and media) of ‘genuine refugees’ and ‘bogus asylum seekers’ 
respectively. 
 
But how were these specific (and general) contradictions and tensions experienced and 
lived out ‘on the ground’ by those agencies, providing a minimal standard of welfare? 
What did delivering welfare under these conditions involve in practice for workers, and 
how did they understand their position and roles? 
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3.6 Experiencing a contradictory position in practice: implementing policy 
 
3.6.1 ‘Picking up the pieces’ after the 1996 AIA 
 
While many public service agencies are increasingly involved in internally controlling 
immigration through welfare state access, social workers have been landed a particularly 
contentious role. While typically currently involved in “investigation, rationing, 
gatekeeping and surveillance,” in a separation of practices from ethics, social workers 
have unreflectively enforced “inhuman policies,” when their expected activities are,  
“…tracking movements, checking on status, deciding on eligibility for and administering 
poor relief, and ultimately withdrawing relief and accommodation from those seen as 
‘undeserving,’”  (Humphries, 2004:38). 
 
These roles were particularly thrust upon social services departments when they were 
suddenly landed, by default, with the responsibility of the welfare of ‘in-country’ asylum 
seekers after their entitlements to mainstream benefits were withdrawn by the 1996 AIA. 
Without planning time or expertise social services were compelled to set up ad-hoc 
‘Asylum Teams’ to monitor and oversee a reduced and deterrent-driven ‘welfare,’ 
including in-kind support. These teams also became involved in the Interim 
Arrangements for the 1999 IAA, operating a ‘voluntary dispersal’ and the voucher 
system, and have been involved in different ways in the 1999 IAA with increasing 
compromises demanded by subsequent legislation. Such roles placed social workers in 
highly contradictory positions, and their understandings of the dilemmas of their practices 
have been explored by two pieces of interview research with London Asylum Teams in 
the wake of the 1996 AIA.  Duvell and Jordan (2000) argued these teams were pioneers 
of New Labour’s general ‘tough love’ welfare agenda, but asked of the Asylum Team 
workers ‘How Low Can You Go?’ in enforcing and operating ‘welfare’ far below 
acceptable standards for UK citizens.  
 
Both this and Sales and Hek’s (2004) study found the teams and workers were forced to 
balance various tensions, the latter discussed in terms of care and control, in more 
extreme ways than with other client groups. The control elements involved assessing 
eligibility for entitlement in ways that generated suspicion rather than trust, involved 
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interrogation and was often based on arbitrary criteria, and often ruled over the ‘care’ 
they could offer, describing their work as more “quantitative rather than qualitative” 
(Sales and Hek, 2004:67). Thus the care and control tensions bore out as attempting to 
balance the defining of need while controlling resources, the latter being dominant. Sales 
and Hek (2004) found tensions between the social workers’ professional values and their 
job of excluding the ‘undeserving’ from support, while Duvell and Jordan (2000) stressed 
tensions between professional values and personal aspirations and the deterrence-style 
‘support’ and shortcomings of their roles and practice. Both studies found the teams were 
caught between the twin pressures of state, or the supposed interests of the wider society 
and their clientele, who were sometimes very vulnerable with acute needs or, some social 
workers believed, exaggerated their adversity to gain services (Duvell and Jordan, 
2000:15), or were over-demanding (Sales and Hek, 2004). Sales and Hek, (2004) found 
there was a particular tension and need to balance, but with limited success, empathy in 
response to clients’ needs and detachment in order to assess eligibility. 
 
Such tensions provoked immense personal stress and some guilt in the workers in both 
studies over the shortcomings of their work and the support they provided, (which one 
worker described more as crisis aid to a developing world disaster, Duvell and Jordan, 
2000) especially those with stronger personal commitment (Sales and Hek, 2004) to this 
client group.  The researchers found workers used various strategies for dealing with the 
tensions and stress of their roles. One strategy, in both studies was the differentiation of 
the ‘deserving’ and undeserving,’ especially as official eligibility criteria could be vague, 
workers could use arbitrary and informal judgements in a “moral surveillance” (Sales 
and Hek, 2004:71) over asylum seekers’ lives, such as whether they smoked cigarettes, 
were thought demanding or aggressive (ibid), or their appearance suggested they were 
homeless (Duvell and Jordan, 2000). Whilst professing their commitment to this client 
group, workers could resort to stereotyping and creating distance from them, defining 
their cultural practices as problems or deficiencies, (Duvell and Jordan, 2000). In both 
studies workers distanced themselves from the state or political issues they felt they had 
no control over, so would blame the Home Office for poor quality support (Duvell and 
Jordan, 2000) or be “up front” about the little they had to offer, so managing the 
expectations of clients and reducing their demand on first meeting (Sales and Hek, 
2004:70). The ad hoc nature of their existence, and changeability of policy, meant their 
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often arbitrary decisions of eligibility left asylum seekers with very variable services 
within and across teams, (Duvell and Jordan, 2000). Managers in Sales and Hek’s (2004) 
study took pride and found it easier to make ‘hard decisions’, drawing on notions of their 
wider responsibility to guarding the purse strings of the LA, than lower level front-line 
workers.  
 
Another coping strategy especially for front-line workers was to “turn a blind eye to 
discrepancies,” suggest they gave clients the benefit of the doubt, and did not “police” 
clients, thereby justifying their work in terms of traditional social work values and 
resistance to the enforcement authorities (Home Office and managers), which Duvell and 
Jordan (2000:18-19) term, “banditry.” Some workers with a particular commitment to 
asylum seekers tried to avoid by deferring, eligibility decisions and also spoke of “doing 
a bit more” than the minimum for clients, and spoke of wishing to work in the VS 
because they felt there would be less conflict of interests, (Sales and Hek, 2004:73). In 
both studies social workers used their initiative to refer clients on whose needs they could 
not meet to RCOs, although they tended to view RCO members as over-demanding and 
their advocacy as obstacles to the smooth-running of their services. In Duvell and 
Jordan’s (2000:24) study some social workers used clients’ demands for putting pressure 
on upwards in arguing for increased resources and power, and one worker took gathered 
evidence to management to stop a “horrific” practice. Sales and Hek (2004) made 
recommendations for improving the practices of the Asylum teams, including the 
building of partnerships with RCOs, although recognising the increasing tendency for 
such groups to be drawn into policy implementation and away from their campaigning 
role. They concede these strategies might enhance services for asylum seekers but do not 
eliminate the basic contradiction of care and control in social services’ role implementing 
restrictive asylum policies. Also these elements of resistance did not amount to collective 
or co-ordinated action to resist implementing policy altogether. In some ways their work 
echoed the guilt and unease of the social workers generally, but 
 
…taking to the extreme the tendency of individual staff and teams to become 
trapped in a downward spiral of compromise between client need and resource 
scarcity – always pressed, rushed and conscious of their shortcomings, but never 
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able to draw a firm line of where falling standards had sunk to unacceptably low 
levels, (Duvell and Jordan, 2000:19).  
 
Duvell and Jordan (2000:3) thus asked at what point social workers would refuse, “to do 
the ‘dirty work’ of social policy, even when this involves intentional and systematic 
deprivation by official agencies of the means of dignified existence.” 
 
This echoes Cohen’s (2001) exhortation for public service and VS providers to boycott 
the 1999 IAA and subsequent legislation, raising the issue of what the most appropriate 
action should be; reform from ‘within’ or revolution and rebellion, by refusing to operate 
such roles. Duvell and Jordan’s (2000:30) fears before that legislation were that social 
services would be unable to be the buffer they once were between “unpopular but 
vulnerable groups,” like asylum seekers and the state as New Labour increasingly turned 
such agencies “into part of the technocratic force to implement its programme.”  
Involved agencies would be providing “…intentionally deterrent facilities where 
conditions are deliberately made more unpleasant than those endured by the poorest 
asylum seeker who can find a relative or friend to offer support,” (ibid: 28).  
 
These interview studies have given many insights into how the 1996 AIA policy, or in 
this case the lack of it, was experienced and practiced ‘on the ground’ by those delivering 
(by picking up the pieces from) it and the sorts of tensions, dilemmas and compromises in 
practice of front-line public service workers placed in the contradictory position of 
delivering a welfare more concerned with exclusion than inclusion in the clash of welfare 
with immigration control.  
 
3.6.2 General dilemmas of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ 
 
Although these dilemmas ‘on the ground’ reflect the particular contradictions at the 
broader political and social level of asylum, control and welfare at this time and place, 
some of these dilemmas and practices are also typical of the delivery of public services 
generally. Lipsky (1980:xii) has argued that to gain an understanding of public policy it 
is essential to study the daily practices and experiences of front-line or ‘street-level’ 
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workers in their relations and encounters with the ‘public,’ because policy is not so much 
made in the offices of those writing it, but  
 
…in important ways it is actually made in the crowded offices and daily 
encounters of street-level workers…  the routines they establish, and the devices 
they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the 
public policies they carry out….  
 
Lipsky (1980:4) developed a theory and detailed analysis, grounded in observations of 
what happens in practice between front-line public service workers and their clients, 
suggesting that because they experience, “analytically similar work conditions,” many 
such workers may be understood generically as “street-level bureaucrats,” and public 
service agencies as “street-level bureaucracies.”  Although Lipsky’s (1980) study was 
conducted in and often refers to the specific time, place, social and political context of 
USA public services and workers in the 1970s, it has relevance across time and space 
where those “analytically similar work conditions” exist. Although Lipsky’s (1980) 
analysis is based in generically similar small-scale practices and interactions between 
street-level bureaucrats and clients, he does not deny the structuring effect specific 
political and policy agendas have on the work of street-level bureaucracies, or of different 
models for public service delivery. However, a street-level bureaucrat is any public 
service worker who interacts directly with, in his analysis, citizens, and who has 
substantial discretion in carrying out their work. Lipsky (1980:4) includes workers as 
diverse as teachers, police officers, social workers and judges, arguing that the ways in 
which they determine eligibility for and oversee the delivery of government “benefits and 
sanctions” have considerable impact on people’s lives and in this work they mediate the 
relationship between the state and the “citizen”.  
 
Lipsky (1980) argues that although most street-level bureaucrats aspire and are trained to 
respond to the individual needs of the people they serve, the conditions of their work 
make it impossible to do so. These conditions are the necessity for processing large 
numbers of people, inadequate resources, demand increasing to meet supply, ambiguous, 
vague or conflicting goal expectations of street-level bureaucracies and policies which 
are hard to measure, and that clients are involuntary so their preferences are not 
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prioritised. Street-level bureaucrats develop routines and practices to cope with the 
pressures and uncertainties and attempt to do a good job in some way. Although 
significant discretion is necessary to provide humane and responsive services to unique 
individuals, because of the other conditions or structure of their work, street-level 
bureaucrats tend to use it in ways which are dehumanising. With the conflict between 
processing large numbers of people equitably and being responsive to individuals, they 
develop routines and simplifications to ration services by limiting access and demand, 
control clients, husband worker resources and manage the consequences. They attempt to 
salvage their service ideals by modifying their conceptions of their jobs to lower their 
objectives and modify their conceptions of their clients and differentiate between them, 
often in ways consistent with prevailing social prejudices, so that they can give adequate 
service to the ‘worthy,’ and make their lack of achievement more acceptable with the 
‘unworthy’. Lipsky (1980:191) states, as the “central contradiction of social services,”   
 
The impulse to provide fully, openly, and responsively for citizens’ service needs 
exists alongside the need to restrict, control, and rationalize service inadequacies 
or limitations. 
 
Lipsky (1980:xiii) thus argues under these work conditions, 
 
At best street-level bureaucrats invent benign-modes of mass processing that 
more or less permit them to deal with the public fairly, appropriately and 
successfully. At worst they give in to favouritism, stereotyping, and routinizing – 
all of which serve private or agency purposes. 
 
In a later work, Smith and Lipsky (1993:115-116), extend the concept of street-level 
bureaucracy to the voluntary sector, contending that workers in USA government 
contracted “non-profit” agencies delivering welfare are “The New Street-Level 
Bureaucrats” where they, 
 
…interact directly with clients and perform their jobs despite limited resources… 
work in agencies with ambiguous and conflicting goals, perform tasks which are 
hard to measure, and are undisciplined by client and consumer 
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preferences…service providers in the nonprofit sector manage scarce resources 
by coping with their jobs in such a way as to render them not simply 
implementers… but ‘makers’ of public policy.  
 
Whilst there are considerable differences in and across current British welfare services, 
where the conditions of work he states are present, Lipsky’s (1980) analysis gives many 
insights that could illuminate and apply to the dilemmas and contradictions of street-level 
bureaucrats and bureaucracies generally, including public and VS workers and agencies 
implementing restricted welfare to non-citizens. Lipsky (1980) has largely removed the 
political content of policy from his analysis, which as shown can provoke considerable 
conflict and contradiction for service providers, but it suggests that some dilemmas and 
contradictions are part of, in some ways, typical structuring of welfare service provision. 
When the political denial or restriction of the social rights of many migrants subject to 
immigration control, meant policy intended explicitly to not respond fully and openly to 
asylum seekers needs, the proposition that the agencies and workers involved in 
implementing this could be considered as much “makers” of policy, appears to put them 
in a more deeply compromising position. Morris’ (2002) analysis of the civic 
stratification of social rights also suggests that there is room for manoeuvre when formal 
social rights are put into practice, as the interpretation or informal practices of policy by 
practitioners implementing it ‘on the ground’ may either expand or contract migrants’ 
rights. Both Lipsky’s (1980) observations on street-level bureaucracy and Morris’ (2002) 
theorising of civic stratification are therefore useful tools to help understand the general 
and specific character and practices of VS street-level bureaucrats implementing a 
welfare ‘safety net’ explicitly designed as an instrument of control. 
 
3.7 Framing and justifying the research 
 
Particularly since the 1999 IAA in the UK, there has been an explosion of research 
interest in issues around asylum, forced migration and migration generally, (in line with 
similar European and transnational interest). It is not possible to do this justice here, 
except for a brief summary aiming to identify spaces for this piece of research. A great 
deal of this 21st century research has been understandably policy based (Castles, 2003), 
and particularly generated by NGO’s involved with or concerned to boost the diminished 
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social rights of asylum seekers by the 1999 IAA. This includes attempts to overturn 
specific aspects of the legislation (Oxfam, 2000), aims to research the impact, and 
publicise negative effects that aspects of the legislation has had on forced migrants lives, 
such as NASS failings (Dunstan, 2002; RC, 2002), and the impact on and activities of 
service providers (RC, 2004). Most include promoting possibilities and recommendations 
for ‘good practice,’ (Wilson, 2001; HACT, 2003) and justify the necessity for funding to 
fill service gaps, (Stanley, 2001), or a combination of these. With the onset of dispersal, 
there has been a concern to map burgeoning regional statutory and voluntary service 
provision and support (Subhra, 2002). Many of these have been concerned to consult 
forced migrants on their experience and views, in the hope that policy may have some 
‘bottom-up’ influence and to make their voices heard, above negative louder, objectifying 
discourses, (Macaskill and Petrie, 2000). NGO based research also investigates the 
experiences of particular groups, or ‘communities’ (Roberts and Harris, 2002; RC, 2005; 
Amnesty, 2001; Sigona, 2003). 
 
There has also been a growth in Home Office research, in line with New Labour’s 
emphasis on ‘evidence-based policy,’ which many of the ‘big names’ in forced migration 
research have contributed to, (for example Castles et al, 2003; Robinson, 2003; ; Koser 
and Pinkerton, 2001). However, they have done so with ambivalence over constraints and 
policy directed, or co-opted research, and concerns that the Home Office might ignore the 
content of their research, and with a set policy agenda, use it to tick their ‘evidence-
based’ legitimacy box. These researchers have expressed fears that their participation 
may lend legitimacy to harsh and inhumane policy.   Home Office emphasis on 
quantitative research and a concern that demand for one-page summaries and 
recommendations, simplifies complexity, are also concerns of researchers in their 
relations with the Home Office. (Castles et al 2002; Castles, S., Cohen, R.., Dona, G., 
2005 Conference Proceedings). These dilemmas echo those of VS and other agencies 
over what the most ethical position is, to work from within or without.  
 
There has been particular concern to do research which consults, previously un-consulted 
forced migrants on their experiences of policy, and other aspects of their lives in exile, 
attempting to amplify their, previously unheard, voices.  This includes participative 
action research seeking to include people who are forced migrants in the research 
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process, working ‘with’ rather than ‘for’ in their empowerment, renewal and 
reconstruction of their lives, towards praxis and innovative and creative local practices, 
and against their objectification, (O’Neill, 2001; O’ Neill and Tobolewska, 2001; Moran; 
2003), 
 
Listening to the voices of peoples seeking asylum encourages us to engage with 
ethics, with people similar to our ‘selves’, within a moral order and conscience 
based on thinking and feeling and compassion. Thus, precluding the possibility of 
objectifying, classifying and categorising as faceless, nameless, less than our 
‘selves’, and may inspire praxis instead of adopting a ‘bystander’ role, (O’ Neill, 
2001:18) 
 
There has also been a proliferation of academic and doctoral research using different 
methodologies and theoretical stances to explore many aspects of asylum policy, forced 
migrants experiences and the experiences and transformations of ‘host’ communities 
(East, 2001; Shildrick, 2001), as is also evident with the growth of research and 
information networks (ICAR), undoubtedly with much ‘work in progress’.  This includes 
a little ethnographic research (Lewis- in process). 
 
From identification of the broader philosophical and global themes and contradictions of 
exclusion and inclusion, universalism and particularism, partialism and impartialism, 
sovereignty and human rights, welfare and control which are implicit in the debate, 
controversy and politicisation around asylum and forced migration, and the devising of 
(‘Firm but fair’, ‘tough but tender’) policies designed to control ‘asylum seekers’ without 
jeopardising basic human rights of ‘refugees,’ we have come to the role of UK social care 
agencies involvement in this welfare as control. Such agencies are in the contradictory 
position at the nexus of welfare and immigration control, especially since the 1999 IAA 
“qualitative leap” (Cohen, 2001) in this conjuncture. This potentially compromising 
position has been recognised (Cohen et al, 2002; Hayes and Humphries, 2004) and the 
experiences and practices of social care workers investigated using semi-structured 
interview research, with statutory sector social work agencies ‘picking up the pieces’ 
from the 1996 AIA (Duvell and Jordan, 2000; Sales and Hek, 2004), giving some 
illuminating insights into some of the dilemmas their position threw up. However, since 
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the 1999 IAA, following New Labour’s model of ‘mixed economy’ Third Way welfare, 
voluntary sector agencies agreed to provide integral sections of the welfare as control 
‘safety net, ’ as well as statutory social care agencies. In some ways, as we have seen, this 
was a continuation of their historical involvement and gathered expertise in the Reception 
and settlement of refugees, however, with the premises and provisions of the 1999 IAA, 
their new position implicated them more in the enforcement of control, separation and 
exclusion of asylum seekers than the facilitation of their settlement, inclusion and 
integration. Cohen (2002) in particular, has highlighted the contradictory, compromising 
and in his understanding, collusive position of those VS agencies, particularly, offering a 
Reception service with “intentionally deterrent facilities” (Duvell and Jordan, 2000:28). 
Although there were many small regional VS agencies in dispersal consortia in receipt of 
some government funding to provide OSS and other services, the five bigger RSA’s in 
agreeing to run Reception services, would be involved in activities that might be 
detrimental to the welfare of asylum seekers, such as controlling access to and eviction 
from the ‘safety net’. Critics argued that the receipt of a large proportion of their budget 
from the Home Office, particularly the two agencies who would be solely RAA’s 
(Migrant Helpline and Refugee Arrivals Project), jeopardised their ethical integrity and 
independence, so their ability to fight for forced migrants’ rights and protect their 
welfare, as they became part of “the technocratic force to implement its programme,” 
(Duvell and Jordan, 2000:30). The RSA agencies defended their position as a 
compromise worth taking to prevent the government using private sector agencies with 
less concern or expertise in the welfare of asylum seekers, and by being involved allow 
their reform from ‘within’. Some critics argued a joint VS and public sector boycott 
would have forced the collapse of the legislation (Cohen, 2002), and a revolt from 
‘without’ was most ethical.  
 
As VS agencies they were in a somewhat different contradictory positioning to the 
statutory social care agencies in the studies above, in that although they had received 
some state funding previously they were not procedurally accountable nor part of the 
state. Also, as VS agencies, they had formed to protect the social rights of forced 
migrants and defend their interests through campaigning and lobbying (although each of 
the five RAA’s had different trajectories and specialities). It could thus be argued that 
their new positioning was more or differently contradictory than the social services 
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teams. A research study exploring the specific position of these (or other) VS agencies 
and their workers has not been done. Also, whilst important and useful, interview studies 
even when conducted in the context of the setting, are not able to offer the same insights 
of an ethnography where the researcher becomes immersed in and observes the everyday 
world of a setting over a period of time, getting a ‘feel’ for the daily life, the patterns, 
uncertainties and shapes of the setting. An ethnography allows a researcher to observe the 
details of what actors actually do in practice; practices which expert interviewees take for 
granted and accounts of which have a presentational ‘gloss,’ or use ‘institutional 
discourse,’ (Smith, 2005). Travers (1999) argues that detailed observation, in his case 
ethnomethodology, of practices and attention to how actors understand their everyday 
actions and practical problems particularly offers insight into highly politicised settings, 
such as immigration courts. It would seem that an ethnographic study of the everyday 
world over a period of time of a VS organisation in the contradictory position identified, 
involving observation and gathering insiders’ accounts could generate some ‘rich’ data to 
help explore the lived experience of and what being a NASS RAA involves in daily 
practice.  
 
Also lacking in the previous interview studies, were the accounts of the service users. 
Although Duvell and Jordan (2000) had interviewed asylum seekers, these did not feature 
in their article. Sales and Hek (2004) had interviewed RCO members advocating for 
asylum seekers but not the service users themselves. Although much recent research has 
included accounts of asylum seekers experience of service provision, there has been less 
ethnographic research with people in this position. To explore the welfare as control 
policy in practice at its Reception stage, it is essential to consider the lived experiences of 
the people, the subjects, who are the objects of the policy. How did asylum seekers 
journeying through Reception provided by a VS agency, experience and understand their 
situation and this welfare ‘safety net’? As Dwyer (2005:32) has said, qualitative research 
with forced migrants makes it, “…possible to highlight how the ‘public issues’ of 
migration and welfare policy structure the ‘private troubles’ (Mills, 1959) of forced 
migrants who arrive at our borders.” 
 
Also, as Lipsky (1980) pointed out, service delivery is not a one-way process. Service 
users, if involuntary and powerless in the process, are active participants in lived out 
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policy. Ethnography would allow observation of how service providers and users 
interacted in the practice of, implementation or ‘making’ of policy. Also “listening to the 
voices” of people labelled ‘asylum seekers’ could, ethically, encourage an understanding 
of people in this position as people “similar to our ‘selves’” and discourage their 
objectification, (O’ Neill, 2001).  
 
From the literature and evidence presented it would seem there was a space, and a 
justification for a sociological ethnography with a VS organisation in the contradictory 
position of implementing a Reception service, a stage of the ‘safety net’ welfare as 
control policy of the 1999 IAA and subsequent legislation, exploring both the lived 
experiences of the workers and the RAA, and the lived experiences of asylum seekers in 
Reception. Questions that might be addressed by this research include: How was this 
contradictory position experienced and understood, in practice? Did the organisation and 
workers experience their position and practices as contradictory or compromising? What 
was involved in the ‘messy’ making of policy in practice? Was, and how was this welfare 
experienced as control? How did people seeking asylum experience Reception?  Whilst 
the general problematic and research puzzle has been identified before entering the field, 
further questions and issues would be generated by ethnographic data gathering in the 
setting. A full explanation of the methodology used is now necessary. 
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4  Methodology       
 
This chapter explains and describes firstly, the philosophical and theoretical assumptions 
underlying and guiding my methodological choices and design and secondly, the reasons 
behind and actual practice of specific research methods of data collection and analysis. I 
use to an extent a “natural history” style suggested by Silverman (2000:236), which 
describes the actual interactive process of my research, without cleaning up too neatly in 
retrospect the inevitable ‘messiness’ involved, thus including any “false leads and dead-
ends,” trials and errors, highs and lows. It seems not only unnecessary and awkward to 
write in the passive voice, but positively constructive in the interests of reflexivity to use 
the first person. I use this less formal style to clarify the development of my thinking 
about and ‘doing’ the research, which should give the reader a better position from which 
to assess my methodological process.    
 
4.1 Philosophical and theoretical assumptions 
 
In this section I will ‘spell out’ the philosophical and theoretical assumptions that have 
informed and guided my choices of research design and methodology. Having stated my 
broad position, I will explain how I came to this and how I understand it to deal with 
essential wider sociological debates, before describing the position in detail. I will then 
explain how and what I have drawn from other sociologists also working from this broad 
philosophical position, to inform my research methodology. This may appear to be an 
eclectic ‘magpie’ mix of theories, but I will attempt to show their relevance, mutual 
compatibility and coherence within the overall philosophical frame.  
 
4.1.1 Developing a philosophical position 
 
Broadly speaking my research is based on critical realist philosophical premises. 
Although developed primarily by philosopher of social science, Roy Bhaskar, critical 
realism is “not a homogenous movement in social science” (Danermark et al, 1997:1) and 
is “a ‘broad church’” (Lopez and Potter, 2001:5). As with any social science ‘paradigm’, 
some social scientists whose diverse practices are premised on or fit with the philosophy 
do not or will not associate with the label. However generally, critical realism begins 
from the ontological position that there is a (social) reality beyond our knowledge of it, 
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that epistemologically our knowing of it will always be conceptually mediated, but 
nevertheless may be “more or less truthlike,” (Danermark et al, 1997:10). The ‘critical’ 
element is a combination including its critique of positivism, as social reality includes the 
unobservable deeper reality of ‘generative mechanisms’ (or social structures), and the 
inherently emancipatory critique of underlying injustices revealed with this level of 
reality.  
 
An early reason for leaning towards the ontological position of critical realism was the 
‘commonsense’ hunch I had that the lived experience of people claiming asylum in the 
UK and those involved in the system for receiving them, reverberates with the 
constraining and enabling nature of social structures beyond their individual agency. 
When considering the constraints on the agency of individuals legally labelled ‘asylum 
seeker’ and informally labelled and racialised as ‘foreign scrounger’ compared to my 
own as a white, middle class British citizen, my commonsense reasoning was to consider 
a position which could accept the ‘reality’ of social structures.  
 
This hunch was corroborated by various sociological arguments, including Porter’s 
(1993:598): “By ignoring the possible constraining nature of social structures, 
commentators are in danger of giving consent, through silence, to their oppressive 
effects.” And Mac an Ghaill’s (1999:13, 34) in relation to recent postmodern or 
“differentialist” theories in the sociology of ‘race’ and ethnicity, 
 
…in which highly complex theories are being developed that fail to connect with 
individuals’ and social groups’ lived experience…  
The differentialist emphasis on the proliferation of identities and the dispersal of 
power may serve to underplay materially structured asymmetrical relations of 
power… 
 
Castles’ (2003) principles for an adequate new “sociology of forced migration” also 
comprehensively articulated some of my basic lines of thinking. Arguing that whilst it is 
essential to do local small-scale research and “vital to investigate the human agency of 
the forced migrants and of the sending and receiving communities” (ibid: 30), 
researchers also need to “…take a holistic approach, linking their specific research topic 
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to broader aspects of forced migration and its embeddedness in social relations at 
various spatial levels,” (ibid: 29). 
 
Castles (2003:27) confirmed my hunch that an in-depth case study of “receiving” forced 
migrants in one organisation would need to be contextualised within wider social 
relations or structural forces, because,  
 
…to generalise from micro-studies of diversity can lead to a false impression of a 
fragmented social world. Rather it is necessary to relate such studies to broader 
theoretical explanations of the structural causes of forced migration and the 
structural determinants of the patterns of incorporation of forced migrants in 
various types of society.   
 
Castles (2003:23) cites a Frankfurt School principle when proposing that the varying 
levels of analysis should be mutually informing, 
 
… The micro- and macro-levels have to be linked through an analysis of the 
complex processes that mediate between them. Ethnographic and cultural studies 
approaches may find that change is experienced at the local and personal levels, 
yet they need to be linked to broader analyses of institutions and structures… 
there can be no local studies without an understanding of the global context and 
no global theorization without a basis in local research.   
 
Castles propositions helped solve the dilemma I had with wishing to investigate the 
agency and lived experiences of individuals in a specific local organisation in a specific 
situation ethnographically but also not wishing to “ignore the constraining nature of 
social structures,” to some extent perhaps ‘determining’ or ‘causing’ aspects of that 
situation, (Porter, 1993:598). Although finding the notion of social structure problematic, 
Smith (1988:90) also argued from her unique Marxist feminist perspective, that a purely 
hermeneutic or interpretive ethnography treating the “everyday world” as “a discrete 
phenomenon” is also problematic: 
 
 105
In constituting the everyday world as an object of sociological examination, we 
cut it off methodologically from the ways in which it is actually embedded in a 
socially organized context larger than may be directly known in that mode. 
 
Of course, as is intrinsic to these contentions, the basis to any sociological study 
necessitates awareness and engagement with the ongoing structure/agency debates and 
the relationships between these levels of analysis and ‘reality’. This leads back to a more 
detailed discussion of a critical realist position. 
 
4.1.2 Explaining Critical realism 
 
There has been a significant growth recently of literature on critical realism as it has been 
posed as a developed and better alternative to a fading postmodernism in social science 
and its philosophy (e.g. Lopez and Potter, 2001). However, only a ‘bare’ summary of my 
reading of the highly complex position is necessary to clarify my methodology. From 
Roy Bhaskar’s initial critique of positivism, he and others developed critical realism as a 
dialectical combination of his ‘transcendental realism’ and ‘critical naturalism’. 
 
Critical realism is more ontology than epistemology, asking “What properties do 
societies and people possess that might make them possible objects for knowledge?” 
(Bhaskar, 1978:13, cited in Danermark et al., 1997:5) and answering, “the world is 
structured, differentiated, stratified and changing” (Danermark et al, 1997:5). Reality 
exists independently of our knowledge of it and consists of the real (deep generative 
mechanisms and structures), the actual (events happen whether or not we experience 
them), and the empirical (experienced events).  
 
Critical realism criticises social science tendencies to conflate structure and agency in the 
over-determination of agents by structures, or denying the real existence or power of 
structures separate from agency, or by their ‘central’ conflation (e.g. Giddens theory of 
structuration), which denies possible influence between them. 
 
Societies can be understood relationally as emergent products of human 
behaviour… people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a 
necessary condition for their activity… [Individuals] reproduce or transform 
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[society] which would not exist unless they did so. Society does not exist 
independently of human activity (the error of reification). But it is not the product 
of it (the error of voluntarism)…Neither can, however, be identified with, reduced 
to, explained in terms of, or reconstructed from the other, (Bhaskar, 1998:36).   
 
Critical realism “claims to be able to combine and reconcile ontological realism, 
epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality,” (Archer et al, 1998:xi). There 
exists an external world independent of human consciousness and socially determined 
knowledge of it. Social reality is concept and people dependent, but not concept or people 
exhaustive, (Bhaskar 2001:28), that is, there is a social reality beyond human agency and 
beyond our knowledge of it. Also, “all knowledge is fallible and open to adjustment. But 
– not all knowledge by far is equally fallible” it can be “more or less truthlike,” 
(Danermark et al, 1997:15, 10). Whereas natural science involves a single hermeneutic 
(its objects are socially defined but naturally produced), social science involves “double 
hermeneutics”:   
 
 “we interpret the interpretations of other people”(ibid:200); “ the objects of social 
science are both socially defined and socially produced… but they are nevertheless just 
as real,” (ibid:31).  
 
Danermark et al (1997:201) suggest several meanings for ‘critical’ including, after 
Bhaskar, critique of positivism’s ‘flat empiricism’ which denied the transcendent (deeper 
unobservable) level of reality that realism proposed. Bhaskar also criticised social science 
tendencies to conflate structure and agency, proposing instead a transformational model 
of social ontology, stressing their separateness but mutual dependence. ‘Critical’ realism 
criticises positivist social science’s universalist claims to truth by stressing its transitive, 
social, thus limited, character. ‘Critical’ realism has emancipatory potential because 
revealing underlying ‘generative mechanisms’ at the social level, power differentials can 
be clearly seen, criticised and social solutions found. Also ‘critical’ realist reasoning 
might surpass every-day thinking but is still often mixed up with “myths, illusions and 
pure ignorance” (p201), but social scientific practice could reveal this and so allow 
critical reflection.  
 
 
 107
4.1.3 Methodological implications of a critical realist position 
 
According to Danermark et al (1997:73), “There is no such thing as the method of critical 
realism.” Because critical realism is “ontologically bold and epistemologically 
cautious,” (Outhwaite, 1987:34), no particular methodology is privileged except that 
“ontological commitments… are inescapable and to be taken seriously” (p118-9). 
Therefore “it is the nature of the object that determines the form of its possible science,” 
Bhaskar (1998:3).  
 
Danermark et al (1997:204) suggest “critical methodological pluralism” as a working 
procedure, which is based on the notion and consequences of reality having ontological 
depth, but shows “a humble spirit” towards arriving at knowledge of a specific 
phenomenon, so does not exclude any method except that “the methods must suit the 
object of the investigation and the purpose of it,” (ibid: 26). 
 
Therefore, because the social world is a highly complex, “messy and ambiguous”, 
“differentiated”  “concrete open system,” (Sayer, 2000:5) of interacting necessary and 
contingent structures, mechanisms, relations and practices which could not possibly or 
desirably be separated out for testing as variables as in experimentation, qualitative 
‘naturalistic’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) or “intensive” research is best suited to 
the complexity of the ‘objects’ or ‘subjects’ of social science, although if considered 
suitable, “extensive” methods are not ruled out, (Sayer, 1993). 
 
On similar principles, because the social (and social science) world is concept-dependent, 
it is essential that the starting point to building scientific theories from scientific concepts 
must be a systematic exploration and “contemplated analysis” of everyday concepts and 
every day knowledge and how it has been formed and used, if social scientific theories 
are to be valid, (Danermark et al, 1997: 34-5). However, while actors’ social meanings 
are intrinsic to the social world, if explanation is an aim, collecting and repeating social 
actors’ everyday interpretations and explanations of social phenomena is not enough 
alone, unless purely registering these is the aim. In contradiction to interpretivist 
approaches such as ethnomethodology, Danermark et al (1997:37) argue there would be 
no point in social science if commonsense explanations were enough to explain the 
causes of social phenomena,   
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…an interpretation of the ‘second order’ does not constitute a social scientific 
explanation either. It is not enough just to build on various social agents’ own 
descriptions and understandings of themselves and of existence… 
 
Exploring the mutual relationship between the material dimension of the social, including 
social practices (with probable power asymmetries) and people’s concepts and notions, is 
also essential.  However, because the deeper dimension of reality is unobservable, 
observation in ‘natural’ settings and study of everyday concepts is not enough alone, and 
theorising is usually considered an essential aspect of critical realist methodology. 
Conceptualisation by means of abstraction (sometimes conceived as ‘thought operation’) 
whereby possible generative mechanisms are separated out in thought to assess their 
possible influence is thus an aim, (Danermark et al., 1997).  
 
4.1.4 Critical realist reasoning and theorising   
 
Sociologists commonly reason and theorise, re-describing reality in a conceptual 
framework aiming to reach deeper explanations for events without explicitly stating their 
critical realism. Thus social science that accepts different levels of social reality involves 
reaching beyond empirical phenomena, to ask ‘transfactual’ questions, postulating what 
must exist, or in critical realist terms, what ‘generative mechanisms’ must exist to make 
the factual event possible. Danermark et al. (1997: 73) argue that “All science should 
have generalizing claims”; not empiricist extrapolation from small to larger populations 
but of, “more or less universal preconditions for an object to be what it is,” (ibid: 77). 
 
Danermark et al. (1997) suggest different types of complementary reasoning are 
necessary to attempt to reach explanations including deduction, induction, abduction and 
retroduction, the latter two being most important for critical realism. Abduction involves 
asking what new meaning is given by interpreting something using one of several 
possible conceptual frameworks, uses imagination and aims at “better knowledge”, not 
definitive truths. Retroduction uses various strategies to ask what conditions (structures, 
mechanisms, relations) are necessary without which something could not exist, and 
which are contingent to the phenomenon’s existence.   
 
 109
Theories are abstractions that cannot be directly tested against objective facts but should 
not be arbitrary either but founded on experience of concrete reality. Moving between 
abstract, relevant theorising and observation of reality without empiricism is core to 
sociological procedure. With critical realism, conceptualisation strives to discern 
properties that are decisive for social phenomena to be what they are and not something 
else and are not like empirical categories, they distinguish mechanisms and structures 
often using existing concepts. Theoretical ‘verification’ is essential but very different 
from positivist testing; a good concept is neither arbitrary nor purely based on 
observation, it “has ‘punch’…should be sharp and forceful… functions in 
practice…provides deeper insight…explanatory power,” (Danermark et al., 1997:122). 
This ‘punch’ will be revealed when used in practice to analyse reality. Both middle-range 
(Merton,1967) (deductive theory verification) and grounded theories (Glaser and Strauss 
1967) (inductive theory generation) have an empiricist bias, whereas using ‘general’ 
theories abductively and retroductively alongside concrete research provides more access 
to deep, structural reality.  Although  ‘general abstract’ theories describe macro social 
processes or structures, they are not ‘totalising,’ nor are they reducible to testable 
hypotheses but evaluated in terms of the fruitfulness of their interpretative framework, 
explanatory power and generation of new, deeper knowledge, (Danermark et al., 1997) 
 
Methodological soundness involves open-minded rather than dogmatic application of 
complementary theories and concepts to empirical research, without succumbing to 
unprincipled eclecticism. Theories should be approached as general interpretative 
frameworks to approach specific, context-dependent concrete research interests, not as 
ready-made empirically tested products to aid predictions. Their productivity depends on 
their ability to capture real structures or fundamental mechanisms, to integrate other 
central theoretical concepts, their creativity and logical consistency. They are tested and 
modified by use in research practice, discussion and empirical study, (Danermark et al., 
1997). 
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4.1.6 Critique of & my ‘take’ on critical realism 
 
Critical realism as an ontology with epistemological implications is not immune from 
criticism itself; for instance, for not moving far enough from positivism in its 
commitment to naturalism of sorts. Critical realists, when placed within the ‘critical’ 
sociological tradition have been accused by ethnomethodogist Travers (2001:114) of an 
unfounded arrogance as, “The key epistemological assumption… is that the analyst has a 
superior insight into the nature of human happiness and well-being, and how to achieve 
this, than most ordinary members of society.” 
 
 This is disputable as critical realism is based on an ontological position that there is a 
deeper reality not always visible in the everyday world, knowledge of which will always 
be fallible to a degree. However, there does seem to be a lack of recognition of the 
superior expertise of everyday subjects in their actual settings and the value of detailed 
and ‘rich’ description of these in their own right, potentially illuminating previously 
hidden settings from previously hidden perspectives, regardless of explanatory potential. 
Even within realism there is criticism that however conceptualised there are no such 
realities as social ‘structures,’ these are always ‘reifications’ of, for instance,  
 
…a taxonomic category… refers to a whole cluster of different practices. These 
practices have power in the world… but not the abstract collection of them, 
(Harre, 2001:36). 
 
However, I accept and will use this broad ontological position to guide my epistemology 
and methodology, though wary of any naïve realism (Hammersley, 1992), which licences 
my use of a wide range of valuable theories as tools, and suggests an ethnographic 
approach would best suit my topic. It is instructive to refer to some inspiring social 
scientists’ methodologies, which broadly (and arguably) fall within a critical realist 
approach, to reach an informed approach for this study. I will briefly discuss the 
methodologies of Dorothy Smith (Institutional Ethnography), Michael Burawoy 
(Extended Case Method) and Pierre Bourdieu (Understanding), explaining how I have 
interpreted and used them to inform my methodology and version of critical realist 
ethnography.  
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4.1.7 Institutional Ethnography 
 
The ‘creator’ of Institutional Ethnography, Dorothy Smith (1987;1990;1999;2005), calls 
it “an alternative sociology…for people,” not a theory or methodology, typical of 
“mainstream sociology,” about people, which objectifies them through its “theory-
governed discourse,” (Smith, 2005:1). Although not doing Institutional Ethnography, I 
draw on some aspects of Smith’s work as providing some valuable insights to inform this 
study. 
 
Although Smith may well be disinclined to label herself critical realist, her ‘sociology’ 
falls within the metatheory in several ways, and outside it in others. She is more 
concerned with ontology than epistemology, although she describes hers as “modest” 
(Smith, 2005:52). Her conception of “how the social is real”(ibid), involves just the 
everyday actualities of people and their activities, which are however co-ordinated 
relationally with the doings or “work” of others, “elsewhere and elsewhen”,  
“translocally” beyond and mostly invisible from the everyday particular, but “mapping of 
the social in its institutional forms”(ibid) is possible. This social is ‘dialogic,’ based on 
‘the material,’ but language, texts and discourse play a key role in the co-ordination of 
activities, that is the social.   
 
Smith’s approach differs from critical realism in her criticism of conceiving social 
structure as having agency over people, when it suffers from “’underdetermination’ of 
meaning,”(Smith, 2005:55); that is, a metaphor with no determinate referent, or a “ 
‘blob-ontology;’ that is for every such concept there is taken to be a something out there 
corresponding to it,”(p56). But, she argues, the solution to not reifying the social in 
theoretical terms abstracted from people’s actual lives and activities is not instead to look 
for the social in the individual, but “is to be located in how people’s activities are co-
ordinated”(p58), and, after Marx, concepts should “express actual social 
relations”(p56). Abstract sociological theorising objectifies ‘subjects’ and their socially 
co-ordinated activities by situating “the knower outside the account and represents 
people as objects” (p53).  
 
Smith’s (2005) development of “Institutional Ethnography” from the “feminist research 
strategy” for “The Everyday World As Problematic” (1987) is a curious hybrid taking 
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from such diverse sources as Marx, Mead, and Foucault. To summarise, the aim is to map 
“indexically” the wider social and ruling relations in which everyday subjects participate 
as experts but unknowingly, beyond the everyday, from a “standpoint,” in the everyday 
world, which is “…a point of entry into discovering the social… a site for the knower that 
is open to anyone… that does not subordinate the knowing subject to objectified forms of 
knowledge” (ibid: 10). 
 
Smith (2005:13) conceptualises “ruling relations” not as modes of domination but, 
“forms of consciousness and organisation that are objectified in the sense that they are 
constituted externally to particular people and places” (unforeseen by Marx) as the later 
development of capitalism became ‘corporate,’ so modes of consciousness were no 
longer tied to particular individuals. These are accessible in the language “as social” 
forms of “activated” texts and discourses.  
 
The “institutional” is understood as “functional complexes” embedded in ruling relations 
where many social relations intersect around a specific function (e.g. education or 
asylum). The ethnographic “problematic” begins from the actualities of everyday lives 
which focus the exploration and explication of just how they are “hooked into a larger 
fabric not directly observable from within the everyday” (ibid: 39); how the social is 
implicit within the wider institutional relations. As well as that relevant to the particular, 
this exploration moves into the general, so explicitly articulating the generalised and 
generalising character of such institutions in contemporary society will be present in any 
institutional ethnography.  
 
I will use Smith’s conceptualisation of the social and institutional ethnographic strategy 
in so far as starting in the everyday and recognising the expertise of the participants in my 
local setting, and from their standpoint trying to map the social and ruling relations they 
participate in. However, I maintain that her conception of actual social and ruling 
relations could also be interpreted as social ‘structure’. Despite Smith’s extremely 
careful, ingenious way of dealing with the structure/agency problem (attempting not to 
abstract beyond the actual in her conceptualisations, after Marx), I am not entirely 
convinced of her success. Her denial of any social agency external to people’s activities 
but of social relations extended beyond them seems very close to suggesting structural 
agency at times. For instance, she insists that social relations “co-ordinating” and 
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“organising” people’s activities is different from determining them (“The larger 
relations of class do not appear as external determinants but rather as social relations 
coordinating women’s time…”). Also the difference between “the actual properties of the 
everyday/everynight worlds of our contemporary societies that are never self-subsisting 
but always tied in multiple ways to complexes of relations beyond them” (Smith, 2005: 
38) or “Research is then projected beyond the local to discover the institutional order 
and its organization that governs the local setting”(ibid:41, my emphasis), and a deeper, 
real structure of social relations constraining and enabling individuals’ activities, is not 
entirely clear, especially as Smith emphasises the generalised character of such 
complexes of relations. These could refer to the same ‘things’ just conceptualised 
differently and more or less (or equally) fallibly. In this case it is a matter of making a 
rationalised decision between the two or a combination of them. The aims of Institutional 
Ethnography and critical realism differ in that the former aims to explore and map wider 
social relations, whereas the latter aims at explanation of the local particular in terms of 
the deeper structural.  
 
Before stating my position, I will first describe another research approach developed by 
Burawoy et al (1991; 2000), known as the “extended case method,” offering another 
strategy for understanding the local particular ethnographically and in terms of the wider 
or deeper social beyond or beneath it. Smith (2005:35-8) contrasts Institutional 
Ethnography with Burawoy’s strategy, arguing his relating the local to the global by 
moving from ethnography to theory is precisely what IE is not doing and is explicitly 
aiming to avoid, as another example of ‘objectifying’ sociology. However the extended 
case method is closer to the critical realism described above. 
 
4.1.8 Burawoy’s ‘Extended Case Method’ 
 
Michael Burawoy (and colleagues, 1991; 2000) has developed from working with and 
through the influence of the “introversion” of the Chicago School and the “extroversion” 
of the Manchester School of anthropology, an approach to doing “Global Ethnography,” 
using his version of the “extended case method” of the latter. Arguing that because 
globalization theses all encompass an emphasis on “recomposition of time and space”, 
the ethnographer, whose task it is to engage in the space and time of others, has “a 
privileged insight into the lived experience of globalization,” (Burawoy et al., 2000:4). 
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He proposes a four-part ‘extension’ from the local, outwards, each with an attendant 
power problematic.  
 
Firstly, the observer extends into the world of the participant (as with all participant-
observation), but problematically “the relation of domination…distorts the mutuality of 
exchange” (ibid:27). Secondly, observations are extended over time and space, where 
situations have influence on actions and beliefs, and an aim is to understand successions 
of situations as a social process, though this could lead to the silencing of some agents at 
the expense of others. Thirdly, most importantly, is the extension from such micro 
processes to macro forces, where this link is a “‘structured’ one in which the part is 
shaped by its relation to the whole…external forces” (ibid: 27), the danger here is 
“objectification” of these determining extralocal forces. This leads to the fourth, as the 
third is only possible by extension to theory, not that ‘induced’ or discovered ‘from the 
ground’ but  
 
…existing theory is extended to accommodate lacunae or anomalies. We try to 
constitute the field as a challenge to some theory we want to improve, (ibid: 27). 
 
Although “We cannot see the field… without a lens, and we can only improve the lens by 
experimenting with it in the world”(ibid: 28), there is a danger of normalization, trying to 
make the world studied conform to the framework we observe it through, thus theories 
must be exposed to continual critique. So Burawoy et al (2000: xvi) claim 
“…ethnography’s concern with concrete, lived experience can sharpen the abstractions 
of globalization theories into more precise and meaningful conceptual tools. “ 
 
Burawoy (et al, 2000) argues that any one case will concentrate on only one or two of the 
above, and in Global Ethnography it is the third “extension from micro to macro, from 
local to extralocal, from processes to forces,”(p29). But they problematise the concept of 
forces and in an attempt to counter their objectification (appearing natural and 
inevitable), they consider global forces constituted distantly, “The focus of the 
ethnography is then on the way global domination is resisted, avoided, and negotiated,” 
(ibid:29). Also forces are seen as the product of contingent social processes and 
“examined as the product of flows of people, things, and ideas, that is, the global 
connections between sites,” (ibid: 29). Thirdly, global forces and connections are 
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considered as “imaginations,” thus “challenging the mythology of an inexorable, 
runaway world,” (ibid:29). 
 
Smith (2005:37-8) distances Institutional Ethnography from Burawoy’s Extended Case 
Method, arguing that her extension into social relations beyond the local never leaves 
ethnography for theory, 
 
Carrying ethnography beyond the locally observable is made possible both by the 
approach to work organization through the work knowledges of participants… 
and through innovative methods of incorporating the coordinating functions of 
text into ethnographic practice… Translocal forms of coordinating people’s work 
are explored as they are to be found in the actual ways in which coordination is 
locally accomplished. 
 
Smith agrees with Burawoy that his method is ‘objectifying’ in precisely the way she is 
trying to avoid: Institutional Ethnography  
 
… has no prior interpretative commitment such as that which follows from 
concepts such as ‘global domination’ and ‘resistance’… extended social 
relations… are not assumed to be malign… it is consciously directed toward 
introducing another form of organizing knowledge than those obliterating the 
presence of subjects as knowers situated in their own lives. As inquiry develops, 
the scope of the institutional ethnography pushes the boundaries of conventional 
divisions between micro and macro, sociology and political economy, without 
deserting its ethnographic commitment, (ibid: 36). 
 
Smith (2005:38) insists,  
 
Institutional ethnography does not have a pregiven theoretical destination; 
indeed, it doesn’t have a theoretical destination at all. Those dimensions of ‘the 
system’ that for Burawoy emerge at the level of the ‘wider structures’ of ‘states, 
economies, legal orders, and the like’…are explored ethnographically rather than 
theoretically. 
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However, Burawoy (2000:40) is not convinced of Smith’s denial of theory,  
 
When one includes the injunction to participatory research, this looks like the 
extended case method except that it claims to have no theoretical premises. 
Looking at Smith’s empirical studies, on the other hand, I find them saturated 
with Marxism. 
 
My methodology aims to take something from both of these approaches. It is possible 
that Smith would argue that their ontological grounds are mutually exclusive. Both, 
however, aim to explore the everyday worlds of people ethnographically without sealing 
these worlds off from the wider social reality in which they “participate,” by which their 
activities are “coordinated” or that constrain and enable them. Smith’s notion of that 
social reality does not conceive of any structural entities beyond complexes of relations 
or “institutions”, whereas Burawoy conceptualises using theory of a deeper level of 
reality closer to Bhaskar’s critical realism. I aim to try to retain Smith’s commitment to 
taking a standpoint with the people I work with in their everyday setting, so not 
“obliterating the presence of subjects as knowers situated in their own lives,” (Smith, 
2005:36). However, I accept the need for conceptualising and theorising the non-
observable but nevertheless real social level as ‘structures’ that constrain and enable 
people in their activities, as well as the necessity to contextualise the setting of my case 
study temporally and spatially, globally, as Castles (2003) argued was necessary. My 
methodology is therefore closer to the Extended Case Method, although I will use theory 
in a less bold way than Burawoy and his colleagues, as a conceptual tool to aid 
understanding of possible structural influences implicit but not immediately observable or 
visible within the everyday world of this refugee agency.  
 
4.1.9 Pierre Bourdieu – ‘Understanding’ 
 
I have also gained inspiration from Pierre Bourdieu (et al)’s “The Weight of the World” 
(1999), Bourdieu being another sociologist who can be understood as operating with a 
critical realist ontology of social reality. Bourdieu and his colleagues’ methodology in 
“The Weight of the World”, ‘Understanding’, as Bourdieu calls it, is extraordinarily 
sensitive to both the social and the psychological, intrinsic within individuals’ accounts 
of their everyday worlds. The narratives of the individuals Bourdieu and his colleagues 
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interview, the “stories from below,” as Grass (2002) put it, are immensely rich, evocative 
and telling of the lived experience and suffering accompanying their specific social 
positions. Bourdieu’s extensive contribution to sociology (and beyond) has included 
much theoretically and conceptually innovative work, which encompasses his concern to 
overcome the opposition between structuralism and methodological individualism 
(structure and agency). His various theories of capitals, explored for instance in The 
Logic of Practice (1980) and Distinction (1979), describe a relational view of society 
where different positions that people occupy within a ‘field’ (of practices) are in a 
continuous state of antagonistic relations. In an attempt to transcend the opposition of 
structure and agency, Bourdieu developed the concept of habitus whereby the social is 
embodied in the individual in the form of a set of dispositions enabling practices 
appropriate to a person’s specific objective position within the class structure of a society, 
(Callinicos, 1999).  Habitus is not a phenomenon individuals are conscious of, but these 
dispositions are almost hard-wired into a person’s physical nature or psychology; “a kind 
of tacit competence implicit in actors’ practical ability to cope with a wide range of 
situations in ways that are predictable…” (Callinicos, 1999: 293). Without explicitly 
stating so, Bourdieu’s (1999) conceptualisations of society as such, obviously inform and 
infuse his understanding of the individuals (and their stories) he and his colleagues 
interview for Weight of the World. 
 
 Like Smith and Burawoy, Bourdieu tries to describe and understand the everyday 
experiences and worlds of individuals (the microcosm) in terms of the broader social 
arrangements of society (the macrocosm). Bourdieu (1999:5) talks about representing or 
making, “a place within the space of points of view for social categories that are 
particularly exposed to this ordinary suffering…” Individuals’ telling of their points of 
view, describe a social trajectory typical of their specific and antagonistic positions in 
social space, as they have been brought together (in reality, in housing projects and the 
workplace, for example, and in the layout of the text by the sociologist) in juxtaposition. 
“All kinds of ordinary suffering (la petite misere)” or “positional suffering” are 
experienced by people in specific social positions because of their antagonistic relations 
relative to others, and not just in terms of  “the ‘real’ suffering of material poverty (la 
grande misere)”, (ibid:4). Bourdieu insists that what he is doing is not relativism, but is 
based in “the very reality of the social world” (ibid: 4), whereby, 
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…so-called ‘difficult’ spots (‘housing projects’ or schools today) are, first of all, 
difficult to describe and think about, and that simplistic and one-sided images 
(notably those found in the press) must be replaced by a complex and multi-
layered representation capable of articulating the same realities but in terms 
that are different and, sometimes, irreconcilable, (ibid:3). 
 
By re-presenting these multiple and different points of view together, Bourdieu also aims 
to resist objectifying his subjects by not using a single, dominant or “quasi-divine” point 
of view (ibid:3). However, he also stresses the importance of the sociological narrative 
and analysis that accompanies each interview, where the interviewer firmly and 
reflexively interprets the personal in terms of the social. As the translator (Priscilla 
Parkhurst Ferguson) explains in her Preface,  
 
The Weight of the World presents a sociology that constructs the emblematic 
from the idiosyncratic… the texts in this work are less interviews than short 
ethnographies where the personal leads to the sociological and where, by 
design, the interviewer-ethnographer enters openly into the sociological 
equation, (ibid:ix). 
 
Bourdieu and his colleagues thus attempt to highlight the socially representative elements 
of an individual’s personal story, in terms of their position or category or ‘case’, in this 
case as ‘teacher’ or ‘shopkeeper’ or ‘school girl’.  
 
I have found inspiration for my own research in the rich and moving accounts of the 
individuals presented in this volume tapped by Bourdieu’s exceptionally careful, 
sensitive but sociologically purposeful methodology, which he describes in a final 
‘chapter’, as Understanding. I have not explored or used in any detail Bourdieu’s theories 
of social capital or of habitus (or doxa, and his many other concepts), and so have not 
adopted (nor necessarily rejected) his version of social reality. However, my 
methodology is informed to an extent, by Bourdieu’s critical realist epistemology and his 
Understanding of the social emblematic of an individual’s social position, immanent 
within their personal or idiosyncratic lived experience and recounting of it.  Bourdieu et 
al aimed to reduce as far as possible the “symbolic violence” possible in the interviewer/ 
interviewee relationship, which can be typically asymmetrical especially if the 
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interviewer holds a higher place in the social hierarchy of types of capital. They did this 
by using “active and methodical listening,” the interviewer submitting to the 
interviewee’s story, trying to use interviewers close in social space to the interviewee, or 
in imitation of this, “founded on the knowledge of the objective conditions common to an 
entire category”,  (ibid:609). Bourdieu (1999:613) also described their interviews as a 
“Spiritual Exercise”, in that the interviewers aimed to put themselves mentally in the 
place of the interviewee, “in order to understand them as necessarily what they are”, not 
in the phenomenological sense but, 
 
…to give oneself a generic and genetic comprehension of who these individuals 
are, based on a (theoretical or practical) grasp of the social conditions of which 
they are the product: this means a grasp of the circumstances of life and the 
social mechanisms that affect the entire category to which any individual 
belongs… and a grasp of the social conditions, inseparably psychological and 
social, associated with a given position and trajectory in social space, 
(ibid:613). 
 
Although Bourdieu is obviously referring to a specific theoretical understanding of 
“position” in social space and “category” to which an individual belongs, this intent and 
approach when gaining the accounts of his interviewees was useful in my ethnography 
and interviews with differently positioned workers, and individuals who could be 
conceived as occupying different social categories. Bourdieu’s method of attempting to 
understand before, during and after the interview process the social conditions which 
have conditioned that individual’s lived experience and account of it, to direct the 
interview to bring such an understanding out and be able to ‘read’ what is representative 
or emblematic of the general category or position of the individual, was an enabling guide 
for this research. As mentioned in Chapter 2, although ‘asylum seeker’ is a socially and 
legally constructed category to which a complex human individual cannot be reduced, 
ascription to this category has real and constraining (possibly some enabling) effects on 
the lived experience of a person so-labelled. Likewise, the difficult and contradictory 
positioning of organisations and agencies, and differently positioned agents working 
within these, in relation to government agencies and policy, and their clients, also had 
real constraining (potentially enabling) effects on workers I observed and interviewed.  
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Therefore Bourdieu’s understanding the lived experience spoken of and demonstrated in 
the interview as representative of the specific social conditions contributing to them and 
that person being who they were, was useful. But also his careful and sensitive 
methodological approach to gaining interviewees accounts by “non-violence” and not 
objectifying “the individual to a specimen in a display case,” but instead employing 
“participant objectification,”(ibid:2), were informative guides of the method I aimed to 
emulate. There was unavoidable social distance between myself and my interviewees, but 
Bourdieu suggests ways of reducing this as far as possible, so that it is possible for the 
researcher to gain access (‘non-violently’) to the deeper social mechanisms affecting 
them socially and psychologically, 
 
…to bring to light these things buried deep within the people who experience 
them – people who are both unaware of these things and, in another sense, know 
them better than anyone. 
Like a midwife, the sociologist can help them in this work provided the sociologist 
has a deeper understanding both of the conditions of existence of which they are 
the product and of the social effects that can be exercised by the research 
relationship…This craft is a real ‘disposition to pursue truth’… which disposes 
one to improvise on the spot, in the urgency of the interview, strategies of self-
presentation and adaptive responses, encouragement and opportune questions, 
etc., so as to help respondents deliver up their truth or, rather, to be delivered of 
it. (ibid: 621).  
 
As with Smith and Burawoy, Bourdieu proposes an arguably critical realist methodology 
for exploring the deeper and broader social mechanisms in the local everyday lived 
experiences of individuals. Again, in this research I have gained inspiration from, taken 
and attempted to use some aspects, aims and practical methods  Bourdieu has suggested 
are important to produce the incredibly rich, poignant but also sociologically telling 
accounts he and his colleagues and interviewees have in describing their ordinary and 
everyday social suffering.   
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4.2 Methods 
 
This section will explain how I have applied my philosophical and methodological 
position as rationales for practice, describing the decisions and processes of the actual 
methods I used in ‘doing’ the research.  
 
 
4.2.1 Research Design  
 
“The methods must suit the object of the investigation and the purpose of it,” (Danermark 
et al, 1997: 26). Investigating the seemingly contradictory position of welfare agencies 
implementing deterrent asylum policies suggested an “intensive” ethnographic case study 
with an organisation in this position. Immersing myself over time in the everyday world 
of a VS RSA, gathering data from observation, interviews/insider-accounts and 
documents allowed insight into people’s everyday lived experience, practices, concepts, 
understandings and relations from their standpoints as deliverers, ‘receivers’ and 
bystanders/compensators of government policy. By extending from this case study in this 
local setting to the wider and deeper social relations, processes, mechanisms and 
structures implicit within it, which co-ordinate peoples activities, which they participate 
in, reproduce and transform and that constrain and enable them, more ‘general’, global 
insights should be possible.  
 
4.3 Research process  
 
I will endeavour to ‘tell it how it was,’ as a ‘natural history’ describing and explaining 
my thought, decision and research process reflexively. The research process could be 
summarised as two-fold. Firstly to reach a point of detailed description of the everyday 
setting, including what actually happens and ‘members’’ accounts and interpretations of 
what happens. From here, to abstract (extend) to reasoning to try to establish what 
necessary (and contingent) conditions are implicit within the setting for it to be the way it 
is and not another way. So to produce an explanation (in terms of structures and social 
relations), of reasons why the situation may be the way it is,  which will be fallible but 
aims to be more rather than less ‘truthlike.’   
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4.3.1 Sampling: Selecting the ‘case’        
 
4.3.1.1 Process    
 
Having identified the broad research puzzle of humanitarian and welfare agencies 
involved in supporting asylum seekers implementing deterrent government policies I 
began researching the different types of agencies implicated. From reading the literature, 
attending conferences, networking and talking with practitioners, I began ‘mapping’ the 
government’s arrangement of public, private and voluntary sector agencies into 
‘consortia’ for covering the new 1999 support arrangements. I began ambitiously, hoping 
to do ethnography with up to four different types of agencies providing support to asylum 
seekers from different positions to or ‘collusion’ with the government and differently 
involved in the 1999 Act.  
 
With the dual purpose of gaining better understanding of the field and issues and starting 
the process of gaining access for ethnography, I interviewed three local social services 
‘asylum team’ managers and two voluntary sector agency managers, operating in Shires 
towns and cities, and one in a NE ‘dispersal’ region.  These gave some interesting 
findings into aspects of their contradictory and, some felt, marginalised positions, 
relations with their clients and interpretation of policy, raising similar and added issues to 
Duvell and Jordan, 2000 and Sales and Hek, 2004.They also gave me valuable interview 
experience. When none of these led to further access for ethnographic research, with the 
social services agencies expressing reluctance to be, as they saw it, closely scrutinised, I 
contacted a voluntary sector agency suggested by my university’s social work department 
who accepted their students on placements. In response the RAP contact expressed 
interest but requested I wait six months because they were short-staffed. I began to 
recognise the benefits of doing a single case study over an extended period, with an 
organisation in such an emblematic position to my research interests. I would be able to 
become far more immersed in the everyday world of the ‘deliverers’ and ‘receivers’ of 
state welfare reception policies since the IAA 1999, focussing on the specificities and 
contradictions of the position of a VS agency within the NASS system. Practically of 
course, it made more sense to do in-depth ethnography with one agency than more 
fleeting comparisons with several, especially as gaining access had been time consuming 
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enough as it was. After much chasing, an initial interview and them  willingly granting 
me access I decided to select RAP as my single ‘case.’  
 
4.3.1.2 Rationale   
 
The benefits of a single case study were obviously partially pragmatic, giving focus and 
simplicity alongside ease of travel. It also made good ethnographic sense to “make a lot 
out of a little” (Silverman, 2000:102), and “trade-off” breadth for depth (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 1995:40), as well as allowing longitudinal investigation. The case for 
selecting RAP (and them ‘selecting’ me) specifically was very strong pragmatically and 
theoretically. It was geographically close, relatively small and its various sites covered a 
discrete geographical area. I quickly struck up a good relationship with my welcoming 
‘gatekeeper’ and over time gained good access ‘within.’  
 
As a purposive or theoretical sample RAP’s “relevance to the wider universe” was very 
significant, so providing excellent grounds for generalisation; it would allow “meticulous 
view of particular units” and “encapsulate a relevant range of units in relation to the 
wider universe” and also had “pivotal significance” in relation to my research questions 
and puzzle (Mason, 1996:92). RAP could hardly have had more “pivotal significance” or 
theoretical representativeness in relation to my research ‘puzzle’ concerning the 
‘tensions’ and  ‘contradictions’ identified: It was set up as a humanitarian voluntary 
agency to address the needs of vulnerable newly-arrived refugees; it currently was in 
‘grant agreement’ to the Home Office to implement a Reception Service, the first and an 
integral stage of the new NASS system; RAP was one of five categorically similar 
refugee support agencies implementing similar NASS services, and of those, one of two 
primarily providing a Reception service; worked closely with NASS daily; provided 
‘front-line’ services to asylum seekers, including accommodation.  
 
4.3.2 Sampling within the case     
 
One benefit of purposive sampling is the flexibility and adaptiveness it allows, 
  
Theoretical or purposive sampling is a set of procedures where the researcher 
manipulates their analysis, theory, and sampling activities interactively during 
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the research process, to a much greater extent than in statistical sampling, 
(Mason, 1996:100).  
 
Access to several months of ethnography with RAP gave access to many further relevant 
“processes, types, categories, cases… examples,” (ibid:92) including; processing of 
asylum seekers through a Reception service; the daily work and types of dilemmas this 
involved; ways in which new pieces of legislation were received, understood and 
incorporated into daily work and changed work over time; a range of types of worker and 
people seeking asylum with different experiences and understandings of the systems of 
welfare support; different sites with different purposes. 
 
Thus, sampling within this case interactively and responsively to data arising from the 
field and in relation to my initial queries became as important as selecting the case itself 
.The rationale behind such ‘sampling within’ should reflect the research purposes and 
aim to be as transparent, rigorous and systematic as possible, although practicality and 
availability play a part, 
 
 Decisions must be made about where to observe and when, who to talk to and 
what to ask, as well as about what to record and how… There are three major 
dimensions along which sampling within cases occurs: time, people, and context, 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:45, 46).      
  
4.3.2.1 Sampling Time        
 
Making decisions about ‘time’ involved choices about the overall time spent with RAP; 
proportions of time spent ‘doing’ different kinds of data gathering and writing up; 
‘sampling’ different times significant within the organisation and to different agents. 
Initially my RAP manager gatekeeper, agreed access to approximately six weeks, but it 
soon became clear that she was willing to accommodate my presence for as long as suited 
my purposes. Overall over the course of eight months, I spent fifty-five full or part days 
with RAP, between mid-November 2002 and mid-July 2003 (the preliminary interview 
with another manager in October 2002, some phone calls on non-visiting days and 
continued phone/email contact after I left). For the first four months I visited RAP on 
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average two to three days a week, during the last four less often, as I spent more time on 
transcription and data analysis.  
 
Deciding which ‘times’ were important for observation was an interactive process of 
discerning times important within the setting for the organisation as a whole or different 
individuals, those important or interesting to observe for my initial or newly arising 
research queries, and those convenient to the organisation and myself, or to which I was 
granted access. I aimed to cover as comprehensive a range of routine and extraordinary 
times as possible, but was unable for mainly practical reasons to ‘sample’ all times (I 
predominantly sampled office hours, not early mornings, “out-of-hours,” evenings or 
nights). The boundaries defining ‘time’ and ‘context’ are blurred, as times were mainly 
significant for the types of activity or event they represented, (e.g. dispersals every 
morning, meetings on Wednesday afternoons, clothes distribution on Friday).  
 
4.3.2.2 Sampling People        
 
I chose people mainly for their accounts (from snatched informal conversations to 
recorded semi-structured interviews), but also to ‘shadow’ and observe (though this was 
more contingent than choosing). Again, choosing people was a complex, interactive, 
inductive process developing over time, where choices included a combination of 
convenience, suggestion, analytic and purposive, opportunist, pragmatic, personal. 
Altogether aiming to be comprehensive, systematic but analytically relevant and follow 
hunches and interests. 
 
Convenience and suggestion were predominant early on as I familiarised myself with 
(and became familiar within) the setting, who played which roles where and when. As my 
access was to the organisation, my initial access to individuals’ accounts was with RAP 
workers. Gradually I attempted to select workers using several criteria where, “…the 
process is inextricably linked with the development of analytical ideas and the collection 
of data,” such as informal and formal “member and observer-identified categories” 
(Lofland in Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:51).  
 
I prioritised the accounts of workers in each ‘type’ of role; those with a differing range of 
perspectives or understandings; or those I had identified as somehow interesting or 
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pertinent (for example, long-term RAP workers for their perspectives on changes in work 
over time, through different legislations). 
 
Of course I did not just ‘choose’ people or have instant access to their accounts, they also 
chose me. Developing relationships of trust with people over time was essential, and 
peoples’ willingness to talk with me varied. Most workers were very open, though some 
were happy to chat informally, but reluctant to do a recorded interview. Other factors also 
restricted my choice, such as workers’ workloads, autonomy over their time, spatial or 
geographical accessibility. For example, managers had the autonomy to programme an 
interview into their diaries, whereas front-line workers jobs were less predictable, but 
their greater spatial accessibility allowed for more quick informal chats and observation. 
 
Access to RAP, over time, began to give me potential access to groups of people other 
than RAP workers, as I had hoped. I had not predicted however, the many individuals and 
agencies integral, incidental or independent in or around the support system RAP co-
ordinated. I therefore also ‘sampled’ individuals from this wider network (for example, 
hotel workers, taxi-drivers, and health visitors), using criteria such as their different 
perspectives on and experience with RAP, government policy, and asylum seekers. 
Vitally, access to RAP also gave me access to asylum seekers and their accounts of their 
experiences of the support system, gradually over time, building trust. Access involved 
observation, quick informal chats to recorded interviews and time spent ‘being’ with 
people. This process involved different ethical considerations, such as not having their 
informed consent for observation, using data from brief chats, and peoples’ relative 
powerlessness and vulnerable positions. Practical issues (particularly language and 
gender) also limited the number and range of people I ‘sampled.’ Again I made a trade-
off of breadth for depth, valuing the deeper relationships and rich accounts from a group 
of four English speaking African women, one of whom recorded two interviews and 
shared many aspects of her life with me.  
 
4.3.2.3 Sampling Context     
 
Again sampling contexts was an interactive process involving opportunistic, pragmatic 
and purposive decisions, aiming at accessing comprehensive but analytically important 
contexts. As a researcher I was in a relatively more privileged position than most 
 127
workers, clients and others, having access to viewing most areas. Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1995) refer to ‘socially constructed’ contexts as well as geographical ones, 
such as Goffman’s ‘backstage’ and ‘frontstage’ regions. Contexts could also be defined 
in terms of the events or activities occurring in them, as well as the standpoint or 
viewpoint of different individuals within them (e.g. clients, workers, and volunteers) and 
their varying access to the contexts.  
 
I tried to sample all the different types of RAP’s geographical sites, or those that I had 
identified as relevant to my developing research interests, and as many contexts I could 
access for relevant activities or types of work occurring (meetings, advice sessions, 
dispersals, etc). I endeavoured also to gain as ‘deep’ a ‘backstage’ access, where I could 
observe and listen for valuable insight, as well ‘frontstage’ (e.g. informal moans between 
workers, clients’ ‘backstage’ conversations). 
 
My sampling of contexts was limited by several factors. Obviously the human limitation 
of not being able to be everywhere at once or to cover every aspect of the setting was 
one. I was also not granted access to all areas such as high-level managerial meetings 
with NASS, or some ‘backstage’ conversations between clients. Ethical sensitivity 
limited my ‘sampling’ of contexts for good reasons, such as clients’ need for privacy and 
confidentiality.  
 
4.4 Ethical Considerations   
 
The ethics of qualitative research, particularly in-depth ethnography with an organisation 
and many participants with diverse interests, involved in a politically sensitive and 
contentious social ‘area’ with a particularly powerless and vulnerable group, were 
inevitably complex and demanded renegotiation throughout the research process, 
resolving difficult dilemmas by thinking in “complex and sophisticated ways,” (Mason 
1996:166). There were ethical considerations for the research as a whole and specific to 
each method. Overall considerations involved attempting good ethical practice with the 
organisation as a whole, responsibilities negotiated with my initial gatekeeper, 
responsibilities in my relationships with each individual involved, wider political 
responsibility, and academic sociological responsibilities. In doing this I aimed to adhere 
to the BSA (2005) Statement of Ethical Practice guidelines.  
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4.4.1 Informed consent 
 
“As far as possible participation…should be based on the freely given informed consent 
of those studied,” (BSA 2005). I initially obtained informed consent, including the 
freedom to withdraw at any time and consent to my ways of using data, from the whole 
organisation via my manager gatekeeper, explaining my research in writing and verbally. 
I gave my gatekeeper a written draft informed consent form, for the organisation to alter 
as they chose, including terms of publication. Before starting with the organisation, I sent 
a briefing about myself and my research to each of the Team Leaders, for them to 
disseminate among their teams, so attempting to feed as much informed consent as 
possible throughout the organisation including to lower level workers. In the field I then 
used frequent written and verbal renegotiation throughout the research with individual 
participants. Gaining full further informed consent for each piece of observation and brief 
informal conversations was not always possible. Overall consent obtained from RAP 
management, had been fed down to lower-level workers to an extent, but informing was 
an ongoing process by managers to workers, workers to ‘satellite’ workers and clients 
and myself to all of these. I was careful in as many small-scale situations as possible 
(such as advice sessions between workers and clients) to ensure participants’ informed 
consent to my observation and offer them the right of withdrawal. This was not possible 
in more generalised settings (such as Reception areas) on every occasion, and every 
client’s consent, particularly, was practically not obtainable. I was very aware of the 
asymmetrical power balance of my position, and made every effort not to abuse this.  
 
4.4.2 Relations  
 
Developing relationships of trust with workers and clients was essential for obtaining the 
necessary qualitative data, and involved ethical issues of power and boundaries. 
Awareness and strategies against abusing my power as researcher with both workers and 
clients were essential and differed with each and each individual. Relationships with 
some participants became close and issues needed resolving around boundaries and 
consent for using all conversations as data. My privileged position as researcher visiting 
all sites gave me greater power than workers seeing RAP from one. The extremes of 
clients’ powerlessness (not homogenising or ‘victim’ stereotyping, accepting each as 
active subjects, but recognising the general constraints on many) made it crucial for me 
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not to abuse my power in a situation where they had few rights, the restrictions of 
extreme poverty, an inability to move or ‘hide’ from me, lack of autonomy, psychological 
and physical vulnerability from possible recent trauma and current conditions and 
difficulties. Balancing appropriate care and humanity with research agendas was essential 
in not provoking individuals in distress, and not intruding on clients’ already minimal 
privacy. Conflicting loyalties to different individuals, their interests and my research 
interests needed frequent negotiation. This included reaching the necessary intellectual 
distance from my feelings of loyalty to the organisation as a whole, to individual 
participants, to my gatekeeper and conflicting interests between participants, to gather 
and use my data well whilst retaining ethical integrity.   
 
4.4.3 Anonymity, confidentiality, privacy 
 
Ensuring participants’ anonymity and feasible levels of confidentiality was important. I 
used some informed consent forms, assuring individuals anonymity, for those less part of 
the organisation (asylum seekers and volunteers) and reassured people verbally. This 
included commitments to the whole organisation and separately to individuals. The 
distinctiveness of the organisation on several dimensions (for example role, geography) 
made it impossible and nonsensical to anonymise the organisation, but I have done 
everything possible to ensure individuals anonymity. I have attempted to alter all 
identifiers that do not distort the data unacceptably (BSA 2005); e.g. name, precise job 
title and character. However some potential ‘identifiers’ were integral to the sense of the 
data so could not be changed; e.g. role (manager), citizenship status (asylum seeker), 
gender, country of origin. I have largely used role titles to suggest workers’ positions in 
the organisation, such as Project Worker (PW) or Senior Manager (SM). Confidentiality 
was the fundamental ethical consideration in using documents and in ensuring clients 
rights to confidentiality were not breached. This restricted my access to, for instance, 
examining the production and consumption of clients’ files and database ‘contact 
episodes’, which would have been interesting. It was ethically essential to adhere to strict 
confidentiality within the organisation and setting for insiders’ protection. Ethical 
sensitivity with informants’ privacy and confidentiality rights also stretches to anyone 
generalised about from their data (Mason 1996:166).   
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4.5 Doing ethnography 
 
 
4.5.1 Observation    
 
As in most ethnography, observation was central to gaining insight into how asylum 
support policy works in practice, ‘on the ground’ and how Reception was delivered and 
received in the everyday practices, activities, work, processes, interactions and discourses 
of this ‘natural’ social setting.  Observation involved using all of my senses to 
experience, notice and record such actual happenings from where I sat or stood, trying to 
take nothing for granted and to record how the actors involved understood them. I wrote 
timed and dated notes where possible while observing or soon afterwards, recording 
sights, talk, interactions, description, my understanding of a situation and others’ 
explanations.  
 
‘Sampling’ where and when I observed was based on a combination of extensive and 
purposive grounds. For theoretical and practical reasons I spent most time with RAP 
workers who interacted directly with ‘clients’, from where I could more easily ‘blend in’ 
and take notes. From my observer’s position I also tried as much as is possible to place 
myself, in and experience the settings from, the different positions (or ‘standpoints’) of 
different actors involved (e.g. noticing the very different views/experiences of the waiting 
room or ‘reception’ with a client, a project-worker and a security worker). Smith’s 
(2005:228) conception of taking the subject’s ‘standpoint,’ “A methodological starting 
point in the local particularities of bodily existence. Designed to establish a subject 
position from which to begin research,” is highly specific to Institutional Ethnography, 
but the principle of observing a setting from different actors’ or subjects’ positions within 
it, as far as possible from their subjective experience of it, is what I intended to follow,  
 
The people who are living the situation know it from the inside. Theirs is the 
moment of recognition that something chafes. Of course, the people involved are 
not all located in the same way towards what happens… Different people in a 
situation will have different experiences of it, Campbell & Gregor, (2002:48).    
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4.5.1.2 Researcher role 
 
While ethnographers may adopt a variety of roles, the usual aim throughout is to 
maintain a more or less marginal position, thereby providing access to 
participant perspectives but at the same time minimizing the dangers of over-
rapport… The ethnographer needs to be intellectually poised between familiarity 
and strangeness… (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:112).  
 
Understanding and being explicit about my role and effects within the setting, producing 
data, interpreting peoples’ interpretations is essential for reflexivity. Mason (1996:64) 
urges the complex selection of one’s role on the complete participant to complete 
observer continuum, though you may “…not take a ‘once and for all’ decision about this, 
but in fact that you move between a variety of roles in any one research project for both 
intellectual and practical reasons.” 
 
As a complete novice within a novel setting, recognising the people within it as experts 
(Smith, 1987), though deciding to participate in a few specific activities, my participation 
was marginal except as researcher. This position as a “’marginal’ reflexive 
ethnographer”, “simultaneous insider outsider”, or “acceptable incompetent” had 
benefits, keeping: “some part held back, some social and intellectual ‘distance’” because 
in this space “the analytic work of the ethnographer gets done,” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995:112,110,115). 
 
Although I will have affected each setting I observed, it is very difficult to know exactly 
how, and I aimed to become as unobtrusive and ‘part of the scenery’ as possible, where 
appropriate. This was easiest in the larger, busy, chaotic offices, and especially over time, 
actors seemed to ignore me as I had requested, becoming “part of the family” as one 
worker said.  
 
My minimal participation in RAP’s work, (and personally with workers and clients), was 
intended to serve a variety of purposes; giving something in return for being given such 
open, friendly access; developing trust and relations; experiencing RAP work to a limited 
extent for an ‘insider’s’/participant’s experience (e.g. doing clothes distribution involved 
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experiencing having to make difficult decisions about how to share out limited resources 
fairly, and trying to run a bureaucratic system humanely). 
 
4.5.2 Interviews  
 
4.5.2.1 Why?  
 
My purposes for gathering informants’ insider accounts as part of the ethnography could 
be categorised as “literal,” “interpretive” and “reflexive,” (Mason, 1996:77), or for 
“‘information’ and ‘perspective’ analyses,” and “advocacy,” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995:124). In all such ‘double hermeneutics,’ my own interpretation of 
informants’ interpretations is inevitable and should be made as explicit as possible.  
 
As experts in their fields or lives, I primarily needed informants’ accounts to help me 
make sense of phenomena I was ignorant about, “for what they tell us about the 
phenomena to which they refer” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:124). However, 
insiders’ accounts, though expert, relevant and presumed to be honest, are not directly 
mappable onto phenomena they refer to, and are among many possible interpretations, so 
were also useful,  
 
…as evidence about their perspectives, and…about the larger cultures and 
subcultures to which they belong…(Thus) Separating the question of the truth or 
falsity of people’s beliefs from the analysis of those beliefs as social phenomena 
allows us to treat participant’s knowledge as both resource and topic… in 
principled ways, (ibid:126).  
 
In researching an organisation hearing differently positioned perspectives (e.g. managers 
and workers) and formal/informal (‘frontstage/backstage’) accounts of the same event 
was essential for informing a ‘holistic’ picture. Also I treated informants accounts as both 
“idiosyncratic” and “emblematic” (Bourdieu et al. 1999:ix), hoping to try to see and 
understand phenomena, as far as is possible, as insiders’ interpreted and experienced 
them in the social situation, for insight into (and separation of) both their idiosyncratic 
story and the general social conditions manifest in/underlying their position as “project-
worker” or “asylum seeker”. Bourdieu’s (1999:613) interview methodology or 
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“Understanding” informed my aims, in that “Without trying to cancel the social distance 
separating” interviewer from interviewee, 
 
Attempting to situate oneself in the place the interviewees occupy in the social 
space in order to understand them…based on a (theoretical or practical) grasp of 
the social conditions of which they are a product: this means a grasp of the 
circumstances of life and the social mechanisms that affect the entire category to 
which an individual belongs …a grasp of the conditions, inseparably 
psychological and social, associated with a given position and trajectory in social 
space… 
 
Also as asylum seekers (and refugee support workers) voices are so rarely heard through 
the cacophony of public discourse, a further intention in gathering accounts was to  
 
…amplify the voices of those on the social margins; and…therefore seek ways of 
representing insider accounts in rhetorically powerful ways. Here the ethnographer’s 
task approaches advocacy, (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:124).  
 
Related to this was my overall intention to illuminate a hidden social area heavily 
shrouded in myth and illusion.   
 
4.5.2.2 How? 
 
My interviews ranged “from spontaneous, informal conversations in places that are 
being used for other purposes, to formally arranged meetings in bounded settings,” and 
from “unsolicited” to “solicited insider accounts,” as typical in ethnography 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:139). The former, intrinsic to and inseparable from 
‘observation,’ the latter resembling ‘interviews’ more, this included conversations 
initiated by myself or informants, grabbed with actors busy in a setting; longer informal 
conversations one-to-one or with several informants; pre-arranged, private, recorded 
‘semi-structured’ interviews using pre-written questions.  
 
Ethnographic interviews are more like, but never just, conversations because the 
ethnographer must retain the control necessary to follow her research agenda, so my 
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interviewing was more “reflexive” than standardized; designed flexibly and interactively 
with ongoing observations and research interests, in sensitivity to the individual/s and 
settings involved, trying to actively listen to what is said “to assess how it relates to the 
research focus and how it may reflect the circumstances of the interview,” (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 1995:153).  
 
I developed my interviewing style progressively with experience. For semi-structured 
interviews, I used ‘directive’ and ‘non-directive’ questions encouraging interviewees to 
express themselves as they chose, generating further un-scripted questions and 
unsolicited talk, while also addressing my research agenda. I developed interviews in a 
range of ways including asking more questions focussed more around research issues the 
more I knew, adding questions previously missed, using questions specific to an 
individual and standardised to their position (client/manager). The benefits of a quiet and 
private place for freedom to think and speak, developing trust, using tape-recording, and 
giving respondents typed questions contributed to the quality of the data produced. 
Interviewing the same person twice (or more) allowed discussion of changes and 
comparisons over time.  
 
Interviewing clients involved some issues different than interviewing workers, including 
negotiating practical and ethical barriers to access. Practical barriers included language, 
the brief and purposive nature of clients’ visits to RAP sites being non-conducive to 
relationship-building, finding a sufficiently private, non-intrusive venue and explaining 
who I was, renegotiating access and informed consent with each individual. Ethical issues 
essentially included necessary sensitivity to the potentially vulnerable position of people 
newly arrived and newly claiming asylum, and having sometimes endured months in 
Emergency Accommodation, as well as the fact that people were already frequently 
questioned and interrogated through their asylum and NASS processes. Their position 
meant they could feel guarded or concerned to say ‘the right thing.’ So sensitivity around 
the acute power imbalance in our respective positions and their presence with RAP out of 
necessity, not choice, meant it was vital to exercise particular care to ensure 
confidentiality and to gain fully informed consent. Gender and cultural issues sometimes 
made building trust relationships with male clients problematic.  
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4.5.2.3 Who? 
 
My ‘sampling’ rationale for interviewing clients was fundamentally based on these 
provisos and opportunity, which explains the relatively small number of English-
speaking women I interviewed in-depth on tape, although in developing more of a ‘case 
study’ approach with each, I came to see this as a benefit. I also gathered the accounts of 
many others in long and short informal conversations in communal areas, particularly the 
EA where RAP’s third office was based and people had more time and freedom to talk.  
 
In practice the accounts I elicited represented a broad spectrum of RAP and ‘satellite’ 
workers accounts and some ‘rich’ accounts of clients. I intentionally targeted ‘operations’ 
(front-line) workers and managers, more than human ‘resources’ workers. Also those 
with most available time and those most at ease with tape-recording weighted my 
selection. Those with least time, autonomy and most unpredictable work were the special 
needs team. Those most reluctant to do recorded interviews tended to be workers who 
expressed a fear of being disloyal to the organisation, although they were mostly happy to 
chat at length informally.  
 
4.5.3 Documents        
 
The two main reasons for studying documents as a third ethnographic method were 
“literal” and “interpretive;” I used them as time-saving sources of information and in 
regards to “factors relevant to or speaking of their context, production and 
consumption”, (Mason 1996:77). I occasionally used them as corroboration or to 
complement to my own documentary data from observing and insider accounts, so 
developing a fuller description. The use of documents, their context, production and 
consumption were fundamental and integral to the social setting; intrinsic tools in the 
daily work of the organisation, and signified extraordinary constraining and enabling 
significance in the lives of people claiming asylum. I approached all documents aware of 
their social production, so problematising their literal reading, but saw no good reasons to 
doubt their overall reliability and accuracy. As the most efficient way of sourcing certain 
types of information, without disturbing workers, I used documents for a broader overall 
picture, and as a practical ‘field’ guide or map (for example, map of organisational 
hierarchy, see Appendix). I also considered documents in terms of their integral use and 
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meaning within particular contexts, how and why they were produced and consumed, by 
and for whom.  
 
4.6  Data generated 
 
o From observation across 3 office sites and 4 EA’s over the 8 month research 
period, I generated 8 notebooks of handwritten field-notes, including notes from 
informal conversations and ‘non-taped’ interview notes 
 
o I generated data from interviews with a variety of participants using differing 
formats (see Table 1, p137). The total number of ALL interviews I conducted, 
including interviewing a person twice, taped and non-taped, fully and partially 
transcribed, and not used, was 42. All of the interviews were used for data 
analysis in some way, except those of the two Volunteers (V) and two Resources 
Workers (RW), as it became clear they were peripheral to the developing data 
analysis. Those interviews taped but partially transcribed, I listened to thoroughly, 
and then transcribed the sections relevant to the already generated themes from 
the fully transcribed interviews.  
 
o I also had numerous  other long and short more informal conversations with 
asylum seekers, RAP workers, Refugee Support Workers (interpreters), 
Volunteers and  Satellite Agency Workers, which I recorded by note taking 
during or shortly after conversations. 
 
o I gathered numerous documents  
 
I have aimed to indicate in the data chapters which sources different data came from by 
using int. (interview) and obs. (observation) alongside the evidence 
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Table 1.  A representation of the number and status of interviews conducted 
 
Title of  
Interviewee 
No.  
Persons 
Interviewed 
No. 
Persons  
Interviewed 
Twice 
Taped Non-taped 
- 
Hand 
Written 
Transcribed  
Fully 
Transcribed 
Partially 
AS 4 2 6  6  
ED 1  1  1  
SM 4 1 5  3  
TL 4 1 3 2 1 2 
PW 6 1 4 3 2 2 
AW 3  3  2 1 
YPA 1  1  1  
V 2  2    
RW 2  2    
CC 1   1   
IC 1   1   
SVSW 1   1   
HW 1   1   
ET 2   2   
EAW 4   4   
TOTALS 37 5 27 15 16 5 
 
. 
 
4.7 Data Analysis  
 
I attempted to maintain throughout my research process, including data analysis, overall 
ontological and epistemological coherence. My research purpose was firstly to describe 
in as much detail possible (from my viewpoint) how I found the social world of asylum 
seekers’ welfare support policy in the practices and understandings of people delivering it 
and people taking it up. What was it actually like? What actually happened? How did the 
people involved understand and interpret it from their different positions in the setting? 
 138
How was it different and similar to my previously held ideas and my readings of ‘the’ 
literature? From here, with this ‘picture’ of these everyday actualities held always in 
mind, I intended to attempt to find some reasons why welfare supporting asylum seekers 
was this way and not any other way, what was ‘idiosyncratic’ or contingent about the 
situation and what was ‘emblematic’ or the necessary (structural and relational) 
conditions making it so? (i.e. to reach some kind of explanation using retroductive 
reasoning). 
 
Therefore, broadly in line with critical realism, I intended to dialectically and 
interactively analyse data alongside data generation and theorising. The purpose of 
analysing the mass of data generated from hours of observation, numerous insider 
accounts and ‘reading’ documents was to try to discern any meanings they held, what 
they might ‘say to’ the wider social area in which they were embedded, to the research 
questions produced before, during and after fieldwork; e.g. How is policy experienced on 
the ground by those involved in its frontline delivery and take-up? Are the seeming 
contradictions evident in the everyday practices? If so, how were they manifest? Also, 
experiencing and immersing myself in this everyday world, were my initial questions 
designed from reading and a few pilot interviews meaningful to the ‘reality’? What new 
puzzles needed focussing on? Was changing or rethinking the research focus necessary? 
These are questions to address during not just after the fieldwork, where ideally a 
researcher should be progressively focussing in line with simultaneous analysis as she 
goes along, 
 
Ethnographic research should have a characteristic ‘funnel’ structure, being 
progressively focused over its course. Over time the research problem needs to be 
developed or transformed, and eventually its scope is clarified and delimited and 
its internal structure explored. In this sense, it is frequently well into the course of 
inquiry that one discovers what the research is really about… (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995:206)  
 
My intention to analyse the data throughout the research process with the aim of 
progressively focussing my fieldwork was more difficult than I had expected; “This 
commitment to a dialectical interaction between data collection and data analysis is not 
easy to sustain in practice” (ibid: 206). This was partially for the practical reasons that 
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the amount of time and energy spent ‘in the field’ left little time or energy for consecutive 
intensive data analysis. Also, I believe that I erred in the pull towards ‘naturalism’ that 
many ethnographers feel, and can hinder this dialectical, reflexive process. Therefore I 
did the main bulk of the data analysis after leaving the field.  
 
4.7.1 Process 
 
This process involved transcribing taped interviews, carefully reading through all data 
identifying recurrent themes and patterns and coding the data (loosely similar to 
‘grounded’ research) inductively, and dialectically in relation to my research questions. 
Initially this process involved generating a huge number of categories, where these 
themes tended towards the mundane and were based more in everyday descriptive 
concepts, including those of the individuals involved. However, gradually with more 
distance, imagination and the application of other theorists’ conceptual frameworks (for 
example, Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy) I began generating more analytical, 
‘sociological’ themes and concepts to make sense of the data, attempting to view the 
setting in novel ways that might provide new insight (i.e. abductively). Analysing the 
themes raised inductively in relation to those addressed in the literature reviewed prior to 
and following the fieldwork, I was able to ‘extend’ further to consider where this 
particular setting fitted in wider social relations and what deeper structural realities 
influenced why it was the way it was.  
 
4.7.2 Reliability, validity, generalisation      
 
Data analysis is a creative process in qualitative research, which has been criticised as “a 
mysterious process about which little can be said… One must simply wait on the 
theoretical muse,” but Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:209) argue that using one’s 
imagination is legitimate, not just in the “emergence of analytical ideas, but is equally 
important in devising ways of developing and testing these.”  Though creativity and 
imagination are useful and important, so are transparent and systematic “strategies”, 
aiding the overall rigour and ‘reliability’ of qualitative data analysis. Reliability in the 
sense it is applied to quantitative research is not applicable or sensible in relation to 
qualitative research; ‘standardised’ methods or measurement are inappropriate, however 
it is still essential, to find a way to ensure your explanation and analysis are sound and 
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convincing, and why it is better or more appropriate than others, (Mason, 1996:145). 
This involves ensuring in research practice and then demonstrating that the analysis and 
explanation have been systematically and transparently constructed and all processes 
have been rigorous,  
 
ensuring that your data generation and analysis have been not only appropriate 
to the research questions, but also thorough, careful, honest and accurate (as 
distinct from true or correct…)…The presentation of your analysis must therefore 
include an explanation of why it is that the audience should believe it to be 
reliable and accurate, (ibid:146).  
 
Demonstrating how the research is ‘general’ is also essential in production of a rigorous 
data analysis but with qualitative ethnographic research this does not involve ensuring 
your sample is representative. However, as Danermark et al. (1997:73) stated “all science 
should have generalizing claims” but in critical realism this involves the ability to 
demonstrate “the more or less universal preconditions for an object to be what it is” 
(ibid:77). With this study, the single case study of an organisation, the individuals 
involved with it, their interactions, actions and work in the specific position it was in, are 
demonstrative of the underlying conditions that make it that way.   
 
However, although a unique organisation, in several important ways RAP was 
representative of the “wider universe” (Mason, 1996) of which it was an example. It was 
one of only two UK VS agencies that were solely RAAs in Grant Agreement to NASS 
and one of five offering some Reception service. Thus it was highly representative of the 
contradictory position in question. Also, as one of the two agencies operating 
predominantly as RAAs, a large number of all people who claim asylum in the UK, 
(especially those who were destitute) particularly (but not only) those arriving at London 
airports, were processed through this agency initially. For these reasons it is possible to 
generalise (in the sense of extrapolation to the wider universe) from these findings to 
make more general statements on asylum support, and on those supporting and supported.   
I will visit the strengths and weaknesses of the research methodology in the conclusion. 
In order to make sense of the data chapters, it is important to set the scene by giving a 
profile of the organisation, describing for instance, its history, remit, organisational 
structure and workers roles.   
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5 Setting the scene – a profile of the organisation          
 
5.1 Overall purpose/role 
 
5.1.1 History 
 
Refugee Arrivals Project was started in 1988 as the numbers of people seeking refuge 
in the UK had begun to increase, and RCOs and members of Refugee Action 
recognised the difficulties people had when arriving at Heathrow, often traumatised, 
bewildered and frightened, knowing no one or nothing about what to do next. A RAP 
manager told this history, “When I arrived myself in 1982 I was give by Immigration a 
piece of paper… and ‘Off you go!’ That might have been OK for a few people who have 
money… speak the language… have friends or relatives…waiting for them… but most 
people don’t have all these luxuries. So it’s the trauma of getting from Heathrow 
Airport to anywhere! … ‘People are getting lost, are sleeping rough’… all sorts of 
terrible stories.”  A steering group including these RCOs raised a small fund of £2500 
from them, the ALG and UNHCR to set up the project to assist new arrivals. The co-
ordinator from RA and two workers started working from a back office in RA, before 
they accessed a “very small” office at Heathrow. When the numbers of arrivals 
increased “suddenly to around 30,000 a year” in 1990, the section of the Home Office 
dealing with the voluntary sector gave RAP funds to recruit seven project workers. By 
1999, RAP still only consisted of 12 full time staff, but in 2001 it had grown to 48, 
having accepted the Home Office grant to run its Reception Service. In 2003 when the 
research period ended, RAP employed 65 full-time staff.                     
 
5.1.2 Remit and responsibilities 
 
At RAP’s inception there was no asylum or refugee specific legislation, only the 
generalised 1971 Immigration Act, therefore new arrivals were entitled to mainstream 
welfare support. RAP’s initial remit therefore involved providing advice and guidance 
on UK welfare systems, and assisting newly arrived refugees in accessing them. This 
included finding them accommodation with Homeless Person Units, private landlords, 
or local authorities. RAP’s remit changed gradually over the years as asylum seekers 
access to mainstream welfare support was restricted by the 1993 and 1996 legislations, 
until it was drastically changed operationally from April 2000 by the 1999 Immigration 
and Asylum Act. When RAP, like the other five major voluntary sector refugee support 
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agencies, agreed to become a “key player” in delivering the Home Office’s new welfare 
support system co-ordinated by NASS, they officially became a “reception assistant.” 
During the research period therefore, RAP’s primary remit was to facilitate access to 
NASS support for destitute new asylum claimants, predominantly new arrivals from the 
London airports and those claiming asylum in the ‘shires.’ This involved making an 
initial needs assessment and referring on where necessary, providing an advice service, 
giving assistance in making an application to NASS for support, finding local 
temporary Emergency Accommodation where necessary and facilitating dispersal to 
more permanent accommodation in ‘the regions.’ RAP’s Home Office responsibilities 
also involved supporting the “Stansted Afghanis” the group of asylum seekers who had 
hijacked a plane at Stansted airport in February 2000. The organisation addressed other 
areas of their clients needs through various differently funded projects.   
 
5.1.3 Publicly stated aims and objectives 
 
RAP’s ‘object’ as stated in their Constitution was  
 
…to provide relief for refugees and their families who are needy or distressed either at 
or near points of entry to the UK or because of their arrival or expected departure from 
such ports. The word ‘refugee’ means someone with a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular 
social group, or political opinion, and who no longer enjoys the protection of his or her 
country of origin or previous permanent residence; it includes those known as 
displaced persons or asylum seekers, (RAP, Memorandum of Association in line with 
the Companies Act, 1985, amended in 1998) 
 
As though to emphasise a lack of change to its purpose, the Grant Agreement of 31st 
March 2000 between NASS and RAP stated that RAP’s initial aim when “formed in 
1988” had been “to provide short-term support to those new arrivals to assist them in 
finding accommodation and in gaining access to welfare benefits,” (ibid: 2). This 
document also stated that the Grant Agreement between NASS and RAP, “for the 
maintenance and operation of a Reception Service for newly arrived asylum seekers at 
London’s airports… provides a broad but well-defined framework in which Refugee 
Arrivals Project may exercise independent discretion,” (RAP, 2000:2). 
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The Grant Agreement continued to list RAP’s responsibilities as a Reception Assistant, 
a Service Specification, constraining terms and conditions and guidance on operating 
procedures standards and Performance Indicators and Quality Control. RAP’s annual 
review for 2001-2002 gives a less formal statement of value, “Despite a complex and 
changing environment we remain deeply committed to providing quality services at the 
point of reception”.   
 
5.2  Positioning of organisation         
 
To understand the context in which RAP was operating, it is important to describe and 
explain its relationships with other agencies; its ‘positioning’ within the field and 
systems of refugee support. This section will clarify RAP’s position in relation to the 
government, within the voluntary sector and to the other agencies they worked with.         
 
5.2.1 Relationship to government 
 
From RAP’s beginnings in 1988 it received some funding from ‘government’. Initially 
this was from the ALG, then from 1990 from various sections of the Home Office and 
London Borough Grants. Before 2000 RAP received a proportion of its funding from 
the Home Office’s Race and Equality Unit, whose responsibility was ‘race relations 
policy’ and promotion of ‘equal opportunities.’ RAP’s work was affected by the 
asylum legislations of 1993 and 1996, but following the 1999 Act its relationship with 
the Home Office changed significantly when connections shifted to the IND as RAP 
agreed to assist in implementing sections 95 and 98 of this legislation.  
 
Operationally from April 2000, RAP entered into a Grant Agreement with the new 
NASS who from then on gave RAP the majority of its funding to “provide a Reception 
Assistant Service.”  NASS was one of seven sections of the “Asylum support, casework 
and appeals,” which was one of the seven sections of the IND. NASS’ aim was to 
“provide an effective support system to asylum seekers who qualify until a decision is 
made on their claim,” their role (as the IND website states) “is embedded in Home 
Office Aim 6: To regulate entry to, and settlement in, the UK…To provide…fair and 
fast programmes for dealing with…those seeking refuge or asylum.”  Thus RAP 
became a “funded stakeholder” of NASS “to enable us to deliver aspects of asylum 
support.”  
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As the letter from NASS accompanying the Grant Agreement to the then CE of RAP 
said, “This Agreement reflects the principles set out in the ‘Compact on Relations 
between Government and the Voluntary Sector in England,’” which, the Prime Minister 
states in his introductory message, “provides a framework which will help guide our 
relationship at every level.”  Not legally binding, this Compact was developed to 
promote government’s partnership with the voluntary and community sector whose 
“vital role in society as the nation’s ‘third sector’, working alongside the state and the 
market” and because they “have a number of complementary functions and shared 
values.” In it the government undertakes “To recognise and support the independence 
of the sector…independent of any funding relationship.” 
 
5.2.2 Relationship to others within the voluntary sector 
 
Throughout its history RAP has had working relationships with other community and 
voluntary sector groups and organisations involved in supporting refugees. Local 
Community Organisations and the bigger Refugee Action (set up in 1982 to aid refugee 
resettlement in the UK) were instrumental in its inception, and it’s Board of Trustees 
and ‘other members’ were primarily made up of representatives from RCOs and larger 
refugee support organisations such as The Refugee Council. RAP also forged links with 
specialist agencies, such as the MF to facilitate referral of their clients, or to share 
expertise and ideas.  
 
During the research period and since its acceptance of its role as NASS Reception 
Assistant implementing the 1999 Act, RAP has had close relationships with the other 
five agencies taking on the same or similar responsibilities delivering the Reception or 
One Stop Services. These six agencies were all positioned similarly in relation to NASS 
and the Home Office as “funded stakeholders,” delivering key aspects of the new 
asylum support system, and had established two groups in order to liaise on their new 
comparable roles.  These were the Asylum Support Voluntary Action Group (ASVAG), 
whose independence were questioned by Cohen (2002) as it was established by the 
Home Office and included representatives from IND, and the Inter-Agency Partnership 
(IAP). The IAP consisted of the six “stakeholder” agencies: the Refugee Council, the 
Welsh Refugee Council, the Scottish Refugee Council, Refugee Action, Migrant 
Helpline and Refugee Arrivals Project.  
 
 145 
The IAP worked fairly closely together, on policy issues related to their similar roles, 
sharing advice and information and discussing ways of influencing NASS on the 
direction of policy and particularly issues relating to its practical implementation. The 
IAP produced a monthly newsletter to inform and advise workers in the individual 
agencies of events and changes from high-level decision making to procedural 
information, and in working protectively for their clients. The IAP had some joint 
lobbying power with NASS and the IND over at least the procedural level of policy 
implementation, and sometimes worked together to challenge aspects of policy. They 
also worked with the Home Office to get a grasp of policy changes and to implement 
them effectively.  
 
5.2.3 Funding status and affiliations 
 
RAP called itself “an independent, not-for-profit organisation.” It was first registered 
as a charitable company under The Companies Act 1985, by the Charity Commission in 
1991, amended in 1997 and 2002. During the research period 2002-2003 the vast 
majority (98%) of RAP’s funding came from the Home Office, as restricted funds to 
provide NASS’ Reception Service. A small amount of funding came from other public 
bodies; London Borough Grants (local government), the Community Fund and from 
charitable Trusts for specific projects operating from RAP: Lloyds TSB Foundation, 
Save the Children Fund and Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund as well as some 
donations. There was a vast increase in NASS funding and expenditure from nearly 
£6m at the end March 2002 to over £13m by the end of March 2003. RAP’s annual 
review 2002-3 sites “exponential growth in terms of its turnover, its staffing and its 
facilities” over the previous three years as NASS Reception Assistant. The Trustees 
Report reviewing their activities also sited, “The steep rise in referrals during 
2002/3…the result of conflicts in Zimbabwe and Iraq in particular…required a rapid 
response by way of increased staffing and procurement of client and office 
accommodation… continuing dispersal problems and increasing average length of 
stay… Infra-structure improvements to support the enlarged and more complex 
operation included three new bespoke databases, and significant… IT  investment.” 
The review identified various financial risks, primarily their reliance on NASS funding 
especially mentioning the effects of NASS reducing funding due to reduced client 
numbers.   
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5.2.4 Operational Relationship with other agencies  
 
RAP was also positioned within a broad network of ‘other’ agencies with whom staff 
and workers cooperated to varying degrees and in varying ways, in their operations. Of 
course, these had changed over time and in relation to their changes in work. Before the 
1999 Act, the organisation would have worked most closely with HPUs, Local 
Authorities and benefits agencies around London, after it RAP had minimal contact 
with these, except HPUs when asylum seekers moved out of NASS support, having 
gained a leav–to-remain status. One of the most important of their relationships since 
taking on their NASS role was that with private sector managers and workers of the EA 
they procured locally and with whom they worked very closely on a daily basis, in the 
management of moving asylum seekers in and out and between EA s. EA workers often 
provided more than just accommodation, but sometimes distributed asylum seekers 
subsistence allowances if entitled. RAP’s relationship with EA providers could be one 
of balancing interests. RAP also worked closely with private sector agency, 
Wackenhut, who ran the coach service taking asylum seekers to their dispersal regions 
and relied heavily upon the local taxi firm. Their drivers drove many times daily 
between all sites, transporting clients, documents and other items. Most of these 
relationships were functional and friendly.  
 
5.3 Organisational structure 
 
When RAP was formed in 1988 it consisted of a Director and two workers. RAP grew 
gradually over the next ten years, increasing numbers of Project Workers and 
administrative staff to deal with an increasing caseload of clients. By 1998 RAP 
employed 16 full-time staff, including 7.5 Project Workers. Throughout this time, 
RAP’s structure was fairly horizontal, and all workers worked together in the same 
offices. To operate its NASS Reception Service between 2000-2002, RAP recruited 
significant numbers of staff, increasing to 65 full-time and many part-time and 
voluntary workers. With this increase, the hierarchical layers also increased. As RAP 
grew, it re-structured work teams to try to address changing workloads and tasks across 
new sites, and the governance of the organisation shifted from a Management 
Committee to Board of Trustees in 2001. The governance of RAP, determined by the 
constitution written in 1988 and revised in 1998, necessarily consisted of three equal 
groups of Trustees aimed at ensuring proper representation of the interests of refugees. 
Therefore five trustees were from RCOs controlled by refugees, five from organisations 
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providing services for refugees but not necessarily controlled by them, and five were 
independent trustees bringing different skills. Other members were predominantly 
RCOs. The previous Chief Executive retired at the end of 2000, by which time the new 
(and current) Executive Director was in post and had taken responsibility for the 
massive new recruitment, which included a new Resources or Facilities section to the 
organisation.  
 
5.3.1 Current Structure 
 
Three weeks prior to the research period, RAP had restructured significantly again, 
further differentiating roles following a chaotic period of adjustment to sharply 
increased numbers of clients and the political environment. It was just beginning to 
settle into its new structure, designed to aid this adjustment and encourage 
specialisation (see appendix). During the research period, RAP’s operational side was 
structured into four teams managed by a Team Leader, with a Senior Project Worker 
and approximately 15 Project workers. Two teams worked at RAP’s Central Office, 
facilitating NASS applications and giving standardised advice to asylum seekers who 
had arrived the previous day. They were known as the NASS teams and I have called 
their workers NTPWs. There was also a new Support Services Team based at Central 
Office, to whom clients with special and complex needs were referred. The two further 
teams ran Reception at Heathrow and what was known as their ‘on-going support 
service’ at Rosehill EA. Many interpreters, also known as RSWs, worked full and part-
time for the organisation, doing administration and other work.  
 
5.3.2 Additional services 
 
Prior to their NASS role, RAP had fundraised to set up a befriending service (BfS), 
which had become integral to the organisation and its work, and although 
independently funded, this group worked very closely with RAP. The BfS team worked 
from Central Office and co-ordinated over a 100 volunteers in a well-established and 
structured befriending service to identified RAP clients and other refugees and asylum 
seekers.  
 
There was also on the Heathrow site a Young Persons’ Advisor, whose role was also 
separately funded to assist unaccompanied young asylum seekers, under 18.  
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5.3.3 Work sites    
 
RAP had progressively expanded geographically also to accommodate their NASS role. 
During the research period RAP worked from three offices and accommodated clients 
in 6 or 7 hotels and hostels around Hounslow and west London. The three office sites 
served different functions, so different (as well as similar) work was carried out at each. 
In 2000-1, they had been called, “Reception Service, Helpdesk & Head Office”, but 
were no longer or not popularly termed as such. It is useful to give a brief description of 
each main site, the work carried out, and the teams of workers operating there.  
 
5.3.3.1 Heathrow 
 
During the research period, RAP’s Heathrow office, was and still is in the Queen’s 
building of Terminal 1. It was a small open-plan office with a separate meeting room 
and a very small waiting room with sofas for about 6 people, so often clients spilled out 
into the corridor where airport personnel walked and worked. The door with small 
window between the waiting room and office was security coded, was usually closed, 
sometimes wedged open.  Clients were “received” at Heathrow, and all new clients had 
to register here. Most arrived or were fetched from the airport terminals having been 
referred by Immigration on arrival. On a client’s arrival, RAP staff would check their 
documentation to ensure they were registered an asylum seeker, explain their support 
options then phone to the Central Allocations Team (“database boys”) to get them 
allocated or “booked in” to EA and with NASS if necessary, register them with RAP 
and arrange taxis to their EA. One team, team leader and administrator would work at 
Heathrow, as well as the Young Person’s Adviser, with the Team Leader in the furthest 
corner, but with optimal view of proceedings, trying not to get involved in individual 
casework.  
 
5.3.3.2 Central Office 
 
Newly acquired in 2000, this big two-storey office facility was behind a multi-storey 
office housing the Probation Service among others. Towards the beginning of the 
research period, RAP procured the top floor of this block opposite them where the 
“Facilities” section and Executive Director moved and they had a meeting room. There 
was a small reception area and a waiting room, lined with hard chairs with a TV. The 
main office spaces for workers were separated from this area with security coded doors, 
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as was the large cubicled area each with a networked computer for one-to-one or small 
group advice work, with the resident Project Worker. Upstairs were two big areas with 
the older casework files and several offices, a meeting room and kitchen off it. After the 
move of “Facilities” from this upper floor, the Senior Operational Managers and Team 
Leaders moved to these offices. All of the management occurred here, and this was 
where clients came for their main routine advice session (up to 72 hours after arrival), 
completion of their NASS application and could “walk-in” for other advice or queries, 
by appointment. The SMT, Facilities staff, two NASS teams, the Support Services 
Team, Amigos and the CAT team worked here. 
 
5.3.3.3 Rosehill (a pseudonym) 
 
Rosehill ‘hotel’ was more a hostel, able to accommodate several hundred people. It was 
RAP’s most longstanding EA provision and RAP had an office, in the front lower area 
of this, their biggest EA. RAP’s office consisted of a big open plan room, with several 
screened off desked work areas, a small kitchen, three cubicles, two rooms off it where 
the clothes distribution occurred, and a waiting room leading into the main reception 
area of the ‘hotel’. This was the most run-down office, (as was the ‘hotel’) with two 
sides as windows onto the outside entrance area of the ‘hotel’, ‘netted’ to obscure the 
view in from outside. The office was used to give advice and assistance to clients living 
in the hotel, distribute petty cash, give routine advice to clients about their dispersal and 
facilitate their actual leaving for dispersal from the car park in front of the building. 
One team of Project Workers and their Team Leader worked here, with several Refugee 
Support Workers. 
 
5.3.3.4 Emergency Accommodations 
 
During the research period RAP had a small office, manned by two Project Workers at 
one of the other four largest ‘hostels’ to give general advice and assistance, and 
dispersal advice for residents. They also began an ‘outreach’ service to clients once a 
week at two of the other large EAs to assist and advise those residents.    
 
5.3.4 RAP’s identity and workers 
 
RAP strongly promoted itself as an organisation “run by refugees, for refugees,” both 
officially in its promotional literature, and by individual workers keen to stress RAP’s 
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“unique” character.  As mentioned, a third of the management committee were 
necessarily RCO representatives and also, as many workers reiterated, most paid 
workers for RAP were refugees or even asylum seekers themselves.  However, the 
percentage had dropped with the new recruitments since 2000, as many of these were 
recruited more on a skills basis, such as in business, language or advice work. Workers 
who were refugees were still represented throughout the hierarchy, although the 
Executive Director was a white British woman, and they were most numerously 
represented among the Project Workers and Interpreters.  
 
This high percentage of staff who were refugees gave the organisation a strong identity 
in several ways. It was often said that this gave staff an understanding and empathy 
with their clients not possible from a person without the experience of such forced 
migration. Indeed, a few workers still experienced the uncertainty and fears of unsure 
immigration status. Also, the sheer number of languages spoken and understood (38 in 
all) gave staff the resources they needed for effective communication with their clients. 
The organisation never had to use an agency for interpretation as they had all the 
languages they needed at least a phone call away, but usually with someone physically 
present. Another benefit often sited by individual workers was the incredible cultural 
diversity of the organisation. Even workers critical of the organisation, said they loved 
working in such a “multi-cultural” environment. On a daily basis, workers brought 
food from their own cultures to share with fellow workers, and work would be 
organised around important religious festivals such as Ramadan.  
 
Another frequently stated facet of RAP’s identity, as one manager put it, “Working as a 
team, a family, is the ‘culture’ of this organisation”. Workers often spoke of RAP as a 
family and of its friendliness. This close-knit long term culture explained in some ways 
the organisation’s very low staff turnover. Several of those workers joining RAP early 
in its existence still worked there, and many others had not moved on for several years. 
This was considered a mixed blessing; some suggesting that the organisation was so 
special nobody wanted to leave, others suggesting that workers could not move on 
because, as refugees themselves, they could not easily get jobs elsewhere. There was 
certainly a high degree of very highly qualified and trained workers not necessarily 
utilising these skills in their RAP position, as is typical of many people with refugee 
status. There was a fairly balanced proportion of genders among workers. 
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5.3.5 Clients  
 
People assisted by RAP were known as ‘clients’. This was the demographic nature of 
RAP’s clientele, according to their 2005 website: 
 
During 2002/3 RAP helped over 9,800 individuals. A large proportion of asylum 
seekers come from Afghanistan, Iraq and Zimbabwe. Other common nationalities are 
Iranians, Congolese and Somalis to mention a few. Over 21% of our clients are under 
18. The bulk (37%) are aged 25 to 34 and are single. More than half (3588) are 
women, over a quarter of whom are under 18. Every week, RAP places between 100 
and 120 asylum seekers in low cost accommodation in West London 55% of our clients 
stay with RAP for over 4 weeks. The majority of our referrals come through Gatwick 
and Heathrow airports. A small number (just over 100) come through Luton and 
Stansted. 
 
RAP only worked with people with the immigration status of “asylum seeker,” and 
occasionally, additionally, with those who had gained ELR or refugee status (for 
instance those still in EA when gaining ‘status’). By far the greatest number of these 
had arrived at Heathrow and claimed asylum on arrival. Since 2000 RAP also worked 
with “in-country” claimants who had made themselves known in the ‘shires.’ They also 
assisted those newly released from immigration detention, in need of NASS support. 
NASS also referred all single people living in London who had claimed asylum before 
the 1999 Act, then lost their rights to Income Support when losing their claim but 
needed RAP support while they appealed. Many RAP clients did not stay in EA but 
lived with a “sponsor” (friend or relative willing to accommodate them) and claimed 
only NASS “subsistence” payments. These were known in RAP as “walk-in” or “subs-
only” clients.  
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5.3.5.1 Typical path of ‘client’ through RAP 
 
 
Reception 
All clients on arrival/referral/application for NASS support required to register at 
Heathrow office, received a RAP reference number and if needing accommodation 
were “booked in” with NASS by phone or fax. Many arrived at airports and were 
collected by or taken to RAP Heathrow, where possible options explained to them. 
Documentation checked. Should only accept those with ARC or SAL 26 indicating 
asylum application registered by Immigration. Occasionally those without were 
accepted if “in-country” and sent to local ASU next day for registration. 
If needing accommodation allocated according to availability, needs, gender, 
family make-up, etc, by Central Allocations Team at RAP Rosehill. Transported by 
taxi to relevant EA. 
 
 
NASS application 
 
RAP required by NASS to give set “advice” session and lodge application for  
NASS support 72 hours after first registration with RAP. Target not always met. 
Clients summonsed by note under door of EA room to be ready for transportation 
in am to RAP’s Head Office. Interpretation arranged if necessary. Given 
standardised advice on options etc, fill in NASS application form with Project 
Worker, two photos taken at office. Asked if needed clothes, usually assessed for 
special needs (e.g. “Were you tortured?”). Procedures explained. NASS app. sent  
 
 
Dispersal 
 
Clients would then stay in EA (or with sponsor) until NASS dispersal. They would 
be notified by general notice of new dispersal allocations pinned up or by notes 
under doors that they would be dispersed to general region or city allocated, were 
required to attend RAP dispersal advice session at Rosehill & given “dispersal 
pack” of information. People given between 1 day-2 weeks notice. Then required to 
come to Rosehill on allotted day for collection by Wackenhut coach.  
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6 Policy in practice: implementing the ‘safety net’ system at reception   
 
 
I think the service we offer… Is as fair as it possibly can be, in the system that 
we’re in and the problem that we have as an organisation, is we’ve got our 
hands completely tied… because our funding doesn’t allow… Pretty much, they 
do say, ‘Jump!’ and you say, ‘How high?’ and that’s it… (TL, int.) 
 
When RAP signed a Grant Agreement with NASS in March 2000 to become one of 
five key stakeholders and one of two primarily Reception Assistants to new asylum 
claimants, implementing parts of the 1999 IAA, they were, by most accounts, placing 
themselves in a contradictory position. Formed to provide “relief for refugees… in 
conditions of need, hardship or distress at or near ports of entry to the United 
Kingdom” (RAP, 1998), RAP were committed as a NASS Reception Assistant to 
provide such people with a ‘safety net’ “to ensure that genuine asylum seekers cannot 
be left destitute” in “a way which minimises the incentive for abuse.” The potential 
conflicts of interest in this role of welfare support provision designed as a deterrent 
were recognised by the Home Office (1999; 2001) themselves. Critics of this 
“apartheid system” (Mynott, 2000), accused agencies like RAP of, despite honourable 
motives, in fact implementing a system “directly antagonistic to the interests of 
refugees” and becoming “a designated poor law enforcer” (Cohen, 2002: 141). By 
accepting Home Office funds to operate a system designed to control migrants’ access 
to welfare, and control immigration internally, agencies like RAP compromise their 
independence to defend migrants rights, instead becoming “a junior partner of the 
state” (Cohen, 2002: 142), part of New Labour’s “technocratic force to implement its 
programme,” (Duvell and Jordan, 2000:30), and internal immigration control officers, 
guarding the borders of the welfare state (Geddes, 2003).  
 
By either the tentative or strong account of their contradictory position, it might be 
supposed that the implementing of such policy in daily practice could generate tensions, 
dilemmas and necessitate compromises for RAP and its workers. Fulfilling their RAA 
role controlling asylum seekers’ access to NASS support, overseeing a minimal ‘safety 
net’ welfare in Emergency Accommodation and facilitating peoples’ dispersal, might 
clash with the objectives of the organisation and presumed desire of its workers to 
relieve need, hardship and distress of asylum seekers at this point of entry.  How did 
agencies such as RAP understand their position and pathway to it? What did 
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implementing a Reception service fulfilling the 1999 IAA involve in practice, ‘on the 
ground’ for a VS agency in this position? From identification of this broad 
contradictory ‘puzzle’, questions raised by it and themes grounded in the data, this 
chapter will explore and describe the everyday lived experience ‘on the ground,’ of 
RAP and differently positioned RAP workers putting this policy into practice. Where 
relevant, I have used Lipsky’s (1980) generic analysis of the dilemmas facing street-
level bureaucrats and Morris’s (2002) argument that the informal practices involved in 
the delivery of the formal social rights of civic status may contribute to civic gain or 
deficit in their actual exercise. 
 
It is important to remember the complexity and broader context of RAP’s position and 
the multitude of different influences (idiosyncratic and emblematic), which might 
constrain and enable RAP’s practices and this everyday world in conjunction with their 
position as a NASS RAA. These include RAP’s unique history, identity, geography and 
trajectory of relations with the Home Office, their shared characteristics and position 
with the other IAP agencies and their important but transient role in the wider ‘safety 
net’ dispersal system.  This local London organisation at the nexus of welfare and 
immigration policy for forced migrants in 2002-2003 was also conditioned by the 
widely diverse people with agency presenting daily for a multitude of reasons and 
global causes with a variety of complex and simple needs, and local, national, regional 
and global social and political events and policy changes.   
 
Since April 2000 RAP became directly accountable to and obliged to work closely with 
NASS to implement the 1999 IAA and subsequent policy. This relationship, central to 
RAP’s practices, will be explored before describing some of the changes to the 
organisation, its work and ‘processing’ of clients, precipitated by it. The chapter will 
then investigate RAP’s practices controlling access at and within the ‘borders’ of the 
safety net welfare system.   
 
6.1 An ‘agent’ or ‘partner’ of NASS?    
 
“You, RAP, are an agent of NASS,” an Amigos volunteer said accusingly during a 
training session with RAP’s support team leader. “For certain, yes. In a way, yes,” he 
replied. This accusation suggests an imbalance of power with RAP working as a puppet 
to NASS’ purposes, subjugating their own values and control to fulfil NASS’ aims, 
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with little independence or autonomy. However some RAP SMs spoke ambivalently of 
their relationship with NASS as a ‘partnership,’ and the government had described  
‘stakeholders,’ consortia members and VS agencies like RAP as ‘partners’ in policy 
implementation. Defining ‘partnership’ is obviously problematic, however it implies at 
least “a degree of trust, equality or reciprocity” rather than a top-down command or 
market-style contract, (Glendinning et al. 2002:3). ‘Partnership’ is also considered as 
joint-working between otherwise independent agencies, cooperating towards a common 
goal, planning and implementing a joint programme where information, risks and 
rewards are shared, (Audit Commission, 1998:8, cited in ibid). The character of RAP’s 
relationship with NASS is crucial to understanding how government policy was 
transformed into practice by both agencies, and RAP’s contradictory positioning. 
Permeating most aspects of RAP’s work, it permeates each chapter; however this 
section considers explicitly how RAP workers understood their organisation’s 
relationship with NASS, and the consequences for the organisation, its workers and 
their daily work of entering into Grant Agreement with NASS.   
 
6.1.1 ‘Soul searching’ 
 
RAP managers, in particular, were well aware of the tensions of their new position 
implementing parts of the 1999 IAA, and criticisms (like Cohen’s, 2001) of VS 
agencies like themselves for doing so. In describing the process they gave RAP’s 
justifications for playing its role, 
 
With the 2000 legislation, the voluntary sector agencies did a lot of soul 
searching, but the overwhelming feeling was that we should be in… We can 
offer other services. Group 4 would not have that interest. There was some 
criticism of our involvement and there will be a lot again. (SM, int.) 
 
This was the most widespread justification across the VS for their involvement, that at 
least such agencies with their commitment to the interests of refugees, would be more 
likely to protect those interests than a private sector agency which the government 
would contract if they refused,  
 
We believe by getting involved, the voluntary sectors will make a difference that 
otherwise would not be there…even under these circumstances, we are making 
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a difference to the lives of asylum seekers and refugees, and if we are not… 
doing it, there will be other people, like Group 4, and we have no confidence 
that they would be qualified or suitable to do this kind of work. (SM, int.)  
 
The obvious ethical dilemmas of the VS agencies was, for RAP, intensified by the fact 
that its  original purpose had been to provide services at reception for newly arrived 
forced migrants, “We are very much a creature of our history really” (SM). As evident 
from the title, RAP had always been a reception agency, predominantly funded by 
various sections of the Home Office,  
 
This is the symptom of RAP’s creation and the work we are in. We will never 
really overcome that because what we do, really is pretty much government 
responsibility, nobody else will give us the money to do that type of work… 
We’ve been government funded for as long as I can remember… the reception 
function… it’s seen as part of government responsibility to basically provide 
these services. (SM, int.) 
 
For RAP then to refuse to implement the 1999 IAA would have condemned them to 
redundancy or a complete change of purpose and new funding sources. Aware of the 
contradictions and ethical criticisms of their involvement, RAP workers defended their 
co-operation with the Home Office from an alternative ethical stance, 
 
It’s very difficult for the voluntary sector, because our principles are still the 
same – that we provide services to clients. It’s a moral duty to provide this to 
clients. (SM) 
 
A TL, acknowledging the compromises, gave a reformist ethical justification mixed 
with personal pragmatism in defence of RAP’s involvement, 
 
Well, they’re getting fair treatment within the legislation, but I think the 
legislation stinks! … It does and it doesn’t (create dilemmas for her 
personally)… in order to change the system, you have to work within it… I 
mean, I know a lot of people who don’t, they’d rather be militant and go out, but 
you know you’re never gonna get anywhere unless you work within the system, 
and we work within the system and my job is to work within the system… and 
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I’d rather we were doing it, this reception, than the Home Office, cos we’re a 
bit more compassionate. At least we can say, “I’ve tried”… and I’ve got a 
mortgage to pay as well. I have to be realistic!  (TL, int.)  
 
6.1.2 The unintended consequences of policy 
 
Karim, an SM, talked of RAP’s changing relationship with NASS as the practical 
realities of policy implementation began to unfold, suggesting that ‘partnership’ 
became a less accurate way of representing the relationship,  
 
We were approached by the government, the voluntary sector, saying “This is 
what we want to do, do you think you can work with us on this?” And when we 
looked at it initially we said, “Yeah” and we proposed a way of doing it, and 
fortunately it was by and large accepted. So… the run up to NASS has been 
quite a reasonable, I would say, strong really, er…partnership, in trying to sort 
of draw the principles and guidelines and the basic elements of this 
relationship. But since its implementation, really two problems arise, one of 
them, practical implementation problems that the policies have… NASS have 
found it more difficult to implement than they hoped to and that causes 
frustrations for us and for them as well.  (SM, int.) 
 
The failings of NASS for the first two years at least of their operating the support 
system since April 2000 are well publicised (Dunstan, 2002), many being reported in 
the Home Office’s own operational reviews (2001; 2003). These were widely accepted 
to be the result of inadequately planned policies, rushed through with insufficient 
preparation time for agencies involved, in response to political pressure to ‘get tough’ 
on asylum. All agencies involved in the system felt the effects of (and in some cases 
contributed to) the failings of the NASS system, (Home Office, 2003), RAP (and the 
other RAAs and OSSs) included.  
 
Most of the difficulties are because the whole concept is, again not very well 
thought through…or it was underestimated, the difficulty. The idea of centrally 
planning the arrival, reception, information, decision, accommodation for 
70,000 asylum seekers from all over the world, with needs and what have 
you…it just speaks for itself really! It’s a mad concept! So, in a way really, the 
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civil service, or NASS have been given, right from the beginning, an impossible 
job! (SM, int.) 
 
Several factors of failing in the NASS system significantly affected RAP initially and 
during the research period and transformed its work. The most considerable of these 
was the failure of NASS to disperse people from the care of RAAs and EA in the seven 
days initially allocated. There were many reasons for this, including NASS’ inability to 
procure sufficient accommodation from reluctant LA’s in dispersal regions, no previous 
consideration of people arriving with varied special support needs, increasing numbers 
of arrivals and the fundamental serious bureaucratic and operational inefficiencies of 
NASS, (Home Office, 2001). Judith, an SM, described the situation: 
 
As the numbers had increased, the amount of paperwork that NASS had to 
complete was becoming bigger and bigger and bigger. They didn’t have systems 
in place because it was meant to be, “You enter, you fill the form in, that’s 
assessed, validated, we find you accommodation, you move on”. There was no 
capacity for “You come in. OK, you’re disabled, you’re in a wheelchair, so how 
do we deal with that?” Everybody was feeling like a cog in a wheel – you came 
in at A and you went out at Z. It started to break down around October of 2000.  
 
Karim explained the dispersal system designed to “intelligently” disperse people to 
‘cluster’ regions according to their language or religion, 
 
Somewhere they can fit it. That has… never worked really from the first week of 
implementation. It just collapsed and basically people are sent to, by and large, 
wherever there is somewhere to send them to.   
 
And some reasons for and consequences of this 
 
It’s not necessarily because of us or them, it’s the other forces, especially for 
example, the role of local authorities. They are NASS’s problem but they have 
not helped the implementation process… One of the main problems with the 
operation is lack of dispersal, finding suitable accommodation for people to 
walk into so they are not clogged up in centres like us. That’s really one of the 
key problems and finding a solution has not been easy for them… And once you 
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have all that backlog, that bottleneck of people, then you start having all the 
other problems arising from large numbers of people staying all in one place.  
 
RAP’s planned RAA role changed almost immediately from overseeing the swift 
transition of asylum seekers from arrival to dispersal, to accommodating and providing 
welfare support to hundreds of people at a time for long periods, many with special and 
complex needs. RAP was forced to adapt and transform itself in order to continue 
servicing NASS, assist clients in new ways and to control the growing chaos. Karim 
insisted, however, that they had good pragmatic working relationships with individual 
NASS workers and, in a sense, they and NASS were “dumped” in this together, trying 
to make as best sense possible of unrealistic government aims, 
  
We are working in a partnership. We try as much as possible to share with them 
information, ideas, support them in trying to reach conclusions that are 
balanced and… workable… Sometimes it’s possible, sometimes you hit a sort of 
policy wall… and we do understand that it’s not really their decision, the 
officials 
 
6.1.3 ‘Bending over backwards’ – Flexibility and uncertainty 
 
Despite Karim’s description of RAP in ‘partnership,’ RAP had to adapt to their Grant 
Agreement with NASS by becoming increasingly flexible, in response both to NASS’ 
inflexibility and both organisations’ attempts to respond to increasingly frequent policy 
changes from above, and changing global movements. Another SM said, 
 
They just keep extending the Grant. We don’t have to go through a tendering 
process, in which case they could give a contract to Wackenhut or Sodhexho. 
We have moved so far away from the original agreement, because we want to 
make it work. We’re much more flexible, (SM, int). 
 
This SM, Judith, suggested their increasing flexibility, and juggling of interests, was 
less than ‘partnership,’    
 
What’s the point in having liaison when there is total disregard for any advice 
we give, but asylum seekers suffer… It is liaison in name rather than deed… It’s 
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always us bending over backwards… It is a big bureaucracy, everything takes a 
long time to filter through and simple changes take months to realise. They have 
a top-down approach… We tried to maintain a good relationship with NASS. As 
one of the first voluntary sector agencies, we did our damnedest to make things 
work… but people [NASS staff] are coming and going and you feel like you are 
training people all the time. It’s quite frustrating and it’s like you are banging 
your head against a brick wall (SM, obs). 
 
Karim was sympathetic to the difficulties of NASS workers’, 
 
Fantastically difficult job to do, because they are basically caught between the 
politicians, who made the decisions without concentration (if I may say!) and 
the voluntary sector, who will always be advocating and challenging these 
policies, and them in the middle really, trying to enforce something that is 
probably not easy to enforce… I totally sympathise and empathise with them in 
terms of the difficulties of their jobs. 
 
However, he also acknowledged the movement RAP had to make in the face of NASS’ 
immovability, 
 
Our strength has really been, flexible and responsive to demands for change, 
and what have you by the government. This government department would have 
the highest level of policy change in any time, in any area… So it’s really 
cumbersome and it’s not responsive, and it’s very difficult to follow through and 
finish something before something else starts, and then priorities shift and 
change very, very often and therefore we really get… frustrations… The 
government’s gone into overdrive about asylum seekers and refugee policy… 
it’s a competition between Ann Widdecombe really! And that does not help 
NASS because they are always completely diverted, whenever there’s new 
policies, new procedures to implement. 
 
The knock-on effects for RAP were significant. Their need to be this flexible was 
translated into major changes in work, and also bred a high level of uncertainty 
throughout the organisation. Although uncertainty was generic to RAP’s work (“You 
never know who’s going to walk through the door,” TL, int.), this had become 
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compounded by policy making, the NASS system and inefficiency. One example of 
RAP’s complex position was when the increase in Zimbabwean asylum seekers fleeing 
the Mugabe regime during 2001, was compounded with NASS inability to disperse and 
a growing backlog of people in RAP’s EA. By summer 2001 large numbers of asylum 
seekers were sleeping on airport concourses, in effect queuing for RAP’s EA. 
Eventually it was only an international sporting event that provoked the government to 
act, via NASS and demand RAP “clear the concourses” (TL, int) for the arrival of 
these more revered guests. Only then was RAP funded to procure a large, squalid hostel 
some distance from their main sites in order to accommodate these people, and 
subsequently for a large recruitment of staff (just prior to the research period). Then the 
Government imposed a visa restriction on November 8th 2002, immediately prior to 
which the numbers of Zimbabweans dramatically rose and afterwards dramatically fell, 
 
…they have to hire a certain number of project workers to meet the need but 
then you might not have any clients coming through… Like we had all them 
Zimbabweans, all we were dealing with was Zimbabweans, the British 
government imposed a visa restriction on people fleeing Zimbabwe, so we 
didn’t have any! So then all these project workers don’t have anything to do, or 
as much to do, there’s always stuff to do so then like, as a defensive measure 
you might get in more… let more walk-in’s come in and then you might have a 
commotion in somewhere else, like if we go into Iraq we’re gonna get loads 
from Iraq, but then you’ve developed the walk-in service, so it’s just this 
constant juggling of… of needs, that your hands are tied by the government 
(BfSW, int). 
 
The problems of planning in such a relationship and environment are also illustrated by 
RAP’s attempts to plan for Induction Centres, the 2002 NIAA model for a more 
standardised, controlled Reception. At an end of year meeting (2002, obs), the SMT 
tried to explain the situation to staff on RAP’s proposed involvement in running an IC. 
The ED joked about the constantly mixed messages they had from NASS, over “The 
elusive Induction Centre” concluding, “We feel let down. We were geared up to 
working and then everything went quiet,” confirming later that RAP were now “Out of 
the loop!”  Karim told the meeting,  
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There have been consultation meetings, but there isn’t a process agreement or a 
firm offer. We expect this soon but we don’t know when, where or how. They 
have not opened a full dialogue with RAP.  
 
An SM then spoke of how NASS demands were affecting his procurement of EA, 
 
So that’s the nebulous future, it is indeterminate to say the least… NASS have 
been hammering very strongly on value for money… Bearing in mind things 
change on an hourly basis, in case things won’t happen when NASS say, we’ve 
got our eyes on a number of other hotels… We’re geared up to business as 
usual, in a fluid position that is very flexible. We have to be flexible as things 
change.  
 
While RAP managers, obviously more expert on process and practicalities, were 
understanding of NASS problems attempting to keep up with policy makers, and 
supportive of different levels of NASS workers, attempting to ‘train’ them, it was 
evident that the relationship was more top-down than ‘partnership;’ RAP used all its 
flexibility to accommodate NASS, but NASS could strike RAP ‘out of the loop’. 
 
6.1.4 Working as a ‘front-line’ ‘agent of NASS’ 
 
RAP acted as the ‘front-line’ face of NASS as, although in theory it was possible for 
asylum seekers to contact NASS by phone themselves, in practice this was virtually 
impossible, and visiting in person was impossible. Lipsky (1980:185) described street-
level bureaucrats as “absorbing conflict in their buffer roles,” protecting the state from 
‘citizen,’ who blames the worker or agency for services received, 
 
Street-level bureaucrats mediate between citizens and the state in that clients’ 
inability to obtain benefits or services and inequities of distribution may be 
understood by clients as personal malfeasance of street-level bureaucrats or 
administrative agency disarray, (ibid:184).  
 
Most levels of RAP worker had daily contact with similar level NASS workers. The 
uncertainties stemming from NASS management of policy and change, fed down to 
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RAP’s ‘front-line’ workers working directly with clients. After the introduction of S55 
of the 2002 NIAA an SM, Judith, explained her role, 
 
On a weekly basis a lot of it is dealing with, particularly recently, there has 
been so much hourly change with the legislation, you know… One minute you 
do it one way, the next minute you do it another. It’s about…as I’m not doing all 
that form filling [NASS applications] I need to know intimately in order to 
inform the staff. I’m actually doing it on a daily basis. So it’s really important 
that the information that comes in is disseminated as quickly and simply as 
possible so that people understand what they are doing on the ground with 
clients, as they walk in.  
 
Such acute changes typically fed what was PWs’ general experience of uncertainty 
working with NASS, with frequent procedural changes, but also NASS structural and 
staff changes. Two RAP PWs described their daily operational relationship with NASS 
workers, mediating for clients, as their main working problem, 
 
…because the rules are changing, because… We are working under NASS, at 
the Home Office…it’s all the uncertainty…One day they say we should do this, 
and the other day the Home Office… NASS, change their mind and then they 
say, “No, you have to do it like this.” I wish they could co-operate with us. I 
don’t think they are co-operating fully with these organisations… and if you are 
an asylum seeker and you have a problem, probably it will take… four or five or 
six hours before you can get a response from NASS… (PW, int.)   
 
Dealing with NASS – it’s very difficult to deal with them…It’s very hard to get 
hold, they keep changing the numbers, and the sections… and anyone who 
hasn’t decide on the case it seems like they don’t want to touch it or take any 
decisions, nobody takes decisions, nobody gives you decisions immediately they 
say, oh blah, blah, blah… you have to do this, so I find it very difficult to deal 
with NASS… passing you on, sometimes you spend a whole day just passing 
from one number to another. (PW,int.) 
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6.1.5 An  ambivalent relationship 
 
SMs gave contradictory messages concerning the degree of independence, autonomy 
and actually interactive ‘partnership’ RAP had in relationship with NASS, suggesting 
the disjuncture between word and deed, intentions and actual practice redolent of the 
differences between the aims and practices of NASS’ dispersal regime. SMs’ 
statements suggest ‘front-stage’ presentational claims of managers defending their 
position, but hint at a masked and more complex ‘back-stage’ reality, 
 
Government agrees that we have a very valuable role to play and we are 
allowed the freedom and inventiveness to play that role in terms of practicalities 
with this new legislation… 
 
I think, we are the, pretty much, the masters of our own decisions and…NASS 
officials, for example, especially operationally, really they are not masters of 
their own decisions. They always have to check and be guided by… So there’s a 
different culture…  (SM, int.) 
 
Obviously the Home Office has the major influence because they’re very much 
funding our service and they specify what services we provide. They don’t 
specify the way in which we provide the services though!  (But)…      The stuff 
that comes from NASS! I mean it’s by the tonne! You know, all the guidance, 
(ED, int). 
 
Karim admitted, 
 
…there is quite a lot of anxiety both internally and externally that our reliance 
on funding from NASS may, in some cases, jeopardise our independence… Of 
course, we don’t think it does but we… as an organisation we constitutionally 
and otherwise we feel really strongly that to do this work, without 
compromising our…er charitable principles, as such…nor have really the 
funders or Home Office asked us to do so…But it’s nevertheless very politically, 
very difficult time for everyone… and if you want to be in this kind of work, you 
will have to get your hands dirty sometimes, I’m afraid. 
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Karim’s awareness of the potential compromises RAP might be making as ‘an agent of 
NASS,’ and his suggestion that working for the Home Office might involve doing some 
things they would prefer not to, was followed by the statement suggesting these were 
sacrifices worth making as they were still able to make a positive difference to 
refugees’ lives (p5). The ambivalence of RAP’s position seems clear, and ‘agent’ a 
more apt description of their relationship with NASS than ‘partner.’  
 
However, to explore the character of RAP’s relationship to NASS further it is necessary 
to go beyond the accounts of workers, to consider how it played out in daily practice. 
This will aid understanding of how government policy was transformed into practice by 
RAP via NASS and an understanding of their relationship should become deeper by 
considering some of the ways that RAP changed and adapted to their new role, such as 
bureaucratising.  
 
6.2. Bureaucratisation   
 
The decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the 
devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively 
become the public policies they carry out, (Lipsky, 1980:xii).  
 
Lipsky (1980) argues that the official and unofficial methods street-level bureaucracies 
and bureaucrats develop to manage and respond to the complexities and uncertainties of 
their tasks, may have significant effects on the character of the policy they are 
implementing or ‘making’. With street-level bureaucracies “Routines and 
simplifications aid the management of complexity; environmental structuring limits the 
complexity to be managed,” (Lipsky, 1980:83). 
 
RAP’s assumption of their NASS RAA role meant it transformed by bureaucratising in 
several ways. The organisation transformed massively in size, structure, geography and 
character very rapidly between April 2000 and October 2002. During that period RAP 
grew from 15 to over 60 staff, transforming from a horizontally to a hierarchically 
organised structure with new ED recruiting down the new layers of management and a 
whole new ‘resources’ section, so that from “a very simple set up” RAP became 
“…much more differentiated… more layers in the hierarchy… more strands, 
specialisms working through it,” (ED, int). 
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From two offices and one ‘hotel’, RAP procured another large office, spreading storeys 
and buildings during the research period and variably up to seven more EA’s to 
accommodate and manage the increases and fluctuations in long-staying clients. Some, 
particularly long-serving refugee workers, felt that RAP’s intrinsic character and 
identity changed, that some new workers were recruited more for their job skills than 
their commitment to refugees, “maybe people who are working for wrong reasons… 
that is just a job for them,” and in the growth, bureaucratisation, new hierarchy and 
spatial arrangement of the organisation, “Metaphorically, even symbolically we are… 
trying to create more distance between the clients and the staff…” 
 
However, others felt that, especially the latest recruitment and restructuring in place 
since October 2002, which required the new teams to stop previous rotation of sites but 
to specialise, had been a change for the better, enabling control over chaos and workers 
to work to their job descriptions rather than down, in crisis-management, 
 
General purpose rotating around the different sites and being a jack-of-all-
trades and master-of-none, there was no consequence of error. If you did 
something wrong it didn’t matter because somebody else was going to be 
coming into your seat next week 
(ED, int) 
 
A long-serving SM confessed,  
 
Adapting to the growth has not been easy. We were very small and have now 
grown to over fifty people, over four legislations… terrible legislations, each 
one worse than the one before it. 
 
And the ED also stressed that the changes related to external requirements, 
 
I’m sure there are people who say it’s much too structured and it’s not like the 
old days… particularly the people who are very committed to the way things 
were because it was a tremendously good team and… did fantastic things! 
…but of course… it doesn’t mean that because things have changed that that’s 
been rubbished. It’s just that the world has changed and moved on, particularly 
in what the Home Office wants us to do. 
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6.2.1 The bureaucratisation of work 
 
Functioning as a Reception Assistant for NASS, not only initiated fundamental 
structural change to the organisation, but from workers’ accounts, their work had also 
become more bureaucratic, and this was also observable.  
 
6.2.1.1 Routinisation 
 
“Routines could be structured to maximize the achievement of agency 
objectives. Or they could be structured to maximize responsiveness to clients.” 
Lipsky (1980:86)  
 
The development of routines in order to control the unpredictability and uncertainties of 
work, especially in street-level bureaucracies, is, as Lipsky (1980) acknowledged, 
almost synonymous with bureaucratisation and not unusual in any work environment. 
However, he problematises the contradictory structuring of routinisation, where agency 
objectives, client preferences and individual worker’s stresses and discretion vie to 
determine whose interests those routines are serving. RAP’s attempts to control and 
regain control over their workload during the first two years doing NASS’ work, were 
mostly structured from the top down, 
 
it’s so much easier to be top-down when you’re a relatively new organisation, 
because you’ve got to be meeting the requirements of your funders and there 
are things that are imperatives laid down for you, (ED). 
 
New routines RAP established by trial and error between 2000 and 2002, were largely 
determined by the performance of specific tasks fulfilling NASS’ requirements, 
differing across sites: initial Reception at Heathrow; completion of NASS application 
forms at Central office; dispersal advice and facilitation at Rosehill EA. At the 
beginning of the research period specific teams had been allotted one of these central 
tasks on a permanent basis. These tasks had therefore become more repetitive for 
workers no longer rotating around sites.  In particular, for the two teams completing 
NASS forms every day,  the nature of this task and at Central Office by managers 
anxious to meet NASS targets, prevented much room for creative involvement with 
clients, who were taxied in and out solely for this purpose. Some workers complained 
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they were becoming de-skilled with this repetitiveness and compared their current work 
with that prior to April 2000: 
 
Particularly after 1999, there is no room for creativity… it is so slow now. 
Before, we had two to five days to accommodate people. One day I moved 150 
people across fourteen London boroughs, in two stages. NASS can’t do this in a 
week. There is a huge amount more bureaucracy and there’s no space for 
creativity in this process, (SM). 
 
It is since four years I’ve joined RAP. I was a Refugee Support Worker, at that 
time… and you were working mainly outside from the office…RAP was 
responsible for finding accommodation then…The Refugee Support used to go 
there and get the client from the accommodation and take him to the DSS, 
taking the client to the council, to the doctors, to the college as well to show him 
the areas, to help that client, that family. We were educating, we were 
interpreting… The other thing was we were travelling around the 
country…Manchester, Leeds, Norwich, Bognor Regis, Bristol, Cardiff. I was 
enjoying that. I’m still enjoying my job now… it was a big change when NASS 
came, so now we are 99% inside, indoors, in the office.  (NTPW, int.)  
 
However although saying, “it is very difficult to deal with them” (NASS), another 
NTPW described the fact that they now only had one agency to refer to rather than 
many previously more positively as making life easier for RAP.   
 
6.2.1.2 Servicing NASS’ bureaucracy 
 
Despite this PW’s contention that work was now easier for RAP, he also reminded that 
pre-NASS clients stayed in RAP EA for two nights before being accommodated in 
HPU’s around London or, latterly, dispersed informally countrywide, whereas now 
clients were in RAP’s care for “four weeks or more.” This and the immensely 
inefficient bureaucratic character of NASS, meant that workers spent the majority of 
their time involved in dealing with some aspect of NASS’ bureaucracy; from the 
routine form-filling, dispersal, ‘booking’ and ‘cancelling’ clients, to trying to deal with 
a client’s bureaucratic problem, due to a NASS mistake or inefficiency. Such as,  
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(NASS)…stopped voucher for no reason, for silly mistakes or something like 
that NASS don’t even know why the money has been stopped and you have to 
keep ringing from section to section (NTPW, int) 
 
Illustrating workers’ buffer role, a PW, following up the case of a client granted refugee 
status but unable to move out of EA until receiving his NASS 35 form, said, 
 
NASS show no initiative, they don’t care. They are a very bureaucratic 
organisation. It should be easy to pass a fax on, but they are very bureaucratic 
indeed, a very narrow-minded organisation. We’ll give them seven more days, 
but this man is very angry. He comes every day, (PW, obs.)  
 
Of just speaking to the correct NASS official a PW said, 
 
We have to phone up NASS, and then… first it is difficult, because NASS is a 
vast organisation… You don’t know where to phone, if you ring because 
they’re… the thing is, they are changing it I would say, every single day… their 
staff, their extensions, so you ring… Well, if you ring someone today, and 
tomorrow if you ring, there’s another one there… It’s a nightmare sometimes to 
find the right person… There should be differentiation between us and other 
general people, because we are working, if we are waiting for one call for two 
or three hours, then it gets very complicated.  
 
Workers’ attempts to circumnavigate bureaucracy and inefficiency and gain some 
continuity by building relationships with particular NASS workers, were often quashed 
by NASS high turnover of staff. An SM was unequivocal about the impact working 
with NASS had on RAP, 
 
All the external restraints I have, particularly with the Home Office and the 
whole new system now, it’s just a nightmare to say the least… So bureaucratic, 
and of course anything bureaucratic puts an awful lot more on people who are 
trying to work within it… There are probably close to 800 people working there 
because of the paper trail they need to have and because they obviously need to 
work within very narrow, defined boundaries of what their roles are… (SM, 
int.) 
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6.2.1.3 Meeting targets  
 
Another aspect of this bureaucratisation of RAP’s work for NASS, was the greater 
emphasis on targets; the setting of targets by management and the meeting of those by 
front-line workers. This was at times dictated by rising numbers of clients, ‘backlogs’ 
in processing clients NASS had not dispersed, or in response to a NASS directive that 
RAP reach one target or another. This caused the inevitable tension between processing 
the most numbers of clients in the least time and dealing adequately with clients 
individually, which Lipsky (1980) argues is the most fundamental dilemma of street-
level bureaucracies. One TL talked about middle-managers’ fight to set the top limit of 
NASS application clients per project worker per day at 6: 
 
We’ve pushed really hard for that, cos it was seen that they should see more and 
we just said, ‘They can’t! It’s too many clients a day for people,’ and just 
because we get walk-in clients who are hotel clients… that takes time to deal 
with too, everything takes time. 
 
Despite this, at a Team Meeting some PWs argued that sometimes having to see six 
clients a day was too many: “If we go for quantity, we cannot go for quality,” one said. 
Another said, “If two of our six cases are difficult, we can’t do all of them…I thought 
that by fixing the number, the pressure was going out, but it’s the opposite, it’s coming 
back to us.”  The TL replied, “While we are monitoring this, you know the pressure. 
You know what the responsibility is: to empty the waiting room. That’s the issue of the 
day”, (Obs.)  
 
Also illustrating how the ‘requirements’ of NASS targets could drive RAP’s practices 
‘on the ground,’  
 
We’re technically not a one-stop service, yet we do it ‘cos managers deem it 
necessary to keep our funding… at one point we weren’t seeing enough clients, 
we were funded to see 240 a week and we weren’t seeing them, so that’s why we 
started the one-stop. At one point we were seeing over 100 walk-ins a week, 
because we were told…‘We just need numbers. You just have to see them all, 
because we can.’ We had about six people off sick every day, absolutely 
exhausted. It became a complete factory, (TL, int).                   
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6.2.1.4 Systems for controlling the chaos 
 
It was obvious that since NASS, the organisation had been in the continual process of 
attempting to develop new systems to control the potential chaos. For instance,  
 
 It’s crisis management. It’s changed I think since I took on the role, it was 
more crisis management. Since I’ve taken on the role and we’ve got these new 
teams, it’s been much more in terms of development of staff. I find the crisis 
management very difficult. If it’s not ordered, I don’t like it. I can’t bear the 
chaos at the front desk…(TL, int.)  
 
A little further on though she said, “…we’ve continued in this whole kind of crisis… 
Daily crisis.” Another worker struggling to prioritise so that she could deal with her 
clients in the way she felt was most humane and productive, 
 
I’ve suggested ways of making it more effective and more efficient, ‘Set aside 
time to do this, make appointments, you know, and they say ‘Yes what a great 
idea,’ but it never happens!  They just still continue…I think everything’s sort of 
on the edge of crisis here, on the edge of chaos… It’s crisis management a lot of 
the time, it’s whichever client shouts the loudest, sometimes, (PW, int.) 
 
However, it was apparent workers had developed many new ‘systems’ of various sorts 
for ordering work. The most significant was computerisation with a (often-crashing) 
cross-site database for processing client information, when prior to NASS all their work 
was ‘manual,’ on paper file. A TL commented on a new petty-cash monitoring system,  
 
I have to do all of this fiddling about with the book to sort out the petty cash. I 
can’t put it into the computer because it would get lost. When I first came here, 
RAP was just haemorrhaging money all over the place; they gave out so much 
money. Now there are systems in place and it’s all recorded and set straight, 
(TL, obs.) 
 
The ED suggested that since the latest organisational structures were in place, RAP had 
been able to begin more “bottom-up” systems and processes in order to 
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Maximise the quality of the service that we give, and the bottom-up aspect of it 
is really increasing. For example, the Quality Mark… saying to staff, ‘Look, 
you’re the experts, you know how things emerge from clients’. People came up 
with some brilliant ideas about how we can improve things, and then you 
develop a little process. 
 
For example, a RSW had begun an admin system with NASS forms that pressurised 
NASS to process them more efficiently. The development of systems to control work 
processes, such as one ensuring workers with appropriate languages were available for 
the clients taxied in to complete their NASS forms, were often the premise of middle-
managers attempting to increase efficiency or assert order on potential chaos. Some 
welcomed and others resented this with an element of nostalgia for ‘the good old days’ 
or intolerance of becoming more bureaucratic. For example, two TLs working together 
at Central Office discussed new forms one had introduced for managing work and 
workers more efficiently. Shirin, a long-term RAP worker, was tolerant but quietly 
sceptical. She joked, “I’m confused. It’s Sue’s fault! I have to write everything down 
now. Before, I had it all in my head!”  Shirin confided that she would let Sue try these 
new systems out, but quietly believed they wouldn’t work and they would go back to 
the old ways of doing things, more by feel than design.  
 
6.2.2 The bureaucratisation of clients  
 
It seems inevitable in such circumstances of the bureaucratisation of the organisation 
and its work, that in order to process their clients through NASS’ bureaucratic system, 
RAP might bureaucratise their clients in certain ways. With large numbers of people to 
be processed in a certain way by a certain time target, the logistics of this operation 
involved considering clients in terms of numbers and categories. RAP workers 
frequently complained about NASS’ inability to consider clients other than as numbers 
or categories, and a visiting NASS worker confessed that sat in their offices at their 
computers without ever meeting clients, “We don’t see the clients as human beings; to 
us they are just numbers, statistics or batches.” One TL’s daily mantra to her workers, 
to NASS workers by phone, and as if to remind herself, was “These are human beings 
we are dealing with, you know, not numbers!” (obs) 
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However, each client had at least three types of different agencies reference numbers, 
an ARC, a NASS and a RAP number, and was usually expected to produce at least one 
of these (or their ‘papers’) to be dealt with by a worker. Clients were also frequently 
considered in terms of the numbers of them to process in one way or another, or move 
from one place to another. For instance, a stressed TL one day explained “we’re trying 
to get through all these walk-ins, because someone has filled in two forms with twenty 
appointments each,” (TL, obs.) 
 
While RAP workers were aware of the need to resist treating clients as numbers, there 
was more of a tendency to consider them in terms of their bureaucratic category or 
problem they presented. Lipsky (1980:59) discusses this common tendency as the 
“social construction of the client,” 
 
People come to street-level bureaucracies as unique individuals with different 
life experiences, personalities, and current circumstances. In their encounters 
with bureaucracies they are transformed into clients, identifiably located in a 
very small number of categories, treated as if, and treating themselves as if, 
they fit standardized definitions of units consigned to specific bureaucratic slots. 
 
The categorisation of clients at RAP was obviously a strategy for simplifying a 
complexity of tasks and attempting to most efficiently address large numbers of clients’ 
complex bureaucratic enquiries and entitlements, within time and staff resource limits. 
This was largely determined by the way they were categorised by the NASS system, 
but their categorisation also fragmented across agencies giving a clue to their specific 
often complex civic status and related entitlements. The complexity and inefficiencies 
of NASS categorisation, which also frequently changed and shifted with new policies 
and procedures, meant that RAP workers often needed to spend considerable time 
ascertaining the specific bureaucratic situation of each client before attempting to assist 
them. RAP also used their own formal and informal categories to determine the type of 
service they were entitled to, thus “walk-ins,” including “subs-only” (NASS category) 
clients, were only officially entitled to be assisted by RAP workers on an appointment 
system. This typically ran three weeks in advance, but was often arbitrary, and people 
were sometimes assisted anyway depending, for instance, on their insistence or which 
TL was running the ‘front-desk’. Official client categories included “change of circs,” 
“disbenefitted”, “self-write”, “ in-country,” “MF”, and unofficial terms included 
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“complex”, “exotic”, or even “untouchable” ‘cases.’ An admin worker explained that 
“untouchables” were clients RAP would not ‘touch’ because they had exhausted all 
claims and entitlements, though she had not seen an ‘untouchable’ for some time now. 
Such categorisation is typical of the fundamental dilemma of street-level bureaucrats 
with large numbers of clients and low resources, despite workers’ best intentions to 
respond to people as human beings. However this consideration and fragmentation of 
people (clients) predominantly in terms of their bureaucratic category was potentially 
dehumanising,  
 
In response to the need to categorize clients they tend to treat them only as 
bundles of bureaucratically relevant attributes rather than as whole persons, 
(Lipsky, 1980:76) 
 
6.3 Controlling access to welfare    
 
Morris (2002:144-5) has attempted to make sense of current contradictory tendencies 
within “the political and social construction of rights and the underlying principles of 
control”’ by developing the concept of ‘civic stratification’ to analyse “the increasing 
diversity of ‘outsider’ status,” focussing “on both the formal inclusions and exclusions 
which operate with respect to eligibility, and the informal gains and deficits which 
shape delivery.”  Morris (2002:147) argues that formally held rights “can be enhanced 
or restricted in practice,” and some aspects of the granting and administration of rights 
are often not clear-cut, especially when there is room for discretion or interpretation in 
application of eligibility criteria. It was obvious from observation of RAP’s operations, 
that within the formal status of ‘asylum seeker,’ there was an increasing diversity of 
further criteria for eligibility to differing welfare rights. Some of these were formally 
specified in the 1999 IAA and 2002 NIAA and amendments; some were formally or 
informally dictated by NASS and RAP; and RAP workers formally and informally 
decided others. While NASS centrally controlled asylum seekers access to their ‘safety 
net’ welfare support from a distance, RAP (and the other RAAs) were actually 
physically controlling the point of entry of human individuals to the NASS system and 
its attendant support rights. They also controlled access to a diversity of different rights 
specific to the pre-dispersal reception stage of the NASS system, as dictated by NASS, 
within which they had the discretion to decide on further details of eligibility to their 
specific welfare arrangements and supplementary services. Lipsky (1980:xiii) has 
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proposed that street-level bureaucrats with substantial discretion in their decisions on 
eligibility, delivery and overseeing of state “benefits and sanctions,” in important ways 
make public policy, and “implicitly mediate aspects of the constitutional relationship of 
citizens to the state” (or, in this case, of these specifically categorised ‘outsiders’ or 
‘margizens’). At best they,  
 
…invent benign modes of mass processing that more or less permit them to deal 
with the public fairly, appropriately and successfully. At worst they give in to 
favouritism, stereotyping, and routinizing – all of which serve private or agency 
purposes, (ibid).  
 
This section considers how RAP workers controlled the access of asylum seekers to 
NASS’ welfare at Reception and how the organisation developed its own systems for 
controlling access to their specific reception services, through devising and operating 
systems of eligibility for the limited ‘benefits’ they (were permitted) to offer.  
 
6.3.1 Controlling access to NASS support: ‘deserving’ and ‘ undeserving’ clients 
 
RAP’s reception service was one of five transitory points of entry into NASS’ dispersal 
system, at which RAP determined asylum seekers’ eligibility to claim NASS support, 
accommodated eligible claimants in EA until they were dispersed or granted or refused 
refugee or another humanitarian leave-to-remain status.  
 
6.3.1.1 Reception 
 
The first ‘border’ to negotiate in order to gain initial access to the NASS system was at 
RAP’s Heathrow office, where people arriving at London airports, in-country and in 
various other circumstances, were initially assessed for their eligibility to claim for 
NASS accommodation and/or subsistence support. If found eligible at this stage and in 
need of accommodation people were “booked in” to one of RAP’s EA’s, then taxied the 
following day to Central Office to complete a NASS application form. Eligibility for 
NASS ‘last resort’ support, officially depended on a person having made an asylum 
claim, having no-where else to stay, and being destitute. For RAP’s Heathrow workers, 
assessing people’s eligibility involved checking their paperwork for proof that they had 
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claimed asylum, checking they had no alternatives to NASS accommodation, and what 
resources (e.g. cash, savings, and valuables) they possessed.   
 
In practice the boundaries of eligibility could be hazy, and workers made decisions 
favouring asylum seekers or not in degrees of defiance or adherence to NASS criteria, 
sometimes using more informal assessments of individuals’ eligibility. For instance, 
depending on a person’s time of arrival, if an in-country applicant and on informal 
assessments of the ‘genuineness’ of their situation, people were booked in to EA before 
they had claimed asylum (defying NASS rules). However, in compliance with NASS 
rules, workers always asked to see proof of their asylum claim (e.g. papers, arc card), 
but decisions workers made, with or without these documents, could be based on 
informal judgements of the enquirer’s ‘genuineness’. For instance, a worker had shown 
a young man who said  he was an asylum seeker requesting NASS support, a map to 
Croydon telling him he must go there to claim asylum before RAP could help him. The 
worker said she didn’t feel bad when he got angry and left because, without any 
documents or luggage, she did not believe he was an asylum seeker and had been in the 
country for some time,  
 
I don’t feel bad about him, but for the one in genuine need and hardship I will 
feel very bad. I can tell which ones are genuine; they might sit down and get 
depressed and cry. Others will get angry… You get to know this by experience, 
(PW, obs). 
 
RAP Reception workers explained people’s options to them and asked if they wished or 
were able to stay with a ‘sponsor’, but did not dissuade them from claiming NASS 
support (as Cohen, 2002, suggested RAA’s did). The Reception team also controlled 
the ‘border’ to changing support if peoples’ circumstances changed. For instance, if 
somebody came saying they could no longer stay with their ‘sponsor’ for whatever 
reason, workers would phone NASS for authorisation to ‘book’ them into their EA and 
NASS’ dispersal system. Sometimes, the TL explained, NASS might say, “Can you 
stay with that person for two more weeks,” or “if they are genuinely destitute,” they 
would be booked immediately. Thus there was an element of persuasion and judgement 
required by RAP workers, on NASS behalf to ensure their ‘safety-net’ really was the 
person’s ‘last resort’. However, workers also used persuasion on a client’s behalf to 
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NASS (again sometimes depending on informal judgements, worker differences, or 
NASS’ ‘crack-downs’), which a PW found, 
 
One of the most challenging issues is coming from a sponsor and need to 
readmit because you need to request that from NASS and you have to argue why 
you want to readmit him in emergency accommodation. 
 
People were asked if they had resources and their answers accepted at face-value and, it 
seemed with this Reception team, strictly adhered to. If a person stated they had 
resources over the NASS defined threshold (which varied by marital status, age etc), 
they were told that they could not be supported by NASS (accommodated in EA) until 
they had used up their resources to below the threshold.  These eligibility decisions 
could also be accompanied by judgements on how ‘deserving’ clients were. The TL 
compared clients she had received the previous day, 
 
…there were three Palestinians and an Iraqi, he was a doctor, and I just said to 
him ‘Are you OK? Welcome. How was your journey?’ …a man, but he started 
crying! …and I started crying with him… and when he tell you how he escaped, 
what happened to his brother who was killed and how he felt now, leaving his 
wife and three children…  ‘Don’t call me a man!’ he felt so guilty because he 
escaped! …The money he had paid! …And these three other Palestinians… we 
couldn’t take them on Friday ‘cos they had £600 between them, and Monday 
they came and said they had spent all the money… I said, ‘What happened to 
the money?’ ‘Oh, we went to Soho! We were drinking!’…I said, ‘If you were a 
new asylum seeker… how would you know to go to Soho, to a party’… and I 
wrote it in the contact episode like that…I said ‘Now that you have spent 
everything, we have to take you, but you will be accountable towards the 
asylum’…But you cannot, we’re not here to… kind of justify what they say. You 
have to say with kind of trust, or listen to what they have to say. Tomorrow they 
have to answer to Immigration and to the Home Office about what their action 
is, but it does make you think, sometimes…So we have got different flavour of 
people who will come, and we have got an open-door policy… we have to be 
helpful for everyone. 
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Therefore, despite the private moral judgements workers sometimes made about the 
‘deservingness’ or ‘undeservingness’ of people, they were also aware of RAP’s equal 
opportunities or ‘open-door policy’, and strove to practice equity and adhere to NASS 
criteria when making eligibility decisions, but did not always succeed.    
 
6.3.1.2 EA 
 
Having gained access to RAP’s EA, an asylum seeker would be required to apply for 
NASS support by completing an application form, officially the next day. Cohen (2002) 
argued that RAA’s would be required to evict and ‘starve people out’ of EA if their 
NASS application was rejected. However in practice, having fulfilled the initial 
eligibility criteria of being an asylum seeker, homeless and destitute, almost nobody 
was rejected for NASS support. Once people, now RAP ‘clients,’ were staying in EA, 
different access issues to elements of welfare requiring eligibility decisions by RAP 
workers were salient. 
 
Because RAP’s EAs had varying facilities and living conditions, because most people 
stayed for several weeks or months (never seven days) and because many of those who 
stayed longer had special needs, RAP had negotiated with NASS to allow people with 
particular needs to stay in self-catering accommodation and receive cash, instead of 
full-board support. For those with special needs, RAP also had some influence in 
applying to NASS for clients’ access to longer-term accommodation in London rather 
than dispersal regions (e.g. via MF assessment). This ‘border’ to specific welfare 
services involved decisions of eligibility based on medical evidence, usually in the form 
of a doctor’s note, or a client’s verbal appeal to a worker about her situation (e.g. long-
staying, pregnant single parent). RAP workers were typically caught between the needs 
and demands of clients in front of them, scarce resources and NASS targets, allocations 
and variable attempts to ‘crack-down’ on different aspects of welfare. Managers, under 
greater pressure to meet NASS demands, would step in to rein resources in and take 
control when lower level workers had handed them out too liberally. For instance, at 
one point SMs insisted all decisions on clients eligibility to move onto cash be deferred 
to them on behalf of NASS who were, 
 
…very concerned that that is acting as an incentive to stay… concerned about 
the number of people on cash… …so we’re getting a handle on it. Otherwise it 
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was getting out of hand, people making decisions willy nilly… for not valid 
reasons, (SM, int.)  
 
But such decisions were not easy for Managers either, attempting to “ration services” 
(Lipsky, 1980:87) more leanly and they became involved in increasingly detailed 
judgements which again were based partly on factors considered objective, such as a 
written doctor’s note but also on more informal judgements of need or ‘deservingness’. 
Such eligibility decisions were often made through intense negotiations with people 
concerning the fairness of different variables, and the validity of their reasons. A SM 
gave an example of a client with constipation and piles, who she argued needed 
changes to a more fibrous diet and medication,  
 
So we have the conversation with the client…‘We’ll ask the hotel to provide you 
with these things, but we’re not going to put you on cash for this,’cos  it’s not an 
urgent medical need, it’s something that just your diet needs a bit of tweaking. 
And then they get very, very angry because the whole purpose is to go on cash. 
As far as they’re concerned, ‘I want to cook my own food’, (SM, int). 
 
The SM also told of a series of negotiations she had with a family wishing to be moved, 
stressing their insistence and use of “emotional blackmail” and the difficulty of making 
such decisions under the circumstances,  
 
Her reasons for going on to cash were much stronger than her husband’s. I had 
the mother and child on the Thursday, and then the husband on the Friday, both 
with letters and I said no to hers, so there was no way I was going to say yes to 
him and he got quite angry about this. She kept coming back and saying ‘You’re 
going to kill me and my child’ and I was like, ‘Your child’s getting money, 
what’s the problem! … the doctor’s asked for this to be improved and we’re 
trying what I can improve in your diet… It was a real uphill struggle… as she 
walked out her mobile phone rang… and I was thinking, ‘how’s she managing 
to pay for that?’… she was getting £54 a week, which is not unreasonable when 
you think that both her and her husband could eat full-board… I had to make a 
conscious decision in the end… not to put them on cash at Carlton… move them 
to one of the other hotels that are cash anyway.  
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Lipsky (1980:151) argues that “ideological considerations that justify client 
differentiation” and “unsanctioned distinctions between worthy and unworthy clients” 
are typical in street-level bureaucracies structured so that workers are always forced to 
ration scarce resources. RAP was certainly no exemption as resources were typically 
scarce and eligibility criteria could be vague, changeable, open to discretion and 
interpretation, and hard to prove. Therefore, despite attempts at equity, access to 
resources could also involve workers’ informal judgements based on, for instance, the 
possession of a mobile phone or nice clothes.  
 
6.3.1.3 Dispersal or Eviction 
 
At the end of the Reception system, people were either dispersed or, if they had had a 
decision on their asylum claim before dispersal, were required by NASS to move out of 
EA, on receipt of a positive decision into mainstream housing and benefits systems. 
Although the designated 14 (increased via lobbying to 28) days those given a positive 
decision to move out of NASS accommodation was notoriously too short for refugees 
to find new accommodation, at RAP people in this situation could wait weeks as NASS 
was failing to issue the required NASS 35 form on time. RAP could assist clients in 
their appeal to NASS to remain in London, or for ‘hard cases’ support for those at the 
end of their asylum process but with ‘good reasons’ for being unable to leave the 
country, or they could enforce resistant clients’ eviction from EA. The options for 
people with a final negative decision are well known. Evictions were fairly rare as most 
people were dispersed before a final decision. Also, there was often not strict control 
over evictions; people often overstayed because they were overlooked by the system. 
When evictions were enforced, usually these were managed by letter and then 
physically by EA, rather than RAP staff.  
 
6.3.2 Managing expectations and perceptions of fairness 
 
As RAP workers peopled the ‘front-line’ controlling access at the borders to NASS’ 
welfare safety net with ‘hands-tied’ (as several workers put it), limited in what they 
could offer to people, workers aimed to change what they could; that is the expectations 
and perceptions clients had of the welfare they were entitled to.  
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One of the perceptions RAP workers could often be heard clarifying was that while 
they were delivering the messages and acting as mediators between clients and NASS, 
“We are not NASS,” and “this is outside of our control, this is their process,” and “It is 
not us doing this, we’re just passing the messages from NASS to you,” and “We are just 
a go-between. Dispersal is not our problem. I can give you the address of the Home 
Office and you can go and shout at them.”  There were several reasons for this 
disassociation from NASS to clients, one being that clients often did confuse 
particularly RAP’s Central office as NASS, primarily because this was where they 
completed NASS applications. Also as one project worker explained of this problem, 
 
The first thing we tell them, ‘We are not Home Office, we are not NASS, we are 
not Immigration, we are not police, we are just independent organisation. Our 
aim is to help asylum seekers and newly arrived refugees as much as we can… 
not to give them a lot of, too much expectations, because…as you know RAP is 
a charitable organisation, so we are not… We are a little bit tied. So in the 
meantime, we are telling them that, as much as we can, sometimes we cannot do 
some things. So… and then we… I mean, if we cannot do something, we have 
signposting as well.  When I say we are not…linked to the government they are 
a little bit eased, they can talk about their different things, (PW, int.) 
 
Therefore as workers sought to reassure clients that they were not the ‘state’, they also 
aimed to absolve themselves of the blame for the conditions of ‘support’ their clients 
found they were offered, the inefficiencies and deficiencies of NASS, and their 
relatively ‘helpless’ position as just messengers for the government. 
 
At the same time, many RAP workers talked of their role as to ‘manage clients 
expectations,’ which almost always meant attempting to lower them to ‘realistic’ 
expectations of what welfare they were likely to receive. A part of this was the role 
workers were expected to play by NASS, of informing clients of their rights, 
responsibilities and entitlements, of giving them standardised and accurate information 
(particularly since the NASS review crack-down). Another reason for this was to 
attempt to stop clients from becoming too demanding of RAP, and RAP workers would 
often talk about lowering expectations in conjunction with the ‘demandingness’ of 
some clients: 
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Some people are very demanding and have high expectations. We teach them 
not to expect too much. My colleague does this well. He is very laid back and 
good-humoured. He jokes a lot and calms people down! (PW, obs.) 
 
This is not necessarily an unusual role for a welfare service agency; “Street-level 
bureaucrats convey to clients what their proper level of expectations of the 
bureaucracy should be,” when ‘teaching the client role,’ (Lipsky, 1980:63). It was also 
an issue for the MF, as a counsellor there told BfS volunteers on a training day that 
when referring people, “It’s very important to manage expectations. Expectation is 
becoming very high. People think that when they get there, all their problems will 
disappear.” However, for RAP in their position as a NASS’ RAA, and easily 
accessible, with little to offer, this task seemed important for self-protection.   
 
Another aspect of controlling clients’ understandings was managing their perceptions 
of RAP’s fairness and trying to ensure that they were seen to be fair and equitable in 
treatment of many people. This was partially necessary because clients gained a lot of 
their information from other clients, so if one person received some benefit, others 
heard about it. But also because the complexity of entitlements according to contracted 
civic statuses meant there was a great deal of seemingly inexplicable confusing 
variation. For instance, a TL jokily berated a woman who came in asking for the £50 
entitlement for women whose babies were six months old and had been born in the UK, 
but had not had a decision on their asylum case made yet: 
  
You women! Talking among yourselves! You think that if one gets it, the others 
have to have it too. Halima only got the money because she had her baby here, 
and you did not, so you can’t have the £50, (TL, obs.) 
 
A SM explained the difficulty of this problem at the EAs which operated both cash-
based provision and full-board,  
 
The problem is now, is you are running two systems in conjunction with each 
other… and of course, clients that are on full-board at Carlton are gonna think, 
well… ‘I want cash as well. Why can’t I have cash?’ 
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Managing clients’ expectations and perceptions of how entitlements to any benefits 
worked was also cited as the reason for making certain eligibility decisions, setting a 
precedent to proceeding clients and reducing demand, so A TL and SM in discussion 
decided that a man with special needs they would have to allow to receive cash, but the 
rest of his family should remain on full-board, because “if we let one family do this, 
everyone else will want to do this too.” 
 
Some front-line workers found the expectations clients had of them extremely stressful 
because they were powerless in making decisions concerning clients’ welfare, 
 
 … for the client, I haven’t got any decision, I’m not deciding how much he’s 
getting, I don’t deciding whether he’s due dispersal or not, I just like, I’m 
between the client and NASS, I just convey the information from the client to 
NASS and from NASS to the client… So my involvement is not very effective… 
maybe my negotiation skill, my communication… and my working relationship 
with NASS help in solving the problems quicker… but the decision at the end of 
the day is not in my hands for the client…(being in this position) t’s not good, 
because sometimes the people, the client when they come to you they have high 
expectations, that you are the one whose going to solve the problems, you are 
the magician who’s going to solve the problems… so this is one of the things, 
the high expectation of the client just is, on the other hand, my hand is tied… 
 
With the pressure from NASS to give less and the pressure from clients to give more, 
RAP workers in the middle found this tension in their roles very difficult, especially 
when they did have some discretion and autonomy to decide how to distribute NASS’ 
minimal benefits. Managers were more in touch with NASS directives than front-line 
workers so sometimes removed PWs and TLs from the dilemmas when they felt too 
much was being given to clients.  Therefore, as a SM said, 
 
I think we try to be as fair as possible within the constraints of the external 
environment and that’s very difficult because often clients will tell you, ‘It’s so 
unfair. Why won’t you do this?’  
 
The only solution to this was to try to lower clients’ expectations of the services they 
could give right through their Reception experience, thus lowering clients’ 
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disappointment and their demand of RAP workers to make these difficult decisions, so 
preventing such dilemmas as much as possible.  
  
6.4 Collusion, compliance and coercion  
 
Taking on the role of NASS RAA had involved major changes as the organisation had 
adapted by bureaucratising, and in different ways had assumed the responsibility of 
guarding the internal boundaries of the separate system of welfare from ‘illegitimate,’ 
receivers. However, the welfare asylum seekers were entitled to was designed not only 
as a last resort, better than sleeping rough but worse than sleeping on a friend or 
relative’s floor, but as intentionally deterrent. Agencies like RAP were also, therefore 
criticised for colluding with overseeing and providing asylum seekers with an 
inadequate degree of welfare, a ‘poor law’. Because of the system failings and 
unintended role RAP played in practice, this was exacerbated and ensuring compliance 
with the system involved a greater degree of discipline, control and coercion of clients 
in their care.  
 
6.4.1 Colluding with welfare as deterrence 
 
Government plans that asylum seekers would stay in Reception EA for up to seven 
days, because this would be humanely tolerable, and because this would prevent 
asylum seekers settling in and refusing to leave London, highlight the compromising 
position a RAA like RAP were placed in as these plans immediately fell foul. The fact 
that those clients of RAP staying longest in unsuitable accommodation were people 
with special needs, in complex positions and the most vulnerable, compromised them 
even further. Their primary EA, Rosehill ‘hotel’, was a cavernous ex-military, ex-HPU 
run-down institutional hostel block with many hundreds of rooms running off long 
linoleum corridors, the majority of which housed at least two single people, with 
bathrooms shared between several rooms. Bedrooms and corridors were cleaned 
regularly, but bathrooms and toilets were often dirty and in disrepair, and there had 
been pest problems. Kitchens were out of bounds except for mothers to heat baby milk, 
as everyone else was required to queue to eat at set times in the canteen which served 
very similar, poor quality food every day.  With failing dispersal RAP procured more 
‘low-cost’ EA; ‘hotels,’ ‘hostels’ and some houses, all basic, varying from squalid, 
dirty, overcrowded and institutional to reasonably comfortable and allowing for a 
 185 
degree of autonomy. EA staff were employed by their private sector owners and gave 
varying service, ranging from helpful and understanding, to abusive and hostile. RAP 
were in a tenuous position with EA providers as, by NASS’ demands for flexibility and 
value-for-money, they held no written contracts only verbal agreements with EA 
providers, 
 
Ultimately, the only leverage we have is that we’ll stop using them as 
accommodation providers, like we did with the Grange because we got 
serious complaints…We’ve done everything we can… but we’re in a bit 
of a catch-22… they’ve got us in a bind, because we need them, we’ve 
got over a thousand people in EA. (SM, int.) 
 
At crisis times, RAP did not always check accommodation before using it, and as some 
of it was widely dispersed, did not always monitor conditions and the services their 
clients were receiving. This factor also meant clients had very different degrees of 
contact with RAP staff for advice, information and support. RAP withdrew from two 
EA’s during the research period, because of the poor treatment of clients, one of which 
had involved the EA manager physically abusing clients. RAP’s provision of deterrent 
welfare also involved overseeing the poverty of clients, tightly guarding small cash 
allowances for essential transportation to asylum-related or medical appointments. 
RAP’s policy under NASS instruction was to give no advice, unless asked, about local 
educational facilities although children had entitlement to attend schools, nor funding 
towards school uniforms, fares or lunches, reinforcing NASS intention to minimise 
incentives to stay in London.  
 
RAP’s almost total reliance on NASS funding, their ‘flexible’ and responsive Grant 
Agreement accommodating NASS’ ‘requirements’, extended by default, so co-opting 
them into implementing further legislation and executive amendments, the most serious 
being the 11th hour amendment of the 2002 NIAA, Section 55, which came into force 
on January 8th 2003. This involved the RAA VS agencies’ potential collusion in 
preventing access to any welfare support for in-country applicants not provably 
claiming asylum “before reasonably practicable.” Another civic status designed to 
control and exclude, S55, made it illegal for RAP to accommodate in-country applicant 
singles, although they could accommodate families whose NASS applications, however 
would not be processed. The system broke down as it started, another example of 
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practitioners expected to enact policies with no planning of operational details and 
Human Rights legislation and High Court rulings began to outlaw a similar wilful 
destitution of asylum seekers to the 1996 AIA.  RAP workers were only briefed by SM 
about the changes at a meeting at 3.30pm on January 7th. An SM said, “This is a clear 
and cruel legislation. Help will be denied a lot of people.” However their position as a 
NASS RAA involved colluding with and facilitating S55, despite all workers 
despondency at doing so. Procedural changes then occurred daily  and  NASS RANS 
backlog grew As the NASS screening team, RAP soon had another backlog of S55 
clients waiting in EA until the Home Office worked out what ‘applying as soon as 
reasonably practicable’ meant in practice and appealed against their breach of human 
rights. Because of this instant failure and their geography, RAP breathed a huge sigh of 
relief that they were not seriously implicated in refusing to accommodate or in evicting 
to homelessness destitute in-country asylum seekers, unlike some other RAAs. It 
wasn’t until July 2003 that RAP gathered their SM team to inform a group of in-
country asylum seekers who had waited at RAP for their turn in the RANS queue, that 
they had to go to NASS where a decision might be made that might result in their 
homelessness. SM were desperately apologetic and encouraged the young men to take 
legal action using the Human Rights Act to fight such a decision.  
 
The new NASS application forms workers were required to complete after the NIA 
2002, included new questions about a client’s route to Britain and time of asylum 
claim, about which one worker commented “This turns us into Immigration Officers,” 
requiring a greater degree of RAP’s monitoring and surveillance by ‘internal control’. 
The implementation of S55 was a further example of the compromising ‘bind’ RAP 
was in with their ‘flexible’ Grant Agreement with NASS, without which they would no 
longer be able to exist.  
 
Collusion also involved complying with the dispersal of people to places beyond RAP’s 
visibility and to unknown and quite frequently bleak or hostile conditions. RAP 
workers, caught up in the daily difficulties of operating the complex machinery of their 
work, could seem blind to what lay beyond their position as a transit agency, 
 
I remember here, when one asylum seeker was murdered, was Huddersfield or 
somewhere like that, and the Home Office said ‘OK, we’re not dispersing 
anybody else, we’ve cancelled dispersal to Huddersfield’… and then the 
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following Monday, people were being dispersed to Huddersfield again… from 
here! Nobody challenged it! No manager said ‘Wait a minute,’ and it went 
ahead! Just went ahead! D’ you know, that sort of thing. They get 95% of their 
funding from NASS and if NASS says… ‘Jump,’ they have to jump, (STPW).   
 
6.4.2 Coercion and compliance 
 
Beyond overseeing a deterrent style of welfare, was a more coercive form of gaining 
client cooperation workers sometimes used especially at the end of peoples Reception 
transit in persuading people to ‘travel,’ that is to be dispersed. Dispersal was a 
contentious process at RAP that routinely happened daily, sometimes twice daily, the 
process beginning with faxes from NASS, a notice in the EA office window and under 
a client’s door to inform them of the date and general region they would be sent to. 
People were given between a day to two weeks warning (predominantly 2-3 days), and 
everyone was required to attend a dispersal advice session with a RAP worker, at which 
they were given an information pack including meagre NASS material in English and 
additional information from RAP such as the address of the local refugee support 
agency. For the majority of the research period this information pack was of very poor 
quality, with the sheet on what to do in case of racial harassment (telling not to return to 
London) photocopied in a virtually unreadable way. There was no information about 
the local area people were being sent to, other than the nearest RSA address and a map 
of Britain on the wall for workers to show clients where a place was if they asked. With 
little information from NASS and RAP, clients spread informal ‘folk’ information 
amongst themselves about the pros and cons of dispersal areas. Towards the end of the 
research period a TL started her team on producing more and better quality information 
about dispersal areas and local services.  
 
There were very mixed responses to dispersal. Many people were desperate to be 
dispersed away from the living conditions of EA and were delighted when their names 
came up. Others accepted dispersal grimly with fears and worries about another 
unfamiliar place and unknown living conditions (a lot of people, especially if single, 
were dispersed to other shared ‘hostel’ type accommodations in dispersal regions). Still 
others were desperate to stay in London where they had connections, social support, 
were undergoing medical treatment or had a solicitor they didn’t wish to change, for 
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instance and did not want to ‘travel.’ Others changed their minds. As a SM said, 
“clients have very good reasons for wanting to stay in London.”   
 
Apart from the routine dispersal advice and reassurances about Glasgow or Hull, RAP 
workers fairly often engaged in interactions of persuasion, compulsion and informal 
techniques intended to coerce people reluctant to ‘travel’ to comply with their dispersal. 
On one occasion a PW and TL were attempting to persuade a young Eritraen single 
mother with a baby to sign a NASS letter agreeing to ‘travel’, as she had refused to do 
so once before, been ‘re-booked’ by NASS and must sign agreement again or she 
would be ‘cancelled’ from EA and the system. Despite their threats NASS (and RAP) 
could not legally evict families from EA, but they performed this ‘dance’ of 
‘cancelling’ and ‘re-booking’ people then sending further letters threatening eviction 
without compliance to travel. The workers were particularly frustrated with this client 
as she had previously been desperate to go, and had been in to plead with them every 
day to move her case on, but had then refused when her dispersal came through. She 
had two weeks to sign agreement or have her support ‘terminated’ and the workers used 
several persuasive verbal tactics to gain her compliance, 
 
You won’t have a home for your baby… You are not listening. You know it’s 
good for you… If you don’t sign, you have to be aware that you will have to get 
out on the 12th or the police will come… NASS doesn’t play, (PW, obs.)  
 
Although reminding Amma that she could stay in London if she had someone to stay 
with, the workers were also very keen to disassociate themselves from the system, 
stressing it was NASS in control of the process, and urging her to think carefully before 
refusing as she would be ‘cancelled’. On the morning of the 12th when Amma didn’t 
arrive to sign NASS’ letter, she was evicted from her room by RAP workers and hotel 
security staff telling her she had been ‘cancelled’ by NASS, and her belongings placed 
in the reception area. They warned her that if she did not sign they would call the police 
and she would be ‘put out’ and have to go to social services. Amma sat all day in 
reception without meals, until 3.30pm when she quietly submitted, saying her solicitor 
had told her she had no other option. Having signed, it then took another two hours 
before RAP could get through to NASS on the phone to ‘rebook’ her. A month later 
NASS had still not found her a dispersal place, so when some NASS workers visited, 
the TL used the opportunity for some unofficial tactics to get Amma dispersed. 
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Explaining to the NASS workers the difficult “pressurizing process” RAP workers had 
gone through, she brought Amma in to meet them, telling them she was settling in 
nicely again at Rosehill. Amma smiled sweetly, not understanding what they were 
saying and the NASS workers agreed to “fix this”, which soon after they did.  
 
Another young woman and baby, from Liberia were subjected to similar tactics of 
persuasion to comply with dispersal to Glasgow that night, a week before Christmas. In 
one of the small cubicles at Rosehill EA, a TL and PW spent over an hour engaged in 
what felt like a process of gradually ‘breaking down’ this young woman’s resistance as 
she gradually became tearful and distressed. The workers argued that she was not 
putting her daughter first and she should not “let NASS do this to you,” they would “put 
her out” of her room if she refused to go. Each of her reasons for not wanting to go, the 
workers took apart. She had a doctor’s note, but the workers said she would get 
treatment in Glasgow. She said she wanted to go to Newcastle where her friends had 
been dispersed, but the workers told her to act like a grown-up and do what was best for 
her child, not spend Christmas in Rosehill but in her own place. To the woman’s 
entreaty that Glasgow was a long way and would be cold, they were scathing, saying 
she had come much further from Liberia, and her appeal that she had only been told the 
night before and did not have long enough to prepare was met with, 
 
This is a very weak excuse. A Somalian woman with several children took an 
hour and a half to pack all of her luggage up and get it to reception ready to go. 
You will be going whether you like it or not, (TL, obs.) 
 
The workers repeatedly reiterated that she should consider her child above herself and 
she should not allow NASS to evict her, “Don’t give them the chance to do this to 
you… We’re out of the equation now, it’s between you and NASS.”  Another worker 
confided that the situation was distressing because the young woman had been in EA 
for six months now. However despite this process she ‘refused to travel’ that night and 
RAP (and NASS) cancelled and rebooked her, despite their threats. The workers said 
that eventually she would realise she had no other choice and she would have to go, and 
that she would be in a better place than she was now.  
 
These workers were not unkind and heartless people, they just believed they were doing 
the right thing both for this woman and child, but also in giving an example to other 
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people who might refuse to be dispersed, thus with an eye to keeping the wheels of ‘the 
system’ oiled. There was the sense of immense pressure from above (from NASS via 
SMs) to clear ‘backlogs’ of people held up in EA. When the incoming TL visited for 
handover, this outgoing TL said, the new team would have to be “really hard… to give 
one or two severe examples or there will be a lot more refusals. You have to put people 
out and cancel rooms,” (TL, obs.) 
 
With care of large numbers of widely diverse people, some living in proximity to rival 
factions they had escaped from, one RAP SM commented that there were remarkably 
few major disruptions. However there were fairly frequent minor problems among EA 
residents that could erupt and RAP Rosehill workers would become involved in sorting 
them out. There was a sense of discipline and socialisation of clients in ‘proper’ client 
(Lipsky, 1980) and refugee behaviour, the latter being part of RAP’s NASS 
responsibility, when during their NASS advice session, clients would be informed of 
the rights, responsibilities and obligations accompanying their ‘asylum seeker’ status. 
Solving disputes workers often used appeals to clients to obey British laws and cultural 
norms, for instance, “When you come to this country, you cannot raise your hand to a 
woman! To anyone! …You must walk away!”  Also workers talked of teaching clients 
patience and independence, appealing to their survival of worse, to encourage greater 
endurance of present hardships and not become dependent. With a woman requesting 
taxi fares,  
 
Pregnancy is not a disease. You are well. You can take a bus. We do not want to 
create dependent people, but independent people. If you came all the way from 
Africa, you can get to the hospital without too many problems.  (TL, obs.)  
 
The informal practice of putting people out and cancelling their rooms was used by 
RAP workers as a disciplinary tool in situations other than gaining compliance with 
dispersal such as punishing a client’s ‘anti-social behaviour’. When a woman resident 
had complained that the man in the adjacent room had been “harassing” her and others 
recommending solicitors, taking their money and papers for his services, the TL dealt 
with him by “cancelling” him, evicting him from his room and making him sit in 
reception with his belongings. She insisted on leaving him there for most of the day as 
though they would evict him entirely, saying “let him sweat a little bit more” before 
warning him about his behaviour and re-booking him into a different room, (obs.). A 
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SM’s explanation of this practice suggested that TL’s away from Central had more 
autonomy, using unsanctioned methods of persuasion and discipline, than under SM 
control. The SM began saying, 
 
We use the cancellation system purely as a means of bringing clients to us. So if 
we’ve left six messages in someone’s room, they’ve not responded, we will 
cancel them in order to bring them to us. If they’re not around then fine, the 
room goes to someone else… You don’t keep rooms that are unoccupied, keep 
paying for them, you put other people in them, (SM, int.) 
 
The SM conceded that only NASS or the EA providers, not RAP had the authority to 
actually evict someone, but they had used the method as a tool for bringing a client to 
them pre-NASS,  
 
We can always re-book… Tried and tested methods, you don’t just throw the 
baby out with the bathwater, you continue to use them as long as staff are clear 
that it is a tool…  
 
6. 5 Conclusion  
 
RAP managers had been aware of their contradictory position entering Grant 
Agreement with NASS, but generally believed it would be a compromise worth making 
in their clients’ and the organisation’s own interests. However the compromise 
involved an unexpected change of role, elasticity to accommodate NASS inflexibility, 
unreliability and an unpredictable and changeable policy (and global) environment, 
where decisions affecting  RAP’s operations, and front-line work were made politically, 
not pragmatically, and felt by workers and clients. The degree and quality of 
independence, autonomy or ‘partnership’ the organisation had with NASS in their 
service provision to asylum seekers was in question when considering the degree of 
power and constraint NASS, embroiled in its own inefficiencies and policy constraints, 
appeared to have over RAP. Although attempting to work with NASS, ‘agent’ rather 
than ‘partner’ of NASS seemed a more accurate description for the organisation in its 
position during the research period. This has been further verified in later Home Office 
(2003:22) research finding the most common complaint among stakeholders was, 
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…NASS does not recognise the value and benefits of partnership working and 
does not have the skills to do it well… 
 
And recommendations include, 
 
Partnership working needs to be treated as a core organisational value within 
NASS – from the most senior level down throughout the organisation…(ibid:23). 
 
The process of bureaucratisation which RAP had undergone, and was continuing to 
develop and work under, since their Grant Agreement with NASS was a fundamental 
aspect of implementing government policy since the 1999 IAA, affecting the size, 
structure and character of the organisation, its daily work and to an extent, the way 
workers conceptualised and treated their clients. Bureaucratisation was a result of 
processing greater numbers of clients, for longer periods of time in terms of NASS’ 
agenda for cost-effectiveness and ‘value for money’, controlling the results of faults in 
the system and attempting to instil order on what had been and occasionally was a 
situation of chaos. It was also enforced on the organisation by the extremes of 
bureaucracy emanating from NASS, and the ever-more complex system of 
categorisation in terms of entitlement that this Home Office agency was attempting to 
instil, which RAP therefore had to engage with, and to some extent reflected. This was 
the lived experience of implementing the increasingly complex system of entitlement 
by ‘civic stratification’ (Morris, 2002) imposed on asylum seekers, which was intended 
to delineate legitimate from illegitimate welfare receivers (Geddes, 2003), and so 
control the borders of welfare.  
 
RAP’s role as an ‘agent of NASS’, and as mediator between the state and their 
‘margizen’ clients, involved controlling the borders of NASS’ ‘safety net’ welfare at 
different stages of the Reception process. At initial entry to the NASS system, at their 
airport Reception, during asylum seekers stay in EA, and on clients leaving (or coerced 
on) by dispersal, moving on, or eviction, RAP workers made “sanctioned and 
unsanctioned” (Lipsky, 1989:151) judgements to assess asylum seekers eligibility to 
varying welfare services. Despite best efforts to use formal and ‘objective’ criteria for 
eligibility, and practice equity and fairness, when there was room for discretion workers 
sometimes used their private judgements of ‘worthiness’ or ‘deservingness’ in their 
decisions. Therefore controlling access to the complexity of these systems of NASS’ 
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and their own negotiated Reception welfare could be fraught with dilemmas and 
through “negotiated pragmatism” with clients, could result in “the informal gains and 
deficits which shape delivery”  (Morris, 2002:147), so expanding or contracting asylum 
seekers’ formal social rights. With little control over the welfare they could offer, 
workers tried to control and manage their clients’ expectations and perceptions of 
fairness in order to reduce the demand, reduce clients’ sense of inequity and reduce the 
dilemma and dissonance in their relatively powerless roles.  
 
Operating the Reception stage of NASS ‘safety net’ also involved colluding with a 
standard of welfare which could be considered compromising to human dignity, and the 
enforcement of a ‘no-choice’ dispersal by coercion of incompliant clients away from a 
place where they had found some security, and sometimes of their eviction. Managing 
Reception could involve the use of discipline and socialisation of ‘deviant’ behaviour, 
both in the interests of ensuring a secure environment and teaching ‘proper’ refugee and 
client behaviour, so reducing demand and instilling ‘norms’.  
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7 Experiencing Reception                 
 
The welfare-related provisions of the 1996 and 1999 asylum legislation greatly 
increase the power of the state to monitor, control and anormalise the lives of 
asylum seekers… ensuring that migration can be reversible by denying access 
to chances for social integration,  (Geddes, 2000:145-6) 
 
 I need my life back… I don’t know how long this is going to take… them to get 
my papers straight… just to go back to that normal life, (Christine, an asylum 
seeker with RAP).  
 
 
The deterrent safety net of Reception was not simply given out or ‘done’ to passive 
recipients, but human agents were actively, inter-actively involved in their individual 
and shared experiences of this stage of asylum seeking. This is so even if “the welfare 
system transforms active adult refugees into passive clients,” as Wahlbeck (1997) 
warned an over-controlling Finnish system risked, and despite the obvious power 
imbalances and the NASS system operating as an inverse form of welfare, attempting 
to prevent opportunities for participation and inclusion, (Geddes, 2001).   To 
understand the ‘safety net’ welfare system in practice, it is essential to consider how it 
was experienced by the active subjects who were its policy objects; from their accounts 
and from reflexive observations an understanding of their viewpoints can be gathered.  
 
Just as the categorisation of the immense diversity of human individuals as ‘asylum 
seekers’ or ‘refugees’ falsely homogenises people who differ in most possible 
dimensions (gender, age, class, sexuality, country of origin, ethnicity, religion, 
education and profession), it is important to recognise the differences in very different 
people’s experiences of journeying through the Reception stage of the NASS system 
with RAP. However, as the system itself homogenized asylum seekers (albeit further 
categorizing within) in processing and controlling their access to specific social rights, 
the system also forced similar experiences. This is, arguably, especially the case as 
large groups of people lived together in very similar circumstances in RAP’s London 
EA’s before dispersal to more diverse living conditions around the country. 
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The heterogeneity of people’s previous experiences, life histories, the complexity of 
their needs, individual psychologies, their possible connections with others in the UK, 
their familiarity with the language and knowledge or expectations of the asylum and 
NASS systems, among other factors, will undoubtedly have affected the way they 
experienced Reception as asylum seekers. The experiences of a lone-parent English-
speaking woman from Nigeria with two young children, say, are likely to be quite 
different from those of a young single Kurdish man from Iraq with no English or a 
married couple from Zimbabwe. It seemed likely, for instance, that people’s different 
reasons and motivations for claiming asylum in the UK might have made a difference 
to their experience of Reception. Sharing showers with many others of both genders 
might be an endurable inconvenience of indignity for  instance for the Zimbabwean 
man who laughed when the RAP PW asked routinely at his NASS application session, 
‘Have you been tortured?’ answering, “Of course not, I just want to come here!”  
However for the Eritrean woman who had been gang raped in communal showers in 
Eritrea the flashbacks of her horrific traumas left her too terrified to use them. Taking 
the plurality of experience into account, each individual’s experience of shared similar 
conditions was valid; they were both idiosyncratic and emblematic. 
 
Geddes (2000) suggests asylum seekers lives are ‘anormalised’ by the safety net 
welfare system designed as deterrent. For people assigned ‘asylum seeker’ status 
opportunities to participate, integrate and settle in society or to lead a “normal social 
life,” (ibid:143) are minimised while waiting a decision on their claim, and the degree 
of state intervention in their lives increased, in order that their ‘removal’, might be 
easier if refused leave to remain. Reception was an important stage of the NASS safety 
net, especially as, in practice and for most, it was not just the point of access to NASS 
support, a brief orientation and transition to a dispersal area, but was experienced by 
many for months, before dispersal, change in circumstances or an asylum decision and 
the variety of fates that led to. This exploration of the experiences of Reception of some 
asylum seekers will consider whether and how their lives were ‘anormalised’ by the 
welfare policies of which they were the ‘objects’. This understanding was primarily 
gained from the in-depth accounts and observations of four English-speaking women 
from different African countries as well as from shorter conversations with and 
observations of other EA residents and visitors to RAP’s offices, and the testimony of 
RAP workers or BfS volunteer befrienders.   
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7.1  Leaving, arriving and dislocating from home 
 
7.1.1 Leaving and Arriving 
 
With the little friends I’ve made, some did come for different reasons. Some 
people come here just to learn the ways, the life, the language of the UK, and 
some people come here to stay because back in Africa, they are unsafe, you 
understand? And some people come here to make money and to go back… Most 
people, they come here because they have difficulties in their own country, most 
people… I can’t continue staying in such a country that there is no security, the 
place is not safe, no food, no shelter, no… the health! (Lucy, int) 
 
People came to the UK for different reasons with different life stories coinciding where 
individuals felt what they left behind was worse than what they could expect or look 
forward to here and in hope for a brighter more secure future, each dislocating from a 
former life and some kind of home. Telling the stories of the four women from African 
countries helps contextualise their experiences of arrival and Reception. 
 
Lucy, a lone young mother who had her first baby during her RAP stay, told how she 
left Liberia,  
 
In my country there is a conflict between the government and the rebels in 
which… we don’t know what might happen the next minute. It’s not safe, no 
security, no rest.  
 
She went to Ivory Coast through her sister, and worked for “a white man,” who urged 
her to leave with him for Canada when the fighting started there, but who abandoned 
her at Heathrow airport, she explained.  
 
Femi, also pregnant and with a three year old told how she had been travelling from 
Nigeria to Canada but, with false documents, was prevented from going further by UK 
Immigration. She only claimed asylum here because her alternative was deportation 
back, 
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Me, I never want to go back to where I’m coming from because I have problems 
there, that’s why I left the place. I’m going far from there… I’m afraid of some 
people in my country, and one also when I was pregnant he told me, if you get 
back I will kill the baby… I want to go far from these people… I can’t stand for 
someone to kill my baby.   
 
Sarah, an older Kenyan woman said that she came to the UK because of the Mugiki,  
 
That deals very badly, the women …a type of sect that has prepared themselves 
to harass women by circumcising them and raping them. Or they tried to do 
that, and then they said they going have to do that to me, so I was circumcised, 
but I said I cannot be raped… some of them have AIDS. So that was why the 
pastor made me run away and I came to this island…  
 
Christine revealed her reasons for leaving Uganda gradually. She said her husband had 
deserted the army who then believed he had joined the rebels and came knocking on 
Christine’s door trying to find him. They did not believe that she did not know where 
he was so detained her. She managed to escape from prison and to the UK with the help 
of an “uncle.”  
 
Not everyone arrives clearly intending to “seek asylum,” as Lucy said laughing, 
 
…the immigration man said, ‘Do you wanna seek asylum?’ I said, ‘what’s the 
meaning of asylum…? I don’t know!’ 
 
 She said that Immigration had been threatening, and  
 
…some people they don’t even allow them to express their mind… and before 
you know they are on their way back home, back to the suffering… They behave 
as if asylum seekers are animals… We are human beings as well! 
 
When Femi arrived, she was desperate to be allowed to continue her journey but was 
detained overnight at Heathrow and her daughter taken into social services care, “My 
God, it was very difficult for me!” When Christine first arrived, she was alone and just 
pregnant, and had a friend to stay with so did not immediately enter the NASS system. 
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Two months later she was joined by her two-year-old daughter, brought by “an agent” 
who took the child’s ‘papers’ because Christine couldn’t afford to pay. Sarah described 
her arrival most positively, arriving unknowingly with untreated diabetes,  
 
When I first arrived here I was very sick. So the first thing RAP did was to take 
me to the hospital… and I was really given good treatment by the doctor… even 
when I was taken to the Home Office, these people were all so friendly! They 
were looking for somebody whom I could speak my language… you are able to 
express yourself better! 
 
Each woman acknowledged the ‘safety-net’; having their basic needs met by RAP and 
the NASS system. Sarah said, “Food I’m getting. Shelter I’m getting. I was given some 
clothes… I do not want!”  Lucy said she found the support system fair,  
 
Back in Africa, who is going to give you a house to stay? That will feed 
you…even clothe you? No! To me it’s fair! To me, they are trying. I’m not 
complaining, they are trying. They feed you, they clothe you, they give you 
shelter. 
 
Christine believed RAP were doing their best under the circumstances,  
 
You can’t blame them for it. You can’t meet everybody’s needs. We are all from 
different kinds of countries, we eat different kinds of foods… It’s not their fault, 
they try to do their best. 
 
And Femi, having been moved around different EAs was philosophical about her 
alternatives, 
 
When you don’t have any other choice, whatever they give to you, you have to 
be agree with this… At least it is a little bit bigger, my baby can play… I cannot 
just go and sleep on the streets… I have to manage. 
 
However the women, all of whom stayed with RAP for several months, and many 
others living in EA for any length of time, struggled with EA living conditions, which 
could compound troubles they carried from former lives. Coming to terms with leaving 
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a ‘home,’ people arrived and entered Reception with a multitude of uncertainties 
around the possibilities of building a new ‘home.’  
 
7.1.2 Dislocation from ‘home’ 
 
The involuntary loss of ‘home’ in exile and the effort to reconstruct a new ‘home’ is 
one of the most defining aspects of the ‘refugee experience’ in the literature, however 
‘home is conceptualised. ‘Home’ may no longer be a place of safety and security, or 
even still exist, except in memories or haunting nightmares. Dislocation from ‘home’ 
often means separation from loved ones who sometimes may still face danger. It may 
not be just the loss of a ‘personal’ home. Leaving a ‘homeland’ in flight even if 
accomplished swiftly and safely, “is likely to prompt major emotional and cognitive 
turmoil”  (Ager, 1999:7) and can involve “cultural bereavement” felt more forcibly in 
adjustment to sometimes intensely ‘alien’ host cultures, and “transition across a very 
significant social distance” (Eisenbruch, 1990, cited in Ager, 1999:8). The concept of  
‘home’ may refer not just to physical but also “symbolic places” where “It is not only 
national, cultural and social belongings, but also a sense of self, of one’s ‘identity’,”  
(Al-Ali and Koser, 2002:7). Thus ‘home’ usually involves a sense of belonging, and 
security in one’s identity.   
 
For the diversity of forced migrants living in RAP’s EA, loss of and dislocation from 
their ‘homes’ will have taken on similarly diverse meanings. For many this meant 
separation from and loss of families and loved ones either still left at home or 
somewhere in their ‘homeland.’ For some this produced intense guilt, that they had 
escaped but their loved ones had not, such as the Iraqi doctor who cried when 
welcomed on arrival (6.3.1.1). For others, the pain and grief of separation haunted them 
day and night, as for a Nigerian man who woke at 5am every morning and cried for an 
hour as he remembered his murdered family back ‘home’. Many women had separated 
from their children in leaving, such as Christine who came initially alone, pregnant, 
then secured her two-year-old daughter’s arrival two months later, but had another 
daughter aged seven still in Uganda. She only revealed this as I enquired about the 
people in photos she had in her room, and said quietly that the only way she could cope 
with this was not to think about her, as she had said about her husband whose 
whereabouts she did not know nor whether he was alive or dead.  Christine’s concept of 
‘home’ revolved around her family. Asked where she considered home,  
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However good things are here, this will never be… I will want to go back home, 
to Uganda… that’s my home… at the right time I know I have to go back cos all 
my people are there… my mother is there, my kid is there, my relatives, my 
people… everybody’s in Uganda. I’ve got no family here, friends I know I need 
friends but that’s not my family and I can’t… bring the whole family to Britain. 
If only I could do that then maybe one day, one time, Britain would become 
home…  
 
Femi also considered her home to be where people she knew were, and so ‘here’ was 
not home because she was alone and felt isolated, 
 
I’m from Nigeria… Yeah! It’s my home. Yes…even if they allow me to stay here 
today, I have refugee status, Nigeria’s my home… and I would also want to visit 
and come back to Nigeria… While you are in your country, no matter what, you 
will have people you know, the family… and here I don’t have anybody…  
 
For single mothers like Femi and Christine coping alone with their children was an 
immense struggle in EA, especially as facilities were not geared around their needs.  
For instance, Femi found cooking quite a problem, as children were not allowed in the 
kitchen of her EA, which was a long way from their bedroom, so she took the three 
year old and left the baby in her room, 
 
If I leave her with this girl, maybe she will just hit her, because she herself is 
just a baby… it’s very difficult, so I have to take her with me… She have to sit 
down when I say sit down, maybe when she is running around they will get 
angry… Here I don’t have anyone. It’s just me and my kids, I don’t have 
anybody, I have to look after them twenty-four hours… It’s very difficult for 
someone to stay inside twenty-four hours. 
 
For others, separation from family and friends was less of an issue, and the situation 
they had left may have been much worse than the one they now found themselves in, 
therefore for some, ‘home’ was less about being with your ‘people’. Lucy, though 
pregnant when she arrived, spoke very little of people she had left in Liberia, 
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Now, Liberia doesn’t feel like home, cos Liberia is not… is not better… Here it 
feels like home, but where you feel like home is when you have rest of mind, 
peace of mind… When UK could be a home is when you’ve gotten your 
papers… Now when you’ve not yet gotten your paper, it’s not yet your home… 
 
Suggesting ‘here’ feels like home because of being given food, shelter and having 
organisations, like RAP, to “run to” when you need them, Lucy continued that ‘here’ 
could not be home while still asylum seeking, because she had no “rest of mind”. 
Becoming asylum seekers had involved leaving and losing a ‘home’ and homeland, to 
come to a strange land where, even if now safer and more secure than before, in 
Reception as asylum seekers people felt dislocated and unable to make a new home 
especially being separated from families and because their status was not secure.   
 
 
7.2 ‘Hanging’ – lost in bureaucracies            
 
When people made an asylum claim and similarly on claiming for NASS support, they 
entered legal and bureaucratic systems which from all accounts seemed obscure, 
complex and often incomprehensible mazes. If some people were unaware when they 
first arrived of what seeking asylum was, they very soon came to associate themselves 
with their new label or identity, aware of the media and public furore over people like 
themselves, and experiencing living each day as ‘asylum seekers’ in distinctive ways. 
Christine said, 
 
I don’t say that everything here is bad, but the moment you’re still asylum 
seeking, oh my God! It’s a nightmare, and…I’ve gone through hell… Hell!! … 
Until I’ve got my papers, that’s the only way out… that’s when you’ve really 
finished everything… At least, you know where you are going… at least, you’ve 
got a destiny… at least, you know where your life is leading. But when you don’t 
have the papers, you never know what is going to happen… and that’s a really 
bad situation… You’re hanging… You don’t know where you are the next 
minute. If you’re back up? Or maybe you’re still here? Or maybe you’re 
somewhere else. They keep on tossing you around…   
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This description of chronic uncertainty and loss of control over her future was echoed 
by Christine several times over the months of her stay in EA. She referred both to 
uncertainties over her asylum claim and her dispersal, and this description seemed to 
express the experience of many others, particularly those who spent months in EA 
waiting to hear what their destiny might be.  
 
7.2.1 Claiming asylum 
 
As people entered the legal and bureaucratic systems they began gathering numerous 
documents which somehow represented their positions but generated immense 
confusion over their meanings as people tried to make sense of them and their 
implications for their lives and entitlements. Everywhere around RAP sites people 
carried bundles of documents and papers, coming to RAP workers or going to a 
solicitor for enlightenment. Finding and working with a trustworthy solicitor was a 
maze to negotiate in itself where, although RAP guided people who wanted guidance to 
a legal firm they had found reputable, some were prey to disreputable legal advisors 
who came round the EA’s at night touting for business using bribery, offering £10 notes 
and taking people’s papers. Some found a helpful solicitor who would not take their 
case beyond a certain point, so they would then need to try to find and change solicitors 
perhaps several times. Others lost their solicitor or found communicating with them 
over a distance, or just the worry of how to manage their case when dispersed, stressful 
and difficult to cope with. One young Iranian man complained that even his solicitor 
recommended by RAP was difficult to communicate with, being mostly unavailable 
and unhelpful when she was. For Christine, the whole conception of going to a solicitor 
was alien, humiliating and she suggested, criminalising, 
 
The way things are being run here, it’s different from… way back home, we 
don’t even go to solicitors, for what? Sometimes we go there, I mean, you sit 
really tight, unless something is really important, that’s when you go to the 
solicitors or the lawyers but here all the time you are going there… 
 
Christine felt similarly about having to give evidence before a judge, 
 
We’re not used to this, you know, going to court. I think I’ve never been to court 
myself, never in my life. I’ve gone to court here… to go in front of a judge, I’ve 
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never even met the judge in my country, I’ve never! Feels that, when we come 
here it looks as if we are being tortured, going in front of the judge, everybody 
listening to you… 
 
On top of just the fact of appearing before a judge like a criminal, was the humiliation 
of having to tell the details of what had happened to her to a room of people, the sort of 
things, she said you would normally only say to a priest “when confessing”, and not 
being believed, 
 
I hate it! All the time you have to go ‘Oh what happened, this, oh that, then what 
happened? Then they raped you, then what? Then…’ Owwww! Why do they 
have to go the… all that? You’ve told them your story! 
 
Despite all the humiliating questioning, Christine said that the judge did not believe her 
and she felt uncertain about how such a decision was made, that it seemed completely 
arbitrary how the judge decided whether you were lying or not,  
 
The judge said, when they went through my case, they said I was lying… my 
case is not strong enough to win. What can I do? If I’ve told you what’s 
happened then what can I do? Am I supposed to lie or what? I’ve told you 
whatever happened to me, I’ve told you what I know… I mean some people, yes, 
do lie. But they get their papers! So I wish I could just turn back the clock and 
lie there… If that’s what they wanted! … Cos I haven’t gained anything! … 
Some people do lie and some are… really they need protection… But how can 
you know anyway if somebody is really lying? It’s just luck… if somebody 
believes your story then you’re lucky, if they don’t then you’re so unlucky… In 
fact I don’t know how they determine if somebody’s lying or not…It’s between 
them… All this time they have been questioning me and I haven’t got anything… 
Oh, OK I’m still waiting, maybe but… it hasn’t helped me at all…  
 
These feelings of ‘hanging’ in uncertainty, waiting for others to make decisions about 
your life using unknown criteria, in a system like a lottery and over which you have 
little or no control but undergo a humiliating, criminalising interrogation, were typical 
of many especially towards the ends of their cases. Many asylum seekers, including the 
four African women, spoke of their anxiety and depression; uncertainty over their 
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asylum claim fed into a constant fear of deportation, which Christine and, here, Lucy 
spoke of, 
 
So the basic thing or the most fundamental thing is for you to get your stay! If 
you get your stay, you become free! Your mind is at rest! …When you are still 
seeking asylum your mind is not at rest, because you hear different things… 
there are hundred and something people, asylum seekers that they are 
deporting. Your mind keeps saying, ‘God! Will I be the next person to be 
deported? Will I go back to my suffering in Africa?’ …So if you are in this, in 
Europe, in England without… a paper, you don’t have rest of mind. You don’t 
have rest of mind! You don’t at all!           
 
 
7.2.2 Claiming for NASS support 
 
As well as waiting in uncertainty, feeling powerless, through their asylum process 
individuals also waited in EA as their claim for NASS support moved through that 
bureaucratic process, uncertain when, where or even if they would be dispersed. Some 
were dispersed relatively quickly (though no sooner than three to four weeks), often 
those with special or complex needs, single-parent or large families and arbitrary others 
were not. People varied in their feelings about dispersal, some desperate to go others to 
stay, others changing their minds seeing others come and go. For long-stayers 
particularly, this experience again seemed as Christine described it, like “hanging;” 
waiting in uncertainty for an unknown future with no control over it and in the 
meantime enduring difficult and demeaning living conditions.  
 
For instance, a middle-aged Zimbabwean couple, with the husband a wheelchair user, 
lived for several months in Rosehill on the ground floor as no EA’s had facilities for 
wheelchair users, and NASS fought over their housing responsibility with the LA. The 
wife talked about the increasing strain this was placing on their relationship, that her 
husband had not had a bath for three months and she had to fetch all his meals from the 
canteen (on the first floor). He was becoming “moody” and she was becoming more 
depressed and had warned him they would have to “split” if he continued like this. 
Sarah, with severe diabetes, partial blindness and bladder control problems, was also 
caught up in NASS because of their seeming inability to find her somewhere suitable to 
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live. She too was desperate for dispersal but had to endure five months waiting in EA. 
When her dispersal finally came through, Sarah was not immediately happy because of 
being uncertain exactly where or what new living conditions she was going to. Her fear 
of these unknowns was particularly pertinent to her special needs, but was typical of 
many, 
 
I was happy that I have been dispersed, but you know, that joy that I’m going 
was not there… because I never knew where I was going, whether I was going 
to a place where we are going to share. That was my worry… I never knew, and 
let me tell you, somebody had told me that people are dispersing here to be 
detained to another hotel there at Newcastle, waiting for two weeks to be 
given… So these are things that have been worrying me…   
 
Christine’s example is typical of some of the worst bureaucratic failings impacting on a 
family’s lives. I first met Christine when she became quietly tearful and obviously 
distressed in RAP’s Rosehill office, being seven months pregnant and with a two year 
old, on hearing for the third time she was lost to NASS’ system, and was on no 
dispersal lists. She was desperate to be dispersed, so that she could have her newborn in 
her “own place” and not in Rosehill EA where she and her daughter had been staying 
for three months. NASS had sent her details to the RC not RAP on one occasion. The 
second time she said, “I had to check and check and check the list” but eventually 
going back to RAP in desperation found she was not on any database and NASS had no 
record of her pregnancy, so had to complete a third NASS form. Christine had feared 
through this time, that there was something wrong with her or her claim, that she was 
under surveillance. She said “they will never know that you are seven months pregnant 
until somebody goes through your papers,” and though disliking complaining she 
conceded she would now have to badger RAP to check her continued existence and 
progress in NASS’ system. Christine was still not dispersed before she had her baby, 
but after she gave birth RAP moved her to Carlton EA where they had begun to send 
pregnant women and nursing mothers, and she had what she had particularly longed 
for, her own kitchen and bathroom. Though Christine conceded of Rosehill, “Actually it 
wouldn’t be that bad here provided I don’t stay here so long…” when she was moved 
to an EA with better facilities, the continued uncertainty of her potential dispersal 
became the problem, 
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One minute I feel OK, another minute everything is changing… one minute 
you’re in Hounslow, the other minute you’re in Manchester. When you’ve got 
kids that’s… in fact, it’s very bad with kids… Sometimes they just keep on 
changing… things keep on changing every now and then, from them…    
 
Femi also experienced the “hanging” feeling, that her future was in someone else’s 
hands, that there was no certainty about what might happen to her, but for her, the 
suspension was one step removed as she was subject to S55 of the NIAA 2002. 
Because Femi had refused to claim asylum immediately because she wanted to 
continue her planned journey to Canada, and applied only having been detained 
overnight realising that this or to be returned were her only options, she was deemed 
not to have claimed “as soon as practicably possible”. Because she was heavily 
pregnant and with a child, NASS granted her RANS so RAP could accommodate her, 
so she was not waiting for dispersal but for NASS to reach her case in their backlog to 
decide whether she could go on dispersal lists. Femi still waited anxiously for a move 
to a better place than her EA not thoroughly comprehending that or why she was caught 
up in this new bureaucratic queue. She was, however, more resigned than others to her 
fate being deportation. Having watched asylum seekers on TV sewing up their lips and 
going on hunger strike when refused refugee status, she said, 
 
That frustrated me, watch telly…every time ‘asylum seekers, asylum seekers…’ 
But for me I don’t have any problem, if they say ‘Go’, I will go… If they say 
‘Go’, I will go to my country. I cannot say, ‘No, I’m not going for me to kill 
myself here’. No, I’m not going to do that because I have two kids to take care 
of…        
 
In another sense, ‘hanging’ can also be understood as suspension from a ‘normal’ life 
or the opportunity to begin to try to settle or ‘integrate,’ as Sarah described her situation 
while living in EA. Her life was on hold, she was suspended separately away from 
normal life in the UK, but anticipated that on dispersal she would experience “outside,”  
 
About my life in the UK? You know, when I came I was brought to this room, 
I’ve never experienced myself outside to know how life is. But now when I go is 
when I’ll know how life is in the UK… I will get more experience. 
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These accounts suggest how “anormalised” (Geddes, 2001) asylum seekers lives were 
while in EA at Reception.  
 
7.2.3 Claiming entitlements to Reception welfare 
 
As well as the sense of loss and confusion in the faces of the giant legal and 
bureaucratic asylum and NASS systems, people living in EA also felt the confusion and 
opacity of RAP’s everyday bureaucratic monitoring of entitlements to different aspects 
of NASS support where they had this discretion. Within the civic status of ‘asylum 
seeker’, were numerous further strata all with differently nuanced entitlements or 
disentitlements to specific social rights and benefits.  
 
Femi with her imposed status of ‘in-country’ asylum applicant just after January 8th 
2003, found RAP workers almost as confused as she was. She recounted how she had 
discovered her entitlement to the one off payment of £50 NASS gave to women who 
had given birth in the country after a certain number of months,  
 
She told me she want to give me £50. So the other one was saying, ‘Nooo! You 
are not entitled.’ She was saying to me, ‘You are a Country Applicant’ I don’t 
know what they call it, ‘You are not entitled to anything in this country, whether 
you give birth or not, so you are not entitled’… But this boy says ‘No! Because 
you have a child, automatically you have another one, you are entitled to it’…  
 
There were two general issues relating to the confusion and uncertainty around such 
everyday, status-dependent entitlements, one was RAP’s (and NASS’) constant 
changing and shifting of the ‘rules’, and the other related issue was an overwhelming 
sense of inequity many EA residents felt as they saw different people receiving 
different benefits for reasons they could not understand. Lucy complained, 
 
Their system changes in a twinkling of an eye. You see them bring this system 
today, tomorrow they bring another system.     
 
Lucy and Christine both moved from Rosehill to Carlton EA whilst heavily pregnant 
and were then living in adjacent rooms. Because Lucy had her baby after the time that 
RAP, under pressure from NASS, were ‘cracking-down’ on the numbers of people 
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receiving cash (6.3.1.2), and Christine had hers before this, Christine was still given 
cash so allowed to do her own cooking, whereas Lucy had had her cash allowance 
withdrawn after giving birth. Neither of them could make sense of this, or RAP’s other 
systems of entitlement, 
 
C: Some people are getting less money, some people are getting more money 
L: Some people are not getting… 
C: Some people are even getting nothing! 
K: Do you understand why some people are getting this? 
C: No…no… 
L: We don’t understand. And we are not even… they don’t alight us… You don’t 
understand their system because you see some nursing mothers, mothers with 
babies, they don’t give them money and you see some single people, they give 
them money. Why? …They shouldn’t! 
 
Christine and Lucy were also confused and expressed a sense of injustice concerning 
entitlements to payments for transport, and were not alone as RAP had daily encounters 
with clients asking for money for fares,  
 
C: …and another thing is like, when you need transport, ‘Ah! You! You’re from 
Carlton… No, no, no, no, you don’t need anything! …Ooh! You go! Just walk 
there! It’s not very far, just walk!’… When you’re on your own, I don’t mind, 
but when you’ve got kids… 
L: The fourth day, I first gave birth, because the manager (of the hotel) said he 
can’t give me money… that I have to go the RAP office and register my baby… I 
couldn’t believe! Four days! They never, nothing like transport… Four days, I 
had to put the baby on my chest… and take the baby!   
C: Me too! …Even from the hospital, I take my own self… I went to RAP, I 
showed them the receipt, they said, ‘No! Who told you to take the cab? You’re 
supposed to go by bus!’ 
 
As well as a sense of injustice and confusion over seemingly ‘official’ systems of 
entitlements, there was also a sense that RAP workers used unofficial, unfair methods 
for deciding entitlements, which Lucy expressed as “a little tribalism,”  
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I’ve really observed something, when you go there. I think there is a little 
tribalism in this staff…in those people working in RAP… Maybe you are from 
Somali, and another person is from Somali, and you, you are from Uganda… or 
Liberia… or Congo, because the…worker is a Somalian, you want to attend to 
the Somali person… Why should there be any tribalism? We are all one!  
 
7.2.4 Summarising  
 
The feeling of “hanging,” being entangled in confusing and obscure legal and 
bureaucratic systems which often seemed unfair, or irrational and over which people 
felt little control, but involved waiting in for uncertain outcomes for an uncertain time, 
which nevertheless might have very significant effects on people’s lives and futures, 
seemed to be one major aspect of the experience of Reception for asylum seekers with 
RAP. Uncertainty and this kind of ‘limbo’ experience, is very well documented as 
typical of the ‘refugee experience,’ not just for asylum seekers waiting for a verdict on 
their claims, but for those with refugee status, living perhaps in Europe or in camps in 
the developing world, suspended somewhere between their former lives, social worlds 
and statuses, and the structural enablement to forge positive new lives, (Al-Ali, 2002). 
Another fundamental and related aspect of experiencing Reception was asylum seekers 
loss of autonomy.   
 
7.3 Losing autonomy 
 
When individuals entered the NASS system, especially those with little or no outside 
help or resources, they gave up various rights to choose, most notably where they 
would live, but also, in accepting this ‘welfare’ package the accepted many restrictions 
on other living conditions. This was part of the deterrent design of the system. Of 
course, most people had no choice but to accept NASS support because they were 
destitute, and most did not have the option of staying with friends or relatives or, if they 
did, this often changed as ‘sponsors’ became unable to support them for any length of 
time. During Reception, people had no choice where to live, whom they would be 
living with and, because given full-board accommodation instead of cash, had even 
fewer choices of lifestyle. As Christine had said, this was endurable for a short time, 
but much more difficult for a long time. Therefore one of the most notable features of 
experiencing reception, manifest in several ways by many, was losing one’s autonomy. 
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As explored above, people lost control over their destinies in significant ways on 
claiming asylum and accepting their dispersal by NASS, but in Reception people also 
lost control over daily living with increasing significance for RAP’s ‘long-stayers.’   
 
7.3.1 Food 
 
For the majority of residents of RAP’s various EAs, their accommodation package was 
‘full-board’, or at least part-board, so people had to eat at the ‘hotel’ canteen at set 
times. At Rosehill EA, where the majority of RAP’s clients lived, this involved queuing 
in a line which went partly round the dining room, out of the doors and down the stairs 
every meal-time. The food and getting it was institutional and low quality, as on a tight 
budget. An AW, working with RAP clients identified as “most vulnerable,” asked what 
the main needs or issues of her clients were, replied 
 
Main thing clients complain about is food… depending on where they are 
staying, but, you know, it would be easier if they could cook their own food. So 
many of them have said that so many times… that is one of the main issues that 
they have… 
 
Food was a major issue for Christine, Lucy, Femi and Sarah, and most of the people I 
spoke to more briefly. The majority of appeals RAP workers dealt with for changes in 
living conditions involved appeals to move so that people could cook their own food.  
Some of the issues revolved around the strict timing of meals, 
 
It’s really stressful… when we always have to wake up really early in the 
morning to go for food. Sometimes I’m not ready for that… So most of the time 
you end up missing breakfast. 
 
Or the lack of variety, 
 
Three kinds of dishes… but the same every day… For a whole week, a whole 
month, one month, two months, three months… So that’s why I say that, if you 
stay here for too long, that’s really too much… 
 
Or the poor nutritional quality of the food, 
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Not a balanced diet, always rice and chips, rice and chips, rice and chips! You 
could imagine a pregnant woman or a nursing mother eating rice and chips 
every day! It shouldn’t be!  
 
Or,  
 
Trust me, it is not food that I would like to eat, because of my special diet, my 
way of life… my diabetic… But for food I have been longing to eat… Sometimes 
I go there and do not eat… there are some things that you don’t want to eat… 
they are the enemies to my diabetes!   
 
A worker at a local ‘satellite’ agency had also heard numerous complaints about food 
from RAP’s EA clients, including Muslims complaining of the inadequacy of provision 
around Ramadan, being given non-halal food and others, that all meals were “curry.”  
Femi and Christine were greatly relieved to be moved to EAs where they could cook 
their own food. Even though for Femi, this involved juggling two children, getting 
some distance to the kitchen with a three-ringed hob that served eighty people, and 
taking her pans back to her bedroom to eat. Femi proudly showed some hot chillis she 
used, saying she liked very hot African food, and this degree of autonomy and freedom 
to express her individual cultural taste was obviously very important to her.  Being 
stripped of the autonomy to produce one’s own food to individual and cultural taste at 
times of one’s choosing, contributed to an institutionalisation of life in EA, and held 
extraordinary significance for people struggling to hold onto their identity and sense of 
‘self.’ Jones (1982) found ‘food’ and the importance of self-catering of similar 
significance to Vietnamese refugees living in accommodation centres for long periods, 
as a staff member commented, 
 
Given the physical and mental state of refugees arriving in this country and 
acknowledging that food is an especially important factor in promoting well-
being and a sense of security, I think it is grossly insensitive to expect families 
to eat institutional food in a huge communal dining room, (ibid: 38-39). 
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7.3.2 Sharing 
 
Losing choice and autonomy over living conditions was manifest in various ways, such 
as sharing often cramped living space with a multitude of others sometimes people of 
rival political, ethnic or religious positions, often sharing bedrooms if single, in most 
cases sharing bathrooms, often with strangers of both sexes. Some with special needs, 
might be moved to slightly less close-knit EAs, where they could have slightly more 
autonomy, and, if somebody had a particular problem with their roommates, RAP and 
EA staff attempted to move people But there was a limit to this choice and not 
everybody’s requests were granted. Obviously, in such conditions, disputes arose 
occasionally over political or similar issues, but more often around mundane 
differences. Femi had had a difficult time in one of the few EA houses RAP had 
procured at a vulnerable time just before and after giving birth to her second child by 
caesarean. She explained that the day after she came out of hospital, one of the other 
women in the house asked her to clean the toilet, 
 
I said, ‘No! I cannot wash the toilet now, because I have caesarean. You have to 
wait for one month. If I can be OK, I will wash it.’ The other ladies whose living 
with us, they say, ‘No! This lady just give birth! She cannot wash the toilet, we 
will do it for her’  
 
However, “the Somalia lady” kept on insisting that Femi could not use the toilet until 
she had washed it herself, and “she was making problem with me.”  This woman had 
hit Femi’s daughter for hitting her own son,  
 
You know, kids, it’s normal! …I say, ‘How can you beat my baby for your son?’ 
So from there, I just take my shoe, I say ‘Let me hit her with my shoe.’ They 
were saying, ‘No, no, no! One have to go out!’ So they take me out… All those 
stress! I was very, very stressed! I was sick! 
 
Christine also found being forced to live closely with strangers problematic. -aving to 
tolerate behaviour she found undignified, which encroached on her and her children’s 
personal space and privacy, and which was very different to ‘home’, 
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Oh my God! It’s very bad! …Everybody behaves differently here… I don’t like 
this kind of environment with my kids… I don’t like staying with a lot of people 
here… Everybody’s been forced… One can stay in a towel for a whole day! She 
can just come in your room in the nightie, or in a towel! And you won’t tell her, 
you know what, go and dress up! One way, your kids are here so… you’ve got 
friends, somebody just comes in, ‘Oh, are you cooking? Give me some food.’ I 
can’t do that! Some people just come in and bang doors… you can be 
sleeping… No private life! Especially when you are not used to this kind of life, 
it’s really hard to adjust, but you try to adjust anyway.   
 
For Sarah, sharing was an issue because of her health problems. She had a humiliating 
bladder problem, and when she gave her interview she had obviously caught scabies, 
which she believed was due to having to share bathroom facilities, 
 
It has not been easy, especially for the toilets, because you cannot sit on them… 
and always when you sit on them and somebody else has come… you will catch 
that same problem… Now even I don’t know whether this has been caught by 
the bathroom where we go to… Cos I had been told this, even the whole body is 
like this… especially through the night when… I just take out my cream, I want 
to scratch! 
 
Sarah found sharing bathrooms with men and other women very problematic and, 
stressing the extent of the indignity this caused her, she compared being forced to share 
in this way with her living conditions in Kenya,  
 
Because even throughout my life I’ve never shared with the outsiders… even in 
this year, let me tell you, I’ve never shared… I have been in my own house with 
my husband and children. Even on my own, where I was brought up, we have 
never shared with other people… So you… when you have a bad experience and 
you come to a place like this one… Only in secondary school… it is normal 
because it was a boarding school, you are using the same toilets, they’re 
separate but then we were only children, we were young ladies on the same 
side… but not among the grown-ups…  
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7.3.3 Dirt and squalor 
 
Although there were occasionally some people who arrived with infectious diseases 
(such as TB), as the Health Visitor said, many of the minor health problems people 
suffered were caused or exacerbated by living for long periods of time in a crowded 
environment often in poor hygiene (shared washing spaces and toilets were often 
unclean) and not, as some EA staff suggested by disease and dirt-ridden clients. Both 
Femi and Christine spoke about the dirtiness of some of the EAs they had had to live in 
over their months in Reception. Christine suggested the dirty conditions were 
inhumane,  
 
I don’t know how they take the asylum seekers… You just look at the carpets 
and say, ‘What’s this?’ …I know they can’t meet everybody’s needs but… Let 
them change the carpets! …We are not cows! We are not goats! We are not 
supposed to live in that kind of environment! The first thing I told them, ‘Can 
you please help me to wash my carpet?’ They said, ‘It’s not dirty’ …so I had to 
get a brush and wash it myself… ‘Cos I knew what I wanted. It’s not them who 
are living here, it’s me and my kids! 
 
7.3.4 Poverty and dependency    
 
While a few people were given a small cash allowance, if they had a child under two, or 
had special needs and were living in part-board accommodation, most were full-board 
and only received cash for essential fares for legal or medical visits. A few people 
obviously had some access to resources outside NASS, such as from relatives or friends 
or even working illegally. This enforced poverty and dependence gave people very little 
autonomy to do much, other than pass time waiting for their dispersal. 
 
Christine obviously had some source of outside financial help, as she had friends living 
in London who, she said, helped her with solicitors’ fees and a few household items, 
however this was also dependency which Christine found particularly humiliating, and 
did not prevent her financially struggling. We had just visited the local single-mother’s 
charity which gave second-hand clothes and equipment to women in need, where 
Christine had returned items her children had finished with and picked up others,  
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all the time going to, what do you call it, charity… I’m not that kind of person 
who’s going there to beg for clothes. I don’t do that in my country, I used to 
work. I’m a secretary by profession, so I used to make my own money. I used to 
buy clothes for my kids. So I’m not used to this kind of, you know… The money I 
get here is not enough, so I can’t afford to go and buy good clothes for my kids 
and myself, so I can’t help it I just have to go to the charity… and I hate that… 
but what am I supposed to do? I’ve got to bear with it…those are the kinds of 
things I’m not used to… People might think, oh you, you’re really poor… 
Africa… Not everybody’s that much poor… Whatever little resources we’ve got 
we try to utilise those and make our own desires… in Uganda, I can’t go home 
and say ‘I need clothes’, you’ve got to work to get those, and I used to work… I 
feel embarrassed ‘cos I know how to look after my kids when I’m working… 
 
Christine continues saying she tries now to be resourceful with the little money she 
receives from NASS, but 
 
Some people can’t do that. That’s why you find them all the time they are 
hanging out, they’re just waiting when they are going to get dispersed. 
 
Such unwanted dependency on the state and charity to survive at a minimal level of 
existence forced idleness, which Christine found robbed her of her dignity and meant 
she and others did pointless activities or just gave up trying, 
 
You spend most of the time (laughing) walking down the High Street doing 
window-shopping! We don’t do that in Africa… there’s no time for that, you 
have to be working or at home…[here, in this situation] you’ve got nothing to 
do, they do your hoovering, they make your beds, they cook for you, so you’re 
either sleeping or you’re in the High Street doing window-shopping…  If 
somebody’s ready to work, let them work! …you can’t live on £35 a week…   
                 
Christine believed the Government were wasting money doing asylum seekers’ 
hoovering, then blaming them for costing too much. She also felt that the idleness their 
situation had forced was a blow to her former status and identity, and could not 
understand why others made their low situation visible by “hanging around” outside 
the EA,  
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I spend most of my time on the telly, I hate being on the streets. I hate sitting out 
on the flats, I don’t do that… I’m not that kind! [Some people] especially in the 
summer time, they hang around, sit there, do what… That seems like, maybe 
somebody finds you sitting there who knows you and just say, ‘Oh my God! 
What happened to her!’ …I’m not this kind of person, but when people come 
here everything changes… 
 
Such dependency on NASS for basic subsistence and shelter had further consequences 
for people living in EA. Another issue that upset Christine was lack of privacy, not just 
from other residents but from NASS and RAP, worrying her that she was under their 
surveillance. Despite being unhappy living at Rosehill, Christine had also been pleased 
that, 
 
They don’t monitor you all the time and they give you at least some little 
privacy… 
 
This meant Christine did not always stay at Rosehill, but sometimes stayed with friends 
in London, and RAP either did not notice or did not mind. However, several months 
later at Carlton she said about her life as an asylum seeker, 
 
You don’t have your private life… All the time they keep on… You don’t have a 
private life here while you are still asylum seeking, unless you get your status. 
That’s what counts… like here where I’m staying, they’ve got to clean your 
house every day. Every now and then somebody’s knocking, ‘We want this. We 
want that’… Someone’s just walking in… like yesterday, ‘Oh, we need to check 
your kitchen’. My food is there, my work is there, you can’t tell somebody, ‘Oh, 
what do you want in my kitchen?’ …Or, like they’re calling you, ‘NASS wants 
you’… 
 
As her case was coming closer to ending, Christine felt that NASS was trying to contact 
her more and more, such as requesting her daughter’s birth certificate, which she did 
not have. It was obvious that she felt uneasy with what she felt was increasing 
monitoring and surveillance, easy to find because she had no autonomy to live 
elsewhere. Christine also felt she lacked privacy from society in general, that without 
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the autonomy to live where she chose, she was on show and stigmatised as an asylum 
seeker, 
  
When you become a refugee… you go in different places, so one wouldn’t know 
they are obviously a refugee… Unlike here, you’re kept in one place… Whoever 
is here is asylum seeker… as long as you’re still here, everybody knows you’re 
asylum seeker… but when you’ve got those papers, you’re given a house 
somewhere… I just can’t wait to have that… From there my life will… would 
start going on, normally. 
 
7.3.5 Summarising 
 
Losing autonomy, choice and control over everyday decisions (on top of long-term life 
steering) meant people were compelled to live fairly institutionalised lives. This was 
experienced by some as a humiliating dependency, loss of dignity and humanity, a loss 
of ‘self’ and former ‘identity’, which contributed to a sense of helplessness and 
sometimes depression. Dependency with loss of purpose and the power or resources to 
change your situation, can erode self-esteem and identity and this theme runs 
throughout the literature on refugee experiences.  “The profound loss of individuality, 
self-esteem and independence endured by refugees and fostered by the dynamics of 
relief assistance, (Callamard, 1998:203), was one of the most significant and difficult 
aspects of the Reception experience, affecting many areas of people’s lives. Harrell-
Bond (1998:137) reviews literature supporting her argument and research that refugees 
receiving ‘aid’, such as in refugee camps in the developing and developed world, 
“during that ‘liminal’ stage of their transition from flight to resettlement,” suffer from 
stress and mental health problems because of their forced dependency and ways of 
“being helped”.  Harrell-Bond (1998:139) contends,  
 
All human beings are dependent on others to a greater or lesser extent; the 
issue is not being ‘helped’ per se, but the relative powerlessness of the recipient 
vis-à-vis the helper. 
 
The NASS system, particularly for those with no other source of help or resource, and 
particularly at Reception, could be equated with such a ‘liminal’ stage. 
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7.4 Responding and Coping       
 
How did individuals respond to and cope with long periods of waiting, “hanging” in 
uncertainty, loss of choice, autonomy and control over their situation, dependency and 
loss of dignity in very basic, even squalid, living conditions sometimes for long periods 
of time; loss and dislocation from home, familiarity and loved ones? Obviously 
responses and strategies for coping with the circumstances of Reception greatly varied 
between individuals, and in all likelihood were influenced by many differential 
variables such as gender, age, language, previous social status, pre-migration 
experience, as well as structural variables such as length of time spent in EA and EA 
conditions. However, the responses of this small number of long-staying women and of 
some others, give some insight into the possibilities for responding and coping.  
 
7.4.1 Attempting to assert autonomy   
                                                                                                        
Although some people (as RAP workers and Christine testified) seemed to succumb to 
the dependency of their positions, many found ways of attempting to assert some 
control and autonomy if not over the guiding aspects of their situations, such as their 
asylum claim or position in relation to NASS, then over their everyday lives. The ways 
in which people may have tried to affect the outcome of their asylum claim is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but some of the strategies people with RAP used included 
appealing to the MF for an assessment for proof of torture, which could positively 
influence someone’s claim, following the advice of an ‘agent’, friend or relative who 
had been through the system, or a RAP worker’s advice to be consistent and trying to 
use good solicitors. As Christine suggested though, many felt that the asylum system 
was a lottery over which they had little or no power.  
 
7.4.1.1 Influencing NASS 
 
More obvious to observe and, it seemed, more possible to influence, was NASS’ 
dispersal system. Although people could have no choice about where they were 
dispersed to (except very rarely, if a close family member wished to join their relative), 
they could attempt a little control over the speeding up if desperate to move out of EA 
or slowing down of the process, if desperate not to. Such attempts did not always work. 
Although in theory it was possible for RAP’s clients to phone NASS themselves, the 
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problems RAP staff had successfully communicating with the appropriate NASS 
worker were several-fold for asylum seekers themselves, so clients relied heavily on 
RAP workers as mediators to NASS, and in some cases viewing RAP as NASS (or 
confusing the two). To get action on their dispersal (or another aspect of their position 
with NASS) people visited RAP offices, some with ease and others with great 
reluctance to appeal or just to make their presence quietly but persistently felt. For 
some these actions were consciously and carefully planned, for others they were just 
acts of desperation. Sometimes these appeals were combined with sacrificing current 
comforts in order to gain envisaged future ones.  
 
Sarah’s main strategy for speeding up her dispersal was making herself visible to RAP. 
She could frequently be seen, a quiet but noticeable presence, sitting in RAP’s Rosehill 
office, sometimes engaged with a worker, sometimes just sat, sometimes crying 
silently. She explained her reasoning when asked how often she visited RAP, 
 
Every day! Every day! Even, I don’t like to come to my room. You see me here, 
‘Don’t get angry with me’ I said now, ‘ I don’t have anywhere else to go. But 
when I come and sit here and then see you work, I’m also happy! And to greet 
you… also you see me, you check into the computer whether my name has 
come’. Yes, you know, they check when they see you. If they don’t see you, it 
means that you only want to stay here! So, that is why I was going every day! 
 
Sarah’s determination to persist in making her presence quietly felt, like a thorn in the 
side for RAP, was also part of her reasoning for refusing RAP’s offer to be moved to 
Carlton so she could cook for herself, as her sugar level was rising,  
 
I have refused… because if I go to Carlton, I will not see them!! (laughs) …how 
will I be seeing them in the office? Unless I ring, and I do not want to ring, I 
want to see them face-by-face! …They have been telling me, ‘Sarah, you have to 
leave this place, we would not like you to die here, because of this.’ And I told 
them, ‘I’m not! If I have to leave here, it will have to be my own house, where 
you are going to give me!’   
 
One of Sarah’s strategies was to endure shorter-term pains for the perceived longer-
term gains of a suitable dispersal place, more quickly. Persistence in appealing to RAP 
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workers was occasionally enough both to provoke them to act in appealing forcefully to 
NASS and for NASS to act quickly to achieve a person’s dispersal place, but often it 
was not. There were few other options, and one of the rarest but probably most 
effective, was when individuals were given the opportunity, through RAP, to appeal 
directly and informally to NASS workers. Sarah’s dispersal was eventually organised 
when her RAP worker gave her this opportunity on a rare occasion when NASS 
workers visited the Rosehill office. She was able to explain directly to a NASS manager 
how life was for her in EA with her disabilities, and he immediately phoned and 
precipitated Sarah’s dispersal to supposedly appropriate accommodation.   
 
Appealing to RAP to appeal to NASS on various grounds was also a strategy people 
used to resist dispersal and gain either extra time in EA in London, or the right to more 
permanent London accommodation. There were very few grounds on which NASS 
permitted exceptions to dispersal; on medical grounds that treatment could be obtained 
nowhere else, and the “concession” NASS granted to those accepted by MF as “victims 
of torture,” subsequently defined very narrowly by MF due to the increased demand 
from those hoping to stay in London. A lot of people attempted to resist dispersal by 
appealing to RAP with doctors’ notes and others by requesting MF referrals. Such 
appeals were rarely successful, but it did not stop people trying, as there were few other 
options. There was more scope for delaying dispersal either with doctor’s notes or just 
by refusing or failing to travel. Single people or couples were not evicted on their first 
refusal or failure to travel, and families were never evicted, though everyone was 
threatened with it, ‘cancelled’ and usually, ‘re-booked’. Many people did this once or 
maybe twice in acts of desperation (6.4.2), others seemed to calculate and consciously 
manipulate the system. One Iranian man successfully delayed his and his family’s 
dispersal by several months until his wife had had their second baby, citing medical 
appointments, failing to sign NASS letters to agree to travel, and failing to attend for 
dispersal several times.  This fact and his attitude towards RAP staff meant they, at 
least, believed he was cynically ‘playing the system’. The fact that NASS had lost so 
much control over dispersal made it easier to for people to ‘hide’ from and resist NASS 
if they chose to. RAP obviously had some influence over the degree of compliance or 
resistance of their clients. 
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7.4.1.2 Coping with EA 
 
With very little scope to influence key factors directing their lives, some people 
attempted to assert autonomy and control over their immediate circumstances, in the 
limited ways possible to them. Many people complained to RAP or EA staff about their 
living conditions and appealed to move rooms or EA, usually because they had 
problems with their roommates or their rooms, or on medical or special needs grounds. 
Some complained vociferously, others very reluctantly and perhaps only to a trusted 
other, such as an AW. The majority of appeals to move EA concerned the desire people 
had to cook their own food, which also involved receiving cash to do so, thus giving 
individuals a small realm for some autonomy over what they ate and  when. For 
Christine, the greater autonomy she gained when moved from Rosehill to Carlton 
giving her the freedom to cook to her and her children’s own cultural taste and with a 
little more privacy, meant that she no longer felt the same urgency to be dispersed as 
when living on full-board at Rosehill. For Femi also, although having to use a shared 
and distant kitchen, gaining the autonomy to cook her own ‘hot’ African food was very 
important to her. Lucy, extremely upset at having the facility to cook taken from her 
after giving birth, asserted her autonomy by insisting on washing her newborn’s clothes 
herself in her room, believing that her baby might “catch something” if they went in the 
general laundry. 
 
Having a little cash for food also gave some people the autonomy to buy a few other 
items, which in Christine’s case contributed to her ability to make a ‘home’ of where 
she lived, a very important aspect of making her current circumstances more bearable. 
She talked about being resourceful “by whatever means you can,” possibly involving 
some resource support from her friends living in London, 
 
 Like the microwave, I had to buy it myself… I had to buy from the utensils e v e 
r y thing! …From the £37 I’m given a week… …I don’t mind… if not being 
dispersed ‘cos I’ve made my place a home, so… Some people it makes me sick 
to know that, OK… Sometimes I just think, they are going to disperse me why 
should I bother with the place, but when I think that Oh, I’ve got the kids, I have 
to make myself… my house clean, ‘cos… shall I drop something down and eat if 
from the…? So I have to make it a nice home, and I’ve tried my level best… I’ve 
tried to make it a really nice home… a lot of people come in here, ‘Oh my God! 
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Your house looks very nice!’ ‘Cos it’s you that make your place home… a nice 
home. If you don’t then nobody will make it…  
 
Christine’s room was always immaculately tidy and clean, with homely touches such as 
photos of her family placed on a piece of cloth on her fridge, and a bedspread on her 
bed. She insisted on doing her own “hoovering,” taking the “hoover” from the cleaner 
at the door when she came round. Although only having one chair, she sometimes had 
friends round to visit, sitting on her bed for instance one time while she cooked 
traditional Ugandan food as they watched a home-video of activities in their village in 
Uganda. Being resourceful with few resources and having the autonomy to make a 
room in EA like a home, was obviously of great importance to some people, like 
Christine. For her, although feeling “For emergency accommodation, I was lucky I got 
this place,” this was obviously a way of maintaining her dignity, pride and sense of 
humanity, in potentially inhumane circumstances, 
 
If I thought I could give a chance to see my home in Uganda, they couldn’t 
believe it… Because I’m a really clean lady, very smart and clean and things, 
now just look at this… Sometimes the carpets are just… I was even seven, eight 
months pregnant, I used to do my carpet, I used to wash it every Monday with a 
brush… Anyway, that’s me, that’s the kind of person I am. 
 
For others held up in EA waiting for dispersal, autonomously attempting to settle 
locally was another way of coping with it and beginning to feel at home, such as 
sending children to local schools. One such lone mother having attended a local church 
had begun sending her daughter to the attached school, and while RAP or NASS would 
not fund her uniform or bus-fares, the Church did. The daughter had been very happy at 
the school, made friends and begun settling, so when their dispersal came up they were 
both very upset at having to up-root and unsettle again.  
 
Such expressions of a little autonomy over their immediate environments and lives 
were one method people found of coping with situations where most of their autonomy 
had been stripped from them and while waiting for their uncertain futures to unfold.   
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7.4.1.3 Passing the time - sitting out Reception   
 
As weeks became months and with work illegal, no money and few recreation facilities, 
people waiting for their dispersal and their asylum decisions found some ways of either 
using their time or passing it as painlessly as possible. In two of the EA’s there were 
accredited English language classes some attended, and in Rosehill there was a nursery 
of sorts for pre-school age children if accompanied by parents  (though some parents 
left their children there). There was a “TV room” with one small TV mounted on a 
wall, a few hard chairs and a large lino floor, in which a few people ‘hung out’ as they 
did in the Reception area of Rosehill, just sitting or chatting to others. Some tried to use 
their time resourcefully without money, such as Sarah, 
 
I cannot just sit here doing… (nothing)…Let me tell you, I have not wasted my 
time. I went to the library and from the time, for one month when I knew there 
was a library here, I have read 40 or 60 books! So I have not been wasting my 
time! …I walk. I’m supposed to walk two hours a day! That is what I am told by 
the doctor for my sugar level to go down. So sometimes I take a long stretch, 
walking one hour and coming back, another hour. I time myself! 
 
Some people obviously worked illegally. Staff at one of the newer EA’s complained to 
a RAP manager that people were working, for instance. Christine also said, 
 
You can’t rely on £35 a week, that’s nothing. So, if somebody’s really working I 
don’t blame them…If they can’t give them work permits, then what can they do? 
You don’t want them to steal. I don’t blame anybody who’s working…I myself 
don’t know anybody, but if anyone… let them do that.  
 
Others were more passive and shut time out as a way of coping with it, for instance by 
sleeping for as long as possible. It was often difficult for RAP workers to rouse clients 
in the late morning or early afternoon to communicate a message to them, and people 
sometimes wandered around in their nightclothes all day.  Christine, who had also 
spoken of window-shopping and watching TV, believed a lot of people were just 
waiting for dispersal, “They hang around, sit there, do what!”     
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7.4.1.4 Others - Social EA networks                
 
Although it was not always easy living closely with hundreds of strangers in such basic 
conditions, the close presence of others in a similar position and possibly from similar 
global regions, languages and cultures, was also a potential source of immense if 
strangely transient support in a variety of ways. The social networks and relationships 
that developed seemed to reflect the somehow unnatural and transient passing-through 
stage of Reception. Sometimes immensely supportive, sometimes superficial, 
relationships and networks provided information, companionship and solidarity, social 
support and practical help in attempt, it seemed, to fill official support gaps and their 
loss of intimates, familiar social networks and familiarity from the suddenly strange 
situation people were in. Such networks and relationships were a resource that people 
formed and relied on in different ways to different degrees and levels of trust. Some 
sought intense support, others more distant, and a few relationships were less than 
supportive (6.4.2).  
 
Many relied on the social networks that developed within EA’s as an essential source of 
informal information, or ‘folk wisdom’ about the systems everyone was going through 
and the complexity of entitlements, especially when official information was obscure or 
inadequate. People gave each other tips and guidance ranging in accuracy, which might 
clarify or confuse, and rumours spread like ‘wildfire,’ for instance on the relative pros 
and cons of dispersal areas. Lucy said that the first information she had was from other 
asylum seekers like herself, before RAP filled in the details,  
 
Through friends I get to know how the NASS and RAP system looks like… Then 
later I went… to RAP and NASS and they really explained the full details about 
it. But the first people I got to know was through friends.  
 
Others were more cautious about taking the advice of fellow-residents, such as Femi  
who was trying to discover if she had the right to send her child to school. Another 
client had told her she should just take her child straight to school, but she wanted to go 
officially through RAP to get the information, feeling it would be too forward to do 
this, (“It’s not so nice”) and that, as RAP were responsible for her care, this would be 
the correct way to proceed, “It’s better for someone to direct me, look how they give me 
information, before I can go there.” 
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Information and informal knowledge passed between EA residents was a prominent 
feature of life in Reception and way of coping with the uncertainties and confusions of 
asylum seeking whether it was taken up, was accurate or contradictory to official 
knowledge or not. RAP workers often felt embattled by this ‘folk wisdom’ and when 
advising clients, frequently began by dispelling rumours, sometimes to replace them 
with more accurate knowledge and sometimes with information not necessarily based 
on known facts, but to persuade people to comply (for instance, Glasgow’s not that 
cold, hostile or far away).  
 
Social networks were both visible and hidden. In the bigger EA’s, especially in the 
large reception area and dining room of Rosehill, often large numbers of small groups 
of people gathered to talk or just ‘hang-out’ together.  People from similar regions 
discussed and thus kept ‘home’ alive, in reassurance to each other, such as a group of 
African men and women sat chatting in Rosehill reception about an escape route being 
used between the borders of Zimbabwe and Botswana. Other networks were more 
hidden, some preferring more private and selective relationships. Christine, Lucy and 
Sarah suggested friendships mostly developed between people from the same country, 
or language, and sometimes just having children precipitated bonding. Christine said, 
“You find your country people” and “The first thing is the nationality, when you talk the 
same language… you’re most likely to be together. Then secondly, might be when 
you’ve got kids.” Sarah explained,  
 
There was a lady who was here… that lady has also helped me, because she 
was the one who gave me courage to go to the office… This one they were 
calling me Grandmama! …they used to say, ‘I cannot go without you Grandma, 
you have to disperse me with her, because we talk the same language, because 
there aren’t other Kenyans here only her and me. Unfortunately she was 
dispersed before me…She rings every, almost every, twice a day…Even this 
morning she rang…So in fact, although we do not know each other so much, 
only that we are Kenyans! … she got in touch like a daughter and a mother! 
 
Such intimacies were short-lived but often continued by mobile phone when people 
were dispersed, continuing the exchange of knowledge, spreading informal networks 
nationally, about unknowns on the later stages of the process, which for some could 
provide extraordinarily significant reassurance. Christine was also in contact with a 
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dispersed fellow resident, who gave her phone numbers and advice on finding 
trustworthy legal advice as she ran out of local options.  
  
EA residents also supported each other with friendship, practical help and solidarity. 
For instance, people frequently interpreted for one another. Lucy explained the 
encouragement of solidarity people sharing similar experiences gave each other, 
 
We help each other, we encourage each other, maybe when I come to an 
interview… ‘Hi! Hi! Hi! Hi!’ We sit down, crack jokes together… Make ourself 
like, lightly… Make ourselves happy! And then we encourage each other… in 
the same place. Maybe you’ve been refused, you will be sad! You encourage 
her, ‘that is not the end of life’, you understand? 
 
The day before saying this, Lucy and Christine with their two babies, were laughing 
and joking together when I arrived, trying on a wig one of them had and dancing 
around the room in it to music. A little later on Christine attempted to help Lucy settle 
her newborn, being the more experienced mother, giving her advice on settling restless 
babies, another time one minded the other’s baby so she could shower. Practical help 
like this could be substantial, if reluctant and ambivalent, when single-mothers had no 
other options, for instance, the woman Femi subsequently fell out with had looked after 
her older daughter for ten days while she stayed in hospital giving birth to her second. 
Femi, now hesitant in forming close relationships, still gained relief from her isolation 
by more distant chatting to a woman living downstairs, “We talk sometimes… she never 
make me lonely, anyway.”  Such combinations of practical, advisory and light-hearted 
support were an extremely important factor for some people in getting through life in 
EA and the asylum systems. Despite the difficulties of living in EA for long periods of 
time, for some people the companionship and social support of others, even though 
often transient and superficial, was an obvious comfort and seemed preferable to being 
isolated in their own place, such as the young single mother who preferred to stay in 
EA than be dispersed to Glasgow where she knew no-one and would be alone with her 
child (6.4.2).   
 
There is substantial long-standing literature suggesting the immense (though nuanced) 
value of different types of social networks in facilitating forced migration, (Koser and 
Pinkerton, 2001) providing social support and assisting settlement (Carey-Wood et al, 
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1995). There is also new evidence of the changing character and increasing significance 
of informal networks, such as these, reflecting the gaps in state, VS and more formal 
networks springing up in support of newly stratified layers of individuals excluded 
from all welfare support and scattered away from ‘communities’ by dispersal (Moran, 
2002; Dwyer, 2005). Medlicott (2006) has suggested the concept of ‘surrogate 
intimates’ to describe the types of relationships developing among EA residents at 
RAP, capturing the strangeness and transience of intimacies developed where peoples’ 
‘familiar’ intimacies have been dislocated and lost. 
 
7.4.1.5 Outside others   
 
For some, support from friends, relatives and outside strangers helped ease the 
Reception experience. Not everyone was isolated and alone in the UK and some had 
relatives, friends or informal contacts from whom they could gain various types of 
support, including a place to stay, as it was possible (though not always easy) to move 
in and out of the NASS system. Although staying with a ‘sponsor’ sometimes seemed 
preferable, this placed strains on relationships, as sponsors often lost benefits if an 
asylum seeker stayed with them, and it could take weeks for NASS to begin sending 
vouchers to people moved to a sponsor. Christine had stayed with a friend for four 
months before entering the dispersal system, when it became impossible to continue 
staying with them. However she obviously had a network of social support outside EA, 
and probably stayed away quite frequently especially from Rosehill, one of the reasons 
she was pleased to have a little privacy there. Her friends had also been asylum seekers 
and could therefore advise her about the processes. She said they lent her money to pay 
the last solicitor she had, so she possibly had some outside help with resources through 
Reception. They were obviously a significant but importantly reciprocal source of 
support, and partially explained Christine’s aloofness from and lesser reliance on EA 
residents. Towards the end of her stay at Carlton, Christine had a young girl staying 
with her in her room, helping her with the children and chores. At one point Christine 
began referring to her as her ‘sister’, but she explained that she was a close relation 
whose mother was friends with her mother, so she just called her ‘sister’,  
 
(K: Do they question you about your friend?) No they don’t! In fact, I don’t 
know why they’re not asking! They’ve never asked her. She comes and goes, she 
sleeps in when she wants to. ‘Cos I need her around, I can’t do it on my own, 
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especially when I’ve got kids. Sometimes she helps me when I’m going to do the 
shopping, I leave her with my kids. So I’m just lucky they haven’t asked me 
yet… So when she’s not around I just feel bad. I like her around all the time. 
She’s cleaning round, so… she gets some advice from me. Sometimes she can’t 
be at home on her own… She’s waiting to appear in court… She’s still young, 
but she’s got to go to court. She’s seventeen, but she was given a house to live in 
on her own. It’s really hard for her. I’ve just told her to come in and stay in 
here. Whatever happens to me, let it happen… 
 
Other than known social networks, there were local church, charity, RCO and other 
‘strangers’ offering different support and services to EA residents. Sarah attended a 
local church group that came into Rosehill and gained obvious emotional support from, 
 
… They come even to preach to us…on Thursday. There’s a group that comes 
here. They preach about hope! ‘Cos sometimes when you come here, you… 
sometimes you’re hopeless! You would just say, ‘I wish I died!’ and such a 
thing. But they come to give us hope! Yes, and we like it very much!  
 
Lucy also got emotional support from a local church she attended regularly. Others 
gained support from Amigos, which offered befrienders to those who had been referred 
usually through RAP, if particularly vulnerable and without other support. Femi had 
recently met her new Amigos befriender who she found friendly and kind and was 
going to help her with getting her daughter registered in school. The Zimbabwean 
couple including the husband who used a wheelchair, had an Amigos volunteer who 
advocated for them with social services to get an assessment and the equipment they 
needed and who took them out to different parts of London occasionally, such as Kew 
Gardens which the wife found a break from feeling trapped in EA.  People living in EA 
were differently active in receiving and acquiring the support they needed; some 
support came to them, some people actively sought it out (such as the woman who 
found the local Catholic church and adjoined school for her daughter to attend).  
 
Some of this ‘support’ was less than supportive. With a growing ‘asylum industry’ 
gathering to exploit the vulnerable, media interest and sometimes politically driven 
groups attempting to recruit members at very visible and easily accessible EAs, 
residents could be vulnerable. On one occasion an EA security worker had to intervene 
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when a young man became intensely angry and upset with a woman visitor who, he 
said, was trying to recruit young Iranians in the dining room to the Mujahedin. The 
woman denied this, saying she was just passing by and was asking if people would join 
a political demo. The young man shouted, ‘We’ve come here to get away from people 
like you, we want peace’, and a RAP worker ordered the woman to leave, so she stood 
outside the building chatting to milling residents. RAP did what they could to try to 
protect people from ‘abusive’ outsiders but were only able to act on what they saw or 
came to their attention. In vast EA’s with hundreds of residents, many often milling 
around reception areas, security measures were unreliable and usually anyone could 
walk in unnoticed. 
 
7.4.1.6 Hopes and fears    
 
With little autonomy or control over their destinies, and living in uncertainty, 
sometimes the only coping strategy possible was to find ways of thinking that alleviated 
mental distress, anxiety and depression. Each of the African women’s hopes and fears 
centred around their asylum claim, gaining their status or being deported.  Christine 
spoke of being prescribed anti-depressants towards the end of her asylum case and said 
she could only feel hopeful while she had a solicitor working on her case. Each of the 
African women talked of a religious faith and prayer, with no option but to trust their 
fates to God. Their prayers were for their ‘status’ and a possible future in Britain,  
 
My main fear is that I might be deported… But I pray I won’t be 
deported…Even I have not been given… the one you call status. But I believe! 
…that if the Lord has prepared me to stay here, I will stay here!  …If they give 
me status… I can still do a job! ‘Cos I have the language! Yes, I am not very 
old! I can…see when people do feel better doing something, doing work. So 
even me, when I get that letter… I will still do some job…even if it is sweeping… 
I will earn my living!  (Sarah) 
 
My hopes? … I need a good life for my kids and for myself. But now, I don’t 
have a good life. I’m not happy with the way I am in my life now… I always 
pray for that before I go to sleep, I pray. When I wake up in the morning, I pray 
for God to help me and give me a good life (Femi) 
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(My hope) Is for me to be granted my stay… take care of my baby, take care of 
myself, then try to go to college, because I didn’t finish my school… Try to be in 
one of the organisation or other helping asylum seekers… going through their 
system. (Lucy) 
 
However some people just did not cope or find adequate ways of thinking to deal with 
their situation, particularly having heard negative decisions about aspects of their 
asylum claim, and believing hope and all options were exhausted. This had been the 
thinking of the young man who had heard one day that his claim had been rejected by 
the Home Office and was due to be ‘cancelled’ by NASS the next day. He had run out 
of RAP’s office before the TL had a chance to tell him that there might be another way 
of ensuring he could stay in EA for now. Instead he returned to his room where that 
evening he had set light to himself. He and the many other residents in the EA only 
escaped serious injury or worse because EA staff found him and pulled him out before 
this could occur. RAP staff who knew him well felt this was a serious attempt at suicide 
from sheer desperation. When this was discussed at a volunteers’ training session, 
several other stories of attempted suicide among clients had emerged.  
 
Reaching the end of perceived options also included for some rejection for treatment by 
the MF. People held high expectations that MF acceptance would give them the option 
to stay in London for treatment, and help with their asylum claim, and felt this rejection 
and its potential consequences very keenly. Within a few weeks two separate Iranian 
men had injured themselves on hearing of their rejection by the MF, the first putting his 
arm through a glass door, the second crashed his head through his window. The TL 
who had rushed to the second scene found him “sobbing like a baby” and his wife 
aggressively throwing accusations at her for letting them down. The TL said she felt 
ashamed of her country when she witnessed such scenes. These were acts of 
desperation from powerlessness, demonstrating the potential for despair when 
individuals lost or felt they had lost, all autonomy and control over aspects of their lives 
and destinies, and reached the end of or had negative decisions made on their various 
claims. These and the hopes, fears and prayers of the four women also demonstrate the 
immense importance that finding a safe and secure asylum was for people journeying 
through Reception, and in many senses they had not yet found it. 
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 7.5 Conclusion 
 
This account of asylum seekers experiences of Reception living in RAP’s EA, from the 
perspectives of several people, who spent several months in this position, has discussed 
various themes that emerged from the data. People had very different experiences prior 
to arriving in the UK, which will obviously have affected their experiences of 
Reception. All were dislocated from ‘home’ and their individual conceptions of it, most 
leaving family and friends when travelling to this country and in losing ‘home’, also 
experienced some loss of ‘self’ and identity. In claiming asylum and for NASS support, 
people felt their lives were left ‘hanging’, they had lost control over their destinies, 
which were in the hands of unknown others making decisions using unknown criteria 
and the outcomes felt like a lottery, just ‘luck’, and an all-encompassing sense of 
uncertainty took over people’s lives as they waited in limbo. 
 
While losing control over these fundamental, life-changing events, people also were 
and felt stripped of autonomy in their daily lives, which bordered on the institutional 
and squalid in some EA’s, with very little choice in where or who they lived with, and 
as such symbolically important aspects of choice and cultural comfort such as preparing 
their own food when they chose, was removed.  Living in poverty without cash, or 
meaningful occupation, people felt the indignity of dependency and forced idleness 
whilst aware of complaints against asylum seekers ‘sponging’.  
 
Despite this, people found ways of coping and attempting to assert some autonomy 
over at least some daily aspects of their lives and to a limited extent over NASS, by 
petitioning RAP to advocate for them or to change their living conditions. Also by 
taking control where they could over daily living, trying to make a ‘home’, doing their 
own washing, and being resourceful with very little. Sitting out the wait, some people 
tried to use their time resourcefully, others tried to shut it out by sleeping or “hung 
around,” waiting for their dispersal or asylum decision.  
 
People developed relationships and social networks with other residents, sharing 
‘useful’ information (not always so useful), giving practical and emotional help, and 
encouraging one another in the solidarity of occupying similar positions, offering 
companionship and “cracking jokes.” Some could rely on more extensive social 
networks outside EA and the NASS system, for relief from living in EA, resources, 
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advice and friendship, as well as organisations around RAP offering various services. 
Most people relied on RAP in some way. When all else failed, people could try to think 
differently about their situation to help them through it, turning to faith and religion, 
future hopes and the necessity to be strong for the children’s sake. Most people suffered 
from some form of mental distress, but for some this overwhelmed them utterly when 
all paths of hope seemed to have closed down to them, and a few resorted to desperate 
measures of self-harm.  
 
The experience of Reception for ‘received’ asylum seekers was one of the 
‘anormalisation,’ (Geddes, 2001) of their lives, where any opportunities for social 
participation and experiencing life “on the outside” especially locally were severely 
curtailed. The deterrent measures of policy (the cashless system, forced to live, with no-
choice where, out of London, subsistence below income support, containment, 
monitoring and surveillance) were felt as a denial of the autonomy to try to settle where 
they were and be other than dependent (so easily monitored) on the state. There was a 
feeling that life was on hold, in suspense or limbo, “hanging” in uncertainty with no 
foothold to control their future direction, that ‘normal’ life could not begin until that 
letter granting ‘status’ was received or, as some hoped, when dispersed. 
 
However, Reception was relatively short term. For most, there was life after Reception. 
Most people were eventually dispersed. Sarah and Lucy were. But for some, their worst 
fears were realised. Having had her last hope, judicial review, dashed when the 
‘solicitor’ she had paid £500 turned out to be unreliable, Christine was woken before 
dawn one morning to find the police and Immigration officials in her bedroom, and she 
and her two young children were taken to the ‘holding centre’ at Heathrow. After 
refusing to get on the plane, transfer to Gatwick’s ‘removal’ centre, appealing to IND 
that she had not yet received their reply on her last appeal on humanitarian grounds, 
enlisting all possible support and all efforts to stay her ‘removal’, Christine and her 
children were deported back to Uganda accompanied by guards threatening handcuffs, 
several days later. Christine and her family were objects of the government’s new drive 
to ‘remove’ failed asylum seekers, particularly targeting families with children who 
found it difficult to ‘disappear’ into society. In RAP’s EA they were sitting ducks.  
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8 The struggle to “maintain integrity:” reinforcing the ‘safety-net’                       
 
The scene is so diverse and fast moving, how are we able to deal with this and 
maintain our integrity? … It is so political and rapidly changing, it requires us 
as an organisation and as individuals in the organisation to develop a strategy 
to best go forward…   (SM, speech to whole organisation, Christmas 2002) 
 
Government funding … It’s not a problem in itself… the challenge then is how 
you balance that in terms of other funding for other projects… because asylum 
seekers’ needs are… very varied and complex and the government funding 
covers only very… sort of… the core needed… (SM, int.) 
 
NASS isn’t interested in support needs, you know… And everything feels like… 
it’s a deterrent against helping people… It’s a real struggle!  (STPW, int.) 
 
While RAP helped implement the IAA 1999 and subsequent legislations as a Reception 
Assistant, they worked daily with children, women and men, the majority of whom, one 
PW said “do have special needs in some way or other, some of them more complex than 
others.”  This chapter examines the conjunction of these two elements of RAP’s work. 
What were the implications of working for NASS for addressing their asylum seeking 
clients’ needs? Were they complementary? What possibilities were there for doing the 
latter when constrained by the former, in the ways we have seen in previous chapters? 
Considering RAP’s increase in control putting policy into practice as an agent of NASS 
(chapter 6), experienced by RAP’s clients as a decrease in control when entering the 
NASS system (chapter 7), this chapter focuses on the possibilities there were and 
efforts RAP made to deliver welfare in response to their clients needs, despite the 
control aspects implementing policy required of them.  
 
RAP experienced their financial dependence and subsequent requirement to fulfil 
NASS purposes, which changed with the political wind, as a challenge to their integrity 
as a voluntary organisation whose aims were to provide welfare to asylum seekers in 
need. NASS funding and prerogatives were designed to provide new asylum seekers 
with only the barest safety-net to allay destitution, being welfare designed as a 
deterrent, and covered only the very “core needed”, “very basic needs,” (SM, int.), 
provision of food, shelter, protection and advice as the women asylum seekers 
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acknowledged. However, Karim continued, “day in, day out we see all sorts of complex 
needs, which require special attention,” seemingly presenting a contradiction and, 
presumably, dilemmas experienced at organisational level and for individual workers 
faced daily with humans in need. In order to explore this apparent contradiction, it is 
necessary to examine what the sometimes special, multiple and complex needs of 
RAP’s clients were. Using Lipsky’s (1980) analysis of public service bureaucracies, 
what were RAP’s “service ideals” for addressing such needs in their reception role? 
This chapter will then examine the boundaries or barriers to ‘helping,’ thus 
compromises to their “service ideals” for workers and the organisation, before 
considering RAP’s potential for addressing clients’ needs despite these. RAP was not in 
a sealed microcosm, and other agencies and individuals (I term ‘satellite agencies’) 
circulated around them, at RAP’s or their own behest, attempting to address unmet 
needs and fill perceived service gaps. It should then be possible to address the questions 
raised by the contradictions and consider the state of reception ‘welfare’ for asylum 
seekers under the NASS system of deterrence and control, via RAP.   
 
8.1 ‘Multiple complex needs’ and the ‘service ideal’ response to them   
 
The stereotyped perception of refugees as helpless and desperately needy victims is 
widespread and, Harrell-Bond (1999) argues, often perpetuated by ‘aid’ responses to 
people forced to migrate. Despite the stereotype, this is not to say that people seeking 
asylum do not, as a result of their particular position, have specific needs, some 
multiple, complex or desperate, others more straightforward. Obviously a person’s 
needs depend on their unique trajectory, and individuals carry and express similar needs 
differently, but the accounts and observation at RAP, of people receiving and giving 
help suggest many have some common needs gathered prior to their arrival in the UK, 
and needs related to their experience of seeking asylum here. This includes some 
common needs when people first arrive in a country of asylum, probably distinctive 
from those who claim asylum having been in Britain some time.  
 
Obviously the most basic need of an asylum seeker arriving in a country of asylum is to 
find a place of refuge, safety and security. The ‘forced’ nature of asylum seekers’ 
migration means that forced migrants are less likely to have contacts, be familiar with 
or know the language of a ‘host’ nation they flee to and more likely to be destitute than 
migrants with more choice, (Bloch, 2002). Therefore people can have very basic needs 
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for shelter, food, the means to survive, that is, a ‘safety net’ to prevent destitution 
(Home Office, 1998). On arrival, people can be “vulnerable, frightened and 
bewildered” (RAP, 2001/2:1) by the unfamiliarity with their new surroundings, and 
situation culturally, legally, socially, linguistically and the legal, bureaucratic and 
‘welfare’ systems they enter as destitute asylum seekers, their new associated 
obligations, rights and entitlements. They therefore could have orientation needs; “You 
haven’t got a context when you arrive,” an AW said, not knowing, how social 
‘systems’ like seeing a doctor, work. Extremes of uncertainty can also be characteristic 
of asylum seeking, which Wilson (2004:4) describes as a journey, 
 
…into psychological uncertainty and the darkness of the unknown that is 
experienced as living ‘in between’ worlds of reality; that which ‘was’ and that 
which ‘exists’ without a foreseeable future. 
 
However, compounded with this, 
  
The traumatizing effects of asylum seeking or being a refugee in a homeland or 
a ‘strangeland’ are overlaid by personal experiences of trauma. Many asylum 
seekers and refugees have layers of trauma – personal, familial, social, cultural, 
national and spiritual, (Wilson, 2004:3). 
 
Asylum seekers arriving in the UK may experience the emotional and psychological 
traumas of separation and loss in multiple dimensions: home, loved ones, familiar 
culture and way of life, status, job, identity, contributing to feeling isolated, depressed, 
stressed and anxious. Some may be suffering the physical and psychological effects of 
torture and persecution, with sometimes complex related health problems (for example 
women made pregnant and with HIV or AIDs as a result of rape). Others may have 
unrelated visible and non-visible health issues and disabilities, perhaps untreated for 
some time, even unaware of their condition (Sarah). However,  
 
…we must not assume that all refugees and asylum seekers are ill or needy. This 
is not only inaccurate but also stigmatises people. The truth is that most asylum 
seekers arrive in the UK in reasonable health, (Refugee Council, Information 
Service, 2004: 122).  
 
 236 
Some people had few needs, maybe had contacts in the UK, access to resources, spoke 
English, were in reasonable health, were able to be quickly resourceful and resilient and 
needed little other than a little familiarising, advice and signposting. As we have seen in 
Chapters 6 and 7, the NASS system of Reception and dispersal, the legal asylum 
system, the complex and obscure bureaucratic webs of both and layers of civic 
stratification, and other social conditions created new needs compounding those with 
which people arrived. This includes the extended time people spent in Reception, 
during which people expressed their needs very differently; some in loud demand, 
others not at all. An SM worried that,  
 
Often the most vulnerable are those that speak quietest. Sometimes the ones that 
speak the loudest tend not to be as needy. 
 
Whether people had complex, multiple special or few straightforward needs, they had 
the need to be treated with humanity and dignity. Many had needs beyond the basic or 
‘core’ needs of destitution met by NASS’ ‘safety net’, which was designed to deny 
people with the means to begin a process of reconstruction (O Neill, 2001), settlement 
(Robinson, 2003) or integration (Castles et al, 2003).  
 
8.1.1 ‘Service ideals’    
 
RAP workers recognised and were daily confronted with the fact that “asylum seekers 
needs are… very varied and complex and the government funding covers only very… 
sort of… the core needed…” (SM, int.). As a VS agency, whose purpose was the  
“…provision of relief for refugees and their families and dependents who are in 
conditions of need, hardship or distress at or near ports of entry to the United 
Kingdom” (RAP, 1998) staffed with workers with strong often personal and ideological 
commitments to the well-being of asylum seekers, their “service ideals” were, it might 
be assumed, challenged daily by this factor. Lipsky (1980:xii) argues that individual 
public service workers usually enter such work  
 
…with at least some commitment to service… because of their potential as 
socially useful roles…Ideally, and by training, street-level bureaucrats respond 
to the individual needs or characteristics of the people they serve or confront, 
(ibid:xii).  
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However there is an intrinsic contradiction in their work, between the service ideal of 
responsiveness to individuals and “the bureaucratic ideal of impersonal detachment in 
decision making” (ibid: 9), of equity in treatment and distribution of resources, “The 
fundamental service dilemma of street-level bureaucracies is how to provide individual 
responses or treatment on a mass basis,” (ibid: 44). 
 
Obviously different players (the organisation as a whole, individual workers, asylum 
seekers, policy makers, the polity, refugee activists and RCOs) will hold different ideas 
about the ideal Reception service for asylum seekers, going to the heart of the welfare 
and immigration control nexus. Any ‘service ideal’ way of responding to the multiple, 
complex and simple needs of newly arriving refugees, is contentious in the literature, 
with conflicting ideas, for instance on issues of ‘dependency,’ but was also contentious 
between workers at RAP. However, when talking of their ideals workers included, a 
desire to provide holistic services addressing the needs of the whole person, 
 
When I use a casework approach to a case, I want to address every issue… ‘Cos 
I think most asylum seekers do have special needs in some way or other, 
(STPW). 
 
This included the ideal of developing services to address the identified needs that front 
line workers witnessed and clients expressed daily, and therefore that the organisation 
should be controlled more from the “bottom up” than the “top down,”        
 
You’re seeking the whole time to have maximum feedback from our staff… …for 
example, there may be some people that would love us to develop a massive 
service for vulnerable women… (ED). 
 
Maybe doing a little bit more around longer-term support through counselling 
maybe, through doing some befriending, being able to respond in some way to 
people that are extremely disturbed, distressed, vulnerable, special needs that 
we can’t always do even for very vulnerable clients, (SM). 
 
These ideals involved filling their and others service gaps, which sometimes involved 
ensuring just that clients actually received their entitlements,  
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In an ideal world, it would be much nicer to be able to plug those gaps…I’d like 
us to be able to somehow fill the gap between what clients are entitled to and 
actually getting someone to acknowledge they are entitled to it, (SM).  
 
One worker also felt that it would be ideal, “to be able to spend some time with them, in 
just not a pressurised work environment… sit down and talk and listen” in order to find 
out clients needs because, 
 
What we feel, what we think that the clients needs are, is different from what the 
client thinks that their needs are and there’s always a gap between these two 
understandings, the priorities of them is different from ours. 
 
The managerial approach to this was the ideal of being better resourced, “more staff 
and more time for it… That would be my wish… also looking to get particular 
expertise.” 
 
All workers felt the compulsion to attempt to respond to clients needs in some way (if 
with differing ideas of just ‘how’ was appropriate) however there were structural 
constraints and barriers, some generic to public service ‘street-level bureaucracies’, 
others specific to RAP’s positioning in relation to this particular state at this particular 
time, as a key ‘stakeholder’ in NASS ‘safety net’ welfare. Thus there were 
discrepancies between their or the “service ideal” and the reality of service provision 
and structure of their work. 
 
8.2 The barriers to and boundaries of ‘helping’     
 
If the service ideal might have been to respond to address clients complex needs by 
offering them appropriate emotional, psychological, functional and practical support 
without fostering an unhealthy dependence or denying people their autonomy, either by 
providing such support themselves or assisting clients in accessing relevant external 
services, what barriers prevented RAP from doing this?  Lipsky (1980: xiii) suggests, 
 
Compromises in work habits and attitudes are rationalised as reflecting 
workers’ greater maturity, their appreciation of practical and political realities, 
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or their more realistic assessment of the nature of the problem. But these 
rationalizations only summarize the prevailing structural constraints on human 
service bureaucracies. They are not ‘true’ in an absolute sense…  
 
We have seen (Ch. 6) how the structural constraints for RAP operating as a Reception 
agent of NASS, precipitated a bureaucratisation and routinisation of their work, a 
greater emphasis on control, and greater numbers of clients, particularly those with 
special needs, staying longer,   
 
…the system itself did not take into account… it tended to treat everybody the 
same and did not make any distinction between people who have different 
needs. There is nothing in the legislation that said if people had needs above 
and beyond pure destitution… where that would fall to (SM, int.). 
 
RAP’s ability to and practice of addressing clients needs was conditioned by a 
multitude of different idiosyncratic and emblematic factors, as well as their position in 
the NASS system, including their unique character and history as an organisation of 
“refugees working with refugees” (SM), and, of course, as an interactive process in 
relations with their clients. This section explores two of the main emblematic barriers 
there were to ‘helping’ or addressing clients’ needs, with reference to the idiosyncrasies 
of RAP. 
 
8.2.1 Superficial, not holistic support       
 
In response to their new responsibility for clients for long periods with “multiple or 
complex needs” (RAP, 2001/2:9), RAP had appointed a worker to manage MF referrals 
in 2001, then in their 2002 restructuring, had set up a Support Services Team, to work 
with clients with obvious special or complex needs. During the research period, this 
fledgling team had just begun operating and was learning its new role, however one 
STPW, also new with RAP’s restructuring, with considerable previous experience 
working with asylum seekers with mental health and other special needs felt, 
 
They do recognise the need to meet people’s support needs, but they’re not 
looking at it… realistically, at what it actually involves… they don’t want to do 
what’s involved in it… they don’t want an intensive approach… they want their 
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staff to get through lots of people quickly… it’s going to be very superficial and 
it’s not going to address peoples needs… (STPW, int.) 
 
However, Kath had been granted by one manager the discretion to develop her own 
service in her own way, using a casework approach with a few clients with particularly 
complex needs, addressing “every issue, ‘cos that’s where I get job satisfaction.” Most 
of this work involved spending considerable time attempting to access wider statutory 
services clients’ needed, and with clients using counselling skills she was trained in. At 
the time of her interview Kath was very despondent with the weight of constraints 
which she felt to be, internally and externally resistant to her attempts to address 
clients’ needs, 
 
…it’s very difficult for me to do what RAP, I think, envisaged the support team 
would be doing. Sort of, doing it in a very superficial way… the approach they 
have to the NASS forms… They look at it, ‘We’ve got to get through all these 
clients, I’ll give you six’, that sort of thing, and for people who’ve got complex 
needs… 
 
Kath recognised the constraints of their NASS position on RAP, 
 
it’s difficult ‘cos so much of their funding comes from NASS… 95% …and NASS 
isn’t interested in support needs, you know, and everything feels like a deterrent 
against helping people… It’s a real struggle 
 
However she also felt that RAP was not yet “geared up” or “equipped” to address 
people’s special needs, and was uncertain that SM wanted to develop this way. Kath 
felt this was partially because RAP was quite an insecure and unconfident organisation, 
repeating another worker saying, “…they don’t want to go away from their recognised 
role.” Other workers and a VS ‘satellite agency’ social worker also expressed the 
concern that, 
  
…a lot of people have never worked in any other environment, have come 
straight from wherever they were as a refugee and then have got themselves a 
job in this refugee organisation, so they’ve never worked in the UK work 
environment before (TL, int.) 
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Many people don’t have a lot of experience about how the system works in this 
country, which is, you know, absolutely understandable, (STPW,int.).  
 
…they are not providing a holistic service……they might have lots of experience 
directly or indirectly, but no statutory qualification and they don’t know the law 
here around health, children and disability…(SAW) 
 
The problem with this was that, without the experience of working in the statutory 
sectors, workers who were refugees were not as conversant in both the formal and 
informal techniques of statutory agencies running a ‘budget-led’ not ‘needs-led’ 
service. They were not as sure as they needed to be on asylum seekers’ entitlements and 
so could accept statutory agencies’ refusal to offer services without assertively insisting 
they fulfil their statutory duty. These workers recognised that many of RAP’s refugee 
workers were very highly qualified but were subject to the well-established 
discriminatory employment situation (Carey-Wood, 1995) where refugees nationally 
tended to be under-employed and could often only find jobs in organisations supporting 
refugees,  
 
Workers who are refugees… not all of them, but the majority of them, I think 
they are really exploited by their employers… they don’t think they can get a job 
anywhere else and they think they should be grateful… They’ve had a tough 
time, they’ve come here and it’s been a struggle, and it continues to be a 
struggle, but they should be grateful for this… or for the Refugee Council, and 
they shouldn’t object to … how they’re treated, or if they don’t have a contract 
for ten years… or something like that.  They’re not happy about it but they feel, 
‘Oh, it’s very hard to get a job, nobody’s going to employ me, this is the only 
place I can work’, and I think that these organisations, however 
unconsciously… take advantage of that… people put up with a lot and get on 
with it… it’s very much a sort of… stoical, accepting culture (STPW).  
 
SM’s position on RAP’s approach to addressing clients’ special needs was ambivalent. 
They acknowledged RAP’s deficiencies, rationalising them in several ways, which as 
Lipsky (1980: xiii) said, summarised “the prevailing structural constraints,” 
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Do we offer enough for special needs clients? …the short answer to that is 
“no”. But then again you need to be asking what our role and function is, and 
where that should be done… I can’t watch my staff killing themselves trying to 
provide something like the boy with his finger in the hole in the dyke, trying to 
provide those support services that really should be provided externally… You 
have to draw the line otherwise we would all just burn out very, very quickly. 
That’s the situation as it stands at the moment. I’ve already said about in an 
ideal world it would be much nicer to plug those gaps, but I don’t think 
anything’s changed that much externally, unless we’ve got the resources to 
challenge that. In the meantime we need to be supporting clients as much as it’s 
reasonable. (SM)    
 
(Lipsky, 1980:99) argues that this is a typical managerial position, 
 
When confronted with the dilemma of serving more clients or maintaining high 
quality service, most public managers will experience great pressures to choose 
in favour of greater numbers at the expense of quality.  
 
This SM also raised the issue of what exactly the service ideal for addressing asylum 
seekers’ special needs was especially over the issue of dependency, while criticising  
the above STPW’s attempt to develop a more holistic service,  
 
As an organisation… I’m very strongly of the opinion that we should not create 
dependency from our clients and I’ve seen that happen time and time again. 
And I’ve had various conversations with various members of staff about, ‘You 
cannot be there… their mentor, their mother, their sister, their brother. You 
cannot be the person they need if things go wrong. They have to start finding 
those resources in themselves and what you’ve got to remember is that often 
they’ve come from situations that lesser people would have collapsed under.’ By 
opening up our arms and saying, ‘Don’t worry, we’ll take care of you,’ you are 
actually not giving them the respect they deserve. You’re disempowering them, 
and I feel that very, very strongly in relation to the work that worker was 
doing… I felt she was creating an air of dependency of the client. She was 
providing services that she felt were appropriate, that were not agreed 
appropriate services from the organisation, (SM, int.)    
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However, Kath had expressed a strong sense of the importance of boundaries to 
attention clients’ were given, believing RAP tended to prioritise by those who shouted 
loudest and could respond by giving ‘louder’ clients “ridiculous” and inequitable 
degrees of attention. Although the SM acknowledged that this STPW’s work obviously 
benefited some clients, despite her belief that she had been “creating an air of 
dependency” with clients; she agreed concerning one refugee, “I’ve seen him change 
and blossom and begin to look a lot happier.”  However she had the managerial 
concern that this man was not RAP’s client, therefore was no longer entitled to 
services, the boundaries of welfare no longer extending to his particular civic status,  
 
We are not funded to do that… we’ve got enough vulnerable clients within our 
care that we are finding it difficult to fund… …I’m not saying she didn’t do a 
wonderful job, I’m saying she didn’t do a wonderful job within the remit that 
this organisation should be providing. 
 
This managerial position reflects the dilemma Lipsky (1980:44) argues is most 
fundamental to street-level bureaucracies,  
 
The ability of street-level bureaucrats to treat people as individuals is 
significantly compromised by the needs of the organization to process work 
quickly using the resources at its disposal… The typical conflicts here are… 
response to the needs of individual clients versus efficient agency performances.  
 
And in RAP’s case, superficial rather than holistic services, because, 
 
The existential problem for street-level bureaucrats is that with any single client 
they probably could interact flexibly and responsively. But if they did this with 
too many clients their capacity to respond flexibly would disappear, (ibid).   
 
It seemed that those intent on providing an intensive or holistic service for people with 
multiple complex needs were likely to either burn out or leave. This STPW had already 
handed in her notice when she gave her interview, conceding partially practical reasons 
for this, but also, 
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I don’t want to be part of a production line; I want to do… reasonable casework 
with people who need it.   
 
The worker doing a similar role to the new ST, had left RAP due to stress,  
 
Jill used to do all of the Medical Foundation stuff for clients with status, 
arguing daily with NASS, trying to get letters, to issue NASS 35s or termination 
letters. She used to do all the stuff with local authorities, trying to get NASS to 
treat people appropriately and she left us because she couldn’t cope with it any 
more. I dearly love her, but she took on everything and we’ve got a team that do 
those functions and roles that Jill was trying to do very much on her own… but 
the thing that got to Jill in the end was she couldn’t… it was so bureaucratic 
that… you know, someone who had been with us in EA, ‘great, wonderful. 
You’ve got ILR, brilliant news! Let’s go ahead and you can start your life now, 
you can go out, you can find somewhere to live, you can get yourself a job’… 
and then they took another three months waiting for a letter to come so that they 
could leave. It was just so frustrating for the client, obviously, frustrating for the 
members of staff as well, (SM, int)                
 
But a superficial and overly bureaucratic approach potentially had serious implications 
for clients with special needs as the outgoing STPW reported, 
 
When she first came her behaviour was very disturbing and very disruptive and 
she was obviously psychotically ill, and she was admitted to hospital. She then 
was discharged within a month back to the care of RAP, unfortunately, and she 
was placed in Unwin hostel…and she’s become ill again, and partly that’s 
because… she’d come here asking for money to go to an out-patients 
appointment, this was following her discharge, and they said, ‘Oh, you have to 
have your appointment card with you, we can’t give you money’. So she missed 
it! You know! And if anybody’d checked the screen, they would have seen that 
she, you know… So she missed her appointment! She just accepted it, and went 
off… missed her appointment, didn’t have her medication renewed and 
gradually began to break down, and she has taken me just, you know, about a 
week’s amount of steady work taking her back to psychiatric hospital…  
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8.2.2 One cog in the machine: ‘nobody wants to take responsibility’  
 
One primary task of the ST and any RAP worker attempting to address clients’ special 
needs was accessing statutory services beyond those RAP provided. Thus a further 
barrier to helping clients was the difficulty RAP workers had in persuading statutory 
services to take responsibility for them, partially because of poor specification within 
the1999 IAA for those with needs beyond destitution,  
 
…it’s been an ongoing problem. Special needs are a real problem because 
nobody wants to take responsibility for them particularly because the legislation 
made no reference… it took the right of… people to access any service apart 
from what NASS were providing, so that if they needed services that were 
beyond NASS’ remit… local authorities would tend to say, ‘No, it’s their 
responsibility not ours’. So it’s been extremely difficult. We’ve had clients who 
have been here for ages in some cases and we’ve not been able to do anything 
or move them on, (SM, int.).  
 
The 1999 IAA did allow NASS to make some special payments to asylum seekers with 
special needs, but these were virtually inaccessible as there were no set procedures for 
making claims and by the research period, very few successful claims had been made. 
However, court cases such as Westminster Council v NASS established that asylum 
seekers were entitled to a local authority Community Care Assessment and assistance if 
found to have needs “above and beyond destitution,” like any British citizen, (Harris 
and Roberts, 2004).  
 
That RAP was just one cog in the machinery of agencies responsible for their clients’ 
support needs was a further time-consuming barrier for RAP workers, 
 
For people who’ve got complex needs… for services, statutory services who do 
not want to touch asylum seekers with a barge pole, it’s very difficult to get 
them the services they need, and it takes for ever, and it’s a struggle, a daily 
struggle, (STPW). 
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Statutory services, as well as reluctant, were confused about specific entitlements of 
people with specific ‘civic’ or immigration status, and employed their own bureaucratic 
stalling techniques seemingly to lessen demand, 
 
The disability team… I have actually managed to get them to do a couple of 
assessments but it’s taken weeks and weeks… apparently, all referrals to Social 
Services have to go to the Asylum Team first! …it’s got nothing to do with the 
Asylum Team! They don’t assess health needs or social care needs… but that 
holds things up… my referral then goes back and forward, back and forward… 
and then I have to keep chasing up… and then it gets lost in transit… and then 
they say, ‘No, we’re not going to do anything’… that is typical, that is really 
typical! (STPW). 
  
This worker particularly found the local CMHT reluctant to engage at all with asylum 
seekers,  
 
…they do prioritise, and obviously they’re like any other service, they’re under 
a lot of pressure, but this particular team, it’s as if asylum seekers are from 
Mars! And, you know ‘We… can’t deal with these people, because we don’t 
have the skills, it’s up to the MF, we’re not equipped to deal with them, they’re 
victims of torture’. That’s actually irrelevant! … you can hardly get them to do 
an assessment, never mind… provide a service! They’re very, very unwilling 
even to address the need to work with this client group… …CMHTs like this 
one, have a statutory duty! …to work with this group, and I think they’re 
discriminating against our clients, (STPW).  
 
A social worker at a local satellite charity confirmed this discrimination among 
statutory agencies against asylum seekers, 
 
Social services have a tiny bit more insight than members of the public, but 
there are serious prejudices against asylum seekers. 
 
This social worker also believed that some RAP workers were not familiar enough with 
the informal working of statutory agencies, which were also guarding the borders to 
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their bit of the welfare state, to get really assertive and demand their clients’ 
entitlements,  
  
they’re not sure when they go to those who provide services that they are budget 
led, not needs led… I know, I’ve been on the other end of the phone in Social 
Services, defending resources… 
 
Together they contributed to the civic deficit of asylum seekers who had the same legal 
entitlement to many special needs services as a British citizen, but were much more 
unlikely to get them. 
 
Kath felt, 
 
I think statutory services, and other voluntary agencies… …I’m sure they’re 
affected by the same… however unconsciously, by the same attitudes everybody 
else is drip fed now, by the media… It’s very difficult even to get people to 
return your calls, never mind get services… 
 
She found this affected her self-esteem, 
 
…trying to find a way of meeting those needs… and it’s (sighs)… often, just not 
possible… and it’s a real shock to me, that it’s not possible! ‘Cos… it affects 
how I see myself as well… I think I’ve got a record of being able to get services 
for people, and provide a good service myself, and if I’m not able to do that! 
God! What am I doing here! …and then I have to see these people, and say, 
‘I’m sorry, I haven’t been able to get you any…’ …and also they’re so used to 
it! They’re so used to being rejected… or receiving a really poor service…  
 
These ‘barriers’ to providing ideal holistic, needs-led services, were largely generated 
by the structural constraints of operating as an agent of NASS, including guarding and 
controlling the boundaries of welfare set to their minimal level by legislation, thus 
control could dominate care aspects of RAP’s welfare provision (Sales and Hek, 2004). 
Lipsky (1980: xiii) argues that, 
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Street-level bureaucrats often spend their work lives in a corrupted world of 
service. They believe themselves to be doing the best they can under adverse 
circumstances, and they develop techniques to salvage service and decision-
making values within the limits imposed upon them by the structure of the work. 
They develop conceptions of their work and of their clients that narrow the gap 
between their personal and work limitations and the service ideal. These work 
practices and orientations are maintained even while they contribute to the 
perversion of the service ideal or put the worker in the position of manipulating 
citizens on behalf of the agencies from which citizens seek help.  
 
There was a range of perspectives and experience among RAP workers in various 
positions concerning the quality of the services they were providing, and the distance 
from or tension with their personal ‘service ideals’. For some, like the STPW, without 
the long-term loyalty or commitment others had to the organisation, and with a very 
strong  “emotional investment” (as she put it) to asylum seekers and refugees, working 
for RAP working for NASS caused her too much dissonance, so she left. A long-
serving SM, aware of but rationalising their service deficiencies, when asked whether 
she felt RAP were only able to “scratch the surface” of meeting clients needs replied, 
echoing Lipsky,  
 
We are not able to provide that sort of intensive kind of service that someone 
needs… I think we more than scratch the surface with very little resources to do 
it. I think we do a sterling job really, in terms of what resources we have.  
 
Others accepted the status quo, perhaps critical of NASS and government policy, 
though sometimes acceptant of it, some having been granted asylum themselves by 
such a government and witnessing less ‘worthy’ asylum seekers trying to “bend the 
rules” in their eyes. Others believed, like one NTPW that “RAP is doing well at 
meeting clients’ needs.”  Some workers felt stressed by the impotence of their position, 
either feeling resentful towards clients for being too demanding or resentful towards 
and blaming NASS and the government for being too minimal and inefficient in their 
provision, or both. 
 
However, despite the tight boundaries to welfare RAP maintained on NASS’ behalf, 
with tied hands, and the other obstacles to holistically addressing clients needs, RAP 
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and RAP workers struggled to “maintain our integrity” by finding ways towards their 
service ideals and “charitable aims,” and of responding to their clients, needs and 
distress.           
 
8.3 Working from within to ‘maintain our integrity’     
 
…there is quite a lot of anxiety both internally and externally that our reliance 
on funding from NASS may, in some cases, jeopardise our independence… Of 
course, we don’t think it does but we… as an organisation we, constitutionally 
and otherwise, we feel really strongly that to do this work, without 
compromising our…er charitable principles, as such…nor have really the 
funders or Home Office asked us to do so…But it’s nevertheless very politically, 
very difficult time for everyone… and if you want to be in this kind of work, you 
will have to get your hands dirty sometimes, I’m afraid, (SM, int.)  
 
 
RAP had been aware from the outset of their involvement in the 1999 IAA, that their 
position in the NASS system, their relationship to NASS had intrinsic contradictions 
and would involve them compromising their ‘service ideals,’ or getting “your hands 
dirty sometimes” and, as many workers repeated, their hands were tied by NASS. 
However many also believed the compromise was worth it because, “even under these 
circumstances, we are making a difference to the lives of asylum seekers and refugees” 
(SM, p5) and “we’re a bit more compassionate. At least we can say, ‘I’ve tried,’” (TL, 
p6).  
  
Lipsky (1980: 81) argues that, 
 
Street-level bureaucrats manifestly attempt to do a good job in some way, given 
the resources at hand and the general guidance provided by the system… and, 
 
…they develop techniques to salvage service and decision-making values, (ibid: 
xiii).  
 
The salvage techniques they use, trying to find satisfactory rather than optimal solutions 
to deal with the uncertainties and indeterminate objectives of their work, involve 
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organising patterns of work within resource constraints, modifying their conceptions of 
their jobs by lowering their objectives, and modifying conceptions of their clients, 
Lipsky (1980:83) argues. For RAP, dealing with the ambiguities and contradictions of 
their position delivering a deterrent-designed welfare, workers and managers sought 
ways to ‘salvage’ the integrity of their personal and organisational aims and deliver 
services attempting to address clients’ needs in some way.  
 
Lipsky (1980:13) has argued that due to their “relatively high degrees of discretion and 
relative autonomy from organizational authority” street-level bureaucrats effectively 
make policy, not just implement it. His analysis concerns public service workers in 
direct interaction with citizens, however in the case of a VS organisation ‘contracted’ 
by the government, RAP itself in some ways - not just RAP’s ‘street-level’ workers - 
could be considered the equivalent of his ‘street-level bureaucrats’ with NASS 
representing the organisational authority he refers to.  Although, as we have seen, 
NASS in many ways held a tight rein over the services RAP offered its ‘margizen’ 
(Martiniello, 1994) clients, (“our hands are tied”), managers were also keen to stress, 
 
We are allowed the freedom and inventiveness to play that role in terms of 
practicalities with this new legislation, (SM).  
 
And,  
 
We are… pretty much the masters of our own decisions and… NASS officials… 
really they are not the masters of their own decisions, (SM). 
 
And, 
 
The Home Office… specify what services we provide. They don’t specify the way 
in which we provide the services though! That is really a matter for us to 
maximise the quality of the service that we give, (ED). 
 
While Lipsky (1980) argues that with few resources, ambiguous goals and considerable 
discretion street-level, bureaucrats were most likely to ration services in line with their 
negative stereotypes of ‘unworthy’ clients, he also recognises that with the degree of 
discretion they have, street-level bureaucrats theoretically could discriminate in favour 
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of their clients, if the structure of their work was different. This is obviously the 
thinking of the VS in their involvement implementing the NASS system; positioning 
themselves close to the government, with the aim of providing the best service possible 
for asylum seekers, they hoped to have the autonomy and discretion to protect their 
clients’ interests and soften the blow of harsh policies. The Grant Agreement (2000:2) 
between NASS and RAP claims, 
 
It provides a broad but well-defined framework in which Refugee Arrivals 
Project may exercise independent discretion.  
 
This chapter now turns to explore just how much “freedom and inventiveness” or room 
for autonomy and discretion RAP was able and did use in attempting to address clients 
often complex needs, and provide them with welfare despite the constraints, which 
could amount to the “civic gain” of asylum seekers status, (Morris, 2002). 
 
8.3.1 ‘Bending the rules’ and defying NASS to offer services 
 
RAP used the concept of widely interpreting their responsibility, using their discretion 
within their legal bounds, or up to a “policy wall” (SM), to provide various services to 
clients either disapproved of or not strictly within their NASS ‘remit’, even ‘bending 
the rules’. This included accommodating, pre S55 in-country, and sometimes port 
applicants ‘out-of-hours’, before they had claimed asylum, which they were not strictly 
allowed or funded to. Either NASS turned a blind eye or RAP continued defiantly to 
ensure that such individuals did not sleep rough, transporting them the following day to 
an ASU to claim asylum.  
 
RAP also operated an ad-hoc ‘One-stop service,’ advising asylum seekers who were not 
their ‘hotel clients’, but were either on subsistence-only, or just living in West London, 
for which they temporarily received the equivalent of two PWs salaries from London 
Borough Grants, not NASS. However in practice, when their NASS client numbers 
were down, they saw more ‘walk-in’s’ to compensate, so using NASS funds, and their 
was no strict division of duties. A TL explained, 
 
We’re technically not a One-stop service, yet we do it ‘cos managers deem it 
necessary to keep our funding… …Our numbers have gone right down, but 
 252 
because we have got so many in EA the Home Office are not saying too much 
about it… …Our bit isn’t government funded technically. I mean, we’re paying 
for it out of our NASS funding  
 
Although RAP had developed an appointment system for this they were often flexible 
and dependent on the particular manager or TL on duty, and the current number of 
‘hotel clients.’ Although people receiving subsistence-only support, or supporting 
themselves could be just as needy of advice as those in NASS accommodation, the 
system was not supportive of RAP for advising them anyway 
 
We want to develop this service in West London… we’re right in the middle of 
working that through because we don’t have any money for such a service but 
there are a lot of refugees who are newly arrived who are living in the 
community rather than our hotels, who need help and they come to our door… 
we have done this for a while, so we know the demand is out there! So in a way 
we should be having money for a one-stop service… We do use opportunities as 
and when we can, but because this area of our work is not currently funded and 
by and large, it’s not seen by NASS as our core business at all, they haven’t 
supported us really… They do know we’re doing it, (ED). 
 
8.32 Gaining concessions 
 
All workers’ defence for implementing NASS Reception, was that RAP had a 
commitment to the well-being of asylum seekers that other, private or public sector 
agencies would not, so working ‘within’ the system they could influence NASS and 
other players in their clients’ interests. Two examples illustrate this potential.  
 
When the NASS system began to break down and people ended up, 
 
…sitting in our EA forever… we need to have some sort of system whereby we 
can address they’re ongoing problems…that develop from… families, 
particularly, living in temporary hotel accommodation… (SM, int.). 
 
In these circumstances, despite NASS’ design as a cashless system, “There has to be 
some leeway,” the SM stated. Therefore she and RAP managed to persuade NASS 
 253 
(approximately two years previously) to give particular clients cash and accommodate 
them in a hotel where they could cook their own food, 
 
We were having a particular problem with… pregnant women, and women with 
children, and so I set up an agreement with the Carlton, that we would move 
those particular categories into that hotel, and put them on cash only basis… 
 
RAP had also just negotiated with NASS that all children under two would receive an 
increase to £35 from £18.50 per week (and three different systems across their EAs), so 
parents could prepare food for them. Despite RAP’s latest clamp down on NASS behalf 
on clients believed to be trying to abuse this cash-based concession, they were also in a 
position to gain and negotiate concessions from NASS when clients’ needs were 
obvious. 
 
Another example of this was RAP’s battle with the management of Rosehill, where one 
SM had attempted to get them to provide more choice and better quality food, in the 
face of the many clients’ complaints about food there. The SM explained during her 
interview that she had just visited a dietician to get advice about balanced diet and was 
due to take this to a negotiation session the following day with hostel management, 
 
…they always argue that we don’t give them enough money. So now we’ve got 
this 12% increment…from NASS! Who’ve agreed to put it up 12%, so now is 
our time… actually to say, ‘Right! You’ve got this lovely increment, way over 
the top, and this is what we want in return… You know, make it a condition! 
Now we’ve got some leverage, which is something we’ve not really had in the 
past… It was always, ‘Well, you don’t pay us enough, so we’re not gonna do 
anything about all that stuff’…  
 
8.3.2 RAP as a ‘buffer’ 
 
As well as Lipsky’s (1980:184) concept of street-level bureaucrats ‘absorbing conflict’ 
in their buffer role, the concept of  ‘front-line’ public services as a ‘buffer’ can be 
understood in another sense. Duvell and Jordan (2000:3) discussed social services prior 
role as a protection between the vulnerable and the state, 
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During the Thatcher era, local authorities, the public sector in general, and 
social services in particular, stood as a buffer between the government and 
unpopular but vulnerable groups like these. New Labour is determined to break 
this, turning these very agencies into part of the technocratic force to implement 
its programme.  
 
Although RAP could obviously be described as part of the government’s “technocratic 
force” implementing its asylum policy, the organisation and workers also acted as a 
‘buffer’ to some extent, protecting their clients from potentially hostile others, and 
NASS action, as well as, at times, having to absorb the anger of frustrated clients over 
the action or more likely in-action of NASS. 
 
RAP primarily saw itself as ‘on the side of the client’, stressing to new arrivals that they 
were independent from the ‘authorities’ and were there to help. A private sector 
Wackenhut co-ordinator of the dispersal coaches who worked with the other London 
RAAs, RC and MH said of RAP, 
 
RAP are firm but fair. Migrant Helpline are very professional, maybe because 
their clients are singles and RAP work with families. RAP are on the side of the 
clients but also work alongside the Home Office. They are efficient, but nice 
about it. I’ve stood at the side of coaches and they smile and say, ‘Good luck!’ 
The Refugee Council are terrible, no-one goes from there. They are completely 
on the side of clients and very few travel. I’ve heard clients say, ‘Oh, I can’t 
travel, I’ve got a blister on my big toe’ and the Refugee Council say, ‘OK’! 
 
RAP acted as a ‘buffer’ of protection to their clients, primarily through their advocacy 
and protectiveness with less caring or scrupulous agencies, perhaps keen to make 
money from them, such as ‘rogue solicitors’ who attempted to tout for custom at EA’s, 
and with EA staff themselves. A TL explained the anger of an EA manager over an 
incident where some clients, were treated prejudicially by kitchen staff, 
 
He thinks I always stand up for the clients, I’m always on the clients’ side. That 
is my job! …I do want the best deal for the clients, whereas the manager is a 
businessman. He’s trying to make as much money as possible. I’m really 
annoyed with him… 
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The TL told how the manager had not handed out the milk and fruit to children at 8pm, 
she had negotiated with him to do because they were hungry having finished dinner at 
5pm. The TL had advertised it, so when it did not happen she felt this made her look 
bad. One of the newer EA managers, who received and segregated paying hotel guests 
from RAP clients, seemed to harbour a lot of hostility towards them and visiting PWs 
attempted to protect clients by gathering information and enlisting a SM who attempted 
to win the hostile manager round,  
 
Pete definitely has some hostility he needs to work through… but the way I look 
at it is… you can’t just ignore people that have these attitudes and behaviour, 
what you need to do is work with them… There was always that element of… I 
felt, second-class type citizens. I had the conversation when I went there on 
Friday… and I said to them… I was…trying to address some of their concerns, 
trying to point out to them, ‘Now that the majority of your work is with us, can 
you not open up your facilities a bit more… ‘cos it’s not really fair that the 
clients cook and then have to eat in their rooms’… …It’s…working with him. If 
I hear anything… that I think is totally racist… rather than just prejudiced, 
thinking people are taking advantage, then I won’t hesitate to say and do 
something… I think it’s a matter of education… 
 
The local satellite agency social worker believed RAP should give their clients their 
cash payments rather than leave it to EA staff, as she had had complaints from lone 
Asian mothers that some Asian EA staff treated them rudely, as 
 
Not just parasites but outcasts from their own community, casting aspersions 
like commenting that women have jewellery on, and how come? It’s a kind of 
inverted racism… 
 
Although RAP did not change their payment system, they did start an outreach advice 
service to two of their main EAs other than Rosehill, once a week. An SM said that 
they were often negotiating protective deals for their clients with EA providers., This 
was difficult because of the NASS -demanded catch-22 that RAP were in, with just 
verbal agreements with them, an example of the difficult and often “delicate balancing 
act” of interests RAP was constantly engaged in. So, it was in several ways that RAP 
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acted as a ‘buffer’ of sorts protecting their clients from the different motives of other 
involved agencies, (as well as absorbing the anger of clients directed at NASS).       
 
8.4 Individual workers addressing clients’ needs        
 
Obviously an organisation, such as RAP is made up of individual workers in different 
positions and separating their work out from that of the organisation is, in a sense, 
artificial. It could be argued that the work of the organisation is a sum of all 
individuals’ work. Yet there are differences. An organisation addresses its clients’ 
needs through its official policy and practices, which are obviously enacted by 
individual workers. But individual workers, depending on the type and degree of 
discretion and autonomy they are permitted, practice formal or official and informal or 
unofficial work, have different working styles and aptitudes, levels of commitment and 
motivation, and could work in compensation for the inadequacy of official systems. 
Lipsky (1980) argues the more space for discretion and autonomy from organisational 
authority street-level bureaucrats have, the more they can be understood to be making 
policy, not just implementing it. This section will examine how individual workers 
attempted to address their clients’ needs. 
 
8.4.1 Advocacy 
 
The reality of RAP’s work was messier than one-way service provision, not just as 
clients could lever some gains but RAP was also involved in trying to get “leverage” 
with NASS, and other potential public sector agencies guarding their resources by 
fighting off responsibility, or private sector agencies, such as EA providers mindful of 
their profits. Thus advocacy at all organisational levels was a substantial part of RAP’s 
daily work, generally with managers and TL’s advocating and trying to get the best 
‘deal’ possible for all or groups of clients, while PWs tended to advocate for individual 
clients. While SMs or TLs negotiated with NASS at a similar level, and with EA 
managers or owners on behalf of clients, PWs in the Support Team negotiated with 
social services, HPUs and other public sector agencies to advocate for their clients’ 
need of specialist services. PWs and TLs in all teams also spent substantial amounts of 
time by phone advocating for clients with NASS, usually over dispersal or some 
processing or bureaucratic mistake.  
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The effectiveness of this advocacy could depend on the persistence, canniness, 
creativity and expertise individual workers used, though obviously sometimes none of 
this was enough. However, success could make a substantial difference to an individual 
client’s situation. Clients frequently visited RAP offices to chase up progress on their 
dispersal, and workers would usually phone NASS to advocate for them. Although 
these calls could take hours and end in frustration, determined workers developed 
strategies to aid successful advocacy, such as attempting to build relationships and 
contact particular NASS workers they found receptive. One PW, who felt his 
involvement was “not very effective” because he was just the messenger between 
NASS and the client, also conceded, 
 
…maybe my negotiation skill, my communication… and my working 
relationship with NASS help in solving the problems quicker… 
 
When a young Romanian man came into his RAP EA office upset that he had not yet 
been dispersed as his friends had, recognising that his perfect English and singleness 
should not have posed NASS any problems, the PW phoned a specific helpful NASS 
worker to move his case on. He reassured the client he would “get an outcome on this” 
and to return at the end of the day. When NASS did not return his call as promised he 
phoned them again and with his persuasiveness and persistence that day, delighted the 
man by securing his dispersal imminently.  
 
Other than perseverance and persuasiveness, committed individual PWs used creativity 
and canniness to advocate for clients. An excellent example of this was the dogged hard 
work of PW Sadiq on Sarah’s behalf. After months of telephone and written advocacy 
to NASS workers to find Sarah a suitable dispersal placement appropriate to her special 
needs, Sadiq resorted to informal methods when NASS workers visited RAP’s EA 
office to learn about operations “on the ground.” Opportunistically, Sadiq called Sarah 
in to tell one of the NASS managers how life was for her in EA, to appeal to his 
humanity with her story.  Sadiq described this as giving the NASS workers, 
 
…a close-up understanding of the pain people feel. They have big offices and 
big computers and no understanding of people’s pain… (PW obs.) 
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Sarah told the NASS worker that they only cared about their money and were 
discriminating against her, but she had shown them the “human face” of their work. 
Later on that week, NASS found Sarah a suitable flat for dispersal. When Sarah became 
anxious about the particulars of where she was allocated, Sadiq phoned around to 
obtain far more details than RAP normally procured or gave clients, to reassure Sarah 
that she would not be sharing, and of her address.  
 
8.4.2 Colluding with clients and turning ‘a blind eye’ 
 
Despite their involvement with NASS, RAP workers generally felt a strong sense of 
solidarity and belief that they were ‘on the side’ of their clients, against unjust 
legislations, an absurdly bureaucratic agency and a generally hostile external 
environment. While this was manifest in their advocacy, it was also manifest in other 
ways.  
 
Attempting to instigate systemic changes when a need seemed obvious was one 
strategy which workers with the will and inspiration tried to utilise. For instance, Sadiq 
attempted to provoke the visiting NASS workers to change their system of “recycling” 
clients who, for legitimate reasons, could not travel on their dispersal; that involved 
sending them back into the system to start waiting again. Sadiq, who witnessed the 
effect this had on people, argued that they should give such people “self-writes,” to 
travel to their accommodation by public transport the next day, which would also make 
far more sense for NASS, 
 
I can’t see the logic of that, to go through the whole system of sending them a 
termination letter and so on. Surely if NASS is to keep to its target of ensuring 
75% of dispersals actually travel, it is of benefit to NASS not to ‘recycle’ them 
but to send them on a self-write ticket which we can organise together over the 
phone. (PW, obs.) 
 
The NASS worker replied that it depended why they could not travel, their case might 
need re-evaluating, but his previous line manager had been “a bit more lax” about it. 
Sadiq retorted, “You mean, more fair! Where Sadiq could do it without being blocked 
by NASS officials, he organised self-writes for clients in this situation.  However on 
this occasion he did not succeed in changing NASS’ system  
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Workers had been trained in equal opportunities but resisting the appeals of clients to 
“Do me a favour please, just do it for me” (SM, int.) was sometimes more difficult in 
practice for workers particularly when clients were appealing to their fellow 
countrywomen and men. An SM suggested some workers struggled with this especially 
when it was the cultural norm in their country of origin. One PW however, could be 
heard giving advice on a mobile phone to an ex-client about getting round certain 
British systems, and she said she sometimes did give her mobile number to clients so 
they could contact her for more informal support. 
 
However, most workers also gave some informal advice to clients about their path 
through the various systems based on their experience as daily witnesses to the way the 
systems worked in practice, and the experiences of the many clients passing through. 
Giving consistent answers to NASS and IND questions and thinking carefully before 
deciding to stay with a ‘sponsor’ were frequently advised. For instance one PW told a 
client that his friend might find it a strain having to put him up for a long time, and his 
NASS subsistence vouchers could take six weeks to arrive, so she advised against 
leaving EA.  
 
Another way of ‘siding with clients’ was to ignore or turn a blind eye to some things 
clients did, which workers considered irrelevant or unjust. For instance one PW dealt 
with her own dilemmas about the injustice she perceived aspects of the NASS system 
to embody.  She gave clients an opt-out to answering truthfully; she said she advised 
clients in her NASS advice sessions that whatever resources they told her they had, she 
would write down, as this fulfilled RAP’s policy to fill the NASS form with whatever 
the client told them, 
 
In Africa if people have saved up £500 that’s a lot of money. They have sold a 
lot; a car, a house… and here it is a small amount… But these people need 
help; they’ll need that money for something important, for their future. We are 
not police, we don’t search people. One client came in with £50 and I didn’t 
question her about it. I don’t know, other people might do it differently. I told 
her she should spend it on a warm coat or some nice shoes…(PW, obs.) 
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A frequently heard sentiment was that “policing” people was not part of their 
responsibility, especially over matters irrelevant to their role as welfare providers. One 
was to turn a ‘blind-eye’ to people re-applying several times, for instance a PW 
berating the introduction of S55 said, 
 
It’s not a fair law just for the 1 or 2% of people who apply for asylum again and 
again. If I recognise them I wouldn’t do anything. It’s up to the Home Office to 
recognise them, and if they don’t, tough! (PW, obs.) 
 
Managers also held beliefs about the borders of their responsibilities as workers and as 
an organisation, and that these did not include ‘policing’ clients over matters outside 
their ‘remit,’ (although it did inside them, at their welfare borders). In response to an 
EA provider’s complaints that clients were working illegally, 
 
What I said to him was, ‘We have no control… asylum seekers are quite aware 
that they are not allowed to work… like anyone else who’s on benefit fraud, they 
know the score, we are not here to police them, as long as we make them aware 
of what the system is, if they want to then break it, then there’s not a lot we can 
do about it’. But… he said to me, ‘they are going out to work every day and 
some people are not actually staying in the hotel’, and I said, ‘Well if that is the 
case then you need to bring that to our attention, ‘cos we can address that with 
the client… ‘If you’re not using your accommodation, then we’ve got plenty of 
other people that can, you need to be there every day. If you’re not… then the 
hotel will tell us and we will cancel your booking,’ (SM, int). 
 
Such colluding, ‘siding with’ clients by giving tips and advice for getting round the 
system, ignoring ‘misdemeanours’ considered irrelevant to RAP’s work, was close to 
individual workers ‘bending the rules,’ and sometimes involved attempting to change 
the rules to address clients’ needs.  
 
8.4.3 Putting “a human face on an inhuman system”  
 
The general issue is that we are all here for the right reasons, but it is so hard 
to put a human face on an inhuman system. We are explaining some horrendous 
legislations, (NTPW, obs.). 
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The increasing bureaucracy, emphasis on targets, mass processing and control involved 
in implementing their Reception service for NASS shown in chapter 6, are the 
constraints and backdrop to workers attempting to respond to clients, as human beings 
with needs. It is clear that most workers at RAP applied for their jobs because of their 
commitment to the well-being of asylum seekers and refugees, though there were 
obviously some people who felt that, with their refugee status, this was the only job 
available to them. As we have seen for some with a deep personal commitment to 
people seeking asylum, the actual constraints of the work posed too great a 
contradiction and they burnt out or left, but for most they learned to live with this 
contradiction, compromise and do what they could around the constraints. For many 
this involved injecting some humanity into their work with clients. There was a strong 
sense among workers, especially those providing direct ‘front-line’ services that they, 
unlike NASS workers, treated clients with humanity as they were in close daily contact 
with “people’s pain,” as Sadiq said. As described, one TL’s almost daily ‘mantra’, to 
NASS workers on the phone, to EA workers to her team and seemingly to herself, was 
“These are human beings we are dealing with” sometimes suffixed with “not 
numbers.” Workers obviously believed that their genuine concern for asylum seekers, 
their “bit of compassion” could “make a difference” to them, despite being the 
messengers of “an inhuman system”.  
 
One aspect of this was the fact that most workers were refugees themselves. Although 
sometimes refugee workers were more questioning of clients ‘genuineness’, they also 
could empathise with them. A SM explained how this worked, 
 
Our organisation was built up by refugees and is run mainly by refugees… it 
makes a huge difference because I think it gives a sense of, for clients coming 
in, for asylum seekers, it’s just telling someone, “I understand, I empathise, I 
sympathise”… coming from one of our staff, if a client says, ‘Well, you don’t 
understand’, well actually they do because they’ve been there themselves… they 
can assure people that are feeling very vulnerable and concerned and worried 
for the future, ‘No, don’t worry too much because this will happen, that will 
happen and look at me! I’m settled now and I’ve got a job and I’ve got this and 
I’ve got that and eventually those things will come to you’, (SM, int.) 
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This SM said keeping this “refugees working with refugees” identity of the 
organisation was one of her main priorities, and as though equivalent to this, “that 
element of giving clients their dignity” and “keeping the friendliness,” in this way “the 
diversity of the organisation has worked informally.” Although it could complicate the 
working relationship, workers who spoke clients’ languages or originated from a 
similar part of the world, could offer support through cultural familiarity and the chance 
to communicate properly. 
 
Individual workers offered different ‘human touches’ at each site, depending on the TL 
on duty. At Heathrow for instance, the TL believed making new arrivals feel welcome, 
assuring them they were not ‘Immigration’ was most important. The TL rigorously 
defended the practice of offering them facilities to make hot drinks, despite a PW’s 
objection on health and safety grounds. Throughout their sites and offices PWs 
attempted to meet people’s distress and confusion with calmness and reassurance. They 
listened and worked through similar issues with patience, trawling through tedious 
bureaucratic intricacies, attempting to ensure that clients understood, and attempting to 
treat them as individuals rather than ‘cases’ or numbers. Workers could greet clients 
with warmth, care and concern, kindness and often, humour. Clients’ expressions 
visibly lightened when their anxieties were allayed by workers in such ways.  
 
Building relationships with clients and for them seeing a trusted worker, familiar with 
their case, was obviously reassuring, especially if clients were ‘long-stayers.’ Workers 
remembering a client’s first name, giving them a nickname, or calling them “Habibi!” 
as this TL often did, also visibly lifted people’s spirits. Despite her frustrations, Sarah 
obviously valued the continuity and commitment of Sadiq and said of RAP workers, 
 
These are friendly people, they come not to harass you… You can see that when 
we meet them… how we greet one another! And not only me, even the rest… 
They know they are dealing with human beings! 
 
Lipsky (1980: 151) argues that one of the techniques street-level bureaucrats tend to use 
to “salvage their service ideals,” rationalizing the contradictions in their work and, as a 
psychological coping strategy, is differentiating between clients perhaps by personal 
preference or some conception of worthy and unworthy (deserving or undeserving) 
making 
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…it possible to perform flexibly and responsively with a limited segment of the 
clientele. Thus workers do for some what they are unable to do for all. The 
street-level bureaucrat salvages for a portion of the clientele a conception of 
his or her performance relatively consistent with ideal conceptions of the job. 
Thus as the work is experienced there is no dissonance between the job as it 
should be done and the job as it is done for a portion of the clientele. 
 
This privately confirms to the worker that she or he is capable of doing the job well, 
despite the structural ‘walls’ to responsive and flexible service with most of the 
clientele, which might suggest she is not. As discussed, workers at Heathrow might 
spend time crying with, comforting, welcoming, reassuring new arrivals they 
considered worthy, trustworthy or ‘genuine’ refugees, but either dismiss or process with 
swift professionalism those they might consider unworthy or ‘abusive’ in some way. In 
the other RAP offices, dependent on the degree of autonomy and the number of clients 
to process that day, some workers particularly those in the Support Team or EA team, 
might spend more time and effort on their case (for instance, Sadiq going the extra mile 
for Sarah) or building a relationship with a few clients, either organisationally endorsed 
as worthy of this extra attention, (for example, those referred to the ST were considered 
in greater need) or just on an ad hoc individual worker’s decision or preference.  
 
As discussed, the STPW who eventually left had the autonomy, though not the 
managerial support, to develop an intensive casework approach with each of her clients, 
refusing to take on other cases or get distracted by other issues, but without the 
structural support found the dissonance and workload too great. Whether managerially 
endorsed or by personal preference, another STPW also built intensive relationships 
with some clients, as Lipsky suggested, doing for “a portion of the clientele” what she 
or the organisation as a whole could not do for everyone. She obviously developed 
personal relationships and talked with great warmth about those she supported, “I am 
soft. I want to help people, to give them my own money.”  One client she was 
supporting was dying of cancer and the STPW had helped her access items of 
equipment to make her life more bearable. Sufia said she cried often over her and tried 
to do all she could, and the client was very grateful. Clients often warmly thanked 
individual workers, on leaving or returning later, with kisses hugs and tears of 
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gratitude, for their particular support. Such responses suggest that sometimes RAP and 
RAP workers did make a positive difference to asylum seekers’ lives.  
 
Although not necessarily holistic ‘needs led’ service provision, and perhaps based more 
on chance and the volume of a client’s shout, there were ways that individual workers 
managed to offer more humanity and sometimes more holism to their processing and 
work with clients, than the superficial, bureaucratic service the NASS system, and the 
need for equity demanded. That constant “balancing act,” managers spoke of and 
Lipsky (1980:15) described as, 
 
…the search for the correct balance between compassion and flexibility on the 
one hand and impartiality and rigid rule-application on the other.  
 
8.5 Enablements of working within NASS’ system 
 
As Mason (1996:155) suggests, looking for alternative explanations and negative 
instances in one’s data is important for developing a rigorous analysis. It is essential in 
this case to consider whether and in which ways RAP’s operation of their Reception 
service, as an agent of NASS, was advantageous or enhanced RAP’s ability to address 
clients’ needs.  
 
The SM in the context of saying that government funding covered only basic needs also 
insisted, 
 
We are very sort of reception, arrival focussed… and it’s only the last couple of 
years we’ve quite coming out of Heathrow… into… kind of the community, with 
this new legislation, that the organisation has grown to a reasonable size to be 
able to make a long term assessment of where it needs to go… I would say that 
we’re just at the beginning of a vision or a strategy for the long term where I 
don’t… I think that the government funding is a strength, I don’t think it is a 
negative thing. 
 
Also the BfSW, despite finding one of the strengths of BfS its independence from 
government funding, argued of RAP, 
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I think we should be funded by the Home Office because then you don’t have to 
worry about, ‘Oh, we’ve run out of money, where are we going to get the money 
from?’ You can operate as a business… with other projects I’ve worked with in 
the past when the funding’s just been for eighteen months, by the time you’ve set 
it up you’ve got to shut it down.  
 
Both these arguments suggested that RAP’s funding from government had enabled 
them to grow and expand their vision away from their previous narrow focus, and 
because of the relative security of their funding (although generally it was reviewed and 
renewed quarterly, this had almost become a formality), it gave the organisation the 
chance to concentrate on improving its services and structuring and to look to the future 
to new ventures.  
 
It can be argued that NASS’ insistence on value for money, its demand of a quarterly 
report of statistical information, attendant monitoring of services and so on, forced RAP 
to become more accountable and more efficient in some ways. This was not necessarily 
always about value for money, but their introduction of a networked database and 
online recording systems, meant essential information about clients cases was readily at 
hand at most sites and enabled quicker, more efficient attendance to clients’ queries. 
RAP had also achieved the “Quality Mark (General Help Standard Certificate)” the 
previous year, and again during the research period, which according to their Annual 
Report (2001/2002) acknowledged their “standards of competence,” with an 
inspection. They had produced a ‘Client Feedback’ questionnaire for this purpose and a 
worker was busy distributing these in time for their inspection early in the research 
period. They seemed more an exercise in gaining their Quality Mark than seriously 
seeking client feedback. However these, combined with a new more rigorous system 
for client complaints, were an improvement in their accountability to clients. Also, as 
previously discussed, restructuring the organisation with their new NASS funded 
staffing in response to huge increases in asylum applicants during 2002, meant 
individual workers were also held far more accountable for their work with individual 
clients.  
 
RAP’s attempts to control the chaos; increased staffing, restructuring teams, stopping 
rotation of teams and specialisation, developing systems to control and co-ordinate the 
processing of clients efficiently (for instance, co-ordination of interpreters and PWs 
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with languages matching clients attending for advice), although bureaucratising their 
services, also made RAP arguably more effective at meeting clients needs. Clients were 
less likely to wait pointlessly for many hours to see someone who could communicate 
with them, for instance; were less likely to be bureaucratically lost, and, with RAP 
more in control of their bureaucratic systems, they were in a better position to hold 
NASS to account over theirs.  With their teams and workers static and more 
accountable, greater control over client processing, limits set on numbers of clients seen 
per day per PW, teams and workers could concentrate more on “development” (TL) of 
their skills and of their services, such as the production of information packs and better, 
clearer information for clients. The specialisation of workers also meant that clients 
with special or greater needs were more likely to be referred to the new Support Team 
and BfS and so have their needs addressed,  
 
The relationship with RAP and BfS has really improved in the last four months 
since the teams have specialised, ‘cos what was happening before was… it was 
really random the referrals, and it was based on particular…project workers 
referring a lot rather than the client need, so now ‘cos they get referred to the 
Specialist Team, the Specialist Team can spend more time with them and see 
that they do have a need and if it’s appropriate for them to be befriended. I 
would say that specialising the teams is really good, for BfS it’s worked really, 
really well. It’s very complementary… before… you were part of a huge team 
and you can’t really get anything done… you don’t know who’s responsible for 
what… you’d say to the particular project workers, ‘Oh, she needs this and that, 
can you do the casework on it?’ and they might not have been able to ‘cos it 
wasn’t their area… So now everybody’s got an area, if you’ve got somebody 
who’s homeless then you know you have to go to Mohammed, if it’s a single 
male… (BfSW, int.)  
 
Another aspect of both their increased accountability and efficiency was RAP’s drive to 
standardise and make more equitable their advice to clients, and their distribution of 
services and cash allowances, partially in preparation to operate the government’s new 
Reception idea; ‘Induction Centres.’ During a Team Meeting of the NASS teams, the 
TL’s introduced a ‘file review’ whereby each PW’s recording of information, or 
“Contact Episodes” of clients was assessed by the TLs. Also, as part of their drive to 
improve ‘information’, a team of PWs was compiling a list of advice and information 
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issues the NTPWs would be obliged to ensure they covered with clients during their 
NASS form advice session, including offering referral to additional services. Whilst it 
could be argued, that standardising, routinising and creating systems such as ‘tick box’ 
referral and needs assessment forms, bureaucratises services making them superficial 
rather than holistic, it was obvious from the testimonies of confused asylum seekers, 
that equity and clarity of advice, information and entitlements was of great importance 
to them. RAP’s Annual Report (2001/2002:9) quotes a SM, 
 
We explain the situation with authority, consistency and empathy. Asylum 
seekers have few choices, but we want them to understand these. We maintain a 
very good rapport with our clients because we convey clearly the limited 
choices they have.    
 
The strong emphasis on managing expectations throughout the organisation, (although 
of course, RAP could not predict everything that would happen to an individual) was 
obviously also important to clients, as the desperation people felt living in uncertainty, 
unsure of what they could expect to happen, is evident in Christine’s account, for 
instance. What one PW felt was most important about his role, and which he struggled 
to balance, was offering people just enough “optimism” to get through the system 
“without giving false hope”.  
 
Though RAP was just beginning to operate in control of the chaos since the 1999 IAA 
and to set up systems and processes aimed at improving services, recognising the need 
to address support needs and to have more rigorous referral systems, as we have seen in 
previous chapters, they were not always successful; people slipped through the net, or 
the net was not yet designed to accommodate them. A SM said, 
 
It’s not been easy. It’s been, in fact, a long time and a lot of hard work, putting 
in place the resources or the mechanisms to be more effective… 
 
With these new resources SM aimed to become more ‘bottom-up’ or needs led in their 
service provision. Although managers publicly denied RAP’s contracting by NASS 
compromised “our charitable principles,” they still felt considerable unease about their 
almost total reliance on NASS for funding, and their individual aims and visions were 
to diversify, to tap new funding sources, 
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We’re moving, shifting our emphasis… in the long term… to be able to survive 
and be a viable effective organisation, we need to move in this direction… 
trying to look for other partnerships, other sources of funding… …Ultimately 
we… I don’t want the government, one source of funding to be everything. I’d 
rather have a spectrum of… or collection of funding or funders who can put 
different pressures on the organisation…  …in that way RAP gradually could be 
one of the organisations providing a holistic set of services for asylum seekers,  
(SM, int.)  
 
As well as the desire to diversify their funding to diversify their services, some in RAP 
had become insecure about the financial uncertainty of being so tied to providing 
Reception to the Home Office, the frequent and unpredictable change of policy and 
process and the latest government drive to cut numbers of asylum seekers arriving. The 
workers recruited just prior to the research period, enabling RAP’s restructuring, were 
only given one year contracts, and a further recruitment of PWs into 2003 with the 
general uncertainty left some workers feeling jittery about their jobs. 
 
8.6 Reinforcement of the ‘safety net’: Supplementary, additional and extra-
organisational support 
 
Cohen (2002:143) quotes IND document ‘Asylum Seekers Support’ (1999), describing 
the potential benefits of VS involvement in the NASS system, including, 
 
The voluntary sector’s unique capacity to involve volunteers in their work… 
once voluntary agencies are involved in the support arrangements, they will 
start to raise funds to provide additional services… their ability to draw in other 
organisations in the sector to provide additional resources or expertise… 
 
Cohen (2002) calls “chutzpah,” the expectation of a government, having involved the 
VS in implementing legislation that reduces asylum seekers’ welfare support to the 
barest minimum and as a deterrent, that they would then fundraise and attract more 
comprehensive services and support, from civil society sources. In RAP’s case this 
Home Office prediction was entirely correct; the organisation’s desire to provide more 
‘holistic’ services and better address their clients needs meant they turned to external 
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sources of funding, or manoeuvred within their government funding to attempt to 
supplement and add to clients’ support. Although one supplementary project had been 
set up prior to RAP’s NASS involvement, these services had primarily been developed 
since, and RAP was seeking to further extend this diversification of funding and 
services. There was particular emphasis on achieving a “balance,” 
 
…it’s accessing that very different strand of funding to improve and build on the 
services that we offer to our clients… to take the uncertainty out of funding that 
is very much based on what the government is funding you to do, that you feel 
it’s not appropriate to do. That’s not an issue at the moment. It could become an 
issue, so it’s really important that we find additional and alternative sources of 
funding… my role will be to identify the gaps within services… (SM, int.) 
 
…there’s always that kind of balance between what we would love to see 
happen and the needs we can see staring us in the face… it’s that reality of 
balancing what we’d like to see done and what we can… what we have to do 
and then, how much scope for developing new projects and things… (ED, int.) 
 
…the challenge then is how you balance that in terms of other funding for other 
projects, because asylum seekers needs are very varied and complex… With a 
focussed strategy, linked to a lot of resources we have not gone for, we will be 
able to increase our capacity to provide and develop services that are not 
funded by the government, and therefore provide not just financial, but also a 
service to balance… (SM, int.)  
 
8.6.1 Supplementary support services – RAP funded    
 
There were three services which RAP instigated that it had not fundraised externally for 
and their exact funding source was hazy, but they operated in defiance of NASS. RAP 
had identified them as high priority needs with potentially extreme significance for 
people seeking asylum. One was their well-developed legal referral service, whereby 
they attempted to identify reputable local immigration solicitors firms and referred 
those clients who wished for this guidance. They also operated a system of telephone 
access, at least at Rosehill EA, for clients to phone their solicitors, or for help from a 
RSW or PW to communicate with solicitors. An SM explained frequent problems with 
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“a lot of rogue solicitors touting for clients, doing bad practice,” going to EAs at night 
when RAP staff were not present, “grab all their immigration papers” or paying them 
£10 to use their ‘firm;’ 
 
We emphasise the importance of good legal advice to our clients, but still out of 
ten clients we refer only seven or eight turn up, (SM). 
 
There was also an extremely high rate (38%) of IND refusals of asylum claims due to 
‘non-compliance,’ usually because a person had not returned their SEF within the 
allotted ten days, or had made some kind of clerical error, such as an incorrect spelling. 
One SM and one PW co-ordinated these referrals, and this option and advice about the 
imperative to return their SEF on time was an ‘additional’ extra in individuals’ NASS 
advice session. The SM in charge had also, 
 
…compiled a dossier of rogues, but the ILPA are not interested. We’ve set up a 
meeting with the OISCR who will try to investigate these.   
 
RAP doggedly insisted in defiance of NASS and the IND, on continuing to develop this 
service, 
 
To be honest we shouldn’t be doing this. NASS don’t like it… NASS won’t fund 
this, the Legal Services Commission won’t fund it either… (SM, obs.) 
 
We use our own resources to fund the Legal Referral process and we’ll continue 
to do that. We are absolutely committed to that. You can’t compromise on that. 
You can’t just have a little bit of advice, either you direct people to legal advice 
or you don’t and we can’t possibly sustain not doing it. We will do it, come what 
may… …that’s a great assistance I would have thought, to IND, because 
obviously the government does not want rogue solicitors working, so we’re 
doing something as usual in the voluntary sector, which we’re not getting paid 
for…  …The Home Office have always resisted that. It’s a political matter! 
…they want people to make fools of themselves……So we have always sustained 
this argument with NASS, because we don’t talk to IND… unfortunately… so we 
do continually say this… we are going to make provision out of this, and so 
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NASS will always say, ‘Well, you shouldn’t but we’ll turn a blind eye to the fact 
that you do, but they’re not going to fund us to do it… (ED, int.) 
 
Another service, of potentially great significance to clients with particular needs, was 
RAP’s MF referral system, begun in 2001 with the appointment of a specialist worker 
to work with those who had been tortured. This worker had since left and a MF 
representative visited RAP once a week to interview clients referred, for an MF 
assessment. RAP’s referral process was not foolproof, people were asked during their 
NASS advice session “Have you been tortured?” alongside a long list of information, 
bureaucracy and completion of the NASS form. These sessions were usually held in the 
first two days of arrival, not necessarily with a worker of the same gender, and not 
every worker remembered every time to ask.  For instance, women who had been raped 
would often not wish to talk freely of this at such a time, if at all. However, referral 
could be requested later. Because NASS had granted a ‘concession’ to those accepted 
for treatment by MF, allowing them to stay in London, and because a positive 
assessment of torture by the MF held great sway in the asylum determination 
procedure, there were large numbers of people wishing for MF referral. Because MF 
had such high caseloads, they had narrowed their definition of torture to that occurring 
in detention, so some people obviously traumatised by persecution, such as the man 
who had seen his twin brother de-capitated in front of him by vigilantes in his town, 
were not accepted for treatment. However, for those accepted by the MF, the treatment 
and evidence toward their asylum claim could have great significance for their mental 
health and settlement. A man rejected by the MF for treatment felt this significance 
intensely, and put his head through his window, then sat on his bed where a TL found 
him “sobbing like a baby”, his wife accusing her of letting him down.   
 
A third service RAP funded, set-up and run by BfS staff and volunteers was second-
hand clothes distribution, also usually offered to clients during their NASS session, for 
which they had developed a ‘system’ regulating access to the provision, in order to 
ensure equity. Again, for some people, arriving with very little and no appropriate 
clothing for a British climate, and also needing equipment like pushchairs, this 
addressed an obvious need beyond government interpretation of ‘basic needs.’  
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8.6.2 Additional services – externally funded 
 
RAP had successfully fundraised for and begun developing several additional support 
services, financially independent from but integrated with the work of the main 
organisation primarily in response to service gaps and obvious client needs not being 
addressed by their mainstream services.  
 
The most well-developed and far-reaching of these was BfS, a befriending service 
conceived by an SM and set up five years previously, pre-NASS, run by one full time 
and two part-time  workers, co-ordinating over a hundred volunteers who befriended 
referred asylum seekers and refugees, approximately 80% of whom were RAP clients.  
 
Although BfS was independently funded through the Lottery, which the one of its 
workers saw as one of its main strengths: “I do have a lot of independence to develop 
what I wanna do” but still “you’re hands are tied by the government legislation, and 
also on a very short term basis” without the time to respond to the changes. Pre-NASS, 
BfS’s main aims were, through befrienders, to assist asylum seekers to settle in to the 
West London area and to understand and access local services and infrastructure (like 
the library, school, doctors surgery), but 
 
 …We’re all working in the context of legislation, so the main problems and 
issues are the fact that BfS… needs to be flexible to meet those changes so that, 
for example when NASS were set up… … all of a sudden they were all moved 
out of London… (BfSW) 
 
So BfS was forced to change its role, and since NASS they mainly worked with clients 
who were slow to be or could not be dispersed,  
 
…just the really vulnerable ones or the ones who were unusual ‘cos they 
couldn’t fit onto accommodation lists… the development of BfS has just been 
that we deal with a higher need… clients with a higher level of need, (BfSW) 
 
This often included those accepted by MF who could sometimes “wait fourteen months 
to see a counsellor.”  Despite this adaptation, BfS befriending still involved a time-
specific period of a client being allocated a volunteer for three to six months, in which 
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the client’s identified need was addressed by means of a list of objectives, usually 
relating to practical issues such as assisting a person to enrol with a doctor, 
 
…the volunteers just put a context around them… that empowers them to do it 
for themselves, so the aim of them is to… make the client more independent… 
…we set an action plan for them to meet those objectives by the end of the 
befriending… It’s very, very specific… 
 
In practice, as well as such specific practical help with achievable targets, “The things 
that are way down the list of priorities of Project Workers, volunteers can do” (BfSW),  
befrienders also obviously gave emotional and psychological support on a one-to-one 
basis, meeting one of the main needs, the BfSW stated, “just to have someone to listen 
to them,” 
 
…Quite often you meet a client and they’ve been disbelieved all through the 
process and then all of a sudden you can just sit there and they can say 
whatever they want, and they get really upset… nine times out of ten, when you 
do a first meeting, they cry because they’re pouring their heart out and 
somebody’s just listening to them and nobody’s done that… to them since they 
arrived… 
 
 Volunteers gave emotional, psychological, practical and advocacy support which could 
often become quite intensive, depending on the clients’ needs and volunteers’ 
capabilities and boundary setting. The STPW, critical of RAP’s superficial support 
service, believed BfS came closer to meeting clients’ support needs,  
 
I think they’re excellent! …basically I think volunteers are used as unpaid staff 
and are expected to do the sort of work I’m doing! … I think it’s very good to 
have volunteers befriending people, and doing whatever is in their capabilities 
and experience, and just being there for clients, but not to do the sort of work 
that, I mean I find it bloody impossible to do! And I’ve got years of experience! 
So I don’t think you should be expecting untrained people… There are plenty of 
resourceful people there but I think it’s (sighing) a cop out!  
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Volunteers could sometimes feel overwhelmed, especially at a first meeting when a 
client’s problems seemed enormous and insurmountable, which was the purpose of 
setting clear and achievable practical objectives, and doing several days’ training 
importantly including boundaries. Echoing some RAP concerns, a BfSW at a BfS 
training session for volunteers spoke of, 
 
Not to create a dependency. People will go on asking for more, they are testing 
it out. That’s OK, cos they don’t know……Don’t raise expectations, but equally 
do not dash them… (BfSW, obs.) 
 
The volunteer who befriended the Nigerian man, who witnessed his twin brother 
murdered, found the experience challenged all these issues of keeping boundaries and 
trying not to create dependency, as well as attempting to advocate for his ‘friend’ with 
the MF, appealing against their decision not to support him because his experience did 
not meet their narrow criteria on ‘torture,’  
 
You want to take him home and make it OK. After our first meeting, he held me 
and didn’t want to let me go. I try to concentrate on the here and now, 
contacting the Medical Foundation, the next meeting. The client and I are both 
overwhelmed, so we took it in bite-size chunks. He could have become 
completely dependent on me. So I try not leaving it too long before the next 
meeting… going to the library, going out with others, to the park…(V, obs.) 
 
When unable to prevent this client’s dispersal, this volunteer found the name and phone 
number of an individual in a support organisation in the region the client was going to, 
and informed both about each other, so at least the client would have some support 
from someone knowing his situation. This kind of intense and holistic support offered 
by a volunteer, filled an obvious gap in the services RAP workers offered, due 
fundamentally to the constraints of their role restrictions, site-tied and NASS -dictated 
work. Other than guidelines on boundaries, on confidentiality, on cultural awareness 
and not giving legal advice, befrienders could support clients how they chose. Although 
it was unlikely that all those clients who could benefit from BfS support received it, the 
support this service offered obviously added another layer of protection to the bare 
safety-net of  NASS-funded support, and also sometimes supported clients in ways 
social services and other statutory agencies legally had responsibility for,  
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…now we are receiving clients who… their needs are much more greater 
because they need statutory agencies helping them… It’s like the hospital 
saying, ‘We don’t give treatment’, and then RAP is expected to care medically 
for them, care for cancer… which is sort of overwhelming for us!  
 
Another current additional service, funded externally and its need identified through an 
external report (Cold Comfort, 2001: Save the Children), with RAP at Heathrow being 
the obvious agency to work with, was a Young Person’s Adviser, who filled a gap 
working with separated children and young people under 18 when they arrived at the 
airport. The YPA attempted to ensure that the young person was advised adequately, 
treated with due care by immigration officers, social workers and others, and that these 
statutory agencies followed the correct procedures, and  
 
…Immigration have a very high turnover of staff and very often have an influx 
of very young, inexperienced people… they don’t have a very full induction and 
they are landed with all this… responsibility, making decisions and they 
actually don’t know which is the way to go… So I quite often get involved with, 
‘you need to do this… this level of screening, you’re not supposed to do a full 
interview’… (YPA, int.) 
 
The YPA also assisted a young person with age disputes assessed by social services and 
attempted to ensure those who had legal responsibility for a young person, took it.  As 
well as informally and formally training voluntary and public sector workers in 
working with separated young refugees, they had begun to work on intervening in 
trafficking of children when possible. Sometimes when the YPA had been unable to 
ensure that social services took responsibility for a young person, perhaps out-of-hours, 
he ensured RAP prioritised their needs above NASS’ rules, so defying them, 
 
…quite often we do accommodate, although we shouldn’t do because a) we 
don’t want to place children in accommodation with six or seven hundred adults 
we don’t know, child protection-wise… but we have to weigh up whether it’s 
better for them to be stuck at the airport surrounded by thousands of people 
they don’t know… …You have to make a choice, so at times we do that, 
although RAP has no funding to do that… (YPA, int.)  
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The YPA working with RAP filled another service gap for this specific, vulnerable 
group, left unheld in NASS’ or RAP’s mainstream ‘safety net’ remit. Towards the end 
of the research period, RAP announced the appointment of a Child and Family worker, 
a qualified social work post, for which they had successfully fundraised externally. 
Having identified an observable need at their EAs where many families, especially 
single-parent families were accommodated, often inappropriately for several months, 
where there were obvious child-protection issues and people with special needs, RAP 
was again compelled to fill this service gap with an ‘additional service’, as predicted by 
the Home Office. The social worker at the local satellite agency had applied and been 
accepted for this position, but decided to turn it down as it involved responsibility for, 
 
…five hundred families. It’s an impossible job; you would have to be 
Hercules… I was shocked at the level of importance they gave the position of 
social worker. I felt this was indicative of the service they’d be receiving…  
 
Despite its potential inadequacies this at least seemed to be  a recognition that their 
complex support needs  required more attention than RAP was able to offer through its 
mainstream, or core NASS service, It was therefore another layer of weaving to the 
‘safety net’ to catch more people than previously.  
 
8.6.3 External ‘satellite’ services 
 
The IND (1999) document hailed the involvement of the VS for, “their ability to draw 
in other organisations in the sector to provide additional resources or expertise,” 
which, as well as providing and fundraising for additional services, could be applied to 
the apparent magnet RAP and the presence of large numbers of asylum seekers in EA, 
became to other agencies and individuals either by invitation or their own initiative. 
Some of these worked closely with RAP or BfS, others seemed entirely independent 
and peripheral, and probably there were more groups and organisations, such as RCOs 
operating invisibly around RAP, with their clients, that neither RAP were aware of nor 
I was able to observe. 
 
Church groups came in to run prayer and support groups, including separate clothes 
distributions, as well as Salvation Army volunteers regularly involved with the BfS 
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clothes service. Although RAP’s Grant Agreement (Appendix B, ‘Guidance on 
Operating Procedures and Standards’) stated in ‘Emergency Accommodation 
Standards’, “Access should be available to… Recreation Facilities,” a SM confessed,  
  
Recreation has always been really difficult. We don’t have a budget for 
recreational facilities…I mean, there are lots of interested parties out there that 
have provided various things. We’ve had churches come in that have… taken 
children and mothers out on school trips. The school bus comes in, in the 
summer for the children… We encourage profusely. We need to do a lot more 
and again it’s resources… someone taking on that role…it’s building locally 
really. But anyone suggesting anything for us, we really have to take it. They 
come in, churches come in at Christmas or at Eid… 
 
Onsite at Rosehill (and while it was used, Ayleswood), through the local college, an 
English language school operated, offering a short accredited course for varying 
abilities. There was also a nursery for pre-school age children, run by the EA where 
children could attend with their parents, but the nursery nurse struggled to maintain this 
rule and many parents left their children. Although meagrely equipped and haphazardly 
run, it gave some children something to do and parents some informal respite.  
 
A male health visitor had held daily clinics at Rosehill for two years and after a long 
campaign eventually got a room onsite a year previously.  Though he felt frustrated at 
the limited service, equipment and time he could offer, he was able to offer a service to 
some people. A medical centre with one, also male, doctor had been successfully 
fought for specifically to serve RAP clients, though he had been unable to recruit a 
second, female doctor and also struggled to cope with the numbers of people needing 
assistance, 
 
Again it’s a matter of resources. I think they do really good work given the 
limited resources that they have… I take my hat off to him, but having that 
knowledge and understanding of the difficulties they’re facing doesn’t help the 
clients who go there and possibly not getting the services they need or having to 
wait a few days… 
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There was also the church funded social work charity, next to Carlton EA, serving 
single-mothers including RAP clients, with a clothes and baby equipment distribution 
and, in liaison with BfS, they offered support and social work advice to women who 
sought it. Some women obviously felt more able to seek help and support here than at 
RAP.  
 
These were the observable selection of ‘satellite’ support agencies gravitating around 
RAP clients. I Independently and sometimes in liaison, they ensured  that the ‘safety-
net’ of NASS’ support via RAP was more reinforced and, as with the traumatised 
Eritraen woman and those not shouting loud, fewer asylum seekers with multiple, 
complex or even simple needs, slipped through the net. There were also plenty of 
‘invisible’ supportive individuals and groups, possibly some less supportive and more 
coercive with easy access to EAs, a multitude of RCOs in West and the rest of London, 
able to support asylum seekers from specific communities, and informal support 
networks some individuals could draw on. Such support was not simply a one-way 
process of ‘benevolence’, but the people who were RAP clients also sought out and 
procured their own support, their own way, such as the woman and her child who 
attended the local catholic church and school, gaining much support, but also offering 
those others the benefits of her experiences.  
 
Recent studies have also emphasised the importance of local, informal and grassroots 
support, where statutory and government funded support has been cut or lacking,  
 
One of the major themes of this study has been the vital role played by ordinary 
people in not only caring for refugees locally but also campaigning for their 
well being at the level of national and international politics. Grassroots 
responses at critical moments… have stopped governments from being merely 
negative… (Kushner and Knox, 1999: 402). 
 
So bad is the treatment of asylum seekers by the Labour government that new 
organisations and layers of individuals, especially from the voluntary sector, 
have been drawn into activity alongside the more established anti-racist 
organisation, (Mynott, 2002:26).  
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The Home Office document suggesting VS involvement in implementing the 1999 IAA 
would attract more voluntary and civil support of the people they would only offer a 
safety-net from destitution, suggests government intended to publicly appear tough, but 
more quietly believed their stakeholders would ensure asylum seekers received some 
more holistic support to address their multiple complex needs.  
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
RAP’s and RAP workers “charitable aims” and service ideals, to adequately address 
clients’ often multiple and complex special needs, were severely challenged by the lack 
of resources and the character of their NASS role. Despite disagreement over the most 
appropriate way to address asylum seekers’ needs, the services that RAP was able to set 
up within the constraints of the NASS system, especially the pressure on managers to 
process bureautically large numbers of clients, meant quantity was prioritised over 
quality and RAP’s service was more superficial than holistic. This was exacerbated by 
the reluctance of external statutory agencies to accept their responsibility for delivering 
the formal social rights of asylum seekers, out of discrimination and confusion, 
according to RAP workers.  
 
Despite these barriers and constraints, RAP struggled to maintain their integrity and 
offer ‘relief’ to their clients from within the state system by operating the widest 
possible interpretation of their role, and in places bending or defying NASS strictures to 
provide welfare anyway. From their position close to NASS and in close daily contact 
with clients’ needs the organisation was able to gain some concessions by pressurising 
NASS to give some leeway and increase the ‘gain’ slightly in asylum seekers’ formal 
rights. RAP also attempted to protect their clients, acting as a buffer, from the hostility 
or exploitation of other agents involved in or circulating the ‘safety net’ system, 
although this could involve a difficult balancing of interests. Individual workers could 
also use any discretion they had to increase the civic ‘gain’ of the safety net in practice, 
by using persistence and creativity in their advocacy to NASS on clients behalf, 
sometimes colluding with clients and turning a ‘blind eye’ to bending rules. Mostly 
workers attempted to soften the blow of a harsh system by using their personal warmth 
and humanity, sometimes small touches to promote clients’ well-being. 
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Being part of NASS system obviously involved severe compromises and left RAP’s 
hands tied in many ways in their ability to address people’s needs or just offer adequate 
welfare, however, some believed there were advantages. RAP was forced to become 
more accountable to NASS, and, even if this was sometimes superficial, it meant they 
were in some ways more accountable to clients. Their discretionary restructuring that 
was part of the bureaucratisation process meant individual workers were more 
accountable and clients were less likely to slip through the net. It enabled development 
of services rather than crisis management. Managing expectations did not just reduce 
the demand on the organisation but was very important to protect clients from having 
their hopes dashed. RAP’s transformation also meant it had expanded and was 
beginning to try to diversify and move away from reliance on government funding, so 
that “RAP really could be one of the organisations providing holistic services to our 
clients,” (SM). 
 
In the meantime, the government prediction that their ‘safety net’ would be reinforced, 
free-of-charge, by involved VS agencies driven by their ‘service ideals’ and ideological 
commitment to trying to address asylum seekers needs, gathering and attracting civil 
society agencies and individuals to help, was borne out. RAP provided vital services 
bending NASS funding, and fundraised to strengthen the safety net and attempt to 
prevent casualties. Also external ‘satellite’ agencies congregated underneath and 
around RAP’s services, attempting to break falls. This planned reinforcement of the 
gaps is evident throughout NASS dispersal ‘safety net.’ 
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9 CONCLUSIONS  from the ethnography  - ‘Welfare as Control’ 
 
Having explored in detail the lived experiences of this VS organisation, its workers and 
the people seeking asylum, journeying through Reception, this chapter aims to stand back 
and consider the conclusions, which may be drawn from the previous three chapters as a 
whole. To do this, this chapter will briefly revisit the conclusions from chapters 6, 7 and 
8. Then, in order to emphasise the theme of Welfare as Control I will separate and 
highlight the elements of control and of welfare evident in the data, (although somewhat 
artificial as they are in many senses inseparable). It should then be possible to discuss in 
Chapter 10 how this research, focussing on a local setting, might inform and aid better 
understanding of the broader picture and contradictions raised in chapters 2 and 3  
(Castles, 2003; O’ Neill, 2001).  
 
Chapter 6 asked and addressed what putting the 1999 IAA Reception safety net involved 
in practice for RAP as an organisation and its workers and how was this presumed 
contradictory positioning experienced by them. In direct financial and procedural 
accountability to NASS, RAP’s daily work was dominated by their new, close but 
ambivalent relationship, and they became more NASS’ agent than partner. Being NASS’ 
agent, involved flexing massively to ‘pick up the pieces’ of unintended policy failings, 
significantly having to give more long than short-term support, particularly for more 
people with special needs. RAP PWs became the ‘front-line’, face of NASS. RAP’s 
transformation into a RAA, involved significant change by growth, expansion, 
restructuring and in work practiced, to become a much larger, more hierarchical 
organisation spread over several sites, performing far more bureaucratic work. The 
bureaucracy and bureaucratic failings of NASS fed down to RAP, making their work 
more routine, less creative yet also more uncertain and frustrating. Workers struggled to 
treat clients as whole persons, rather than bureaucratic entities. RAP’s management of 
clients’ welfare became one dominated by controlling access, determining eligibility, 
rationing resources, sometimes in conflict and negotiation with clients, especially where 
room for discretion existed, so workers struggled not to use ‘unsanctioned’ judgements. 
Operating NASS Reception also involved overseeing some degrading welfare standards, 
coercion of clients to comply with their no-choice dispersal and discipline techniques to 
keep order in EA.  
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Chapter 7 asked and addressed how Reception was experienced by the people seeking 
asylum, who became RAP’s clients. The immensely diverse people travelling through 
RAP’s Reception came with a diversity of former lives and histories which could affect 
the way they experienced it. In leaving and arriving, though maybe safer, many 
experienced multiple dislocations from ‘home;’ loved ones, former selves and identities, 
cultures; the familiar. The women testifying acknowledged and were grateful for having 
their basic needs met. However, one woman’s frequent description of herself as 
‘hanging’ was descriptive of the chronic uncertainties and unknowns many experienced 
being caught in the bureaucratic systems of asylum claiming, NASS dispersal and the 
complexity of welfare entitlements, feeling they no longer could control their destinies. 
Many found these systems obscure, confusing and unfair. People struggled with the loss 
of autonomy over many aspects of their daily lives experienced in Reception, some 
feeling forced into dependency and stripped of purpose and basic dignities. It was worse 
if you had special needs and lived in EA for long. All of the women interviewed had 
lived in EA for many months. Often with no cash, poverty reinforced people’s loss of 
self-governance and choice. People found many creative and mundane ways of coping 
with their situations; by reclaiming autonomy where possible over their dispersals and 
daily living, trying to re-create a type of ‘home, for instance. The social networks within 
EA were a resource for many, and in these transient relationships people found ‘surrogate 
intimates’. Other than relying on RAP, some tapped social support outside EA of their 
own finding or others offering. Living with hopes and fears, some found religion 
comforting. Others ran out of coping mechanisms or did not cope; their worst fears 
realised, powerless and desperate, they turned to self-harm. For some, the final act of 
losing control and autonomy was government refoulement. 
 
Chapter 8 asked and addressed, how RAP and RAP workers dealt with the contradiction 
between their charitable service ideal impulses to address and relieve many clients 
multiple and complex needs and their NASS funding and imperatives covering only basic 
needs. The conjuncture of their unplanned-for longer-term support in their RAA role, 
meant there were many barriers to helping clients with special needs. Although 
restructuring to address these, the bureaucratisation of their work, managers’ imperatives 
for quantity over quality, lack of specific expertise and contentions over service ideals 
meant RAP tended toward superficial rather than holistic service and vulnerable, 
especially if quiet, asylum seekers could slip through the safety net. The resistance of 
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discriminatory but necessary statutory agencies guarding their own welfare ‘borders,’ 
was a further barrier to helping, together leaving some workers experiencing extreme 
dissonance. In struggling to maintain its integrity and meet its service ideals somehow, 
RAP used its position and discretion sometimes bending NASS rules, and lobbying 
NASS and other involved service providers to gain added benefits, also acting as a 
protective buffer to extend clients welfare and well being. Individual workers could make 
“a difference” using their language, advocacy skills, and determination, by some siding 
with clients against ‘the system’ and in their efforts to treat clients with warmth, 
humanity and dignity. Despite the severe constraints of operating under NASS, some 
workers felt this funding had enabled RAP to expand its horizons beyond Reception to 
fill service gaps. Growth, restructuring, and attempts to stamp order on chaos under 
RAP’s discretion but with NASS funding, worked to improve services in some ways and 
tactics to reduce demand also aimed to provide more certainty to clients. Being co-opted 
into further legislations, political agendas and global uncertainties led to a greater 
compulsion to diversify funding to attempt to reinforce the basic safety net and better 
address clients’ needs, and for RAP’s own survival. Some immensely valuable 
supplementary, additional and external services were gathered or attracted to fill the large 
gaps.  
 
9.1 The contradictory position of delivering welfare as control 
 
Cohen (2002:142) had accused VS organisations such as RAP of “Dining with the devil,” 
by joining the NASS system, arguing that their integrity, independence and capability to 
protect asylum seekers were compromised by involvement in a system “directly 
antagonistic,” to their interests. Also Duvell and Jordan (2000:3) suggested work such as 
RAP’s was “the ‘dirty work’ of social policy… involves intentional and systematic 
deprivation by officials of the means of a dignified existence.”  These are serious 
accusations, and it is now worth considering how this research might address them. The 
data presented shows a deeply complex setting at the heart of many of the contradictions 
raised in earlier chapters, where human beings struggled to survive and maintain their 
integrity. The main contradiction people involved struggled with was that of welfare and 
control. This was a government directed ‘control’ aimed at deterring people from seeking 
asylum in Britain, controlling and limiting access to welfare for people who came despite 
this and controlling movement for monitoring, tracking and spreading the ‘burden’ and 
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by denying settlement to increase the ease of returning people. I will address first those 
elements of RAP’s Reception service that were designed as, or in practice concerned, 
‘control.’ I will consider these from the perspectives of the organisation as a whole, from 
asylum seekers positions and then from those of individual workers, before moving on to 
discuss ‘welfare’ in the same way. 
 
9.1.1 Control 
 
9.1.1.1 RAP - ‘Hands-tied’ 
 
In many ways becoming a NASS Reception Assistant was not so very incongruous for 
RAP. Reception had been their whole purpose and, although there were dilemmas and 
“soul-searching,” over facilitating NASS’ system, in some ways this would just be a 
change of methodology. Before this RAP had already begun dispersing people around the 
country themselves when the availability of London accommodation was diminishing, 
and for this particular organisation, without other functions, there was more compulsion 
in their decision to co-operate, than for some others. In some ways it could be argued 
therefore, that RAP’s hands were tied to an extent even before entry. Also, the initial 
conditions of RAP’s Grant Agreement with NASS involved asylum seekers in staying in 
EA for just seven days, arguably a bearable length of time, slightly longer than the stay 
RAP had been facilitating. 
 
However, once RAP were ‘in’, the NASS system not working as planned, their hands 
were tied in many ways and they were co-opted in practice to far greater compromises 
than they had initially agreed to; “we’ve got our hands pretty much tied… they do say, 
‘Jump!’ and you say, ‘How high?’” (TL, Ch.6). One of these elements was the intensely 
but inefficiently bureaucratic nature of NASS. This constrained RAP’s ability to 
concentrate on clients welfare or attend to their support needs, and the uncertainties and 
inhumanities it caused such as having to wait all day to have a query answered, being 
bureaucratically lost, not being sent subsistence vouchers, often became compromising of 
peoples welfare in itself. In their new position RAP workers felt they and RAP were in a 
powerless position. They had lost a great deal of their autonomy and were now only ‘one-
cog’ in a system of many others and were compelled to bear the consequences of other 
agencies actions ‘upstream’. Their role being severely constrained and dictated by NASS, 
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it seemed they could just tinker with clients’ welfare and there were many aspects of their 
role, intended and unintended, that worked against their ability to provide quality welfare.  
 
Under these circumstances, RAP were often only able to attend to the reasonably fair 
distribution of the very basic welfare, in their hands to deliver, and the welfare support 
needs of those with “a higher level of need” were often dealt with only superficially if 
they had been identified through the often bureaucratically dominated contacts made with 
clients. In some ways, this was typical of any “street-level bureaucracy” operating under 
the conditions Lipsky (1980) spoke of, but also resonated with the Government’s 
‘control’ by restriction to welfare agenda. However, another aspect of their role involved 
more explicit ‘control’ elements, as part of NASS deterrent ‘safety net’. 
 
RAP’s Reception system resonated with many of the ‘control’ aspects explicit and 
implicit within its policy design. These were exacerbated by their loss of autonomy to 
control the system they were now involved with. One of the elements of the ‘control’ as 
deterrent design RAP operated was to make living conditions as basic and unattractive as 
possible. RAP were constrained to provide only the very bare necessities for ‘survival’ 
and prevention of destitution, to find resource-led often institutional, sometimes squalid 
accommodation and with their hands now tied this was intensified as in practice they 
were often compelled to oversee  clients with special needs living in often poor and 
degrading conditions, without cash, for long periods of time.  
 
RAP were also obliged to control and monitor the ‘borders’ of NASS welfare, on 
peoples’ entry and during their stay which could involve cutting back and restricting 
benefits on NASS behalf, and acting in ways which prevented clients attempts to settle in 
London (such as restricting cash and not informing clients about  local schools, unless 
asked). RAP became compelled to act as “enforcement officers” (Cohen, 2002), coercing 
clients with no other choice to comply with the system they operated on NASS behalf, 
and evicting people when their NASS entitlement was terminated. In some ways RAP 
seemed to turn a “blind eye” to the potentially negative effects of dispersal and once 
clients had left, what happened to them next was ‘out of sight and out of mind,’ (as one 
worker had suggested concerning continuing dispersal, despite a young dispersed man’s 
murder in Huddersfield). Again, the compulsion for RAP’s control and enforcement of 
dispersal was exacerbated by the unintended “bottleneck” of people in their care, due to 
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NASS and further ‘upstream’ dispersal failings. It seems clear that RAP’s role did 
involve collusion with and facilitation of the control elements of the NASS system they 
assisted with, but RAP had not foreseen just how compromising of their integrity this 
might be, once their ‘hands’ were ‘tied.’   
 
9.1.1.2 Asylum seekers - “Hanging”  
 
It was obvious that many people who were RAP clients suffered because of the ‘control’ 
elements built into the ‘safety net’ system, and the exacerbation of these by the 
unintended consequences of the policy. The experience of “hanging” out of control, in 
uncertainty while lost in NASS bureaucracy was intensely distressing to Christine, 
compounding her sense of “hanging” in relation to her asylum claim, and later she feared 
being “tossed about” again by being dispersed to an unknown place. It seemed that the 
sometimes chaos of RAP offices, and often bureaucratic structuring of relations between 
asylum seekers and RAP, made it more difficult for very vulnerable people who might 
find it very difficult to speak out to do so. The woman with deep fears of communal 
showers only managed to confide this to an outside satellite agency worker, who re-
conveyed this to RAP via the BfS. It seems very likely that this woman having found the 
personal resources and opportunity to ‘tell’ was a lucky one and many such quiet others 
would have gone unnoticed, in the bureaucratic environment. Others obviously suffered 
over the ‘forced’ nature of dispersal, such as the two women being coerced by RAP 
workers who wished to stay in London when, as an SM said, “people have very good 
reasons for staying in London,”. The man returning a second time after racist hostility 
towards him in Sunderland, returning to RAP having nowhere else to turn, was an acute 
example of the potential suffering caused by the deterrent design of no-choice dispersal. 
The “anormalising” (Geddes, 2002) design of RAP Reception, particularly felt as a loss 
of autonomy, and related loss of dignity and difficult endurance of a separated and 
inferior existence, was also part of asylum seekers experience of the control agenda of 
this safety net. NASS imperative to restrict cash allowances, dictated by political pressure 
to deny incentives to asylum seekers to stay in London, and enforced by RAP workers, 
meant Lucy could not eat what she felt she needed to as a nursing mother, for instance  
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9.1.1.3 Workers – “Hands tied” 
 
How did RAP workers, with personal and ideological commitments to refugees’ well 
being, many refugees themselves, conscionably operate the ‘control’ aspects of NASS’ 
Reception? How did they experience and live with this compulsion to ‘control’ or be 
involved in the control implicit in their work? Most RAP workers attempted to follow 
official criteria, in obedience to law, which NASS frequently reiterated. When discretion 
was available, their use of ‘unsanctioned distinctions’ was borne out of a sense of 
legitimacy that the ‘deserving’ (the truly destitute and registered asylum seeker) should 
be distinguished from the ‘undeserving’. In fact RAP workers could sometimes feel that 
NASS or RAP official criteria were more generous than their own private judgements. 
There was a general (although not in every case) acceptance that the law must be obeyed. 
Workers enforcement and coercion of a clients exit by dispersal or eviction was partially 
explained by this also, but also out of a sense of powerlessness, and belief that clients 
with no other resources had no other choice but to be dispersed. Most workers believed 
that being dispersed out of EA was in a client’s best interests, having witnessed other 
long-staying clients increasing distress with EA conditions. Coercion was acceptable 
because workers felt they knew better than the client, what was best for them. Also just as 
“the pressure of the day,” was to “empty the waiting room,” so it was to “empty” EA 
places, as there was nearly always a queue. Among some workers, legitimacy for a 
‘culture’ of assertiveness seemed to develop from a need to impose order on chaos 
especially when clear and standard systems were lacking, and to manage often large 
numbers of people This could spill over into control to and of welfare.  
 
For a few, the dissonance was just too great; they burnt out or left, feeling unable alone to 
overcome the overbearing bureaucracy, obstacles and widespread statutory resistance of 
others also involved in internal controls, where “everything feels like a deterrent to 
helping,” (STPW). Most lived with the contradictions and tensions in their work, dealing 
with them in different ways. Some managers justified guarding and controlling worker 
time and cash resources as promoting clients’ independence. Many were caught up in 
everyday technical details and concerns for increased efficiencies of work, and some 
seemed to view the changes, ethically unreflectively, as those of technicalities in a basic 
continuation of former work. Others distanced themselves from NASS and the legislation 
in feeling like powerless mediators; “This is between you and NASS… We’re out of the 
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equation;” (TL) feeling on clients’ side against a culpable NASS, or experiencing 
tensions, stresses and frustrations predominantly from being in this intermediary role 
between ‘over-demanding’ clients and an impossibly unbendingly bureaucratic NASS; 
“the high expectation of the client… on the other hand, my hand is tied,” (PW). Some 
experienced clients in their presence most stressfully, generally accepting the legitimacy 
of a legislation aimed at stopping those they perceived were not refugees, or not destitute 
from entering and claiming. This was more likely so for some workers, refugees 
themselves, comparing their own experiences with the person in front of them and 
occasionally feeling their hands tied by RAP’s imperative for a criteria-based equitable 
“open door,” (TL; PW). Some workers, some of whom were refugees and structurally 
constrained themselves, either wished to leave their “stressful” (PW) job but found or 
believed they could not get work elsewhere, or work as well-paid. Also many had found 
an immensely supportive and valuing community, or “family” (SM), working at RAP. In 
summary, most workers felt tensions in their work, but experienced them in different 
ways and from different sources. Front-line workers were more likely to feel powerless 
between clients demanding more and NASS giving less. Those verbalising the 
contradictions of welfare and control in their work, more often those managers with more 
responsibility for the choice to operate NASS Reception, rationalised their ambivalent 
position, “you will have to get your hands dirty” (SM), as a compromise worth the 
difference they would make to asylum seekers lives.  
 
Workers who stayed, daily working in close human contact with individuals similar to 
themselves, sincerely believed they were assisting asylum seekers (as Cohen, 2002, 
acknowledged), and felt they were doing a good job in some way  (Lipsky, 1980). The 
main reasons most workers were able to live with their contradictory positioning and 
operation of ‘control’ was that they were delivering a welfare service.  
 
9.1.2 Welfare 
9.1.2.1 RAP 
 
There was a strong sense that the thrust of RAP’s purpose and work was about 
facilitating access to and delivering a welfare service. While designed as a deterrent to 
the ‘unwanted,’ the NASS system, and RAP’s own Reception stage of it, was also a 
safety net designed to provide a means of survival and basic security to both the ‘wanted’ 
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and the ‘unwanted,’ that came anyway, while the government decided which was which. 
There was a legitimacy about this ‘safety net’, because it at least protected people and 
basic human rights in some way. In some ways this safety net, whilst not giving asylum 
seekers the dignity of independence and autonomy at Reception at least, could be 
considered a better initial protection in the short term, than that RAP provided previously 
because some people were better protected and enabled to be more secure with a little 
time of dependence for orientation and relocating themselves. On top of meeting their 
basic needs for survival, as asylum seekers were no longer spread out across London, 
RAP was able to provide a more ongoing net (even if difficult to access) of advisory 
support and protection. There was a belief and evidence that the welcoming and friendly 
approach of generally supportive human others, not formally part of the state or 
immigration service enhanced the well being of people seeking protection.. RAP gave not 
only a ‘human face’ and were “a bit more compassionate” (TL) to arriving asylum 
seekers, but they had a level of expertise after 20 years of operating a Reception service, 
and were undoubtedly able to offer a more holistic service than a private sector human 
management agency. As SM’s had stated RAP did have a level of autonomy to arrange 
themselves and organise their work within the constraints of their funding and NASS’ 
requirements. As we have seen, some SM’s overstated the degree of autonomy or 
“freedom” (SM) RAP had, but there was a degree, in which RAP could exercise 
“inventiveness,” within their constraints. There was a space for RAP to decide “the way 
in which we provide the services” and to “maximise the quality” (ED). Within NASS 
funding and constraints, RAP had restructured to include a Support Services Team which 
gave a better chance to protect those with a “higher level of need” (AW), and had 
structured to provide specialisms and greater accountability. This had given RAP the 
breathing space to further develop the quality of its Reception within the constraints. 
There was some space and autonomy for some bottom-up needs-led initiatives; for 
instance the good quality and full information initiative was in this case (Sarah’s 
example) and is evidenced (Robinson et al, 2005) as providing asylum seekers with a 
significant ‘layer’ of protection. There was a sense that having emerged from the initial 
(two-year) chaos of NASS’ beginning, RAP were progressively developing and 
improving the basic safety net. This, of course, included their reinforcement of separately 
funded supplementary, additional protective and creative services. Also RAP was a 
magnet for satellite agencies to do the same.  
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The fact that RAP was explicitly faced towards welfare provision and their activities 
geared as much, if not more, towards facilitating (as well as controlling) access to a basic 
welfare safety net masked the control intent and some of the practices involved with that. 
RAP was making a difference to the lives of asylum seekers. And without any state 
funded safety net asylum seekers would have been worse off.  
 
9.1.2.2 Asylum seekers 
 
The people journeying through this Reception did experience a basic level of welfare that 
met their basic needs, and on this level, enhanced their ability to survive. The women in 
this study acknowledged the value of the provision of shelter, food and clothing. They 
also felt a sense of protection and comfort (if problematic) to have an advice service at 
hand and RAP to “run to.” For some, this level of welfare, the provision for basic needs, 
was all the safety net they needed especially if they were dispersed quickly. The 
movement within and around RAP to reinforce this safety net was also experienced as a 
source of support and comfort in some way, especially to those with a greater level of 
need. Some people were able to find resources and further ways of supporting 
themselves, from the basis of this basic survival resource including becoming involved in 
negotiating. 
 
9.1.2.3 Workers 
 
Although workers often found their jobs stressful, demanding and frustrating, and some 
felt some ambivalence over their roles, and a few felt extremes of dissonance, the 
majority believed they were helping and supporting their asylum-seeking clients and in 
their daily interactions they gave advice and assistance and felt they were doing what 
they could to improve clients welfare. Workers attempted to bring humanity into their 
work and obviously offered comfort and cultural support, for instance by being able to 
communicate with clients in their own languages. Many workers gained satisfaction from 
the small successes and progress they gained for clients. Generally, workers recognised 
the difficult living conditions their clients endured, especially those staying for long 
periods, and sought ways within their constraints, to improve them. They could 
sometimes feel caught between clients high expectations and the standards of living 
NASS provided, finding it difficult, for instance, when their clients expected Rosehill to 
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be a “five star hotel,” when ‘hotel’ was not even the most accurate description of this 
site. However, many workers coped with the low levels of welfare their clients endured 
by considering them in relative rather than absolute terms, and also by considering them 
as temporary. For instance, workers often reminded clients that they would not have had 
been given a roof over their heads from the state they had left. Some workers had worked 
in other EU state asylum support systems (and some in refugee camps in developing 
countries) and felt that the NASS system gave better provision.  
 
9.2  Managing the contradiction of welfare as control 
 
RAP’s contradictory positioning implementing Reception since the 1999 IAA had 
involved managing the contradiction between welfare and control. In her research and 
analysis on “national regimes for rights in their active operation”, where “They are tied 
into often complex systems of differentiation which serve as both a statement of rights 
and a basis for limiting the claims of some groups”, Morris (2002: 158) concludes, “The 
area of rights and controls with respect to migration is thus shown to be one of 
compromise, made inevitable by the management of contradiction.” Although Morris 
concludes on the national level, having explored in detail several European nations 
regimes of rights (and controls) in operation or practice, this statement is applicable to the 
active operation of social or welfare rights (and controls) at the organisational level that 
RAP operated on. The services they operated in practice, implementing Reception in line 
with the 1999 IAA, were compromises and compromised by the unavoidable daily (and 
longer term) management of the contradiction of a system of welfare designed as a 
mechanism of control (understood in the various senses mentioned). Although this was 
not expressed explicitly as such by RAP workers, the tensions, dilemmas and stresses 
they displayed and expressed, in different ways and to differing extents, and the evidence 
given in the preceding chapters, suggests this conclusion is reasonable.  
 
The organisation had experienced their position as a VS organisation being pulled 
between their service ideals of enhancing the social rights of their clients and NASS’ 
directives towards restricting them. Workers struggled between their desires to provide 
qualitative services and the imperative for the quantitative. Their difficult position was 
one of a constant balancing of such interests and a struggle to ensure a general fairness 
within their bit of the system and trying to find the most ethical compromise. However, 
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with their ‘hands-tied’ and constrained by their almost entire reliance on NASS for 
funding, once involved, they were dragged further along into ethical compromise picking 
up the pieces of the mistakes and new political demands made, where particularly those 
people with the greatest need had least protection. This could be considered a “deficit in 
the right to support” in practice (Morris: 2002:151).  This position involved some serious 
compromises and their ethical integrity was battered in their struggle to maintain it. In  
this sense, it seems that they did get their hands dirty by colluding with a system in which 
some of their clients suffered some serious curtailments to their autonomy and human 
dignity. Workers found their clients distresses distressing but also felt powerless with 
them, in the face of the power and effects of the state’s emphasis on controlling and 
restricting. Although some of the contradictions and tensions in their position were 
similar to those of everyday street-level bureaucrats working under any typical street-
level bureaucracy work conditions (Lipsky, 1980), and of other social care workers 
caught between different care and control policy agendas (Sales and Hek, 2004), the 
intent that the care given should maintain social exclusion for this particular group seems 
particularly compromising.     
 
However, it is also the case that from their contradictory position close to NASS, RAP 
were able, within the constraints upon them and when sufficiently motivated and 
resourced, to use any discretion they had, driven by their VS ideals, to expand in practice 
the minimal formal social rights of their asylum seeking clients, to include some informal 
gains, (Morris, 2002). This included, for example fundraising to fill service gaps, 
facilitating access to MF assessment, improving the quality of information given and 
providing a stronger safety net using volunteers to support the more vulnerable. They 
were also able, in this position, to have some influence over procedural policy in practice 
and, especially when working with the other IAP agencies, had at least some lobbying 
power with NASS. RAP and RAP workers always presented themselves, and indeed 
genuinely saw themselves, as an organisation and staff assisting and supporting people 
seeking asylum, and as “making a difference to the lives of asylum seekers and refugees,” 
(SM, Ch6). To the extent that they had and used their discretion, RAP could be 
understood to be, in the senses that both Lipsky (1980) and Morris (2002) have discussed, 
not just implementers, but makers of asylum ‘support’ policy in practice.  
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But just “How Low Can You Go?” as Duvell and Jordan (2000) asked of their social 
work teams picking up the pieces after the 1996 Act, and Cohen (2002) has suggested in 
no uncertain terms, that the few VS organisations including RAP, made an ethically poor 
decision to implement a Reception Service for NASS. The contradictory positioning of 
VS agencies such as RAP, raises the question Lipsky (1980: xiii) also asked, which may 
be applied to workers and the organisation in this case; should street-level bureaucrats 
“look for other work rather than perpetuate unfair, ineffective, or destructive public 
practices?” or,  
 
Should they struggle from within to change the conditions under which citizens 
are processed by their agencies? This path seems the hardest to maintain and is 
subject to the danger that illusions of difference will be taken for the reality of 
significant reform, (ibid: xiv). 
 
Is it possible now, in the light of this research, to address and answer this question in a 
better-informed way? What is the most ethically sound position for organisations such as 
RAP and the workers within them: attempts at reform from within or refusal to co-
operate in attempt to force revolution from without? Or at which point should such an 
agency decide the compromise to its ethical integrity is just too great? In some ways, 
having explored and discovered the complexity of the lived experience of actors and 
agencies involved with these policies on the ground, as practitioners and ‘clients’, this 
question is now more difficult to answer. RAP workers, despite some acknowledging the 
tensions, mostly believed their position to operate ‘in’ and between the Government and 
asylum seekers with their expertise and will to act as a protective buffer, was the ethical 
one. But, as we have seen, their effectiveness in doing this was extremely limited by their 
position and the pressure on them to ‘oil the wheels’ of the NASS system was often 
dominant, despite the potentially harmful effect this might have had on their clients. 
Having ethnographically illuminated this hidden local setting and revealed greater 
complexity in everyday practices, and also therefore greater ethical complexity than 
Cohen’s (2002), for instance, black and white terms, in order to address this question 
more adequately it is important to step back and consider the implications of this case 
study for the broader context it is a part of. That is, having drawn some specific 
conclusions from the fieldwork, how might these inform some broader and more general 
conclusions?  
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10 – GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
To conclude, it is important now to place and consider the ethnography and the particular 
selection of ethnographic data presented in the last four chapters in the context of the 
thesis as a whole, in terms of the initial aims and research puzzles it has set out to 
explore, and in relation to the broader and more general levels of analysis, and time and 
space that are its context, as explored in Chapters 1 to 3. Doing this will indicate the 
broader relevance of this research and its possible contribution to understanding some of 
the contemporary dynamics around forced migration, and other related areas this research 
has touched on. It should then be possible to suggest some ways of moving forward. 
 
10.1 Contributing to a Sociology of Forced Migration 
 
To begin with, this research has taken up the argument, premises and challenges that 
Stephen Castles (2003) laid out in calling for a new Sociology of Forced Migration (in 
Chapter 2.2) and has attempted to contribute to this project. One of the arguments and 
challenges that Castles (2003) proposed was that studies concerning forced migration 
should incorporate and be informed by the many different levels of analysis (and reality) 
from the global to the individual, that are intrinsic to the phenomena and processes it is 
made up of. For instance, Castles (2003) argued that studies of local situations, 
communities and individuals needed to be informed by those concentrating on macro 
levels of analysis such as political economy, and broader global social processes, such as 
globalisation, and vice versa. As stated in the Introduction, the literature and 
contextualising in Chapters 1 to 3, framing the ethnography within a global, regional and 
national context and a conceptual understanding of these in terms of ‘contradictions’, is 
intended to be taken as part of the analysis of the ethnographic data.  Therefore, taken as 
a whole, where the ethnographic illumination of this local setting and the lived 
experiences of agents within it (Chapters 5-8), is informed by those broader and deeper 
levels of theoretically and historically informed analysis of the structural processes 
involved in it (Chapters 2-3), and guided by critical realist and Castles’ (2003) suggested 
methodological principles (Chapter 5), this research thesis has attempted to contribute to 
what is becoming a blossoming Sociology of Forced Migration. What, then, does this 
research contribute to this wider project? What might this ‘microcosm’ say to the broader 
‘macrocosm’? What is its relevance to the social arena of Forced Migration? How might 
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it be “useful public knowledge” (Castles, 2003:27)? Does it offer any emancipatory 
potential, as critical realism usually aspires to do? 
 
One of the ways in which this research has approached ensuring that this local case study 
is informed more broadly beyond its discrete setting, has been to use a critical realist 
ethnography drawing in a unique way elements from Smith’s, Burawoy’s and Bourdieu’s 
methodologies for understanding the local and individual in terms of the social general, 
and extending out wards as far as the global. Using such a critical realist methodology 
permits understanding of a local and small-scale (or micro) setting in terms of the broader 
and deeper structural processes implicit within it, and making it what it is. All of the 
Chapters in this thesis are part of this methodological project (as stated), but to conclude, 
it is important to explicitly stress some of the broader structural processes which seem to 
have conditioned and may be considered explanations of the local setting at RAP, and in 
light of both these and the detailed description of everyday lives, to consider some of the 
implications of these findings. 
 
Another way in which this research has attempted to contribute to a Sociology of Forced 
Migration has been to take heed of Castles (2003) warning that research designed around 
a narrow policy agenda aiming to find a solution to a particular bureaucratic problem, can 
lead to the development of short-sighted policies that do not work. This research has 
aimed to develop a more theoretically informed, historically long-sighted and broader 
view of this social area. Although it focuses around a specific policy agenda and its 
implementation at a specific point in space and time, it is not intended to be an evaluation 
of this policy which ends listing a series of recommendations, but does aim, nevertheless, 
to offer a “more useful public knowledge,” in the manner Castles (2003:27) suggests. 
Therefore, the research might ultimately raise more questions than it answers.  
 
10.2 The focus and concept of ‘welfare as control’ 
 
An aspect of developing a more theoretical (and sociological) approach has been the 
process of focussing in on a particular problematic, from the inklings and inspirations at 
the beginning of the research (as described in the Introduction), through reading the 
literature and doing pilot interviews, then in-depth immersion in the field, data analysis 
and writing up, to develop and use the concept of ‘Welfare as Control’ as a conceptual 
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frame to view certain responses of receiving nation-states to forced migration. The 
research has explored how this contradictory problematic of a welfare system designed as 
a mechanism of immigration control is experienced and lived out daily by those it most 
affects. That is, from the perspectives and positions of individuals involved in a 
contradictory position in implementing Welfare as Control, and from those whose 
welfare has been at stake because of their being controlled. Particularly, doing an 
intensive ethnography has helped to reveal the complexity of what these (welfare as 
control) policies involve in practice, on the ground, illuminating a previously hidden 
setting and giving voice to some previously unheard voices within it, and so, it is hoped, 
giving greater substance and better understanding of this ‘concept’, Welfare as Control. 
 
In these senses the research adds to previous research and literature, which has explored 
this problematic more generally in terms of the links between state systems of welfare 
and those of immigration controls, historically and politically (Cohen, 2002; Hayes, 
2002; Mynott, 2002), theoretically (Bommes and Geddes, 2000) and in some interview 
research with public sector social work teams (Duvell and Jordan, 2000; Sales and Hek, 
2004). This research has developed the concept of “welfare as control” to describe the 
intent and subsequent practices behind policies, such as Part VI of the 1999 IAA, devised 
by governments attempting to control the number of asylum seekers entering their 
territory and then internally controlling those people’s subsequent trajectories whilst 
asylum seeking, through exploring how this concept is lived out in daily practice. The 
practices that it involved and the experiences of the welfare as control recipients were not 
expressed as such by the research participants, nor the writers of the policies it 
incorporated, but the concept was developed through this theoretical and ethnographic 
research, data analysis and critical realist reasoning (abductive, and retroductive), as a 
useful interpretative framework to aid understanding. Taking this research as a whole, 
from the theoretical and ethnographic explorations, this concept seems to carry some 
weight or, as Danermark et al. (1997:122) put it, “has ‘punch’… should be sharp and 
forceful… functions in practice… provides deeper insight… explanatory power”.  
Welfare as Control may therefore be a useful concept to think about and research further 
settings where agencies and individuals are negotiating these contradictory elements in 
their daily lives. For now, how might this in-depth case study exploring and identifying 
Welfare as Control be relevant beyond the setting and offer some more general 
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conclusions? It is necessary to revisit the critical realist understanding of ‘general’ laid 
out in Chapter 4. 
 
10.3 A general contradictory position? 
 
How may this research be concluded in terms of the national policy in practice it is an 
example of? What is its relevance to or, what does it say about the enactment of safety-
net Welfare as Control since the 1999 IAA, in more general terms?  
 
As stated in the methodology Chapter 4.14, a critical realist approach accepts the 
prerogative that science and social science should be able to make generalising claims, 
but argues that this does not involve empiricist extrapolation from small to larger 
populations but involves instead, claims of “more or less universal preconditions for an 
object to be what it is,” (Danermark et al, 1997:77). In this sense of generalising from 
this case study then, it is argued that the numerous complex ‘universal’ preconditions, or 
underlying generative structures, influencing the everyday setting at RAP to be the way it 
was, spread out through the meso and macro levels, or from local, national, regional, 
global and mediating between them-processes. Many of these, important in terms of this 
interpretive frame and the specified problematic, have been identified in the earlier 
Chapters (2 and 3) of this thesis and highlighted where appropriate through the data 
chapters (6-8), and it would be unnecessary to restate these in full here. However, those 
considered most important, which allow any new conclusions or illuminations, will be 
discussed. It seems prudent to move from the everyday personal and local, outwards 
again.  
 
Those preconditions that seem the most striking and necessary in making the setting at 
RAP what it was are obviously its contradictory positioning at the hub or ‘nexus’ (Cohen, 
2001; 2002) of delivering a policy of welfare which was at the same time a policy of 
immigration control. More specifically this positioning involved both their aims, ideals 
and status as a Voluntary Sector organisation and their financially and procedurally 
binding relationship of ‘partnership’ or in practice as an ‘agent’ to NASS. Also 
conditioning this setting was its specific position and role in the process of Welfare as 
Control support for destitute asylum seekers, as a Reception Assistant Agency and all that 
involved in practice. In practice, RAP was conditioned by the spaces for discretion and 
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independence it found, for making policy (Lipsky, 1980) in its contradictory position and 
the influences driving it to use these spaces in particular ways to increase the gain or 
deficit of the formal social rights of asylum seeking clients. This could involve oiling the 
wheels of the system for NASS or sticking spanners in the works in protection of clients, 
although these do not simplistically or necessarily map onto ‘deficit’ and ‘gain’, and 
these outcomes were not always intentionally reached. The out workings of this position 
found at RAP suggest some broader conclusions in terms of policies for receiving forced 
migrants (specific to Britain, and possibly more generally), of Third Way social policy 
arrangements and implications generally for Voluntary Sector and welfare workers, 
involved in implementation of these. (These will be explored a little further on). 
 
Also evident, to use the valuable conceptual framework developed by Morris (2002), was 
the structure of civic stratification, found in this research to be intensely bureaucratic in 
practice and involving many further complex layers of often shifting strata of rights (and 
their conjoined, or inverse, controls), sometimes through formal expansion or, more 
usually, contraction, and sometimes informal gain or deficit, within the broader status of 
‘asylum seeker.’ This more complex bureaucratic structuring of civic stratification 
(constructed in order to limit welfare rights as a means of immigration control) was at 
least partially caused by the initial poor and heavily centralised design of NASS and the 
NASS system and its subsequent semi-collapsing and adapting in practice. It was evident 
in the number of acronyms, of formal and informal categories NASS created to try to 
organise its work in line with policy, and to distinguish between statuses of asylum 
seeker and associated rights or disentitlements, daily negotiated and fought over and 
processed with RAP workers who in turn negotiated these with their clients. This 
bureaucratic structure weighed heavily on all involved in the setting; dominating and 
structuring time and work, and individuals’ well being. For people seeking asylum, this 
structure of minimal rights (designed also to control), predominantly served to 
anormalise (Geddes, 2001:143) their lives and hold them in suspense (‘hanging’) from 
settling psychologically or physically, as it was intended to do (“designed to hinder the 
possibility for asylum seekers to live a ‘normal social life’”, ibid:143). On top of the 
structure of bureaucratic civic stratification was that of more generic street-level 
bureaucracy, (Lipsky, 1980), where the struggle to cope with the structure of ‘public 
service’ work made it difficult for workers to use their available discretion to serve 
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clients better, rather than serve the bureaucratic purposes of the management agency 
(ultimately, NASS).  
 
Of course, extending out, there were many broader global preconditions contributing to 
the setting at RAP to be the way it was. The many complex processes which can be 
understood as globalisation, as discussed in Chapter 2, were at least part of the causes 
responsible for inducing and forcing the arrival of many of the forced migrants at 
Heathrow and the other London Airports (as well as by other means), who then journeyed 
through RAP’s section of their Reception in Britain. Just being at any RAP office for any 
length of time felt like being at a global hub, at the hub of twenty-first century 
transnational and globalisation processes. There were hundreds of people from hundreds 
of places around the globe in one place, with a multitude of different cultures, languages, 
personal histories and journeys, idiosyncrasies, forced (in that grey area that is ‘forced’) 
to migrate to this place where we all were, to find greater security. Through the complex 
interactive processes between these individuals’ agency and the social, political and 
economic forces compelling them, people arrived in Britain and at RAP and journeyed on 
from there. 
 
10.3.1. RAP as emblematic of similarly positioned organisations 
 
The conceptual frameworks mentioned here have aided a more general understanding of 
the setting to be the way I found and have interpreted it, and I believe, this research also 
lends more weight and adds something to these particular theories. However, I argue that 
it is also possible to make some generalising claims in the other sense mentioned, that is, 
treating this case study organisation and the individuals in specific positions involved 
with it (workers and asylum seekers), as emblematic (Bourdieu, 1999) of a wider 
universe (Mason, 1996) of similarly positioned organisations and individuals. There were 
a lot of factors about RAP that made them unique, and indeed about each of the six 
similar organisations that were in Grant Agreement to NASS to provide some degree of 
Reception Assistant Service. They each had different strengths and fields of expertise, 
each conditioned to an extent by their geographical position and each with their own 
idiosyncratic histories and trajectories as Refugee Support Agencies, in social space.  
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However, there were also many important similarities between these organisations, 
including their initial purposes and stances as Refugee Support Agencies, their Voluntary 
Sector statuses and their statures among British Refugee Support NGOs (although the 
Refugee Councils and Refugee Action were considerably bigger than Migrant Helpline 
and Refugee Arrivals Project). They were obviously also similar in the other most 
important aspect to this research, in their relationship to NASS and roles in the safety-net 
welfare as control system of ‘asylum support’ (see Chapter 5). Therefore, to the extent 
that the general underlying conditions of a contradictory positioning of Voluntary Sector 
Refugee Support aimed agencies were involved in delivering welfare as control for 
NASS, particularly, but not only, Reception Services, it seems extremely likely that such 
similar agencies would have experienced some similar contradictions, dilemmas and 
compromises, and would have been compromised in the types of support they were able 
to offer to their clients, in similar ways.  
 
There obviously would have been some complex differences between these agencies’ 
abilities to provide welfare, which can only be hinted at from this research with one of 
them. For instance, as the Wackenhut Transport Co-ordinator confided, the agencies 
among this group she dealt with all seemed to have somewhat different stances towards 
NASS authority and their role, and seemed to use spaces for discretion they had in 
different ways, but it seems unlikely they had significantly different degrees of power to 
defy NASS in favour of their clients interests, when the other conditions of constraint 
remained similar. During my research period, gossip filtered through at RAP that the RC 
had closed down their London Reception Assistant Service and role, that it was chaotic 
and unworkable over there, and not enough asylum seekers travelled to their dispersal 
regions. Whether this was by RC intention or NASS edict was not clear, but this and the 
hints from the dispersal coach co-ordinator, suggests that some scuppering of the 
dispersal system was possible. However, RC were in a very different position to RAP in 
their capability to do this, in that they had many other successful services (such as 
information, campaigning, training and research facilities) to fall back on, were much 
bigger, older and had a more prominent public status. RAP had only ever been a 
Reception Agency. Also, RC withdrawal from their RAA role, did not result in any 
fundamental scuppering of the dispersal system overall.  
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I also contend that other VS and Public Sector agencies with some similar and some 
different features, including differing (but with at least some) relationships of service 
delivery to NASS, within the system of welfare as control, would also have struggled 
with some of the same contradictions, dilemmas and compromises RAP did, as well as 
interesting different idiosyncratic ones. Griffiths et al (2005) give detailed evidence of the 
co-option of RCOs by NASS, and particularly relevant here, their co-option into spending 
time and resources in crisis management, especially around NASS inefficiency and 
bureaucracy. There is further literature touching on the work of some of the agencies in 
the multi-agency partnerships that form the Regional Consortia, mentioning their difficult 
relationships with NASS, (for example, Wilson, 2001). This also suggests the hugely 
important role a wide variety of Voluntary Sector organisations is playing across Britain, 
reinforcing the dispersal safety net, either as funded members of Regional Consortia, or 
as self-propelled satellite ‘agencies’ (some, loosely organised networks), which have 
formed in response to big holes and gaps in the basic state funded survival net, (Wilson, 
2001; Mynott, 2002; Griffiths et al, 2005), and to ‘pick up the pieces’ from asylum policy 
(Dwyer, 2005).  
 
This research case study with RAP suggests that the more tied an agency is to providing 
direct services to NASS (and some of those are more compromising than others), and the 
more reliant an agency is on NASS for its funding, the less autonomy and spaces it has 
for using its discretion to increase the civic gain of asylum seekers formal rights in 
practice. This, and it is likely to be true of other, agents of NASS were strongly propelled 
to use the majority of their resources (time, staffing, expertise) in fulfilling NASS’ 
agenda, which was often detrimental to asylum seekers well being, and dealing with the 
fall-out from its failings. However, there were some benefits to this position, in that a 
fairly secure reliance on funding and the ability to use its integral position (especially 
with other agencies), together with the will and drive as a VS agency, allowed some 
directive development of more holistic services appropriate to asylum seekers needs, to 
provide a buffer of sorts and towards procedural change benefiting clients. What, then (as 
Lipsky, Duvell and Jordan and Cohen have asked, mentioned earlier) can be said in terms 
of the decisions organisations and individuals make to work for NASS as an integral part 
of the safety-net system, to accept full or partial funding, to fulfil a NASS agenda or just 
to co-operate with NASS?  
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There was evidence from this research that agencies which had chosen to remain entirely 
financially independent of NASS, in this case the MF and RAP’s befriending service, 
also had their service provision and work agendas substantially dictated and directed by 
policy changes and NASS’ agendas. The Befriending Service working closely with RAP 
were forced to change their service provision, the purposes of their befriending liaisons, 
and to re-train their volunteers when the 1999 IAA introduced dispersal, and their 
volunteers’ ability to support clients was frequently curtailed by the uncertainty and lack 
of warning of clients’ dispersals. The BfS worker spoke of the benefits of working 
autonomously from NASS funding, but at the same time their service having its ‘hands 
tied’ by government policy agendas.  The MF, which had steadfastly refused government 
funding in order to retain its integrity and independence, had also had its service 
provision and ability to support the victims of torture it worked with, significantly 
affected by the 1999 IAA welfare as control provisions and agenda. With the concession 
NASS allowed that MF clients could stay in London for treatment, and the known 
proviso that people who had their experiences of torture verified by the MF were more 
likely to succeed in their asylum claims, the MF were forced to spend their resources 
assessing large numbers of asylum seekers, so having to cut back on the amount of 
therapeutic work they could do. From these examples, and those in the literature (as 
mentioned), it seems that any agency attempting to support and work with asylum seekers 
were constrained and shaped in certain ways by needing to work with or around the 
policy of ‘welfare as control’, again picking up the pieces and reinforcing the safety net. 
This makes answering the question of the most ethical path for Voluntary Sector agencies 
somewhat more hazy. Although an agency bound by funding and contract (or Grant 
Agreement) into providing specific services for another (such as the Home Office) would 
seemingly have less autonomy to decide what services to offer and how to operate them 
than one fundraising from other sources, if this latter type must shape its service 
provision around and use its resources supporting clients negotiate that policy system 
anyway, does it make a substantial ethical difference?  
 
Lipsky (1980) argued that efforts to change processing systems from within an 
organisation might not amount to the significant reform necessary to change harmful 
practices, and Cohen (2002) suggested Voluntary Sector organisations should refuse to 
co-operate with a system detrimental to the interests of asylum seekers, but what is the 
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evidence that attempting to bring about that refusal to co-operate can instigate the 
collapse of a policy (as Cohen suggested it would)? 
 
While the VS agencies such as RAP did not believe that refusing to co-operate with the 
1999 IAA would mean a restoration of social rights to asylum seekers, only a change of 
personnel to the private sector, there has been some evidence since this time that refusal 
to co-operate can lead to a Government stand-down, withdrawal or reform of harsh 
policies. After the 1999 IAA a RA branch in Liverpool closed its offices unable to cope 
with the exceptionally high demand of people dispersed there who were in trouble due to 
NASS failings (such as not receiving their vouchers), which action contributed to reviews 
and a regionalisation of a centralised NASS. Oxfam and other shops refusing to accept 
asylum seekers’ NASS-issued vouchers, helped bring about the collapse of that system. 
Both of these organisations’ actions seemed detrimental in the short term to asylum 
seekers seeking their services, but brought obvious long-term gains. Also, social workers 
have refused to co-operate with the 2004 legislation attempting to introduce the 
separating of children from parents into social services care after their asylum claims 
were refused, in attempt to induce them to return to their countries of origin, and this 
section of the Act has been abandoned. There is therefore some evidence that a case for 
non-cooperation from without, can force the government’s hand in abandoning pieces of 
asylum legislation and policy.  Although this research has explored one organisation in-
depth and in doing so has been able to generate some rich and revealing data, further 
research would be necessary (and interesting) with some of these other organisations in 
different positions to reveal a more general picture in the sense of the ‘wider universe’ 
RAP was one example of.  
 
10.4 RAP’s part as a ‘cog’ in the machinery of national ‘welfare as control’ dispersal 
 
However to consider this issue further, it is essential to place this research and the further 
questions it raises, in the wider context of the NASS dispersal system as a whole and in 
terms of some of the issues around Reception policies raised in Chapter 3, because RAP 
(and the other organisations like it and in a similarly contradictory position) was a 
discrete Reception element in a much bigger and more complex ‘machinery’ of asylum 
seeker ‘support’ and processing.  What conclusions can be made from this case study 
about the wider, national system of ‘welfare as control’ policy in practice? Although it 
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has been possible to explore how RAP’s position and practice of policy impacted on the 
everyday lives of asylum seekers while staying with RAP, in order to consider any longer 
term consequences of experiencing their Reception in these ways, it would be necessary 
to look beyond RAP’s Reception to see how it fits and feeds into the broader NASS 
system and welfare as control policy as a whole. This research has not followed up 
individual asylum seekers into their dispersal and beyond their stay with RAP, and 
therefore it is only possible to speculate on the impact of RAP’s contribution to their well 
being further on along the processes of asylum seeking and beyond, in general terms 
from the literature.  
 
Bommes and Geddes (2000:2) argued that the types of welfare an asylum seeker might 
receive in a country of asylum “mediate efforts by immigrants to realise their chances for 
social participation” and contribute towards “pave[ing] the[ir] social options.”  Also, 
Castles et al. (2003:126) suggested that, “Long-term outcomes may be influenced by early 
experiences” and those “with limited rights and opportunities may integrate in ways that 
lead to disadvantage and marginalisation.” Korac’s (2003) research demonstrated some 
of the differentiated ways the early experiences of ‘Reception’ of asylum seekers in Italy 
and Holland, paved their later social options and later experiences of integration in those 
societies.  As we have seen RAP were obliged to make it difficult for destitute asylum 
seekers to settle or stay in London and played a part in anormalising their lives by 
enforcing a cashless system and dispersal around the country. People seeking asylum 
differed in their resilience and ability to cope with this anormalised life in EA and in their 
contact or integration with social networks outside EA, as well as in their ability to 
demand or gain the support that they needed. How might their experience of Reception at 
RAP therefore, have paved the future social options of people seeking asylum travelling 
through it?     
 
There will obviously have been similarly variable experiences of life after dispersal, 
however it seems fair to say that the contradictory position of RAP during the research 
period, and the necessity for them to crisis manage and concentrate so much of their 
resources on negotiating the extremes of bureaucracy, meant their ability to prepare 
people adequately for this transition seemed severely compromised. My observations at 
RAP fit with other research that has found an immense paucity of information given to 
people about their dispersal regions, and between Reception agencies and NASS and 
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Local Authorities and agencies in dispersal regions about the needs of asylum seekers 
due to be dispersed into their care, (Robinson, et al., 2003). There is plenty of evidence 
that this has contributed to causing the experience of dispersal for many asylum seekers 
to be extremely distressing, with cases of severe isolation, inappropriate accommodation 
and seriously unmet special needs, as well as inadequate infrastructure (religious facilities 
and legal advisers) and racist victimisation, (ibid:145).  
 
The bureaucratic inefficiency of NASS particularly during the first few years of 
implementation, was not just evident at Reception but was continuous through the 
dispersal process, and there were numerous cases of people failing to receive vouchers to 
meet even their most basic needs, and even greater pressure on VS agencies and 
voluntary networks to ‘pick up the pieces,’ (Stansfield, 2001; Robinson et al. 2003). Also, 
the fact that the so-called ‘intelligent’ dispersal planned, instantly became a system based 
on expediency and accommodation availability rather than of grouping people in regions 
according to language, cultural and religious needs, caused obvious isolation and distress 
for inappropriately dispersed individuals. There has been a great deal of research around 
the many details of post-1999 IAA dispersal policy in practice, predominantly aimed at 
improving this practice, commissioned and conducted by agencies from the VS, 
Charitable Trusts (such as Wilson, 2001) and the Home Office (Audit Commission, 2000; 
Home Office, 2001). Some of this details examples of ‘excellent practice’, where the 
multi-agencies of Regional Consortia and newly forming organisations, agencies and 
networks including RCO’s have worked together, shared information and resources 
without over-duplication efficiently and effectively, in addressing the support and welfare 
needs of dispersed asylum seekers, (Wilson, 2001). There have also, of course, been 
many criticisms, particularly centring around the workings of NASS, its centralised 
decision-making and inefficiencies, including its failure to collect or distribute 
information on asylum seekers needs prior to dispersal, (Stansfield, 2001), which would 
have been the work of Reception Assistant Agencies, such as RAP. Some of the lead 
academics in the Forced Migration field were commissioned by the Home Office to 
research the workings of different aspects of the policy in 2001 (including Robinson, 
2001; Harvey, 2001; Johnson, 2001; Griffiths, 2001, all cited in Robinson et al, 2003), 
and then again in 2002 to research ways in which dispersal could be made more ‘efficient 
and effective’, (Zetter, et al., forthcoming and Robinson, forthcoming, cited in Robinson 
et al., 2003). Overall, this research has suggested that the NASS dispersal system has 
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improved to an extent, over time, and the fact of its commission suggests some 
willingness by the Home Office to make improvements, or at least to listen (or appear to 
listen) to  suggestions based on research evidence.  
 
For the purposes of understanding how RAP’s work in practice fitted into the wider 
system of NASS dispersal, the key factors from these pieces of research include the 
necessity for producing and sharing more and better information, both for asylum seekers 
about their dispersal regions and their rights and entitlements and about asylum seekers 
needs for agencies along the dispersal line to help facilitate better, adequate or even any 
provision of support, (Zetter, et al., forthcoming and Robinson, forthcoming, cited in 
Robinson, et al, 2003; Anie, Daniel, Tah and Petruckevitch, 2005). Zetter (forthcoming, 
cited in Robinson et al. 2003) stated that the system was over-centralised, overly 
bureaucratic, lacked a sense of coordination and partnership and that the systemic 
weaknesses impacted heavily on voluntary sector organisations and OSS. These 
conclusions fit with the picture of policy in practice found in this research. Zetter (cited 
in, ibid) also concluded that where dispersal was fully implemented as initially planned it 
worked well, consortia were effective bodies for implementing policy and there were 
examples of excellent practice, but that this was insufficiently widespread, and he made 
39 recommendations for improving the system.   
 
Wilson’s (2001) criticism that the practice of keeping people in EA in London for long 
period’s of time made their dispersal (in this case to West Yorkshire), when it did occur, 
particularly disruptive for them especially in relation to legal advice and schooling 
children, making it harder to settle once dispersed, is relevant to this research as well. As 
we have seen from the mother and daughter distressed to be dispersed because leaving a 
local supportive church community and school near RAP, and RAP’s policy of 
discouragement to parents to enrol children in schools locally, their practices had 
consequences for people further along their asylum seeking journey. Taking this longer 
view, RAP’s policy of discouragement to settling in London can be seen in two lights; as 
complying with NASS and the Home Office intent to prevent asylum seekers integration 
(and colluding with their forced, unwanted dispersal), but also as a way of protecting 
their clients from the distress of uprooting when the inevitable dispersal (beyond their 
control) did occur.  
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It can be deduced from these later pieces of research that asylum seekers dispersed on 
from RAP would have had very variable experiences dependent on the lottery of NASS’ 
fundamentally accommodation-led dispersal selection process and the quality of the 
services provided, dependent on which place and which formal Consortium and less 
formal development of agencies operated there, (Griffiths et al., 2005). Some would have 
met appallingly difficult circumstances, strongly maintaining their anormalised 
existences, others would have found some of the support structures they needed to enable 
the processes of reconstruction and settlement, especially if also gaining their refugee 
status, and undoubtedly many would have had very mixed experiences. It would seem 
that RAP’s contradictory position, (and that of other integral RAAs) compromised their 
ability to prepare their clients adequately for their forward journeys on dispersal (as well 
as their support during Reception) as it was not until early 2003 that they found the space 
and resources (combined with the initiative and drive of a particular worker) to begin 
producing information about dispersal regions to give to clients. RAP’s position also left 
them compromised in lacking the resources or expertise to conduct thorough needs 
assessments and to require NASS to share this information to enable agencies in dispersal 
regions to adequately support their clients with special needs. 
 
However, in considering this research in its wider national and policy context it is 
important to acknowledge and recognise its specific historical juncture. 2002-2003 was 
quite early on in the establishment of an entirely new Home Office bureaucracy and 
enormous national infrastructure of multi-agency regional consortia, and complex 
procedural and practical processes of dispersal (which involved the development and 
maintenance of the rights and controls in practice, of asylum seekers civic stratification). 
It could be argued therefore, that some of the factors compromising RAP’s ability to 
support their asylum seeking clients and the extremes of chaotic crisis management that 
obviously occurred before gaining extra resources for staff and restructuring, and 
immediately before the research period, were due to teething problems with the fairly 
‘young’ NASS’ system, which might be ironed out in time. 
 
 It could also be argued that the dispersal system as it had originally been designed, with 
a short period for orientation in Reception and EA before dispersal to a region based on 
language, pre-existing multi-ethnic communities and the availability of appropriate 
support services including increased expert VS involvement, and legal advisers, would 
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have been a generally tolerable and supportive process for asylum seekers waiting for the 
planned six month period for a verdict on their claims. Putting aside the explicit intent 
and inbuilt measures of deterrence, control, easing ‘community relations’ and, as 
Robinson et al., (2003) have highlighted, ‘burden sharing’, it could be argued that if the 
dispersal system had worked as planned, it might have been a creative and positive 
experience for both people seeking asylum and local communities benefiting from the 
enrichment of new multi-ethnic populations and encouraging national ‘ownership’ or 
responsibility for providing asylum to global refugees. Perhaps the Third Way design of 
‘modernised’ welfare with centrally controlled multi-sector, multi-agency co-ordination 
would form a dynamic machine of co-operatively functioning parts to support asylum 
seekers? After all, dispersal programmes for asylum seekers were typical throughout 
Europe, for instance in Holland, Sweden and Germany, (Robinson et al., 2003). In 
anticipation of these measures working as planned, it could be argued that VS 
organisations such as RAP were not choosing the compromising path Cohen (2002) 
argued they were, in participating so integrally with NASS. However, as one of RAP’s 
managers had said,  
 
Most of the difficulties are because the whole concept is…not very well thought 
through… The idea of centrally planning the arrival, reception, information, 
decision, accommodation for 70,000 asylum seekers from all over the world, 
with needs and what have you… it just speaks for itself really! It’s a mad 
concept! 
 
This and other warnings (Audit Commission, 2000) suggest that it was or should have 
been obvious to organisations like RAP and the RC and RA that the NASS system would 
not work as planned in practice, that this rushed through policy and giant piece of social 
engineering, seemingly more concerned with political expediency than practical success, 
was doomed to collapse in parts and cause considerable collateral damage in doing so (on 
top of the hardship it had planned to include).   
 
However, it seemed that the VS agencies, and perhaps particularly RAP as a solely 
Reception service, felt powerless in the face of a seemingly unstoppable government 
agenda to restrict access to territory and welfare, other than to offer a limited protection, 
alongside their implicit control role from within. On their entry at that time it seemed as 
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though there was a sense that ‘there is no alternative’ than to be dragged along by New 
Labour’s Third Way and immigration control agendas, trying to minimise human damage 
where possible. Towards the end of the research, RAP became increasingly concerned to 
have the capacity to diversify and so withdraw itself, having gained new strength and 
confidence to do so in their new shape, as the threat of becoming implicated in 
increasingly compromising legislation threatened their integrity further. However, during 
it this ethnography shows, RAP had become part of the ‘dispersed state’ operating 
internal control policies, with their ‘hands-tied’ with some welfare still intact. What then, 
might this research ‘say to’ this wider policy project of New Labour, of Third Way 
welfare in general? 
 
10.5  Welfare as Control as an experiment in ‘Third Way’ welfare   
 
It can be argued that the ‘qualitatively’ and radically new arrangements of support for 
destitute asylum seekers introduced by New Labour with the 1999 IAA, was the ultimate 
experiment in Third Way welfare design and practices. The government could afford to 
be this brashly experimental, introducing and constructing radically new institutional 
arrangements in a hurry because its policy objects were asylum seekers, with tentative 
claims to welfare rights in the eyes of a hostile electorate who would not problematically 
protest over any human ‘fall-out’ of these particular people, who in turn were not in a 
position to protest themselves. This was a giant piece of social engineering, possible 
because its welfare was mixed with and driven by principles of control.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3.4.2, the welfare provisions of the 1999 IAA enact New Labour’s Third Way or 
‘modernised’ (Home Office, 1998) design of ‘joined up’ government and a mixed 
economy welfare state of ‘partners’, based on communitarian principles stressing active 
citizenship, responsibility for oneself and one’s community and welfare independence, 
(Etzioni, 1993; Blair, 1998). Although New Labour has introduced Third Way welfare 
arrangements throughout its social policy, the infrastructure created since the 1999 IAA 
seems a particularly ‘gung-ho’ and radical example of these principles in practice.  
 
Initially this involved the regional Consortia of multi public, private and voluntary sector 
agencies expected to cooperate and joint-work to effectively and efficiently establishing 
the services and strategies to support dispersed asylum seekers in accordance with NASS 
policy. As structures and services were established over time and refugee and asylum 
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seeker communities developed, new organisations and networks sprung up at various 
relations to policy and government, variably across regions, and (as we have seen, 
Robinson et al, 2003) to varying degrees of ‘success’ in terms of efficiency and 
supportiveness to asylum seekers and integration with local populations. As noted and 
research shows, many of these ‘organisations’ have developed to ‘pick up the pieces’ 
from policy, sometimes independently struggling with no funding (Dwyer, 2005), and 
sometimes encouraged and funded by the Government to form in a particular way and 
fulfil specific functions, such as RCOs (Griffiths et al., 2005). Therefore civil society has 
been heavily incorporated in all its forms from individuals and the most loosely organised 
networks of individuals to the large formal Voluntary Sector organisations such as RAP 
and the RC, ‘factored in’ either by seemingly intentional default (for instance, 
government reference to the VS attracting volunteers), or by direct and fully funded 
design to provide services as government ‘partners’.  
 
These new types of relationships between the state, civil society and the private sector at 
local, regional and national levels have been explored and explained as a network of 
control by governance theorists, some of whom have argued that national state power has 
been dispersed and devolved, (Daly, 2003). However, many argue that the national state 
still retains significant (if dispersed) power in the process of policy implementation 
(Jessop, 1999; Clarke and Glendinning, 2002; Dwyer 2005). Dwyer (2005) found in his 
research, which uses a governance frame to understand social policy for forced migrants 
in dispersal regions that the ‘partnerships’ of the organisations and networks forming the 
‘dispersed state’ did not seem to enhance the welfare of forced migrants who were often 
forced into self-reliance, as the state retained ultimate power in its ‘separation and 
erosion’ of welfare.  
 
This research, by exploring in all its complexity how this Third Way welfare (as control) 
policy was lived out in practice with one integral Voluntary Sector ‘partner,’ may enable 
more general illumination of civil society, particularly Voluntary Sector, roles and 
involvement, in both Third Way welfare policies for forced migrants and in general. As 
we have seen, RAP’s example (which also resonates with other research; Robinson, et al 
2003) demonstrates the lack of ‘partnership’ in practice, and the ultimate, top-down and 
heavily constraining power of the national state, in the form of NASS (although some 
elements of this was inevitably due to its new and hurried formation). It also illuminates 
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the potential for necessary negotiation and compromising with and being compromised 
by other public and private sector agencies, in their position. This research also 
demonstrates the ethically and practically difficult position such VS agencies are placed 
in when agreeing to be integrally involved in Third Way (particularly welfare as control) 
policy and service delivery. The organisation and workers were obliged to take on the 
frontline ‘face’ of the state but as advocates both for state and client, their abilities to act 
as a protective ‘buffer’ from state policies and to enhance their clients welfare was 
severely limited, by their having become part of New Labour’s “technocratic force to 
implement its programme,” (Duvell and Jordan, 2000:30).  
 
Third Way emphasis on individuals’ independence from state welfare and the drive to 
take responsibility for oneself and one’s own could be witnessed on the ground, as 
debates and negotiations between and among workers and clients over beneficial levels of 
‘dependency’ and the empowerment of ‘independence’. These struggles were resonant of 
wider debates over the ideal ways of ‘helping’ people who were seeking asylum 
(Ch.3.1.4), as well as those around Third Way (and previously neo-liberal) aims and 
emphases on individual and community obligation, responsibility and independence from 
the state.  
 
My research suggests some possible conclusions about government use of the Voluntary 
(or Third) Sector in the delivery of Third Way welfare (as control) policy. This ultimately 
seemed a very clever move by the Government and to serve a number of purposes. 
Firstly, with the larger and more powerful VS organisations ‘onside’ and integrally 
involved and financially needing NASS, their power to protest was diminished, their 
resistance significantly strangled, and in their involvement the VS were arguably 
‘emasculated’ in their ability to fight the government for forced migrants rights. Like 
RAP, VS organisations of all shapes and sizes, in their differential involvement with the 
policy in practice were likely to be forced to use the majority of their resources in 
servicing the bureaucracy of the system and/ or picking up the pieces from it, (as Dwyer, 
2005, and Griffiths et al., 2005 have found). The Government seemed to have rightly 
predicted that when withdrawing and diminishing the social rights of asylum seekers, if 
the VS were involved, they would be compelled to try to increase these using their own 
voluntary, or attracting and seeking other (non-state funded) resources, as RAP did. The 
Government’s aim of “harnessing” (Home Office, 1998) the expertise of the Voluntary 
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Sector could be seen in practice as taming and tying the Sector up (both metaphorically 
and literally, in their resource utilisation), as well as utilising their expertise. But also, 
using an expert and welfare-focussed VS, as one RAP worker said, made them seem a 
“caring Government” to those who wished to protect and enhance asylum seekers social 
rights, including asylum seekers themselves.  
 
However, to the perceived as intolerant and hostile electorate, the Government’s use of 
the VS could be considered to appease feelings of hostility and injustice over welfare 
rights as it might seem (rightly to an extent) the funding for the minimal rights which 
existed came from the VS rather than national or local government, or the tax payer. 
Therefore the Government could play up to the electorate the harsh and control-oriented 
aspects of their policy, whilst playing up its ‘caring’ aspects to those protecting forced 
migrants rights. Cornelius and Tsuda (2004:42) have argued that some immigration 
policy is more liberal in practice than in rhetoric, as national states 
 
…tolerate – indeed, often create- large gaps between policies and policy 
outcomes in this area… Ineffective and ‘symbolic’ immigration control 
measures are thus perpetuated because they reduce the potential for a broad 
public backlash. 
 
Duvell and Jordan (2002:513) also suggest (at the time though in relation to the small 
number of forced removals and lack of counting those leaving willingly, not to welfare 
restrictions),  
 
The UK prides itself on being an open society and economy, with freedom and 
tolerance as its most widely shared values; in practice, this means that 
xenophobic political rhetoric is often combined with laissez-faire 
implementation… 
 
These conceptions were echoed in the words of a RAP worker who suggested that the 
Government introduced harsh measures such as Section 55 of the 2002 NIAA in order to 
appear ‘tough’ with the electorate, knowing they would be brought down in time by 
actions of the judiciary using Human Rights legislation (as S55 later was). It could be 
suggested that reinforcing the safety net was the intention of Government in its devising 
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of this Third Way structure of policy, by utilising the VS either by request or in the 
knowledge of likely voluntary or civil society ‘satellite’ movement in to provide 
protection and additional non-state funded services. This could be seen as both or either a 
more liberal policy in practice, in which the deterrent aspects of this policy were 
knowingly (but quietly) to be softened by humanitarian rather than profit motivated 
agencies involved, or as the state cutting back (in line with its broader welfare 
retrenchment), on its responsibility for welfare, and devolving the ‘dirty work’ of this 
particularly punitive policy, in a move that served several functions for the state, onto the 
Third Sector. 
 
Overall, it can be concluded that this research and the highlighting of the contradictory 
positioning in practice in all its complexity, of VS organisations implementing 
specifically ‘welfare as control’ but potentially other Third Way policy and service 
delivery, demonstrates some of the problems with this approach to social policy.  It might 
seem that co-opting the contributions of many different partners into a functionalist-type 
policy delivery ‘machine’ of many co-operating parts, would produce dynamic, creative 
and effective strategies and services utilising shared expertise and resources, and as 
several pieces of research have suggested, results like this can be at least the partial 
outcome of some Third Way welfare structures under certain conditions (Wilson, 2001; 
Zetter et al, forthcoming, cited in Robinson et al., 2003). However, this research also 
suggests that when the underlying policy agenda is fundamentally punitive and involves 
the restricting of social rights, and of deterrence and control, (which includes the ‘gung-
ho’ rush to push through a practically unworkable policy and implementation structure), 
then this Third Way welfare design more sinisterly hides some of these elements and ties 
civil society into fulfilling this agenda, so strangling their resistance to it. It would seem 
that the Third Way agenda for social inclusion through encouraging active involvement 
and citizenship in taking responsibility for welfare, ties civil society up in this instance 
into an agenda of social exclusion, can leave the welfare of those in need of humanitarian 
protection in the hands of those with minimal resources who may also be socially 
excluded, and can have a compromising effect on those involved agencies and 
individuals within them attempting to increase service users welfare.   This conclusion 
fits with Duvell and Jordan’s (2002:514),  
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These policies have direct effects for public sector and NGO workers involved 
in provision for asylum seekers and refugees. Intentionally deterrent conditions 
require services to be well below standards deemed suitable for citizens, and 
restrictions on liberty go beyond those tolerable, even under the tough new 
regimes applied to indigenous claimants. Issues of professional ethics, as well 
as wider considerations of social justice in a global context, are at stake for 
those who will staff services for asylum seekers and refugees all over Europe.  
 
This leads on to another possible contribution this research has made to a broader 
consideration of the issues it has raised.  
 
10.6  Engaging with ethics    
 
The highlighting of ‘welfare as control’ in this local setting may serve to illuminate some 
of the underlying power differentials (Ch 4.1.2), and encourage different ways of 
thinking about the issues and action to challenge injustices. Also, as O’Neill (2001) has 
argued, listening to the voices of people seeking asylum, and in this case also those 
others, the VS workers involved in and affected by ‘welfare as control’,  
 
…encourages us to engage with ethics, with people similar to our ‘selves’, within 
a moral order based on thinking and feeling and compassion. Thus, precluding 
the possibility of objectifying, classifying and categorising as faceless, nameless 
and less than our ‘selves’, and may inspire praxis instead of adopting a 
‘bystander’ role, (O’ Neill, 2001:18). 
 
I have attempted, as far as is possible as an ‘inside outsider’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
(1995) not doing participative research, to understand the ‘points of view’ (Bourdieu, 
1999) and take up ‘standpoints’ (Smith, 2005) alongside these ‘expert knowers’ in their 
everyday worlds, and to see it or re-present it as they have, to an extent. I have aimed not 
to ‘obliterate’ “the presence of subjects as knowers situated in their own lives,” (Smith, 
2005:36), and to recognise them as experts in their life ‘fields’, despite having used an 
interpretive framework to understand their positions and everyday worlds as part of a 
wider (‘extended,’ Burawoy, 2000) social ‘field.’ Listening to the voices of these expert 
knowers, these people similar to our ‘selves’, might encourage engagement with ethics 
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‘based on thinking and feeling and compassion’, enabling identification with them in the 
situations they are in, which might, in turn, encourage ‘praxis’ of some kinds. Also, in 
itself, the re-presenting of these usually hidden voices attempts to re-dress some power 
imbalances (if in a small way), to the effects of the dominant, powerful discourses found 
particularly in the media.  
 
As well as encouraging an engagement with ethics by listening to the voices of people 
seeking asylum, this research has participated in engaging with the complex and difficult 
ethical dilemmas it has raised, evident in the contradictions and competing interests, for 
instance, of the particularist national interest sovereignty and the universalist recognition 
of global human rights, of the exclusionary and inclusionary aspects of citizenship and 
the further complexities of recent civic stratification. This research has highlighted the 
ethical dilemmas governments, politicians and policy writers grapple with when devising 
policies. It has particularly highlighted the dilemmas of potential organisations then faced 
with dilemmas over their involvement with such policies and how to manage the 
subsequent contradictions in their roles, to balance competing interests and to distribute 
their resources fairly, and also the individuals working within those over their most 
ethical courses of daily and longer-term action. People seeking asylum also face ethical 
and practical dilemmas over how to present themselves, how to best protect their 
families, whether to be assertive or meek in ascertaining their rights, who to trust, how to 
negotiate with the bureaucracies and systems that treat them as guilty until proved 
innocent, for instance. In focussing on these contradictions that involve engaging with 
ethics for the subjects of study, this research (and this researcher) has engaged and 
attempted to grapple with these ethical dilemmas itself and so aims to encourage further 
engagement with the ethics of the field, in academic research and study, by those directly 
involved with it, and especially those with the power to change it. It is hoped that, at 
least, by firmly highlighting (though in all its complexity) that social policy for asylum 
seekers is and how it is Welfare as Control, this research might encourage more thought 
and engagement with the issues it has raised, and attempts to find more ethical and just 
solutions to dilemmas around receiving asylum seekers, than the ones described here. 
 
By illuminating the everyday difficulties of those experiencing these policies as welfare 
providers and receivers and the complexity of the policies in practice, as well as the 
underlying and broader influences conditioning ‘welfare as control’, this research has 
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raised more questions that could be addressed by those who are experts in the field, and 
by doing further research. Academic research of this sort has a particular place, and as 
stated earlier, the research is not intended to be an evaluation of policy, accepting 
problematic definitions of policy makers, that gives a series of recommendations 
designed to solve a particular policy problem (Castles, 2003). However it seems 
important, having drawn some broader conclusions from the research, to return to the 
questions raised by Cohen (2002), Duvell and Jordan (2000), and Lipsky (1980) and 
attempt to answer these again. It also seems important, in light of the research as a whole, 
to suggest some possible ways forward. 
 
10.7  Moving on – thinking forward 
 
 
The biggest ethical dilemma raised and explored in this research is that facing the 
Voluntary (and Third) Sector (although it is also relevant to public sector agencies and 
workers) over the type and level of their involvement in the face of Third Way policy 
agendas, but particularly this Government’s agenda to modify a system of welfare into a 
system of immigration control. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, internal immigration 
controls infiltrate many aspects of welfare delivery, and not just that designed for people 
seeking asylum, and therefore agencies and individuals may be potentially compromised 
in their long term and daily work and will need to reflect ethically on their involvement. 
To return to the question at the end of Chapter 9, in the light of all the evidence and 
exploration of the issues this research has given, should RAP (and the other organisations 
like it) have agreed to co-operate with the Government to operate and maintain their 
Reception Assistant Service? Was this ‘too low,’ as Duvell and Jordan (2000) have put 
it? It is still immensely difficult to pass judgement on this question. As this research has 
shown, this is an extremely complex area and the ethical dilemmas multiple. It is still not 
clear what might have happened if these VS organisations had refused to co-operate. As 
we have seen, there is some evidence that their resistance might have forced a positive 
change in restoring asylum seekers rights. However, without a sea change in political and 
public attitudes towards asylum migration, therefore little perceived public support for 
this at the time, this seems an unlikely outcome. What is more a failure of the policy 
might have caused a right-wing media backlash and therefore the Government seeking a 
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more authoritarian solution, than even the fears of the VS that private sector organisations 
would have been used in its place.  
 
It can be argued, just on the basis of the known suffering and hardships the Welfare as 
Control system did cause individuals and families (some of which this research bears 
witness to), that VS and welfare agencies should not have had any involvement in 
perpetuating and so legitimising this policy (as was Cohen’s, 2002, position). However, 
although the position of an organisation such as RAP was obviously compromising, to 
assess just how compromising it was would need consideration of the wider 
consequences of the system as a whole. For instance, it is not clear what the long-term 
outcomes of this particular dispersal policy might be for people who go through it, 
although past research would suggest that ‘anormalising’ and withholding the right and 
the facilities to integrate early on, contributes to later marginalisation if asylum seekers 
are granted refuge. There seems to be mixed evidence over the relative harms versus 
benefits (Robinson, et al., 2003) being dispersed and living on minimal subsistence might 
cause, in the long term. There is also mixed evidence over just how safe or unsafe the 
safety-net was, even when patchily reinforced by the best efforts of civil society. My 
research alone shows that some fell through the gaps, and it seems these were more likely 
to be the most vulnerable and those the Government might have considered the most 
‘genuine’ and had stated the safety-net was designed to catch. Further and wider afield, 
the evidence suggests the safety-net seemed very variable and dependent on the lottery of 
where a person might end up in it, and whether its civil society reinforcers had the 
resources, and the autonomy and space from central Government to fill the gaps. 
 
In a sense, the most I can hope to have done in this research is to have highlighted some 
of these complexities and problems by having explored, from a new angle, previously 
unexplored lived experiences of them. I am not an expert asylum seeker, VS or welfare 
practitioner, nor writer of policy nor politician and it is inevitable that each of these 
experts from their positions and with their expertise would find gaps and provisos and 
wish to raise new questions and arguments in answer to this research. Each of these 
experts is also likely to be in a better position, with their expertise, to devise some 
creative and workable solutions to some of the problems raised. However, I suggest that 
it is important that research which attempts to be “publicly useful” in the way Castles 
(2003) has laid out, is considered and may change ideas of what exactly the problems are, 
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when experts in the field attempt to find more longer term, and also more just solutions. 
Having said this, I will make some suggestions from my position as a student sociologist 
and student ethnographic researcher, on the basis that I have aimed in this research to be 
reflexive and transparent about my position and interpretive frame and have aimed to 
produce more rather than less truthlike knowledge, (Danermark et al., 1997).  
 
To return to Cohen’s (2002) charge. Should VS organisations such as RAP have refused 
to go ‘in’ with the Government’s policy? I would suggest that VS agencies like RAP had 
good intentions but were naïve (and arguably for good reasons) in deciding to enter into 
Grant Agreement with NASS. I would argue that perhaps RAP and the other VS 
organisations could have joined forces and together have held out for longer to try to at 
least slow the policy down (if they were unable to collapse it, which they may have been 
able to do) and force proper preparation for such a massive operation to take place in a 
way that was able to support asylum seekers and enhance their welfare more. As stated, it 
seemed obvious that the way it had been planned and rushed into action in political haste 
strongly indicated the likely problems the system did encounter (and its policy objects 
would therefore suffer from), as the Government’s own Audit Commission (2000) had 
warned. However, this ignores the explicit intent of the policy as a mechanism of 
immigration control, which was the main focus of the charge Cohen (2002) brought 
against such organisations’ ‘collusion’ with the 1999 IAA. He argued that the ‘support’ 
provisions of the Act were “directly antagonistic” to asylum seekers’ interests (ibid:142). 
If this premise is accepted, as raised earlier, surely it does make an ethical difference 
whether organisations operated the system from within, enforcing its deterrent aspects 
(such as no-choice dispersal and minimal living standards), than if it operated from 
without, following an independent welfare agenda but being constrained and curtailed in 
it by NASS (such as the MF). However, as we have seen, in such circumstances RAP was 
unlikely to have been able to continue in its existence as Refugee Arrivals Project and its 
many workers (many of whom were refugees) may have lost their jobs. Therefore a 
strong partnership with broader-based VS agencies might have been able to carry them 
into finding a new role. These are tentative speculations. What seems more certain, taking 
this research as a whole, is that the VS and civil society needs to become much more alert 
to and aware of the potential dangers of ‘partnership’ with the state.  
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My research would suggest that organisations such as RAP and the other RSAs, and 
indeed the Voluntary Sector, and looser elements of civil society generally, need to take a 
longer view, become less naïve, more ethically reflective and politically astute, mobilised 
and aware of the potential problems they may face when participating in Third Way 
welfare. This seems necessary in order for them to assess their ethical positions and 
generate the resources, where necessary, to resist government agendas that may be 
extremely compromising to their values, integrity and most importantly, their ability to 
protect their clients’ rights. As the organisation of welfare generally becomes more 
designed around Third Way governance, these issues are likely to become more rather 
than less salient, suggesting that the ‘Third Sector’ will be under more pressure to operate 
‘within’ the dispersed state. This necessitates their development of new methods of 
resistance to policies that are as double-edged, and potentially harmful to those whom 
they exist to protect as this one, and civil society will need to find new ways of building 
power to shape policy ‘from below’. It seems that this Third Way, and ‘active 
citizenship’ inclusiveness can mask hidden and very powerful underlying central 
Government agendas which may, (but also, it has to be said, may not as Cohen, 2002, 
assumes in terming the Government, ‘the devil’) be antagonistic to their policy objects’ 
interests, and suggests that extra vigilance and awareness is necessary.  Statham’s (2005) 
research suggests that there is some hope in that although British governments dominate 
and shape public discourse on asylum, which comes more from the top-down than in 
response to public pressure, it is pro-asylum civil society actors which are organised and 
dominate civil society political action in the field: 
 
Counter to the ‘racist public’ thesis, our findings show that to the extent that 
they get involved, civil society actors do so with a pro-migrant stance. The main 
challenge to the British state’s anti-migrant stance comes form specific pro-
migrant NGOs (16.7%…) and human rights and welfare NGO’s (4.7%…). 
Taken together, these NGOs account for six tenths of all civil society demands 
(57.9%) and have a highly pro-migrant position, (Statham, 2005:6). 
 
Statham (2005:6) argues that on this basis, if a Government with a large electoral 
majority were to take “a more pro-migrant stance on asylum politics, and emphasised 
Britain’s obligations to asylum-seekers,” they would not necessarily lose public support 
to those promoting anti-asylum sentiments.  He suggests that if a Government were to 
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change its stance in this way, civil society groups may be in a better position in taking 
financial and legitimising support from Government to create “a buffer zone against any 
potential xenophobic political entrepreneurs. To achieve such a situation, the government 
could remain publicly quieter on asylum, and try to manage the objective problems away 
from the public domain” (ibid: 6). However, Statham (2005) concludes that the 
Government’s restrictive stance seems unlikely to change soon.  
 
This leads on to questioning the initial policy agenda of New Labour (and previous 
Conservative governments, governments across Europe, and the EU). It has been well 
established and verified in research, that people migrating to claim asylum 
overwhelmingly do not base their decisions about which country to migrate to (if they 
make a decision), on the relative welfare provisions they might find there (Audit 
Commission, 2000; Robinson and Segrott, 2002; Robinson et al., 2003). Robinson et al., 
(2003:127) found that few asylum seekers had much prior knowledge of their 
entitlements to UK benefits, fewer still knew how these compared to other countries, 
most expected to have to fend for themselves, earn their own living and find their own 
accommodation, and none interviewed in late 2000 to early 2001 knew about the UK’s 
dispersal system. It seems that this premise for the policy was based more on, as Geddes 
(2000:167) put it, the potent “myth” of “the immigrant welfare scrounger.”  Just based 
on the evidence from the numbers, it is clear that cutting welfare benefits to asylum 
seekers has a very limited deterrent effect. After the 1996 AIA, there was only a very 
transient change in the numbers of people coming to the UK, and 60% of people 
continued to make in-country claims despite being offered no welfare assistance, (Audit 
Commission, 2000). After the 1999 IAA, the numbers of asylum seekers arriving at UK 
ports and claiming overall, increased dramatically to peak in 2002-2003 (the year of my 
research), from when they have steadily begun to fall. The reasons for this fall are likely 
to be multiple and complex, but the evidence suggests they are unlikely to include the 
deterrent effect of Welfare as Control.  
 
As well as being based on one false premise, Robinson et al. (2003) suggest another of 
the Government’s motivations for introducing the dispersal system, that of  ‘burden 
sharing’ by supposedly spreading the cost of asylum seekers to local infrastructures (with 
the 1999 IAA in the UK this was away from London and the South East), is also of 
dubious efficacy. He argues that the dispersal system as it stands in Britain is based-on 
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very short-term, non-evidence based decision making over areas chosen, is 
assimiliationist in intentions and is inherently more expensive overall than allowing 
asylum seekers to ‘cluster’ in places of their choosing. Allowing people to choose where 
they lived from a carefully chosen selection of places known to have the resources and 
support systems conducive to their needs, would not only be more ethical but more 
practical for the Government. Leading geographer in the field and researcher for the 
Home Office, Robinson (2003:171) argues that the concept of ‘spreading the burden’ of 
asylum seekers is based more on media-stimulated moral panics, that seek to “protect the 
purity of national and local space,” than on evidence-based policies which suggest 
dispersal ‘works’ well for either local populations or asylum seekers. 
 
Both of these seemingly dubious premises for introducing the Welfare as Control 
dispersal system uncover what seem the overwhelmingly political motivations based on 
misconceptions and misperceptions of asylum seeking (and other) migration as a problem 
and crisis, as a threat and “mass invasion” (Sassen, 1999:2). Ultimately, it seems that 
these misperceptions must be changed, and policies based on better understandings of the 
global dynamics of forced migration, of global responsibilities and so emphasising 
welfare rather than control.   
 
Other than an overthrow of the entire system of Control oriented Welfare in the particular 
shape of dispersal, my research suggests some possible improvements to current 
arrangements. The denial of autonomy to people in Reception over their everyday lives 
and in choice over their dispersals was found to cause distress and curtail human dignity 
and is criticised by others, including Robinson et al. (2003:154) who argue, 
 
…the policy disempowers the asylum seeker and removes a basic human right. 
Despite obvious practical difficulties, there is a strong ethical argument that all 
dispersal policies should incorporate an element of informed choice and there 
are powerful and practical reasons for allowing asylum seekers some choice 
over their own destiny. 
 
The practical reasons Robinson et al. (2003) refer to here include the fact that people who 
have been denied all choice, and forced to live in a region they are unhappy or isolated in, 
have migrated again (secondary migration) back to cities where they have connections or 
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feel more comfortable. This was wide-scale in past dispersal programmes, and has 
occurred to a lesser extent since the 1999 IAA (although Griffiths et al. [2005:210] point 
out in the context of their research on developing refugee communities and RCOs that 
there have also been significant numbers of people who have stayed in dispersal regions 
following a positive decision on their claim).  
 
Again my research fits with Robinson et al.’s (2003) in that it highlights the need for 
much more and much better information for asylum seekers and about asylum seekers. In 
the former case, people need information about dispersal regions and much greater clarity 
about their rights and entitlements, and in the latter case, information sharing between 
agencies based on thorough needs assessments is needed in order that they may properly 
prepare and be resourced to address the specific needs of people dispersed. The evidence 
suggests that a short Reception period to assess newly arrived asylum seekers’ needs and 
provide an orientation and more assisted period was beneficial, and as RAP (2002) 
documentation stated a quality service at Reception could, “enhance people’s ability to 
survive”.  However, as found at RAP, this would involve radical systemic change to 
ensure that the Reception period was short and of quality, rather than months long, 
designed as deterrence and under-resourced. Reception should be based on evidence that 
listens to people who have experienced it and based on how it has enhanced their ability 
to survive and thrive in this or any country of refuge.  
 
Ultimately this research points to a need for radical change of thinking about Forced 
Migration and migration in general. It would seem that policies such as this 1999 IAA 
Welfare as Control, are grounded in false premises based on false theories and 
understandings of migrations and are heavily motivated politically to appease the 
perceived electorate’s misperceptions of asylum seeking. To refer back to Chapter 2.6, 
Government’s, such as Britain’s, have allowed a particularist agenda to dominate any 
universalist solution. There has been a perceptible change in the UK Government’s (and 
also variably among EU member states) attitude to and moderated promotion of specific 
economic migration, particularly since the 2002 NIAA, which introduced ‘Managed 
Migration’ (Duvell and Jordan, 2002; Griffiths et al., 2005). This does not seem to have 
spread to asylum seeking, although the shrinking numbers of arrivals deflate the 
perceived political need, and, as Duvell and Jordan (2002) point out, the former attitude 
is motivated by economic and labour market priorities, whereas approaches to the latter 
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are based around the ‘modernisation’ of welfare states and continued restriction, as well. 
In the UK, there has also been some change in approach to those granted refugee status 
since the 2002 NIAA and the ‘Integration Matters’ agenda introduced in 2004 (Griffiths 
et al., 2005). However, asylum seekers are still very much separated in terms of social 
rights and attitudes towards them, and still considered ‘guilty’ until proved innocent. 
There are more people being detained, including more children, and there is a greater 
emphasis on reaching targets for forced removals. Asylum seekers within the NASS 
system are taking increasing responsibility (such as sharing their accommodation) for a 
growing strata of forced migrants who have not been granted leave to remain, but for 
many reasons cannot or choose not to return. When comparing themselves to these 
migrants with no social rights to meet even their most basic needs, those within the 
NASS system are counting themselves lucky, (Dwyer and Brown, 2005). 
 
I argue that it is an ethical duty of the Government to take responsibility for properly 
informing and educating the electorate on the facts and realities around asylum seeking, 
such as the reasons and causes why people migrate, ensuring that it is understood that 
asylum seekers are exercising their legal and human rights to seek asylum. Considering 
the New Labour Government’s adeptness at media ‘spin’ and manipulation, positive 
media campaigns around asylum issues (which every piece of research into asylum policy 
stresses is essential to ensure just treatment of asylum seekers and understanding among 
local populations to ease two-way integration), should be more than possible. Welfare 
policy should be considered as a means to enhance people’s protection rather than control 
their migration. This of course includes stressing the benefits asylum seekers bring to a 
country, a society and a locality (which are publicised to some extent for people granted 
refugee status). Although what a person can contribute is not just economic, as 
Moorehead (2006:289) has pointed out, a more ethical stance includes acceptance that 
not all people will contribute to the economy,  
 
It has to be accepted that not all asylum-seekers will ever contribute anything to 
the West’s economy: some will be too frail, too damaged, too inflexible to 
achieve a productive life. But to rail at that is to misunderstand the nature of 
asylum, because asylum in the end is not only about responsibility and 
interdependence but about morality; in an age of globalisation, it is simply not 
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possible to ignore the world’s dispossessed. How a state deals with its refugees 
should be a measure of its social and political health.  
 
This last statement echoes with that made by Rabbi Hugo Gryn, quoted in the 
introduction. It is time to reinstate the ‘innocence’ of the asylum seeker. Robinson (2003) 
talks of this as re-legitimising asylum seeking.  
 
I also argue that the ethics of how nations should respond to the migrations of people 
seeking their asylum is the responsibility of all citizens (and inhabitants), not just their 
governments, and in a globalising world, national citizens need to look beyond national 
boundaries at their global responsibilities for solutions to the type of ethical dilemmas 
this research raises. This points towards encouraging and nurturing global citizenship, 
which would involve promoting understanding of the types of interconnectedness of 
nation-states, of processes of globalisation, including as Sassen (1998:xxxi) argued, that 
“major immigration countries are not passive bystanders in their immigration histories.” 
(As could be directly witnessed on the ground at RAP in the effects the British 
Government’s policies to prevent the forced migration of Zimbabweans, and historical 
relations with that country, had on the individuals seeking asylum and RAP workers 
attempting to receive them). But also, moving towards building global citizenship would 
involve efforts to dissolve borders of responsibility (and rights), and towards developing 
new concepts of global belonging. Sassen (1999:6) suggests one new way of 
understanding migrations in this era of globalisation, 
 
…I call immigrants and refugees ‘today’s settlers’ to indicate that old concepts 
of belonging do not fit present realities. Migrations are acts of settlement and 
habitation in a world where the divide between origin and destination is no 
longer a divide of Otherness, a world in which borders no longer separate 
human realities. 
 
Developing global citizenship should involve education and would encourage action at a 
local level to develop creative and positive responses and interaction with people who are 
forced migrants, but also encourage ownership and responsibility towards finding 
solutions to the immense global inequities and processes which have caused people to try 
to find exile. There are many efforts to begin such a program and to suggest conceptual, 
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philosophical and practical ways forward, which could be tapped into and developed. 
Castles and Davidson (2000:209) suggest multi-cultural citizenship within nation-states 
has been a move in this direction, but should be considered just a “stop-gap,” and supra-
regional (such as European) citizenship, which is also necessarily multi-cultural, 
encourages more than just national notions of belonging. They also discuss UN projects 
for global citizenship, the importance of new global civic values and civic education, but 
suggest that there is much work to be done,  
 
…despite the thinness of global citizenship… some set of values greater than 
those demanded of a nation-state citizen is clearly required. The major 
problems of the twenty-first century – migration, pollution, crime, global 
epidemics – will be uncontrollable within nation-states.  These are issues that 
cannot be coped with by a Periclean citizen ready to defend his or her national 
patrimony, even if it is democracy or human rights. The warrior-citizen is not 
enough if it means no more than a defence of what is ours against the Other. 
 
Castles and Davidson (2000) stress the need for realism when working towards a global 
citizenship, that huge structural changes would also need to occur. 
 
Lister (1997:57) also discusses and gives suggestions for developing a global citizenship, 
which embraces feminism, especially ideas of a multi-layered citizenship, “operating on 
several frontiers from the local to the global, in which people can express multiple and 
overlapping identities.”  Such a global citizenship should stress the inclusionary rather 
than exclusionary side of the citizenship ‘coin’, and should be underpinned by notions of 
rights and responsibilities. This should include a project towards distributive justice and a 
more equitable sharing of global resources, and Lister (1997:58) quotes Doyal and Gough 
(1991:294) who argue that those living in the developed world, as beneficiaries of the 
world order, have “a duty to participate in some way in organisations with feasible 
strategies for challenging those world politico-economic structures which deny millions 
their most basic needs.” 
 
Lister (1997) argues that the concept of a multi-layered global citizenship could free 
citizenship from the nation-state but also recognise its continuing power 
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…to delineate and control the boundaries of exclusion. Such boundaries will 
always operate to some extent in a world of scarcity… The challenge then is 
how to use international human rights law and the development of an 
infrastructure of global citizenship to substitute a more just ‘order of inclusions 
and exclusions’, in the name of global citizenship rights and responsibilities, 
(Lister, 1997:63) 
 
The principles Lister (1997:64) promotes towards such a global citizenship, she suggests 
should be regulated by international powers able to ensure nation-states are held to 
account on them and govern admission and membership at a national level. Although 
international human rights laws (including of course the Geneva Convention) already 
exert pressure on nation-states from above, the regulation and enforcement of these 
would need to improve significantly, Lister suggests, as well as their being added to. The 
principles Lister suggests are,  “non-discrimination… observance of basic human rights 
…autonomous legal status… internationalism… transculturalism… democracy,” all of 
which, she argues are important for an ethical response to refugees and asylum seekers. 
She suggests (as have others) an important role for global civil society in developing and 
demanding greater and better global citizenship. Which brings us back to this research. 
This ethnography revealing a complex and contentious setting where human individuals 
were at the heart of and experienced the global, national and local contradictions and 
social relations implicit within it, gives no easy answers. However, answers must be 
sought and this research suggests the important role each of us and each civic 
organisation has in the development of a better world for all, the necessity to engage with 
ethics and work out real, practical solutions, and to fight for change.  
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